M WAQAR..... "A man's ethical behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties; no religious basis is necessary.Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." --Albert Einstein !!! NEWS,ARTICLES,EDITORIALS,MUSIC... Ze chi pe mayeen yum da agha pukhtunistan de.....(Liberal,Progressive,Secular World.)''Secularism is not against religion; it is the message of humanity.'' تل ده وی پثتونستآن
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Military intervention and Egypt’s future

Dr H.A. HellyerThe military may be coming – and it seems like everyone knows and is waiting for it, except the Muslim Brotherhood. The irony is: they are the ones who have the most to lose. A new intervention into governance by the Egyptian armed forces is something that many in the political, social and economic elite are clamouring for. They’re not all on the same page in that regard, and people ought to be honest about that. Some people just have it in for the MB, and always would have had – regardless of whether or not the MB had been successful in taking Egypt forward along the transition towards a second republic. There are others who (and let us also be equally frank in this regard) prefer a military intervention, because it removes the MB from the political playing field, thus giving them a political advantage they might not already have. Politics is hard work – and many are tempted to do away with that hard work in favour of a military intervention that would remove their adversaries. There are, however, those who are not necessarily calling for such an intervention – but are nonetheless expecting it to happen. They see the pound fall in value against the dollar; they see the supply of wheat becoming more problematic; the supply of petrol and diesel diminishing; food prices potentially rising; and looming power cuts as the summer draws closer, putting pressure on the country’s electrical infrastructure. In other words: a state akin to a slow moving train-wreck. With security becoming more and more of an issue, the propensity for that train to suddenly speed into overdrive is not beyond the realm of possibility. If the economic troubles of Egypt then turn into real threats to public order, with riots and the like, the state’s security services are not likely to be able to keep a lid on it – and at that point, the military may feel obliged to intervene. People ought not to be so idealistic about what this scenario could look like. The military’s conduct over the eighteen months it directly governed Egypt is a model for how not to conduct a transitional process. Indeed, much, if not most, of the problems that currently face Egypt are down to the military’s mismanagement of that period. While General Al-Sisi is, by all accounts, an extremely smart individual, it remains to be seen whether or not he would be able to conduct an intervention that would leave the country better off than before. Nor, it should be stated, does the military want to intervene. It doesn’t. The military’s standing in the country at the end of the governing period was extraordinarily good (all things considered) – but it was still markedly less than in the months after the downfall of Hosni Mubarak. The military does not want to be in that position again. Indeed, who would want to be responsible for such a mammoth task? However, if public disorder does go beyond a certain point, it is hard to see the military simply staying on the side-lines. It would then have to deal with certain challenges. The first is the threat to the democratic and pluralistic quotient of Egyptian politics. No matter how you slice it, an independent move by the Egyptian military means that the military continues to be above civilian control – and an intervention would almost definitely be against the elected government’s wishes. Ethically and morally, that is not a particularly good way to begin a transition. Having said that, very few people are likely to care. The military’s position in the country, and in public opinion, is the envy of any political force anywhere. If it was to construct a decent enough cover story, the intervention could be packaged as ‘supporting democracy’ – and enough people outside and inside of Egypt would be more than willing to go along with it. The second challenge would be how to reintroduce economic stability – a task that would require the military to deal directly with ‘consensus politics’. They would need to build a consensus on economic issues with the prime political forces in the country, which command the loyalty of the expertise of the country. Would those forces work with them? Potentially, probably – there would be some whose principles would keep them back from engaging with a military junta, but that might actually encourage the military to create a proper road map that ensured reform and restructuring during the interim, and an exit strategy within a certain time period. That would bring the military to the third challenge: a political road map that actually works. In an ideal situation, that would bring together the main presidential candidates that would be partial to such an arrangement – excluding Ahmad Shafiq. That would necessitate the involvement of Amr Moussa, to bring on board forces allied to the former regime without actually getting a hardcore ‘felool’ candidate. Mohamed ElBaradei, who has little if any grassroots support, would be important for international recognition, and international recognition of a civilian body would be necessary for macroeconomic assistance. Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, if they consented to being involved, would be critical to ensuring the political road map had a civilian face that was genuinely bought into on the ground. Ideally, that would also mean the involvement of Mohammed Morsi – but it is difficult to consider how that would be possible if the military jumped in, as they would in this scenario. This brings us all to that final piece of the puzzle. If public order diminishes to the point that the military feels obliged to step in, it is hard to see how they could do so while remaining acquiescent to President Morsi. On the contrary, it might be easier for the military to simply place him, and other members of the MB leadership, under house arrest. In such a scenario, can anyone really envisage that the MB would simply say ‘OK’? What would their response be? Would it turn violent? No-one knows for sure – but everyone does know that Egypt is now a country that is armed on a far more widespread level than it was in the past. The irony is – everyone sees this scenario as quite plausible, if not a certainty, except for the MB. The MB leadership is convinced it can move forward and continue in the way it has done thus far. It does not seem to realise that it is indeed in the cross-hairs. Escaping from this slow train-wreck is possible – but that all depends on President Morsi.
Afghan government says Nato war 'aimless, unwise'
http://www.stasiareport.comAfghanistan's presidential spokesman on Tuesday described the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato)-led military operation in the war-torn nation as "aimless and unwise", in the latest broadside by Kabul against the international coalition. Mr Aimal Faizi, spokesman for President Hamid Karzai, hit out after Nato chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen rejected Karzai's recent allegations of United States (US) collusion with the Taleban. "The people of Afghanistan ask Nato to define the purpose and aim of the so-called war on terror.... (They) consider this war as aimless and unwise to continue," Mr Faizi said in a statement. The verbal onslaught is likely to worsen relations between Afghanistan and the international coalition that has been fighting for 11 years against Islamist militants who are trying to overthrow Karzai's government.
Migration part of global development

Pakistani voters must reject those parties and candidates that have ties with ASWJ-LeJ terrorists

Editor’s note: Voting is a very important decision. LUBP(Let Us Build Pakistan) urges its readers to encourage moderate Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and all other communities to collectively vote against those parties and candidates that have any ties with or support of Takfiri Deobandis militants of Sipah-e-Sahaba (operating as ASWJ, TTP, LeJ etc). These are enemies of Pakistan who enjoy support of Saudi Arabia and certain rogue elements in Pakistan army. The undermining of the pro-Taliban pro-ASWJ Takfiri establishment should be the biggest issue in the next election. Sipah-e-Sahaba Taliban terrorists are contesting elections on the platform of Mutahidda Deeni Mahaz (MDM, United Religious Front), an alliance of Takfiri Deobandi militant groups under the leadership of Mullah Samiul Haq Deobandi, Ahmed Ludhianvi Deobandi, Malik Ishaq Deobandi and Hakeem Ibrahim Qasmi Deobandi. Their election sign is ‘ladder’. Make sure to bring their ladder down, along with all those parties and candidates who are forging political alliance with these enemies of Pakistan. LUBP calls on all Pakistan media to join us in this call to vote smart, vote to save your own life and the lives of the oppressed people of Pakistan.Votes of religious minorities can play a key role in the coming elections in about 96 constituencies of national and provincial assemblies. Analysts believe minorities can change the electoral scene in many of these constituencies if they choose to collectively vote for specific political parties or candidates. According to official statistics available with Dawn, there are 2.77 million non-Muslim voters in the country, and 13 districts in Sindh and two in Punjab have significant presence of these voters. Umerkot and Tharparkar districts in Sindh have as high as 49 per cent and 46pc non-Muslim voters, respectively. In Umerkot, there are a total of 386,924 voters of which 189,501 belong to religious minorities. In Tharparkar, out of a total of 473,189 voters, 219,342 are non-Muslim. In Mirpurkhas, the total number of voters is 590,035 and among them 192,357 (33pc) are non-Muslim. In Tando Allahyar, 74,954 non-Muslims constitute 26pc of the total 288,460 voters. In Badin and Sanghar, the proportion of non-Muslim voters is 19pc. Total number of voters in the two districts is 642,243 and 797,976, with 123,845 and 150,234 non-Muslim, respectively. In Tando Mohammad Khan, 39,847 non-Muslims account for 17pc of total 231,522 voters. In Matiari, 81,589 non-Muslims constitute 13pc of total 302,265 voters. In Karachi (south), total number of voters is 1,070,321 and among them 81,589 (8pc) are non-Muslim. In Ghotki and Hyderabad, 41,031 and 62,243 non-Muslims account for 7pc of the total 571,636 and 928,236 voters, respectively. In Chiniot and Lahore districts of Punjab — 35,335 and 247,827 non-Muslims constitute 6pc of the total 604,991 and 4,424,314 voters, respectively. In Jamshoro and Kashmore districts of Sindh, 18,912 and 17,495 non-Muslims are 5pc of the total 373,097 and 355,904 voters, respectively. Among 2.77m non-Muslim voters, 1.40m are Hindus, 1.23m Christians, 115,966 Ahmadis, 5,934 Sikhs, 3,650 Parsis, 1,452 Buddhists and 809 Jews. Jews and Parsis are two minorities in which number of women is higher than that of men. There are 1,915 Parsi female voters against 1,735 male voters. The number of Jewish women voters is 427 against 382 men in the community. Talking to Dawn, National Database and Registration Authority (Nadra) chairman Tariq Malik asked members of the minority communities to check their names in voter lists through Nadra’s SMS service by sending the number of their computerised national identity card to the code 8300 in a text message.
Turkish media in betrayal of democracy

By: SERKAN DEMİRTAŞI admit that the title of this column is an assertive one. But, unfortunately, it describes the current state of the Turkish media in the most suitable way. A good majority of journalists are part of this betrayal, some on purpose and some not, but, at the end of the day, that counts for the whole media sector. It’s a well-established fact that freedom of expression has been deteriorating significantly under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, especially since 2008. The first and most important hit was the world-record three-billion-dollar tax levy issued against the country’s largest media group in the late 2000s for its coverage of corruption allegedly linked with ruling party officials. That followed the detention and arrest of dozens of journalists as part of ongoing prosecutions on alleged coup attempts and other cases. Led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and followed by top government officials, a very strongly worded media-bashing campaign found its place as an important element of ruling party policies, in the meantime. This campaign, fueled by growing intolerance against AKP opponents, also included veiled threats against the media bosses that had to fire some government-critical columnists or TV producers. With the recent victim of this tradition, veteran journalist Hasan Cemal, the number of sidelined or silenced colleagues has reached more than two dozen so far. Turkey is passing through a landmark transformation with very important processes aiming to solve the Kurdish question, rewrite the Constitution and accelerate the EU process. The role of the media in this process is very, very important in terms of providing sound and correct information to the public. The very essence of the existence of the media is its ability to meet the people’s right to demand accurate information. A media so under threat that it is exercising self-censorship or underreporting on all of these sensitive issues would not naturally serve for the good sake of democracy. Media, as the fourth power in modern democracies, is the most influential element in building public opinion either for or against the government but always in the service of the public interest. Those in the media who believe that they are doing the right thing by not questioning government policies are in fact denying the role of free journalism. It is also a fact that the problem is rather structural because of problematic ownership in the media sector. Those in the government who complained about it a decade ago are now benefiting from it as they successfully manage to create their own media. An institutional democracy requires institutionalized media. An institutionalized media requires individually and structurally independent journalists both economically and consciously. The contrary could only bring an embedded media with fully dependent journalists on those who have the power. And that is not compatible with contemporary democracy but with old-fashioned authoritarian reigns.
Pakistan: ''Corruption is us''

By Mohammad A QadeerIn almost every Pakistani home on a typical evening, there is a passionate recounting of the day's stories of officials' bribery, merchants' cheating, WAPDA's overbilling, bureaucrats' nepotism and politicians' loot. It is always the others who are corrupt, not us. There is a national consensus that corruption is the number one problem of Pakistan. Yet it has spread in all areas of life, partially because it is woven into our social organization and embedded in the moral order.

Turkey Miscalculates Syria

By: Semih IdizTwo years have elapsed in the Syrian conflict, and no apparent end to the bloodshed is in sight, as the warring sides are locked in what looks increasingly like a war of attrition. Ankara's calculations concerning Syria seem to have amounted to nothing over the past few years. But even more than that, Syria has turned out to be the crisis on which Turkey’s ambitious Middle East policies foundered in ways expected by neither Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu — the architect of the now-defunct “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Just over two years ago, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Erdogan met in a friendly atmosphere for the groundbreaking ceremony for the so-called “Friendship Dam,” to be built on the Orontes River which separates the two countries. Erdogan couldn't have predicted that this friendship would turn sour just a few months down the road. Turkey and Syria had not only lifted visa restrictions in order to enable the two nations to mingle and increase their economic interaction, but had also held joint cabinet meetings to demonstrate just how close the two countries had become. There was also a tone of defiance in Ankara’s Syrian policy at the time — sending a message to a West increasingly wary of these ties that Turkey, and not others, would decide who Ankara would establish ties with. In the meantime, Ankara demonstrated its potential as a regional “soft power” when it mediated indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel. Although that effort ended abruptly after Israel unleashed its brutal “Operation Cast Lead” against Gaza at the end of 2008, it nevertheless showed that Turkey could act for the benefit of the region. Another development along these lines was the 2010 deal spelled out in the “Tehran Declaration,” worked out by Turkey with Brazil for Iran’s enriched uranium stocks. That deal was eventually rejected by Washington, but nevertheless proved Turkey’s ability to mediate regional disputes. But all that is a distant echo today: Assad has turned into Erdogan’s archenemy, and Turkey retains scant leverage over Iran due to the radically different positions of the two countries on Syria. What went so wrong for Turkey that it finds itself in this situation? There was nothing wrong in Ankara’s opening up to the Arab world, with Syria as the main litmus test in this regard. Erdogan and Davutoglu’s intentions on Syria were ultimately good. Their mistake was adopting overly ambitious policies that misjudged the Middle East and miscalculated Turkey’s capacity to influence the course of events in the region. Those were the days when Davutoglu claimed that Turkey knew the Middle East better than most because of its past there, and uttered remarks to the effect that not even a leaf could budge in the region without Ankara’s consent. According to Davutoglu, Turkey was “the region’s game setter.” Armed with that kind of self-assurance, he went to Damascus in August 2011 with the hopes of convincing Assad to reform his country and avoid the fate of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. But six hours of talks with Assad bore no fruit, and ties between Ankara and Damascus took a nosedive after that failure. Davutoglu had simply overestimated his capacity to convince Assad. But Davutoglu's misjudgments of Syria didn't end there. He also failed to consider Syria's complicated demographic makeup with its ethnic, sectarian and regional fault lines, and he overlooked the bad blood that went back to the Hama massacres of 1982. Erdogan and Davutoglu preferred to see the situation in Syria simplistically, as a case of a brutal dictator attacking and killing his own people. Ankara failed to consider the fact that Assad still retained support from minority Alawites and from Christians who feared Sunnis were out to avenge the past. In the end, Turkey’s support for the “oppressed Syrian people” came to be seen by Syria's Alawites and Christians as support for the Syria's Sunni majority. As a result, many in the region now think Ankara is pursuing a divisive policy in Syria based on its own sectarian preferences. Another major misjudgment by Ankara concerned Syria’s historic links with Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, and Iran, as well as radical groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah, for whom Assad’s survival is vitally important. Turkey has had no success in diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing Moscow and Tehran to desert Assad for the opposition — a clear indication that Davutoglu didn't understand the nature of the strategic relationship these countries seek to protect with Syria. The irony is that Volkan Bozkir, a deputy from Erdogan’s own party who is a former senior diplomat, and currently heads the Foreign Relations Committee in the Turkish parliament, has said on numerous occasions that there can be no settlement to the Syrian crisis which does not factor in Russian interests. One could add Iran's interests to this equation. This realistic piece of advice from a seasoned diplomat was not taken seriously by Erdogan or Davutoglu, who instead put all of Turkey’s eggs into single basket and developed a one-dimensional policy of dispatching Assad by any means possible. Turkey today continues to bet on a military victory by the opposition, even as that seems increasingly impossible. Ankara also underestimated the “Kurdish dimension” of the Syrian uprising, and Turkey was caught unexpectedly when Syrian Kurds started gaining ground along the border with Turkey. Kurdish reports claim that Ankara went on to pursue a proxy war by supporting jihadist elements such as Jabhat al-Nusra fighting the Syrian Kurds. As a result of these miscalculations, Ankara today faces a multidimensional crisis in Syria, with refugees continuing to stream into Turkish territory and new threats posed to Turkey’s security. Ankara is no longer a key player, let alone a “game setter,” in the search for a resolution to the crisis, having lost its impartiality in regional disputes. No mater what policy it pursued, the Erdogan government would have been faced with a serious crisis on its borders as a result of the uprising in Syria. But had it positioned itself better with a deeper understanding of the region, instead of operating on the basis of subjective assumptions, it could have left some useful channels of communication open with the Assad regime. Instead, it preferred to burn bridges instead and turn Assad — who was no less of a brutal dictator when Ankara enjoyed good ties with him — into an arch-enemy. It chose to pursue policies that have left Turkey facing Shiite and Alawite accusations of destabilizing the region with sectarian policies, which in turn have deepened the divisions in Syria.
'Assad Must Go' Is the Wrong Solution




European Union poverty 'eating into the heart of society'



Poor British pupils deprived of meal at school


Italy and India diplomatic row escalates


Israeli president: No doubt Obama has Israel's back

Obama relishes opportunity to wear green tie
http://www.politico.comPresident Obama welcomed his fellow Irishman, Prime Minister Enda Kenny, to the White House on Tuesday, for a two-days-late celebration of St. Patrick's Day.

Israel's Defense ministry to showcase Iron Dome to Obama

Say Goodbye to the Assault Weapons Ban


Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly dissolved

Cost of U.S. wars in Iraq, Afghanistan will linger over 100 years
The U.S. government will be paying for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for the next century. History says so: the federal government is still making monthly payments to relatives of veterans from wars dating back to the Civil War and the Spanish-American War.If history is any judge, the U.S. government will be paying for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for the next century as service members and their families grapple with the sacrifices of combat.

پېښور کچرۍ کې د ځانمرګو بریدونو خلاف د وکیلانو ویر او هړتال
http://www.mashaalradio.orgد خیبر پښتونخوا دمرکز پیښور په کچرۍ کې پرون د ګل پر ورځ د ځانمرګو بریدونو خلاف د عدالت کارکوونکو او وکیلانو د دریو ورځو ویر اعلان کړی دی. دوی د بریدونو په کلکو ټکو غندنه کړې او د عدالتي پلټنې غوښتنه یې کړېده. وکیلانو نن کارونه هم نه کول.
Force is no solution to the Balochistan conundrum


Rape of Swiss national tarnishes India's image
Pakistani Ruling Party Slams Taliban's Peace Talks Postponement
Malala back at school for first time since attack



Legendary actor Muhammad Ali to be remembered today

Pakistan: Awarding perks to themselves

Pakistan: Futile infighting over caretaker PM

Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)