In February, Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement fashioned its own version of Egypt’s Liberation (Tahrir) Square, bringing the spirit of Arab rebellion to the tiny, oil-rich Gulf country.
The site of the protest encampment is a traffic roundabout in the commercial district of the capital, Manama. The fountain at its center, a pearl held up by six arms representing the Gulf countries, was built to honor the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
A month later, that same council authorized the deployment of a joint force – under the command of Saudi Arabia – to support the Bahraini government in its escalating domestic dispute. The very next day, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa imposed martial law, and Bahraini forces cleared the protesters from the roundabout in a haze of tear gas, fire and lethal buckshot.
The council’s decision to send troops is a momentous one.
The GCC was established in 1981 as an economic and defense compact, drawn together by common fears over the emerging Islamic government in neighboring Iran. More recently, the GCC has been focused on economic integration, with four of its members proceeding with plans for a monetary union.
The Bahrain intervention returns the GCC to its security mantle, but with a twist. Instead of defending the state from foreign aggression (as the military pact specifies), the GCC force is protecting a monarch from a domestic uprising – the first time the forces have been deployed this way.
The alarming turn of events spells bad news for the cause of democracy in Bahrain, for reform in the Gulf, and ultimately for the stability the monarchs seek to ensure. Most disturbing for the United States, it also expands what had heretofore been a local conflict, and it injects a dangerous sectarianism with international implications. Both of these factors work to the benefit of the Tehran hard-liners that the United States – with its Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain – is trying to contain.
The primary mission of the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force is to protect strategic sites. But, in reality, they are there to strengthen the ruling family’s resolve for a military solution to the crisis. The arrest of political leaders, many of them released from prison only a week ago, leaves few partners for the negotiation of a political settlement.
Ebrahim Sharif, the leader of the centrist, cross-sectarian democracy movement al-Waad, is now in jail. The main Shia Islamist opposition, al-Wefaq, has resigned its representation in the parliament and seems to be shifting from engagement to a strategy of peaceful resistance. Their leader, Sheikh Ali Salman, struck an MLK-like tone, arguing they need only endurance: “With our peacefulness and values, we are deepening the moral and political crisis of this regime and hastening its defeat.”
Yet after the brutal crackdown on mostly peaceful protesters and the assault on Shia villages by state-sponsored thugs, the patient strategy of al-Wefaq may have less appeal, particularly among the young and disenfranchised. The presence of the foreign troops exacerbates the problem by reinforcing the hard-liners’ conviction that Al-Khalifa’s government cannot be trusted.
The reigning Bahraini narrative already paints the Sunni-led government as "outsiders" who rely on foreign mercenaries and dilute the "native" Shia population through strategic naturalization of Sunnis from neighboring countries. The import of foreign troops only validates their viewpoint, and it will convince many more that political freedoms will come only with the monarchy’s demise.
The political repercussions extend beyond Bahrain, implicating the entire Gulf in a stand against the Arab uprising. The Gulf has chosen the role of defenders of order, and it has now sanctioned force – not just the use of petrodollars – to achieve that end. This strategy may work in the short term, but it is unlikely to hold against the growing economic and political demands of their youthful populations.
If the democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia turn out well, the Gulf will look increasingly out of step with the hopes and ambitions of Arab people. One sign of this can be seen in the defection of Kuwait – the Gulf’s most democratic state – from the GCC force dispatched to Bahrain.
Compounding this formula for medium-term instability is the dangerous tactic used by the monarchies to build support for the crackdown: fear of Iran and all things Shia. Sectarian tensions have already been on the rise in the Gulf since the U.S. intervention in Iraq unwittingly empowered the Shia majority there. The corresponding rise of anti-Shia Islamist movements is dangerously polarizing. Inflaming these communal tensions – which exist in most of the Gulf countries and beyond – hardly qualifies as a recipe for stability.
Ironically, the decision by the Al-Khalifa government may be opening the door for the very Iranian influence they fear. As U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates cautioned, Iran did not start the Bahraini unrest but there is evidence that they are looking to exploit it.
By inviting in troops, the Al-Khalifa government took the first step to broadening the conflict beyond the national context. While a direct intervention is highly unlikely, frustrated Shia people may be more receptive to Iranian support. Ultimately, the best insulation from Iranian influence lies in more fully integrating Shia people into their respective national projects.
Today, the Pearl Roundabout – a symbol of Bahrain’s democracy movement – is cleared of protesters. And in an absurd turn, the Bahraini government – aided by the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Forces – has dismantled the monument that once stood at its center.
Could this action to prop up a neighboring monarchy be undermining the GCC’s own foundations? Time will tell, but one thing is clear: Containing the mounting demands for reform will not be as easy as destroying the fountain built in their honor.
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