Wednesday, October 1, 2014
Their border disputes and maritime rivalry aside, China and India may be able to make common cause in Afghanistan.Afghanistan is going out of fashion among governments in the West, as attention shifts to a disintegrating Middle East and a new battlefront in Eastern Europe. But something may be moving in to fill the void. China and India held their first bilateral talks on Afghanistan in April 2013, and discussed the issue most recently during Xi Jinping’s visit to New Delhi last week, where both sides agreed to “strengthen strategic dialogue” on building “peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan,” which was identified as a “shared interest.” The China-India relationship is still riddled with suspicion from the 1962 war, and a smoldering border dispute and rivalry in the maritime sphere complicates relations further. But as Western forces are drawn down in Afghanistan at the end of this year, cooperation may be the best way to establish the regional stability that the country needs for its future growth and security. The pressing question is not, therefore, if such cooperation is desirable, but whether the two Asian giants are capable of working together to produce a robust and viable framework for the country’s future. Convergence of Interests Cooperation grows from common interests, and China and India are united in the common threat that both countries face from the surge in terrorism that would likely accompany state collapse in Afghanistan. India perceived a terror threat emanating from the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate for much of its existence, and an attack in May on India’s consulate in Herat by four heavily armed militants – reportedly members of Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Taiba – suggests that this threat is still alive. While Beijing is not overtly concerned with instability in Afghanistan (it weathered the Taliban decade by simply closing its borders) spillover into the poorly governed spaces of Central Asia – or worse, Pakistan – could provide a means for terrorist groups to link up with Uyghur fighters in Xinjiang. Afghanistan also figures in the regional strategies that both countries are unveiling. Beijing’s “Silk Road Economic Belt,” emerging as a hallmark foreign policy under Xi Jinping, will comprise a cross-border logistics infrastructure linking China’s western regions with resource-rich Central Asia and, eventually, the markets of Europe. Meanwhile, India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy envisions Afghanistan as a regional trade hub crossed by energy pipelines and air, rail and road links that will one day transport the resources of Central Asia to the subcontinent. In other words, both countries have a vision for Afghanistan and its neighborhood as a thoroughfare for regional trade and prosperity. Part of this vision is unfolding within Afghanistan, where foreign investment is dominated by Chinese and Indian state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As natural resource hungry developing powers, China and India have significant interests in ensuring market access to Afghanistan’s reserves. A Chinese mining company, MCC-Jiangxi Copper, owns a thirty-year lease worth $3 billion in a copper mine in Mes Aynak and oil giant CNPC is pursuing a joint oil venture with a local partner in Amu Darya. An Indian steel consortium, SAIL-AFISCO, holds a multi-billion dollar stake in an iron-ore mine in Bamyan Province. Lack of Progress Despite their common interests, cooperation has been modest so far. Both sides engage in a regular Secretary General-level dialogue on Afghanistan, and the country regularly features in bilateral discussions as part of the China-India Strategic Partnership. But the results of these discussions have not moved beyond joint statements of intent. This is unfortunate because as my RUSI colleague has written previously, a Sino-Indian business dialogue on Afghanistan, for example, could yield cooperation in numerous areas. With investment overwhelmingly led by SOEs, both countries’ governments are well positioned to influence company direction and harness it for Afghanistan’s long-term stability. A stable Afghanistan would reduce the difficulties that many Chinese and Indian investors currently face on the ground; whether it is insecurity at Mes Aynak; outdated mining legislation in Bamyan; or inadequate transport infrastructure in Amu Darya. More broadly, while both countries are parties to regional initiatives, including the Heart of Asia Process and various World Bank and Asia Development Bank projects, neither side has yet tried to coordinate their efforts, and there is a wasteful duplication of effort as a result. In this sense, India’s application to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – made at the group’s annual summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in early September – is a commendable first step, as it would allow both sides to coordinate on a range of regional economic and security issues. India has long coveted membership in the SCO, which would offer Delhi a platform to push its security and economic interests in Central Asia. With the weight of China and the region behind it, Delhi may also face less recalcitrance from Pakistan, which has long denied it access to the markets and resources of Central Asia, and blocked its logistical arteries to investment projects in Afghanistan. Indeed, it is perhaps not coincidental that on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Dushanbe, talks were restarted on the TAPI gas pipeline, an ambitious transnational project that would bring gas from Turkmenistan to India, and supply the energy needs and line the tax coffers of fragile transit states like Afghanistan. If this trend continues, China-India cooperation at the regional level could blossom into a more institutionalized pattern of behavior, despite tensions on their land border and at sea. Limits on Cooperation Deep mistrust between China and India – which dates back to the 1962 border war – is the most obvious impediment to a functional relationship on Afghanistan. Progress has been made recently in bilateral economic ties and in multilateral institutions such as BRICS. Yet ongoing border clashes – including a nasty recent spat between Chinese and Indian troops in Ladakh – and India’s attempt to forge closer military links with Beijing’s adversaries in Japan and Vietnam (which Modi and his foreign minister visited respectively in September) suggests that there are limits to China-India bonhomie. Further, while cooperation on security in Afghanistan would seem obvious because of the shared threat from Islamist extremism, it may actually be the area with the least potential for cooperation. China’s Five Principles – particularly that of non-interference – continue to shape Beijing’s foreign policy on its western frontier, and it will be loathe to take actions – alone or in conjunction with others – that suck it into the same morass that has trapped NATO for well over a decade. Indeed, China has indicated that it is unwilling to commit troops post-2014, and while it has contributed to training Afghanistan’s police force, Beijing has remained silent on the problem of Afghan National Army (ANA) funding, which still faces a shortfall of $2.5 billion and requires assistance in key areas such as air support and battlefield intelligence to sustain it post-ISAF withdrawal. By comparison, India has offered more on security, but is also sidestepping the issue of ANA funding, and is instead hedging against the worst-case scenario of state collapse. Delhi recently partially acceded to former President Hamid Karzai’s longstanding request for heavy weaponry by agreeing to pay for Russian military equipment to be supplied to Afghan forces from the north (thereby bypassing Pakistan), and may be trying to revive its forward presence in Tajikistan – once India’s backdoor to supply the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. India is also working with Russia on refurbishing a Soviet-era armaments factory outside Kabul, and is running training programs for Afghan officers and Special Forces on Indian soil. While Afghanistan features prominently in both countries’ economic strategies, neither China nor India sees it an essential ingredient. Chinese analysts are quick to point out that the Silk Road Economic Belt does not rely on routes through Afghanistan: pipelines can be laid around the country, and substantial sources of energy and minerals can be found elsewhere. India has made similar calculations: overland trade with Central Asia has been geographically blocked for decades by Pakistan and, in any case, a partial solution to this problem may have been found in the developing Iranian port of Chabahar, which is being built on $100 million of Indian investment, and which promises to become a new trade and logistics link with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Finally, the role of other regional powers will be decisive in defining the scope of China-India cooperation. Above all, their differing relationships with Pakistan are a source of continued suspicion. Delhi is often infuriated by Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Islamabad and activities in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, and both countries have radically different views on the capacity of the Pakistani state to control the region’s terrorist networks. Admittedly, China will never discuss Pakistan without the latter being present, but Beijing is trying to facilitate better relations between Delhi and Islamabad, including through a recently proposed trilateral security arrangement and joint SCO membership. Russia, meanwhile, which has consistently applied the brakes to regional free trade agreements and funding mechanisms – including those proposed through the SCO – would look askance at any move that increases China-India preponderance in Central Asia. The Bottom Line China and India do not see eye to eye on many issues, but there is a growing convergence of interests in Afghanistan and the region. That both sides are willing to engage despite their tensions is commendable, and should be supported. As Western forces draw down in Afghanistan, a new China-India led regional multilateralism may be important in reenergizing the region and providing the opportunities for the prosperity and security that will underpin Afghanistan’s future. Yet given that neither country is interested in security provision, these efforts are unlikely to be decisive – at least in the short-term. A solution to Afghanistan’s problems must begin within the country, and a strong Western security commitment post-2014 will be just as important.
Pakistan's blasphemy law has survived almost unamended for the past three decades. Yet blasphemy cases and even the frequency of incidents of violence have spiked only in the last 10 years or so. A graph from the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad records major blasphemy cases in the 60 years between 1953 and 2012. Although there were very few blasphemy cases between 1953 and 1979 and only a handful of cases almost every year in the 80s and 90s (that is, after Zia changed the law), the number of blasphemy cases only began to increase at an alarming rate after 2004 -- almost two decades after the amendment to the law by Zia.There could be many reasons as to why there was a jump in cases only in the last decade, but it demonstrates quite clearly that neither the blasphemy law's existence, nor its amendment by Zia can explain the sharp rise in blasphemy-related cases or the descent into blasphemy related violence on their own. To be sure, the argument is not that the law does not have problems. It is very defective -- in design and in application. Yet, while Pakistan's blasphemy law has serious defects such as the lack of intent required for the offence and the vague language used to denote offences and its particular targeting of Ahmadis, as highlighted by Osama Siddique, we do suggest that, based on the data, it is short-sighted to adopt a narrow focus on the law as being the sole instigator of blasphemy related violence in the country. Such a presumption is common where even informed commentators sometimes assume that the law caused the violence -- when in reality, the sudden rise in the number of cases indicates something else: that other deeply-ingrained social factors, and not the law on its own, may be at play in increasing blasphemy related violence. A myopic focus on the law thus detracts from getting to the root of the problem. Further, in terms of reform, one thing is clear: blasphemy is and will remain a sensitive and "popular" issue. Indeed, 75 percent of Pakistani Muslims say blasphemy laws are necessary to protect Islam in their country, according to a PEW Research poll. As one of us has written before in a journal article, considering the place of Islam in popular thought in Pakistan and some other Muslim majority countries (partly due to Islam and Islamic law being seen as "a" -- and sometimes the only -- mechanism to realize rights and good governance in otherwise unjust political settings), it is not surprising to see wide social support for sanctioning those who are seen to have "attacked Islam" -- that is, the law in itself is not controlling or determinative of the support for vigilantism, and social norms are important. Hence, reform of such a sensitive area of law must originate and be grounded within an Islamic and culturally indigenous framework to be effective. At the same time, perceptions of foreign "colonial" influence should be and should be seen to be non-existent in the matter (indeed, it is not surprising to see people in Pakistan marching in anger in response to statements by foreign figures such as the Pope with regards to amendment or repeal of the law). An example of a successful reform strategy for Pakistan's blasphemy law can be gleaned from Morocco, where a strategy of reforming women´s rights -- a similarly controversial issue -- was successful mainly because it drew upon Islamic arguments and credentials for legitimacy. As one of the authors has written in an academic article, Morocco features some of the strongest women's rights in the Islamic world -- perhaps second only to Tunisia. However, Moroccan women did not enjoy these rights until only about a decade ago, when in early 2004, the Moroccan parliament passed significant reforms to the Mudawana or Code of Personal Status, which governs the legal relationships that most significantly affect women's rights including marriage, divorce, child custody, maintenance, and inheritance. The 2004 Mudawana reforms garnered international praise for their progressive interpretation of Islamic law. Notable reforms included making the husband and wife equally responsible for leading the family, prohibiting divorce by repudiation, abolishing male guardianship and wifely obedience, and providing an innovative de facto prohibition on polygamy. While the 2004 reforms succeeded, previous reform efforts had failed largely due to conservative opposition that characterized Mudawana reform as Western, secular, or un-Islamic. Further, conservative leaders often equated reforming the Mudawana with an attack on Shari‘a, which created a strong social and cultural barrier to strengthening women's rights. Rather than shrinking from this debate, Moroccan women's rights activists met this challenge head-on by basing their arguments for reform on Islamic social values and Islamic legal scholarship. Accordingly, women's rights activists countered conservative opposition by highlighting the egalitarian ethos of Islam as well as the legal principle of gender equality clearly established in the Qur'an. By engaging conservative leaders on their terms, women's rights activists won public support and avoided claims that they were simply trying to impose Western or secular values on Muslims. The Moroccan experience provides valuable lessons for reformers within other Islamic states and in our particular case, for blasphemy in Pakistan. Moroccan activists advanced women's rights not by appealing primarily to international treaties or human rights discourse, but by grounding their efforts in Islamic social and legal discourse specific to Moroccan culture. Using this tact, women's rights activists successfully argued that patriarchal interpretations of Islamic law were harmful to women, detrimental to the country's development and modernization, and legally spurious. Perhaps most importantly, this experience illustrates that lasting social and legal reform will occur through domestic efforts and not externally imposed solutions. For anthropologists, sociologists, and most activists in the field this may be obvious, but it is surprising how this lesson can be ignored by some human rights reformers and not least of all, those who wish to improve upon Pakistan's blasphemy law.
Pakistan's constitution was amended 40 years ago to declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Regarded by orthodox Muslims as heretical, Ahmadis are not allowed to refer to their places of worship as mosques or to publicly quote from the Koran - acts punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
Critics of the anti-Ahmadi laws say they have encouraged violence against the community. Residents of the all-Ahmadi town of Rabwah told BBC Urdu's Nosheen Abbas of their fears for the future.The survivor: I was in one of the mosques Usama Munir used to be a banker in Lahore, but after his father was killed in attacks on Ahmadi mosques in the city in 2010, he decided to move to Rabwah. Usama was in one of the mosques in Lahore, but survived the attacks which were blamed on Sunni militants. He felt his survival was another chance at life and he moved to Rabwah to dedicate himself to the Ahmadi community's local chapter (known as Jamaat). The student: I face new problems every day Humaira (not her real identity) is a student outside Rabwah. She says she faces discrimination on a daily basis - unlike her older sister who also studied at the same university, she is unable to stay in the dorm because Ahmadi students are not welcome there, she says. Her older sister told us that moves to ban Ahmadi students from the dorms had begun while she was a student. Humaira says she and other young Ahmadis need to fight against this discrimination. The leader: Religious intolerance Mirza Khursheed Ahmed is the head of all the Ahmadi missions in Pakistan. He believes that the atmosphere in Pakistan is growing ever more difficult for Ahmadis.He says that when the state denies rights to one group it leads to wider religious intolerance. The elder: 'It's said it's necessary to kill Ahmadis' Chaudhry Hamidullah, who has lived in Rabwah for years, believes the community will see better days - but says the younger generation should be prepared for tough times. Anti-Ahmadi laws had set a precedent in the country and any community could be stigmatised in the future, he said.
By Zahir Shah Pakistanis are chalking up the recent arrests of suspects accused of being Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants who shot girls’-education activist Malala Yousafzai as a big success for women’s rights and the country’s security. A joint intelligence-police-military operation nabbed 10 suspected TTP members accused of carrying out the shooting of Malala and two other schoolgirls in Mingora in October 2012, Pakistani army spokesman Maj. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa said September 12. All three recovered. Accused TTP terrorist Israr ur Rehman was the first suspect caught. He confessed to being one of two gunmen who carried out the attack. A 10-member shura led by Swat resident Zafar Iqbal plotted the assassination attempt, Rehman told authorities. They were following orders from now-TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah. Fazlullah was based in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, when he ordered the shooting. The nine other accused shura members have confessed to carrying out Fazlullah’s orders. The group also admitted to involvement in the November 2012 slaying of Abdul Rasheed, watchman of Swat College of Science and Technology, in November 2012. Members said they had plans to kill 22 significant locals, including Aman Committee members and other notable Swat residents, all on Fazlullah’s orders. Police have recovered the weapons used in those incidents. They will produce all suspects before an Anti-Terrorist Court that will try them under the Anti-Terrorism Act, Bajwa said. Security situation, human rights improve in Pakistan The arrests are proof that the country’s law-and-order situation is improving, observers say.
Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Chris Alexander who participated in the inauguration ceremony of Afghanistan new president, has asked Pakistan to stop ‘supporting insurgency,’ saying there are no doubts of Pakistan being a ‘safe haven’ for terrorist. “Today, Canada and most of the countries around the world know why there is still insecurity and instability in Afghanistan,” Alexander said in an interview with the Afghan TV. “Taliban are trained in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Waziristan and some parts of Karachi,” he blamed. He stressed that it was not acceptable for people, non-governmental organisations or government institutions to support the terrorist groups like the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. “Canada has put Taliban in the black list of terrorists and it is known to all that training centres and weapons are provided for the terrorists in Quetta, Miramshah and other parts of the country,” he blamed. Alexander expressed optimism about the national unity government and the partnership between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, pledging Canada's support for the new government. “I worked closely with both when I was in Kabul during that time, Abdullah was the foreign minister and Ghani was the minister of finance,” he said. “I want to discuss with each of them their priorities, foreign policy and approaches to the challenges in the region,” the Canadian minister said, emphasising that his country would continue its support to Afghanistan and provide the country with an annual $90 million aid.
http://www.voanews.com/Ayaz Gul Pakistan says the national unity government in neighboring Afghanistan is a good beginning for promoting peace and reconciliation in the war-shattered country and Islamabad is ready to offer whatever help Kabul needs to further the peace process. Pakistan’s traditionally uneasy relations with Afghanistan have sharply deteriorated during President Hamid Karzai’s final months in office. His administration publicly accused Pakistani spy agency, ISI, of helping the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups continue the war in Afghanistan, charges Islamabad rejects. In turn, Pakistani officials blamed Afghan authorities for letting anti-Pakistan militants establish sanctuaries on the Afghan side of the border and launch deadly attacks against Pakistani military outposts. Optimism But officials in Islamabad say they are “absolutely confident” relations with Kabul will improve under new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s advisor on national security and foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, says his country has made initial contacts with President Ghani and Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. He told VOA the talks were “very positive,” and both the Afghan leaders have shown their desire to forge “a much stronger and special relationship” with Pakistan. “A smooth transition has taken place and a democratically elected government has taken over [in Afghanistan]. And at the same time, the fact that both the ethnic groups [majority Pashtun and minority Tajik] are represented in it, is also a very good start, particularly for reconciliation because in this case it strengthens the hands of the government to deal with other groups,” Aziz explained. The Pakistani advisor was referring to the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami militant groups waging a bloody insurgency against Afghan and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Kabul believes key Taliban leaders and commanders are sheltering in Pakistan and want the neighboring country to help in promoting peace. Aziz reiterated that Afghanistan has to take the lead in promoting political reconciliation within the country and hopes President Ghani will implement an agreement Pakistan made with his predecessor on effective management of their porous border. “Reconciliation is an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led process, but if they want our help, whatever help we can give. But it is an Afghan initiative how they want to approach this task and what exactly do they want us to do. So, once they have developed their strategy and they need our help we will certainly respond positively,” he said. BSA Aziz says Pakistan has no reservations about the security pacts Afghanistan has signed with the United States and NATO. He termed it "a positive development", saying they will help better train Afghan security forces and will ensure Afghanistan receives much needed international financial assistance to support its economy. Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Janan Mosazai, is also upbeat about a strong bilateral relationship in the coming years. “President Ashraf Ghani Ahmdzai’s focus will also [be] on strengthening, deepening and broadening economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, because so far we have focused mainly on trade ... So, there will be a redoubling of efforts on the part of the new Afghan government to enhance and strengthen economic ties, but also to work on deepening cooperation between the two countries in the necessary and essential common struggle and common fight against terrorism and extremism, which has taken such a huge toll on both countries,” Mosazai noted. The Afghan ambassador says the new government in Kabul will be seeking enhanced cooperation and improved coordination from Pakistan to defeat terrorist forces in the region and ensure stability on both sides of the border.
Zia’s stewardship of Pakistan changed the internal dynamics of Pakistan’s politics and society by making religion and religious politics much more relevant.Pakistan is in a state of perpetual crisis. Its political theatre has the appearance of a long running drama that seems familiar, going back almost to the country’s birth. There is the usual manufactured rage of its lead political characters, promising to put the country on its rightful course if only they were given a chance to govern. And each time they make a mess of it, starting the same game all over again. In the late 1950s, the army chipped in to rescue the country from the sordid game of politicians. Many people felt a sense of relief, believing that the army would fix things and put the country on its forward trajectory. But, lo and behold, it did not take long for the generals to become adept at the political game themselves, including making money, lots of it, from this new political lottery. Since then, everyone who is anyone in Pakistan has his/her finger in the cookie jar to make the most of it. Therefore, when everyone is compromised — almost everyone — the easiest way is to become self-righteous and attack others for political thuggery and all that goes with it. There was a change for the worse, if one can imagine it, towards the late 1970s when the then military chief, Ziaul Haq, staged a coup against then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and, subsequently, managed to secure his judicial execution. The military, which till then had been known to usurp power and rule by decree, now seemed also to have the power of life and death over the country’s highest elected leader, if they so wished. In other words, the supremacy of the military over the civilian order was so brazenly established that military rule directly, or behind the scenes, is now a sad fact of life in Pakistan. Another thing happened under Zia that was even more pernicious. He gave the country a turn towards religious conservatism and orthodoxy, which further legitimised and even entrenched the role of Islamic politics. It is true that electorally religious parties were not as significant but their significance and influence socially and culturally became quite pervasive. And this was happening even as Pakistan, under Zia, became increasingly enmeshed in the Cold War politics of the 1980s centred on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state for the US-led western bloc that used religion (Islam) to prop up the mujahideen in a crusade against ‘Godless’ communist invaders from the Soviet Union. With money and weapons pouring in from the US, as well as from Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan performing a coordinating role of sorts, the Soviet army was bogged down and then finally withdrew, even as the Soviet Union was crumbling. However, in the meantime, Afghanistan’s feuding groups of Islamic militants turned on each other until the Pakistan-supported Taliban prevailed and the new, still truncated Afghanistan, became Islamabad’s strategic backyard, or so it was thought. But it was still too early to be complacent, as the Taliban sheltered al Qaeda and its leadership that had incubated during the mujahideen struggle against the Soviet forces. They were to make or break history with the al Qaeda-inspired 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Zia’s stewardship of Pakistan changed the internal dynamics of Pakistan’s politics and society by making religion and religious politics much more relevant. The role of the mujahideen crusade against the Soviet army and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support led to the rise of militant Islam of which the Pakistani version of the Taliban was most telling, with disastrous results. And with the army involved deeply in sponsoring and promoting different militant groups, it became part of the violent culture that spawned in Pakistan, as well as the target of those it opposed. The army had obviously reckoned that different militant groups it had sponsored would follow its writ. And some did but others, like the Taliban in Pakistan, wanted to play their own game, bringing them into violent confrontation with the army, currently being played out in North Waziristan. While the current government sought to open up peace negotiations with the Taliban leadership, even as the army was militarily engaged against them, the military leadership was not amused. This created tensions between the Nawaz Sharif government and the army high command. Coincidentally, or by design, the opposition PTI started to get cozy with the army and started a mass movement to bring down the government, accusing it of having rigged the 2013 elections. The army chief found himself in the middle of it all as a mediator but, eventually, decided to hold back for the time being at least. As things stand, a military coup cannot be ruled out, which will further complicate things. Going back a little, when the Taliban-sheltered al Qaeda became the ideological centre of global Islamic militancy and brought the wrath of the US to Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US soil, Pakistan’s then dictator, Pervez Musharraf, found himself aligned, willingly or unwillingly, in the US’s war on terror. Despite this, the top leadership of the Taliban still found refuge in Pakistan from where they are still operating. In other words, while Pakistan was a US ally in the war on terror, it had not altogether ditched the Taliban. This led to the US accusation of Islamabad playing both sides. Therefore, the US-Pakistan relationship was marked by deep suspicion and distrust. After the US commando attack killed Osama bin Laden sheltering in Abbottabad, the relationship virtually reached breaking point. Though things have improved somewhat, the US’s drone strikes continue to plague their relations. The upshot of all this is that the US drone strikes and Washington possibly leaning on the army against a military takeover have made Imran Khan even shriller than usual. Whatever the result of the current political impasse with the PTI on the warpath to bring down the Sharif government, Pakistan’s situation will remain dire. According to Anatol Lieven (writing in a recent issue of the British magazine, Prospect), who recently visited Pakistan and has access to high levels of government and military brass: “Pakistan today, as so often in the past, presents a Janus-faced appearance. On the one hand, Pakistan is not northern Iraq [where ISIS is now entrenched]. As my experience in South Waziristan and the military offensive in North Waziristan demonstrate, the Islamist insurgency which has caused such terrible losses and raised such fears in the west is not about to overthrow the state.” Elaborating, he wrote, “On the other hand, the political elites do not appear capable of the unity, the vision, or the resolution necessary to carry out the reforms that Pakistan needs if it is to survive in the long term.” It is not a pretty picture but the Pakistani governing establishment surely knows it because they have created the mess in the first place.
By Dr Qaisar Rashid
Pakistan Naval dockyard attack: In attack by al Qaeda, lines blur between Pakistan's military, militants
A polio team was attacked on Wednesday in the Khanpur area of Rahim Yar Khan, Express News reported. Police arrived at the scene and arrested a school teacher, identified as Ashraf, who reportedly led the attack. The polio team halted immunisation activities in the area following the incident. On Tuesday, three people were injured in Gujranwala when a polio team was attacked in the area. For this year alone, the total number of reported polio cases stands at 184 in Pakistan, which is one of only three countries in the world where polio is still endemic. Despite the increasing number of polio cases, authorities have failed to put a concrete plan in place to address the situation. Polio workers are frequently targetted in the country, while many parents refuse to let health workers administer polio drops to their children.
At least three people were killed and 12 wounded on Wednesday after a barber shop was attacked with a hand grenade in Langoabad area on Quetta’s Double Road. Police and security forces rushed to the site, while rescue workers transported the dead and wounded to Provincial Sandeman Hospital in Quetta. One of the deceased was identified as Ghulam Shabir. “The victims have splinter and bullet wounds,” medics at the hospital said. Two of the injured are in critical condition. “Two people were killed and seven wounded,” Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Quetta, Abdul Razzaq Cheema confirmed to The Express Tribune. Police suspect this could be a targeted attack on settlers in Quetta. “Police are investigating the incident; I am at the hospital and recording statement of victims,” SHO Industrial Town Shaukat told The Express Tribune. The unidentified assailants opened fire and hurled a hand grenade before escaping on a motorbike, he added. Police have cordoned off the area after the incident. No one claimed responsibility for the attack till the filing of this report. Separate incidents of violence In a separate incident, one person was killed as a photographer’s shop was attacked with a hand grenade on Sariab Road. A woman and a child were killed in a domestic dispute on Joint Road, Quetta as well.
A teacher was killed and two children injured on Wednesday when a hand-grenade attack took place on a school in the Shabqadar area of Peshawar. Sources said the school had received letters a month earlier which threatened the administration to direct students to wear shalwar kameez instead of pants and shirts. According to police sources, unidentified miscreants threw a hand-grenade on Askari Public School and College in Shabaqadar area. The explosion resulted in the death of school teacher Madam Honey and injured two children. Sources said that miscreants fled the scene after launching the attack and a search operation was under way. Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan and Chief Minister Pervez Khattak have condemned the attack and sympathised with the families of those targeted. Earlier, the PTI government had also decided in principle to remove ‘objectionable material’ from the textbooks of local primary schools to please the key partner of the ruling coalition, Jamaat-i-Islami. JI had objected to pictures of girls without dupatta, X-mas cake, Cross emblem, good morning expression.