Tuesday, August 24, 2021
Census shows Ahmadi Muslim population on the decline in Pakistan
https://www.rabwah.net/census-ahmadi-population-decline-pakistan/
How the Taliban's Afghanistan takeover could hurt US-Pakistan ties
NATO has said Pakistan has a "special responsibility" to make sure Afghanistan lives up to its international commitments. But some Pakistanis say they refuse to be the "scapegoats" of the West's failure in Afghanistan.The fall of Kabul to the Taliban has left many people in Pakistan questioning their country's future relations with the US. Some hard-liners in Pakistan say Washington will blame Islamabad for the Islamic fundamentalist group's takeover of Afghanistan. Pakistan's Human Rights Minister Shireen Mazari wrote an article on Tuesday asserting that "her country would no longer accept being scapegoated for the failures of others." Bill Emmott, former editor-in-chief of The Economist, wrote last week in a commentary for Project Syndicate that "the blame" for failure in Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban "lies largely with Pakistan and America's inability to bring the country onside." Pakistan is said to be the largest backer of the cloistered group of the Taliban whose regime was recognized by Islamabad when they governed Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Husain Haqqani, the South and Central Asia director at the Hudson Institute — a Washington-based think tank — says Pakistan's past role in Afghanistan has always created friction between Washington and Islamabad. "Most Americans believe Pakistan's consistent support enabled the Taliban to succeed," Haqqani told DW. "There is resentment against Pakistan's role in Afghanistan which may not help improve US-Pakistan ties in the near future," he added. Waning interest for Pakistan Pakistan in the past relied heavily on the US military and financial assistance, with some estimates suggesting that the country may have received over $30 billion (€25.5 billion) from Washington since 2001. Islamabad also received generous aid packages and financial assistance during the Cold War when it was a close ally of the US. But Haqqani says there is very little support in Washington "for resuming large-scale economic or military assistance for Pakistan right now." Author Ayesha Siddiqa believes Washington has "lost interest" in Islamabad. Pakistan has always sought funds and military assistance from the US, but such support would no longer be on the cards, Siddiqa told DW. "The ties are already strained and there is a sanction-like situation with Pakistan being in the grey list of FATF (Financial Action Task Force)," she added. The China factor Defense analyst General Amjad Shoaib says Pakistan's close ties with China have also strained Washington-Islamabad relations. Pakistan has sought a strategic partnership with China, throwing support behind the Belt and Road Initiative, Shoaib told DW, adding that the move particularly did not go down well with Washington. The US still has many supporters in Afghanistan, he says, predicting that the war-torn country would be used against Pakistan by "pampering" Baloch insurgents who would target Chinese interests in Pakistan. According to Haqqani, the US and Pakistan have very different foreign policy strategies, and so will have to find a new basis. "Pakistan has made the strategic choice of aligning with China while the US seems to have chosen India as its strategic partner in the region. With tactical cooperation relating to Afghanistan diminishing, the relationship will have to find a new basis," he told DW. Pakistan's 'special responsibility' NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on Friday told reporters that Pakistan "has a special responsibility to make sure that Afghanistan lives up to its international commitments" and does "not once again become a safe haven for international terrorists." "A stable Afghanistan is in the interest of all countries and not least the neighbors as Pakistan," he said at the press conference. According to Haqqani, "Any evidence of international Jihadi groups becoming active again will also result in sanctions against Afghanistan which has implications for Islamabad as well." But for Amjad Shoaib, the US could use the "pretext" of human rights and the presence of international terror groups to blackmail Pakistan. The defense analyst questioned why such groups were not eliminated during NATO's 20-year-long occupation. Disruptions to Pakistan's economy Economist Azra Talat Saeed warns that deteriorating Washington-Islamabad relations would have a catastrophic impact for Pakistan. Saeed also believes the US will use its leverage against Pakistan. "The US and its allies will make it more and more difficult for us (Pakistan) to access funds," she told DW, adding that the country is at risk of economic chaos like Iran and Venezuela. Saeed believes that Washington will pressure Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to "create problems for Pakistani workers" and cause crucial remittances to plummet. "This would be very devastating for our economy," she said. The coronavirus pandemic has already dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's economy, prompting the closure of over 55,000 small businesses, rendering more than 20 million people jobless. The country already faces over $100 billion dollars in external debt. Salman Shah, a former federal minister for finance, says that if Pakistan is "pushed to the corner," then Islamabad has Russia, China and other regional countries "to fall back upon." "We wish to have good ties with the US and want it to be involved economically in the region," he told DW.
https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-talibans-afghanistan-takeover-could-hurt-us-pakistan-ties/a-58971659
Opinion: The time for equivocating about a nuclear-armed, Taliban-friendly Pakistan is over
Opinion: by John R. BoltonMany profound ramifications of America’s exodus from Afghanistan are competing for attention. Among the top challenges, Pakistan’s future stands out. For decades, Islamabad has recklessly pursued nuclear weapons and aided Islamist terrorism — threats that U.S. policymakers have consistently underestimated or mishandled. With Kabul’s fall, the time for neglect or equivocation is over. The Taliban’s takeover next door immediately poses the sharply higher risk that Pakistani extremists will increase their already sizable influence in Islamabad, threatening at some point to seize full control. A description once applied to Prussia — where some states possess an army, the Prussian army possesses a state — is equally apt for Pakistan. Islamabad’s “steel skeleton” is the real government on national security issues, the civilian veneer notwithstanding. Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, has long been a hotbed of radicalism, which has spread throughout the military, to higher and higher ranks. Prime Minister Imran Khan, like many prior elected leaders, is essentially just another pretty face. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, ISI extensively supported Afghanistan’s mujahideen against the Soviet military, for religious and national security reasons. Washington made the mistake of funneling much of its assistance to “the muj” through Pakistan, thereby relinquishing control over which politicians and fighters actually received the aid. Pakistan also enabled terrorist groups targeting India, its main regional rival, over Kashmir, a continuing flash point emanating from the 1947 partition and independence from Britain. After Moscow exited Afghanistan in 1989, ISI unsurprisingly pirouetted to support the Taliban and others who subjugated the country in 1996. Pakistani military doctrine holds that a friendly Kabul regime ensures “strategic depth” against India, which Pakistani leaders believed the Taliban provided. When the U.S. coalition overthrew the Taliban in 2001, ISI provided sanctuaries, arms and supplies inside Pakistan, although Islamabad routinely denied it. Now, again in power, the Taliban can return the sanctuary favor to Pakistani Taliban — the Pakistani counterpart of the Afghan Taliban — and other radicals. Obviously, the world doesn’t need another terrorist regime, but the risk in Pakistan is of an entirely different order of magnitude, even compared with the menace of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State gaining secure bases in Afghanistan. While Iran still aspires only to nuclear weapons, Pakistan already has dozens, perhaps more than 150, according to public sources. Such weapons in the hands of an extremist Pakistan would dramatically imperil India, raising tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, especially given China’s central role in Islamabad’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. Moreover, the prospect that Pakistan could slip individual warheads to terrorist groups to detonate anywhere in the world would make a new 9/11 incomparably more deadly. These dangers provided compelling reasons to sustain the U.S. and NATO military presence in Afghanistan. We could have continued overwatch not just of potential new terrorist threats in-country but also observed what was happening across the borders in Pakistan and Iran. Sadly, the Trump-Biden withdrawal policy canceled that insurance policy. From Cold War conflict against the Soviets in Afghanistan to our own efforts since 9/11, Pakistani-U.S. cooperation has been essential. It led Washington to temper vigorous criticism of Islamabad’s nuclear and pro-terrorist polices. Now, after Kabul’s surrender, America is less dependent on Pakistan’s good will and logistical support. Acknowledging the enormous uncertainty, given Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, the United States must now come down hard on Islamabad if it continues supporting the Taliban and other terrorists. It has been said that Pakistan is the only government consisting simultaneously of arsonists and firefighters. The firefighters need to step up their game. They must convince their fellow countrymen that the government’s recent path has made Pakistan less secure, not more. Absent clear evidence that Pakistan has terminated assistance to the Taliban, the United States should eliminate its own aid to Islamabad; strike Pakistan from the list of “major non-NATO allies”; impose anti-terrorist sanctions; and more. Our tilt toward India should accelerate. Most important, we must devote maximum attention to Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles and weapons-production facilities. If a future terrorist regime in Islamabad (or even today’s government or like-minded successors) appears ready to transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, we should take preventive action. This is highly unpalatable, but the alternative of allowing these weapons’ use is far worse. China must be made very aware of our intentions and seriousness, including that Beijing’s long-standing, vital assistance to Islamabad’s nuclear efforts makes China responsible for any misuse. Is President Biden sufficiently resolute to do the necessary? Probably not. In George Packer’s recent biography of diplomat Richard Holbrooke, he quotes from Holbrooke’s notes taken during an Obama administration Situation Room meeting on Afghanistan. “Among his notes were private interjections,” Packer writes. “Vice President Joe Biden said that every one of Pakistan’s interests was also America’s interest: ‘HUH?’” Biden’s assertion was wrong when made and would be dangerously wrong today; Holbrooke was correct, and eloquent in his brevity. Let’s hope Biden has changed his mind. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/23/john-bolton-taliban-takeover-pakistan-extremists/
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