Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Pakistan Christian Persecution: Pope Francis Prays For Asia Bibi, Christian On Death Row For Blasphemy

As Pakistani Christians become increasingly concerned about their safety in the wake of a spate of violent incidents against their community, Pope Francis has drawn attention to the case of an imprisoned Pakistani Christian woman who was sentenced to death in 2010 after being convicted on controversial blasphemy charges. The pontiff gave a special greeting to the family of Asia Bibi during his Wednesday General Audience, saying he would pray for her and all the persecuted Christians in Pakistan.
Bibi’s family are currently in Rome to urge European leaders to put pressure on the Pakistani government to release Bibi. Pakistan’s highest court is reviewing an appeal of the imprisoned woman’s sentence to death by hanging, the final legal step before the sentence can be carried out. “If the Church will get involved it could be [easier to secure her freedom],” Bibi’s lawyer, Joseph Nadeem, said in aninterview with Vatican Radio on Wednesday.
Bibi has maintained her innocence, claiming that the blasphemy charge against her was retaliation for a squabble with other villagers in her rural Punjabi community. Bibi was arrested in 2009 after getting into an argument with Muslim field workers when the women refused to drink from a bucket of water she had touched because she was not Muslim. The Christian woman, a mother of five, was later accused of defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad, a capital offense according to Pakistan’s penal code.
The case has come to symbolize the problems with Pakistan’s blasphemy legislation, which critics argue has been misused by authorities to settle political disputes and pressure unpopular individuals or minorities. While no death sentence has ever been carried out against those convicted for violating the law, vigilantes have in the past targeted accused blasphemers, including a Christian couple lynched and burnt to death by an angry mob in November 2014.
Because blasphemy is such a sensitive subject in Pakistan, it has been very difficult to change the laws, in place since the 1980s. Those politicians who have even attempted to raise the subject of reform have faced harsh, if not fatal, consequences. In 2011, two of the most notable politicians publicly lobbying for reforms to the law were murdered. The governor of Punjab province, Salman Taseer, was shot dead by his own security guard for speaking out against the law and supporting Bibi. Two months later, Minorities Minister Shahbaz Batti, the only Christian member of Pakistan’s cabinet, was assassinated in Islamabad after he recommended Bibi’s release.
These incidents have also highlighted the challenges of Pakistan’s Christian community as it faces increasing threats of violence against a rising tide of religious intolerance. The latest case of violence this week saw a 14-year-old Christian boy beaten and set ablaze in Lahore after reportedly identifying his religious beliefs to a pair of Muslim youths. The attack comes less than a month after twin bombings at churches in Lahore that left at least 14 people dead. The church attacks prompted Pope Francis to call for solidarity with the country’s Christian minority, who were being persecuted for their beliefs. Christians are Pakistan’s second-largest minority group after Hindus and make up 1.6 percent of its 182 million population.

Pakistani Christian boy dies after being set on fire by muslim extremists
A teenage boy was attacked on Friday for saying he was a Christian
A Pakistani Christian boy has died after being set on fire by a group of young Muslims after they discovered he was a Christian, according to a charity dedicated to supporting Pakistani Christians.
The Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and Settlement (CLAAS) said that Nauman Masih, 14, was set upon by unknown Muslims who were going to the mosque to offer their Friday prayers.
Nauman died last night and his funeral service was held today at 1pm (local time) in Gulshan Ravi, Shera Kot, in Lahore, CLAAS said.
In Nauman’s statement to the Superintendent of Police he said that two Muslims approached him on a motorbike and asked him about his religion. When he said he was Christian they started to beat him up and after he ran away, folllowed him and subsequently threw kerosene over him and set him alight.
Nauman said: “I was running when a heap of sand came my way, I lay down on the sand, and a few people from the community put out the fire by putting sand on me. I became unconscious, and they called the emergency medical helpline and called [for] an ambulance.”
The police have registered a case against the unknown attackers.
Christians in Pakistan are becoming increasingly endangered in the country. Last November a Christian couple, Shama and Shahzad, were burnt alive in a brick kiln furnace.
Nasir Saeed, director of CLAAS-UK, said: “The perpetrators must be brought to justice for lessons to be learned and to act as deterrents. Other people, and if necessary the government, must introduce some stringent punishment.”

India and Pakistan’s Proxy War in Afghanistan

In an interview Tuesday with TOLONews, Amar Sinha, the Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, called the idea of a proxy war between his country and Pakistan playing out in Afghanistan a myth.
[The] India-Pakistan war is somehow getting reflected in Afghanistan… we see many analysts and journalists [calling] it a proxy war, which is a myth. [Rather] it is a smokescreen created to justify Pakistan’s behavior, which has not been [that] of a friendly neighbor.
Sinha, nonetheless, says that India’s “proxy” in Afghanistan is the Afghan people and that Pakistan’s is the Taliban.
Talk of a proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan has gone both ways for some time. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh, whose ministry is responsible for internal security, said in March that Pakistan used terrorism as a weapon in its proxy war with India. Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal in February that “Pakistan and India both must stay away, and not to have this kind of a proxy war going on there.”
The Wall Street Journal did not miss the irony in Musharraf’s remarks as it outlined Islamabad’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan:
Islamabad was one of the few governments to recognize the Taliban regime in the 1990s, and U.S. and Afghan officials long charged that Pakistan continued to play a “double game” after the Taliban government was toppled by the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, by providing support to an insurgent movement that reconstituted on Pakistani soil, while remaining a major U.S. ally and partner of the American-led coalition that was fighting the Taliban.
In her 2014 book, The Wrong Enemy, Carlotta Gall touches on the issue of Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghanistan war from the U.S. perspective. The title of the book refers directly to a quote from the late Richard Holbrooke, U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, who once said “we may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country.”
Competition between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan is high and while the Karzai administration had better relations with India, it seems that the Ghani administration is beginning to lean more toward Pakistan. The EastWest Institute’s Col. James L. Creighton (U.S. Army, Ret.), told our own Ankit Panda in a recent podcast, that “when Ashraf Ghani visited Islamabad in November, that started off a rapprochement with Pakistan that continues to this day.”
Creighton points to positive movements in several security and economic areas as indicative of this rapprochement. This week a delegation from Pakistan attended meetings in Kabul to discuss bilateral trade, including a trade agreement currently in the works. According to MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity (which draws from the UN Comtrade database), Afghanistan’s largest export partner is Pakistan (47 percent in 2012) followed by India (22 percent in 2012).
With this seeming rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, India is keen to emphasize that Pakistan has not always been a good neighbor. In a recent memo, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Alyssa Ayres argues that India could be an even better friend to Afghanistan, especially when it comes to security as the U.S. pulls back, but that  ”New Delhi’s concerns about poking a Pakistani hornets’ nest have limited the security partnership.”

Whether or not Pakistan will join the war in Yemen may depend on a group you’ve probably never heard of

By C. Christine Fair and Ali Hamza

On March 26, as Iranian-backed Houthi rebels appeared to gain the upper hand in Yemen, Saudi Arabia initiated a military campaign against Houthi rebels in support of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Saudi Arabia, which has long patronized Pakistan’s economy, military, and even nuclear program, wants Pakistan to support this gambit militarily.
When Riyadh comes knocking in the twin cities of Rawalpindi (where the army’s general headquarters is located) and Islamabad (the seat of the civilian government and domicile of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI), ignoring the clamor is not an option. Last March, Saudi Arabia “gifted” Pakistan with $1.5 billion, and many analysts viewed this as essentially a down payment on Pakistan’s support for Saudi Arabia’s preferred policies in Syria.
Pakistan’s powerful military—long accustomed to getting its way in Pakistan—has said that it wants to comply with Riyadh’s request. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has long-standing ties to the Kingdom, including a long exile in Saudi Arabia after General Musharraf seized power in October 1999, is also likely inclined to support the request. Even the “left-of-center” Pakistan Peoples’ Party has publicly stated that it supports the Saudi intervention in Yemen.
Unfortunately, the civilian government and the army have hit a road bump: Pakistanis do not support entering this war. So to generate public support for this endeavor, the Pakistan army’s most loyal militant proxy, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), has stepped into the fray. The group, which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks among other outrages, has been using its social media and convening rallies across the country to mobilize public support for providing military assistance to the Saudi intervention in Yemen. This essay documents JuD’s messaging efforts by examining JuD’s various official Twitter feeds as well as the rhetoric that JuD deploys during its rallies.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Loyal Ally of the Army and ISI

Jamaat-ud-Dawa was known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) until it was “banned” in 2002. Following the ban, the group simply reorganized itself under the new name.  Most international analysts consider Jamaat-ud-Dawa (née Lashkar-e-Taiba) to be a terrorist organization that prosecutes the army and ISI’s agenda in India and, at different times, in Afghanistan. In contrast, many Pakistanis view JuD more as a philanthropic organization than a purveyor of terror at the state’s behest. What few analysts have generally understood is that JuD also plays a critical role in Pakistan’s domestic politics that derives from its close ties to Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies. One of these important roles is that JuD, with its commitment to safeguarding the state, offers ideological and material competition to other violent groups in Pakistan. JuD also offers the important utility of street power through its ability to mobilize thousands of ordinary Pakistanis behind government policies.

JuD Messaging

In its campaign to generate public support for Pakistani military assistance to Saudi Arabia, JuD’s messaging has pushed five themes: 1) it is the duty of all Muslims to defend Saudi Arabia, as it is the home of the two holiest sites in Islam; 2) the crisis in Yemen is the result of a Jewish-Crusader alliance out to destroy the Muslim holy places; 3) the Houthi rebels plan to attack imminently and thus Saudi Arabia is fighting a defensive war to protect the sacred sites; 4) the Muslim world must unite to fend off this menace; and 5) everyone in Pakistan supports this effort.
1) Protect the Harmain and Saudi Arabia
JuD’s emir (leader) Mohammad Hafez Saeed has proclaimed at public rallies that it is the duty of every Pakistani, and indeed every Muslim, to protect the “harmain”—the Grand Mosque in Mecca, which surrounds the Ka`ba, and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina—from a Houthi onslaught. JuD also argues that because of the presence of the harmain in Saudi Arabia, that country is the spiritual center for Muslims; thus, Saudi Arabia must also be protected against the enemies of Islam and of God who have conspired to create fitna (strife) on Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.
On April 2, JuD announced that it had formed a new nationwide movement called “Pasban-e-Harmain-Sharifian” (Defenders of the Holy Sites) for the defense of the  revered structures, aimed at generating support beyond JuD’s traditional support base. They set up a separate Twitter account and designed a special symbol to represent the movement, which JuD’s national twitter feed also adopted (see Figure 1). Saeed explained that under this banner JuD would gather the various political and religious parties on a single platform for the defense of the harmain.
The logo is a remarkable piece of propaganda. In addition to featuring the Ka`ba, it references the poetry of Allama Iqbal, a Muslim political philosopher that Pakistanis revere alongside Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the so-called Father of Pakistan. In fact, Iqbal’s portrait appears along with that of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistani public buildings. At the top of the logo is a well-known couplet from one of Iqbal’s most important poems, “Dunya-i Islam” (World of Islam), in which Iqbal implores Muslims to unite for the defense of the Ka`ba. The poem argues that the biggest impediment to Muslim unity is “racialism.” Ironically, though Iqbal thought parochial nationalisms undermined the strength of the umma (the global Muslim community), Pakistanis revere Iqbal because they believe he argued for a separate Muslim state. (Needless to say Iqbal’s corpus of writings cannot so easily be reduced to this demand as many Pakistanis believe.) JuD’s mobilization of this Pakistani revision of Iqbal’s call to Muslim unity is a clever and emotive strategy because most Pakistanis will recognize this line and immediately understand the message its use is meant to convey.
2) Blame the Jews and Crusaders
A second theme that JuD propounds in its efforts to galvanize support for providing Pakistani military aid to Saudi Arabia is that, contrary to what the international and even Pakistani media claim, the conflict in Yemen is not sectarian and it is not about Iranian and Saudi competition; rather, the JuD claims that the conflict is a result of a conspiracy on the part of “the Crusaders and Jews” to destabilize Yemen. Sometimes the Crusaders are omitted.  For example, on March 27, Saeed declared that that a “Jewish conspiracy” (yahudi sazish) has destabilized Yemen. Rather than characterizing Iran’s involvement in the conflict as “sectarian,” Saeed explained that Iran is involved because it is part of a “US and Zionist conspiracy” and castigated Iran for not representing the “Muslim world.” Incidentally, this supports JuD’s anti-sectarian commitments within Pakistan. Similarly, on April 3, Saeed explained to the people gathered at a public rally that the Houthi rebellion in Yemen is not a problem of “Saudi Arabia vs. Iran” or “Shi`a vs. Sunni;” rather it is due to a conspiracy waged by “Crusaders and Jews.” The concept of a nefarious “Crusader-Jew” alliance has considerable takers throughout the Muslim world. Indeed, Osama bin Laden himself alleged that such a nexus exists to harm Muslims.
It also has salience in Pakistan. Even though the vast majority of Pakistanis have never met a Jew in their life, many Pakistanis are deeply anti-Semitic. Pakistan’s media spends considerable time dilating upon Israel’s treatment of Palestinians while paying virtually no regard to Arab maltreatment of the same. Many Pakistanis are  susceptible to any number ofconspiracy theories about “the Jews,” including, inter alia, that they: 1) run Hollywood; 2) run global finance; 3) dictate U.S. foreign policy; 4) are behind virtually every woe in Pakistan; and  5) were behind the events of 9/11. Pakistanis tend to conflate being Jewish with being Israeli and typically use “Jew” and “Zionist” interchangeably. In addition to believing that Jews are behind every malady in Pakistan, many Pakistanis believe that Jews operate in tandem with Hindus (sometimes referred to even more pejoratively as Brahmans or Baniyas) and the Crusaders (i.e., the United States). Ordinary Pakistanis, popular media personalities, and many in the military or government take it as fact that there is a “Zionist-Hindu-Crusader” nexus that seeks to impose any number of tragedies upon Pakistan. Lamentably, these themes are commonplace in Pakistani textbooks.
3) Saudi Arabia Is Fighting a Defensive War
JuD asserts that the Houthi rebels pose an imminent threat to the Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia. To protect them, Saudi Arabia is fighting a defensive war. On social media, JuD uses the hashtag #DefendingHarmain and phrases like “defending and protecting the harmain” to imply that the war is being fought inside Saudi Arabia rather than in Yemen (see Figure 2). Additionally, JuD claims that ISIS and the Houthi rebels are part of the same conspiracy, bent on destroying sacred sites.
Pakistanis, like Americans, are not well versed in geography, and JuD has not used maps in their rallies. Portraying this offensive war in Yemen that was launched to protect Saudi strategic interests as a defensive war in Saudi Arabia to protect the harmain is a straightforward communication strategy that will resonate with Pakistanis, most of whom will know that the holy sites of Mecca and Medina are in Saudi Arabia even if they have no clue about Yemen and the complex web of woes ensnaring it.
4) Muslims Must Unite (to kill other Muslims)
Another theme the JuD emphasizes is that only unity across the Muslim world can undermine this conspiracy. For this reason, the invocation of Iqbal’s call for all Muslims to unite to protect the sanctuary is particularly salient. Hafez Saeed told his followers that Muslims of all countries—including Pakistan—should worry more about the harmain than their own countries and the problems they confront. This message is particularly germane to Pakistanis given that Pakistan has been at war with itself since 2002. During a press conference at JuD’s headquarters in Khyber, Saeed told attendees that protecting the harmain is “a part of our faith” and that Pakistan should unite Muslim countries in their defense.
In this vein, JuD exhorted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to unite Islamic countries in defense of the “Land of the Harmain” (Saudi Arabia) and called on him to present himself as the leader of the Muslim world. After all, Saeed argued, Pakistan is an atomic power and is thus at the center of defending the Muslim world and standing up the various world powers. Saeed alsoreminded Pakistanis that Saudi Arabia has always played a role in Pakistan’s defense (Saudi Arabia is widely suspected of funding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program). JuD’s statements construct Pakistan as the “defense center” of the Muslim world and Saudi Arabia as the “spiritual leader.” In this way, Pakistan is obliged to defend Saudi Arabia against this threat, construed as a Jewish and Crusader alliance to mobilize Houthis against the holiest of Muslim sites.
Of course, Saeed and the JuD conveniently tend to gloss over the fact that this war to “defend the Muslim world” will mostly involve killing other Muslims.
5) There’s Already a Consensus (Even If It’s Fictitious)
Finally, many of JuD’s statements give the impression that the civilian government and militaryhave already made the decision to militarily support Saudi Arabia and that the Pakistani public is behind the government’s decision. Figure 3 presents a typical JuD rally and concomitant tweet to this effect.
The caption reads: “The people are ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Saudi government to protect the Holy Harmain!” The tweet also includes a photo of rally in which JuD activists, who are easily identified by the organization’s distinctive black and white flag, carry a sign that reads: “We strongly support the decision of the Pakistani government to protect the sanctity of the holy sites.” Extraordinarily, JuD claims that Pakistanis are ready and willing to sacrifice their lives in defense of the “Guardian of the Holy Sites”—that is, the king of Saudi Arabia.
The reality is quite different. Pakistani opinion leaders have noted that Saudi Arabia is behind much of the terrorism that has ravaged Pakistan and has done little to attenuate Saudi-origin support for extremist madrassas that churn out students steeped in sectarian hate-mongering. Opponents have also rightly asked what Saudi Arabia has done to support Pakistan in its various internal and external military challenges. Moreover, Pakistan’s military has been fighting the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas for more than a decade, and the Pakistani Taliban receive support from Saudi Arabia (among others). Pakistanis—especially Shi`a—also worry that the sectarian-tinged war in Yemen will exacerbate the ongoing war being waged against Shi`a in Pakistan by Sunni militants with ties to Saudi Arabia.


It is impossible to assess what the net impacts of JuD’s messaging will have on public opinion. And it should be remembered that JuD is not the only organization engaging in such efforts. Deobandi political religious leaders have also weighed in to support the move; Deobandis have influence over most of the militant groups operating in Pakistan and they have influence over most of the country’s mosques and madrassas. Mainstream Ahl-e-Hadisulema  (religious scholars) also support the move. Meanwhile, Barelvis and Shi`a oppose militant support for Saudi Arabia’s Yemen misadventure.
Ultimately, the Pakistani state will decide after weighing numerous considerations, not the least of which is Saudi largesse. However, if the past provides any clues, the efforts of JuD will likely be significant. After all, JuD has an enormous domestic infrastructure, deep credibility among Pakistanis, and considerable street presence. Unlike its Deobandi counterparts who support this measure as part of their larger sectarian worldview, JuD espouses national unity. Even after the decision is taken, likely to support Saudi Arabia, JuD’s efforts will continue to shore up support for the controversial policy. No matter the ultimate outcome, JuD will use this opportunity to burnish its credentials with the deep state and further imbricate itself in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies.

Why Pakistan Said No to King Salman

By: Bruce Riedel

Pakistan's decision to stay out of the military conflict brewing in Yemen complicates Saudi-Pakistani diplomatic relations.

Saudi Arabia's request for tangible Pakistani help for Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen has led to an unprecedented rejection by Islamabad. In response to a direct face-to-face request from King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud for ground troops and aircraft for the war against Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen last month, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took the issue to the Pakistani parliament, which on April 10 unanimously decided to stay out of the war. On April 13, Sharif reaffirmed the parliament's decision while also pledging Pakistan's commitment to Saudi Arabia. 
After five days of debate, not one speaker apparently supported sending ground troops. While many praised Saudi Arabia as a friend of Pakistan, almost all called for a political solution and diplomacy to end the crisis. Some even blamed Riyadh for starting the war. Every political party opposed sending troops. The consensus was to stay neutral while reaffirming friendship with the kingdom.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Pakistan during the debate. He met with both Prime Minister Sharif and Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif. The army has argued that it is stretched too thin with a counterterrorism campaign against the Pakistani Taliban and tensions with India to send troops to Yemen. Sharif said April 13 that he urged Zarif to rein in the Houthis and support a political solution.
The Pakistani response is a potentially big setback for the bilateral relationship. Given that Sharif owes his life to the Saudis, who helped save him from execution after the 1999 Gen. Pervez Musharraf coup and provided him exile (with a little help from Washington), it's a remarkable development. No Pakistani politician knows the Saudis better than Sharif or has more access to their inner circle.
Why did Sharif send the issue to parliament? A revealing editorial in the Pakistani press suggests the prime minister had already concluded that the Saudis have blundered into a war they cannot win and for which they are unprepared. Their goals, restoring the Hadi government to power and preventing the creation of a pro-Iranian regime on the Arabian Peninsula, are not matched by the resources available. Sharif met with the king and his advisers on the eve of the war and judged they "had made a strategic error led by an untested leadership that panicked" at Iran's role in Yemen.
In this account of Sharif's decision, the Pakistani leader reportedly believes that if the Saudis enter into a ground war in Yemen — with or without Pakistani forces — it will become a quagmire. They have simply "bitten off more than they can chew." The Egyptian experience in Yemen, in which Egypt had up to 20,000 casualties in the 1960s fighting the same Zaydi tribes that back the Houthis, figures prominently in Pakistani thinking, especially in the army.
But Sharif also does not want to endanger Pakistan's close ties to the kingdom. He will note that strong military and diplomatic relations will continue between Riyadh and Islamabad. Pakistani experts and advisers are already in the kingdom in small numbers. One died in a training accident in Saudi Arabia last week.
Sharif will also argue that he had no choice but to consult the parliament. Once a consensus emerged, he also could not go against it. 
Already, close Saudi ally the United Arab Emirates has threatened that the no vote will have negative consequences for Pakistan's relationship with the Gulf states. The kingdom and the United Arab Emirates provide sizable amounts of aid and investment to Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis live and work in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

The episode also has implications for the long-standing issue of whether Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a secret unwritten agreement for Islamabad to provide a nuclear weapon or several weapons to Riyadh if the kingdom felt threatened by an Iranian bomb. The Yemen crisis suggests any such vague nuclear "promise" may be worthless. If Islamabad won't deliver conventional ground and air support when the kingdom is at war with an Iranian proxy (the Saudi view of the Houthis), it can't be relied on to provide a bomb.
The episode also raises concerns about Iran's clout in the region. Much of the debate in parliament had been about avoiding further sectarian violence in Pakistan (which is 20% Shiite), which intervention in the war in Yemen would stoke (perhaps with Iranian help). Zarif had a big stick behind his back. Without ever mentioning the threat of Iranian meddling in Pakistan's already fragile domestic stability, Zarif could remind his hosts they don't want more trouble at home.
Zarif visited Pakistan after a stop in Oman, the other big no-show in the Yemen war. Oman is the only GCC state to stay out of the air war. Like Sharif, Sultan Qaboos is wary of the Yemen conflict expanding beyond Yemen's borders. Just west of Oman's Dhofar province both Houthi and al-Qaeda fighters have expanded their control since Operation Decisive Storm began. The Houthis seized Shabwa province last week and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken much of Hadrawmawt province. The sultan is also wary of a quagmire that only benefits al-Qaeda.
There is now talk in Islamabad of Pakistan playing a mediator role to find a way to end the fighting. As a major Islamic power, Pakistan could potentially help engineer a face-saving solution to achieve a cease-fire and end the war. But that requires a willingness to compromise that as yet does not look apparent either in Riyadh or Sanaa.