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Monday, August 11, 2014
Prepare for a long war against the Islamic State
The hawks (including me) were wrong about a lot, but some got one thing right. It's going to be a long war.Jonah Goldberg
In the early days after 9/11, there was a lot of talk about a "clash of civilizations" and a long "existential struggle" facing the West. I once asked the late Christopher Hitchens what he felt on that terrible day and he said he felt no small amount of joy. Not for the suffering and death, but for the fact that the West finally had been awakened to the terrible but necessary struggle before us.And for a time, many liberals bought into the idea that America was heading into a generational struggle with jihadism. There were a slew of books on the subject. Peter Beinart, for instance, wrote "The Good Fight: Why Liberals — and Only Liberals — Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again." As the subtitle suggests, there was a lot of partisan mischief in his argument, but it rested on the premise that liberals must accept that "Islamic totalitarianism" — his phrase — has replaced communism as our enemy. On this, at least, Beinart and company briefly agreed with George W. Bush that the war against "Islamic fascists" — Bush's term — was the "decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century."
That consensus evaporated in the hot rage ignited by the Iraq war. By the time President Obama was elected, even the war in Afghanistan — once the good war according to most Iraq war critics — had become an emotional albatross. Tellingly, Obama's first executive order was to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as quickly as possible.
This was a triumph for the new enlightened consensus that the war on terror wasn't really a war at all. In 2007, retired Gen. Wesley Clark co-wrote an op-ed for the New York Times ridiculing the idea that Al Qaeda was a military enemy. "Labeling its members as combatants elevates its cause and gives Al Qaeda an undeserved status," he argued. The "more appropriate designation for terrorists is not 'unlawful combatant' but the one long used by the United States: criminal."Although Obama has tried to move captured terrorists into the domestic criminal justice system, to his credit, he never fully bought into this argument. Still, he cast terrorism as a manageable problem for the experts, not a civilizational struggle. Zeus-like, he personally went over his kill lists, selecting which enemies should be dispatched with a drone strike or, in the case of Osama bin Laden, the furies of SEAL Team Six. When new threats emerged, the White House dismissed them with the whitewash that "core Al Qaeda" was "on the run." All pretenders to Al Qaeda's mantle were little more than a "jayvee" squad, as Obama put it. It's OK to slumber again was the message.
One jayvee squad — the self-styled Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS — now controls the territorial equivalent of Britain and is one of the best-equipped and motivated military forces in the Middle East. Everyday jihadists — many with Western passports — enlist in the struggle to create a global caliphate while the "Muslim street" from Turkey to Saudi Arabia follows the Islamic State like a sports team.The Islamic State's atrocities are too numerous and too horrible to list here. It includes rape and slavery, religious cleansing, mass murder, public crucifixions and beheadings. Over the weekend, an Iraqi official said that the Islamic State had killed at least 500 Iraqi Yazidis, burying some alive, including women and children. The group is only too happy to tweet about all of it. Watch Vice TV's reports from Islamic State-controlled parts of Syria and you will quickly see how the word "criminal" is morally, logically and strategically inadequate. They indoctrinate children to become jihadists and suicide bombers. They vow to fly their black flag over the White House. No one in the West wants a generational struggle with jihadism anymore than Israel wants perpetual war with Hamas in Gaza. The problem is the enemy always gets a vote. And it just may be that the Middle East will become the West's Gaza. And so far, nobody has a good answer for what to do about it.
Mugged by reality in the Middle East
So ends a foreign policy experiment that began with two choices in 2011. In that hinge year, President Obama decided to stay out of the Syrian conflict and to passively accept the withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Iraq (which he later claimed as a personal achievement during his reelection campaign). I’m not sure the motivation behind these acts can be termed a strategy. They seemed rooted in a perception of the public’s war-weariness (which Obama fed through his own rhetoric), a firm determination to be the anti-Bush and a vague belief that a U.S. presence in the Middle East creates more problems than it solves. Not coincidentally, according to political scientist Colin Dueck, “elite, trans-Atlantic liberal opinion” viewed Obama’s approach as “the height of sophistication, regardless of its practical failures.” Those failures are now massive, undeniable and unfolding: Atrocities in Syria (including the death of more than 10,000 children); an endless Syrian civil war in which the threat of the Islamic State gathered strength; the victory of the Islamic State against a hollowed-out Iraqi military; the massacre of religious minorities; the establishment of a terrorist safe haven the size of New England, controlled by well-armed, expansionist, messianic militants; the attraction of more than 10,000 global jihadists to the conflict, including thousands with Western passports; and now the forced return of U.S. attention to the region under dramatically less-favorable circumstances. This is what the complete collapse of a foreign policy doctrine looks like. In the absence of stabilizing U.S. leadership, the Middle East has become a regional Sunni-Shiite proxy war in which the most radical and ruthless thrive. The Obama administration seems gobsmacked by the speed and extent of this unraveling. The possible collapse of Kurdistan (one of our most reliable friends in the region) was something that even the worst-case American analyses during the grimmest days of the Iraq War did not contemplate. This is what shocked the administration into (limited) action and accelerated the rethinking of U.S. policy. The options are few. The administration could seek the eventual destruction of the Islamic State safe haven. This would involve encouraging a political accommodation to increase the legitimacy of Iraq’s central government; stabilizing the defense of Irbil and Baghdad with immediate military aid (which the administration has tentatively begun); targeting the extremists on both sides of the (nonexistent) Iraq/Syria border; attempting to peel off support among Sunni tribes sickened by the Islamic State’s brutality; and dramatically strengthening the Iraqi government and the Kurds so they can regain the offensive over time. Thousands of U.S. troops would be necessary to advise Iraqi units, collect intelligence, conduct airstrikes and carry out special operations raids. This approach would require presidential leadership to mobilize American national will for a difficult fight against a determined enemy. An alternative option might be the long-term containment of the Islamic State threat. This would also involve stabilizing the military situation in Iraq’s north and south but leaving Islamic State militants in control of large sections of Syria and Iraq — trying to degrade their ability to strike globally and making clear that attacks on Western targets would bring massive retribution. This assumes a level of rationality (Western, secular rationality) on the part of Islamic State leaders that can only be called laughable. It is also the strategy most likely — after, say, a large-scale attack traced to the Islamic State on a U.S. city — to result in U.S. divisions back in Mosul. Or the Obama administration could continue to make a series of tactical adjustments to avoid further disaster while avoiding setting out any definition of victory, which might become a standard against which it is judged. This might (with luck) run out the second-term clock; it would also leave a toxic mess for the next president. Clearly, the Obama administration is undergoing an internal struggle to define its ultimate policy goal. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey talks of a strategy to “initially contain, eventually disrupt and finally defeat [the Islamic State] over time.” Meanwhile, unnamed White House officials consistently downplay the ambition of U.S. goals in Iraq. And the president himself is a model of ambiguity, leaving the world to wonder if any of his various lines have a hint of red. Is it even possible for Obama to make the psychological adjustment from “the ender of wars” to “the sworn enemy of the Islamic State”? His record offers no reason for encouragement. But on this unlikely transformation now depends the future of the Middle East and the security of the United States.By Michael Gerson
The case for doing nothing in the Middle East
By Stephen M. Walt
Every time the U.S. touches the region, it makes things worse. It's time to walk away and not look back.In case you hadn't noticed, the Middle East is going from bad to worse these days. The Syrian civil war grinds on. Israel and the Palestinians spent the last month in another pointless bloodletting (most of the blood being Palestinian). ISIS keeps expanding its control in parts of Iraq, placing thousands of members of the Yazidi religious sect in peril and leading the Obama administration to launch airstrikes and deliver airborne humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, officials back in Baghdad snipe mostly at each other. Libya continues to unravel, belying the high-fives that liberal hawks gave themselves back when Qaddafi fell. A U.S. general was shot and killed in Afghanistan, and another disputed election threatens democracy there and may give the Taliban new opportunities to make gains at Kabul's expense. Turkey's Prime Minister Recip Erdogan has been calling Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi a "tyrant," an irony given Erdogan's own authoritarian tendencies. A diplomatic spat between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar remains unsettled. Nature even seems to be against us: the MERS virus on the Arabian Peninsula may be transmissible by airborne contact. I'm sure you could find some good news if you tried, but you'd have to squint pretty hard. A string of events like this attracts critics and Cassandras like yellow jackets to a backyard picnic. In The Washington Post, neoconservative Eliot Cohen laments the "wreckage" of U.S. Middle East policy, blaming everything on Barack Obama's failure to recognize "war is war" and his reluctance to rally the nation to wage more of them. (Never mind that the last war Cohen helped get the United States into — the invasion of Iraq in 2003 — did far more damage than anything Obama has done.) A far more convincing perspective comes from former Ambassador Chas Freeman who surveys several decades of America's meddling in the region and comes to a depressing conclusion: "It's hard to think of any American project in the Middle East that is not now at or near a dead end." Is there a silver lining in this disheartening tableaux? Perhaps. After all, when things are this bad, the need to rethink the entire U.S. approach to the region is hard to escape. If we cast aside familiar shibboleths and taboos and took a fresh look, what might we see? Since World War II, the meddling that Freeman recounts has been conducted in partnership with various regional allies. These alignments may have been a strategic necessity during the Cold War (though even that could be debated), but the sad fact is that the United States has no appealing partners left today. Egypt is a corrupt military dictatorship with grim prospects, and Erdogan's AKP regime in Turkey is trending toward one-party rule, while its ambitious "zero problems" foreign policy has gone badly off the rails. Working with the Assad regime in Syria is out of the question — for good reason — but most of Bashar al-Assad's opponents are no prize either. Saudi Arabia is a geriatric, theocratic monarchy that treats half its population — i.e., its women — like second-class citizens (at best). Iran is a different sort of theocratic state: it has some quasi-democratic features, but also an abysmal human rights record and worrisome regional ambitions. The view doesn't get much better no matter where one looks. The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has been an ally for decades, but it remains heavily dependent on outside support and is too weak and fragile to be the linchpin of U.S. engagement. The same is true for Lebanon. Libya doesn't even have a government, let alone one the United States would want to be close to. Israel is wrapping up its latest outrage against the Palestinians-to no lasting strategic purpose — and its march to the right now includes open advocacy of eliminationist policies by prominent political figures. The "special relationship" with Israel also fuels anti-Americanism and makes Washington look both hypocritical and ineffectual in the eyes of much of the world. But Palestinian political groups are no more appealing: the Palestinian Authority is corrupt and ineffectual and elements of Hamas still proclaim the worst sort of toxic anti-Semitism. States like Qatar and Bahrain do provide valuable real estate for U.S. bases, and many of these governments cooperate with the United States out of their own self-interest, but it's hard to find anyone in the region that looks like a genuine strategic or moral asset these days. Faced with this unpromising environment, what would be the sensible — or dare I say realistic — thing for the United States to do? The familiar answer is to say that it's an imperfect world and that we have no choice but to work with what we've got. We hold our noses, and cut deals with the least objectionable parties in the region. As Michael Corleone would say, it's not personal; it's strictly business. But this view assumes that deep engagement with this troubled area is still critical to U.S. national interests, and further assumes the United States reaps net benefits from its recurrent meddling on behalf of its less-than-loyal partners. In other words, it assumes that these partnerships and deep U.S. engagement make Americans safer and more prosperous here at home. But given the current state of the region and the condition of most of our putative allies, that assumption is increasingly questionable. In fact, most of the disputes and divisions that are currently roiling the region do not pose direct and mortal threats to vital U.S. interests. It is admittedly wrenching to watch what is happening in Syria or Gaza, or to Israel's democracy, but these events affect the lives of very few Americans directly. Unless, of course, we are foolish enough to throw ourselves back into the middle of the maelstrom. Moreover, the Middle East today is riven by a series of overlapping conflicts along multiple fault lines, driven in good part by protracted government failures and exacerbated by misguided outside meddling. There's the division between Sunni and Shiite, of course, and between Islamists (of many different stripes) and traditional authoritarians (also of several different types). Add to that mix the conflicts along sectarian lines (as in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere), and the recurring suspicions between Arabs and Persians. And don't forget the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, which still reverberates throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Here's where Americans need to remember the United States may have permanent interests in the Middle East, but not necessarily permanent friends. In terms of its strategic interests, the central U.S. goal since World War II has been to prevent any single power from dominating the oil rich Persian Gulf. However troubled we may be by all the divisions and quarrels in the region, those conflicts also make the possibility that one power will dominate the region more remote than ever. Does anyone seriously think Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS), the Kurds, Russia, Turkey, China or anyone else is going to take over and manage this vast and turbulent area, and smooth out all these rifts and feuds? Of course not. And if that is the case, then America's primary strategic goal will be met whether Washington lifts a finger or not. Some will argue that we have a moral responsibility to try to end the obvious suffering in different places, and a strategic imperative to eradicate terrorists and prevent the spread of WMD. These are laudable goals, but if the history of the past 20 years teaches us anything, it is that forceful American interference of this sort just makes these problems worse. The Islamic State wouldn't exist if the neocons hadn't led us blindly into Iraq, and Iran would have less reason to contemplate getting nuclear weapons if it hadn't watched the United States throw its weight around in the region and threaten it directly with regime change. So instead of acting like a hyperactive juggler dashing between a dozen spinning plates, maybe the best course is to step back even more than we have already. No, I don't mean isolationism: What I mean is taking seriously the idea of strategic disengagement and putting the whole region further down on America's list of foreign policy priorities. Instead of constantly cajoling these states to do what we think is best — and mostly getting ignored or rebuked by them — maybe we should let them sort out these problems themselves for awhile. And if any of them eventually want American help, it should come at a steep price. Among other things, the policy I'm suggesting would mean the United States would stop its futile efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I've argued against such a course in the past, but it is now obvious to me that no president is willing to challenge Israel's backers here in the United States and make U.S. support for Israel conditional on an end to the occupation. Until that happens, even well-intentioned efforts to broker a peace will keep failing. Instead of continuing to squander valuable time and prestige on a fruitless endeavor, the U.S. government should disengage from this thankless task until it is ready to do more than just palaver and plead. If Israel's leaders want to risk their own future by creating a "greater Israel," so be it. It would be regrettable if Israel ended up an apartheid state and an international pariah, but preventing that tragedy is not a vital U.S. interest. (If it really were, U.S. policy since Oslo might have been rather different.) To be consistent, of course, the United States would also end its military and economic aid to Egypt, Israel, and perhaps a few others. I don't expect Congress to suddenly grow a backbone and do the right thing here, but even a realist can dream, can't he? But even if the "special relationship" remains more-or-less intact, at least U.S. diplomats wouldn't be wasting more time and energy trying to do the impossible. To be sure, the course of action I'm sketching here is likely to leave the Middle East in a pretty messy condition for some time to come. But that is going to be the case no matter what Washington decides to do. So the question is: should the United States squander more blood and treasure on a series of futile tasks, and in ways that will make plenty of people in the region angry and encourage a few of them look for ways to deliver some payback? Or should the United States distance itself from everyonein the region, and prepare to intervene only when a substantial number of American lives are at risk or in the unlikely event that there is a genuine and imminent threat of regional domination? The latter course would be a real departure for U.S. policy, and I can see the potential downside risks. Some local governments might be less willing to share intelligence with us, or to collaborate on counter-terrorism. That would be unfortunate, but on the other hand, because anti-American terrorism emanating from the region is mostly a violent reaction to past U.S. policies, a less engaged policy would almost certainly make that problem less severe. In any case, the results of a different approach could hardly be worse than what the United States has managed to achieve over the past 20-plus years. Unless Americans have a masochistic addiction to disappointment, this seems like an ideal time for a more fundamental rethink. One final thought: this argument would not preclude limited U.S. action for purely humanitarian purposes — such as humanitarian airdrops for the beleaguered religious minorities now threatened with starvation in Iraq. That's not "deep engagement"; that's merely trying to help people threatened with imminent death. But I would not send U.S. forces — including drones or aircraft — out to win a battle that the Iraqi government or the Kurds cannot win for themselves. The United States spent the better part of a decade chasing that elusive Grail, and the end result was precisely the sort of chaos and sectarian rivalry that has produced this latest crisis. We may be able to do some limited good for the endangered minorities, but above all, let's do no further harm: not to the region, and not to ourselves.
http://theweek.com/article/index/266111/the-case-for-doing-nothing-in-the-middle-east
Obama applauds nomination of new Iraqi PM as "step forward"
Speaking to reporters in the Massachusetts island of Martha's Vineyard, where he is vacationing with his family, Obama said Iraq had made important strides toward rebuffing fighters from the Islamic State, an al-Qaeda offshoot, since the United States authorized air strikes last week.
He urged the quick formation of an inclusive government to address the needs of all Iraqis.
"Today Iraq took a promising step forward in this critical effort," Obama said in brief remarks.
Obama's comments and a congratulatory telephone call he made to Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Haider al-Abadi signal the administration's expectation, or hope, that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's 8-year-rule is all but over, even as Maliki shows no sign of relinquishing power.
"They’re treating him like he’s the prime minister already,” Michael Knights, a Boston-based fellow and Iraq scholar at the Washington Institute, said of Abadi."Now the U.S. can press on with its offer of enhanced security cooperation with Iraq."
Maliki, a Shi'ite Muslim Islamist blamed by Washington for driving the alienated Sunni minority into a revolt that is fueling the Islamic State's brutal insurgency, deployed militias and special forces on the streets on Monday in a potentially dangerous political showdown.
Obama urged Abadi to quickly form a new cabinet that represents Iraq's different ethnic and religious communities. "This new Iraqi leadership has a difficult task," Obama said. "It has to regain the confidence of its citizens by governing inclusively and by taking steps to demonstrate its resolve."
Abadi, a deputy speaker and veteran of Maliki's Dawa Party, was named by President Fouad Masoum on Monday to replace Maliki.
"PARTNER IN BAGHDAD"Obama's comments underline what one former U.S. official described as a potential "sea change" in Washington's ties with Baghdad if Abadi forms a government following increasing U.S. disenchantment with Maliki, who Washington backed as prime minister in 2006 when a Sunni insurgency raged and again in 2010 for a second term. "The U.S. will finally have a partner in Baghdad," said Wayne White, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington and a former senior State Department intelligence official. Born in Baghdad in 1952, Abadi was a trained electrical engineer before entering Iraq's government after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. He was part of the political opposition to late dictator Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime and lived in Britain for many years. Two of his siblings were executed in 1982 for their membership in the then-outlawed Dawa party. James Jeffrey, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2010 to 2012, said he had met Abadi in Baghdad and believed he was "someone the United States could work with." He said that Abadi's main strength was that "he's not Maliki" and has not alienated groups across the Iraqi political spectrum. He predicted that Maliki would resist but not be able to hold onto power. Too many forces inside Iraq, including the country's Shia establishment in the city of Najaf, have turned against Maliki, he added. Jeffrey said that while some Iraqi army units remain personally loyal to Maliki, the presence of 600 American advisers make it difficult for Maliki to get all of Iraq's security forces to act on his behalf. "He's really trapped." A U.S. official said that to his knowledge the United States had not played a role in the selection of Abadi. "We were sufficiently burned by the interference and choice of Maliki that people around here are not into king-making," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "In this case, he was pretty much chosen by the (Iraqi) process and everybody is pretty relieved that they have chosen somebody and that it was not Maliki." Obama late last week authorized air strikes in Iraq to protect U.S. personnel in Arbil from the Islamic State, a Sunni fundamentalist militant group that has swept through northern Iraq, and to ensure that members of the Yazidi sect were not subject to systematic violence at the hands of the militants. The air strikes carried out so far are the first direct U.S. military action in Iraq since the Obama administration completed its withdrawal of U.S. troops at the end of 2011.
'Heroic' mission rescues desperate Yazidis from ISIS
The Iraqi air force and fighters with the Kurdish peshmerga carried out a dramatic rescue mission Monday at Mount Sinjar, taking supplies to desperate Yazidis and bringing some on board the helicopter to make it safely out. A CNN crew was on the flight that took diapers, milk, water and food to the site where thousands of people have been driven by ISIS, which calls itself the Islamic State. CNN's Ivan Watson, who was on the chopper, described the mission as "heroic." Teams hurled out bags and boxes of food from as high as 50 feet before approaching the ground. "We landed on several short occasions, and that's where -- amid this explosion of dust and chaos -- these desperate civilians came racing towards the helicopter, throwing their children on board the aircraft. The crew was just trying to pull up as many people as possible," Watson said. Soon, some of the trapped families -- including babies and the elderly -- were packed into the flight.By Josh Levs and Dana Ford
"It was chaotic. It was crazy, but we were able to then lift off with about 20 civilians," Watson said. Yazidis, among Iraq's smallest minorities, are of Kurdish descent, and their religion is considered a pre-Islamic sect that draws from Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism.
One of the oldest religious communities in the world, they have long suffered persecution, with many Muslims referring to them as devil worshippers. More than a week ago, they fled into the surrounding mountains when ISIS fighters stormed the town of Sinjar. Now, trapped without food, water or medical care in the summer heat, thousands of families are in desperate need of help.
It's already too late to save dozens of children who've died of thirst. But for the 20 or so people rescued Monday, the relief was palpable. The crowd on board the helicopter burst into tears as it took off. Gunners had to open fire at the ground in order to make it away from ISIS. "They flew in shooting; they flew out shooting," Watson reported. "There was not a dry eye on the aircraft."
Controlling the Ebola Epidemic
Many drug companies have little interest in devising treatments or vaccines for Ebola because the potential for profit is small. Much of the research has been financed by the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Defense and carried out by small start-ups, but some experts believe the federal government has not shown enough urgency to push these programs ahead.
Traditional public health measures, like finding and isolating patients who become sick, tracing their contacts and using stringent infection control procedures in hospitals, remain the best bet for containing the epidemic in West Africa.
The C.D.C. has elevated its response to the highest possible level and is sending 50 more health care professionals to the area, backed by hundreds more professionals in this country. Sierra Leone, which has the highest number of cases, is planning to deploy hundreds of troops and police officers to enforce isolation measures that its residents have so far ignored, and Liberia, with the second largest number, has declared a 90-day state of emergency that allows it to suspend civil liberties and impose quarantines. Nigeria has also declared a state of emergency. Such public health measures should ultimately, although perhaps not quickly, bring the outbreaks under control.
Turkey lets Frankensteins loose in ME: Analyst

The Turkish government has been unleashing Frankenstein monsters across the Middle East region by supporting the Takfiri ISIL militants operating in Syria and Iraq, an analyst tells Press TV.“You (Turkey) are letting Frankensteins loose all over the region, which is the last thing the region needs, because no matter what happens in Syria, all of these people with all of these fighting experience, they are going to be looking for another fight to get into,” Jim Dean told Press TV in an interview. He added that the Middle East region now has to live for decades with Turkey’s “horrible mistake,” emphasizing that Turkey is “siding with the West” in its “destabilization program” for the region. Dean said Turkey is currently helping the ISIL militants operating in Iraq by buying the oil they have been stealing from Iraq. “We are tracking now ISIL and other jihadists that are taking over the oil areas; most of that oil they are selling it, transporting it to Turkey,” he said, adding, “So, Turkey is actually helping them fund themselves, which is making them independent even from the [Persian] Gulf states.” The crisis in Iraq escalated after the ISIL Takfiri militants took control of Mosul, in a lightning advance on June 10. More than a million people have been displaced in Iraq so far this year, according to the United Nations. The ISIL has vowed to continue its raid towards Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said that the country’s security forces would confront the terrorists, calling the seizure of Mosul a “conspiracy."
Pakistan: No political representation of Ahmadis
Elections in Pakistan were held under a joint electorate system since 1947. All religious communities contested and voted for general seats at both federal and provincial level.
During the PPP government, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reserved seats for religious minorities in provincial assemblies in the 1973 constitution. The fourth amendment to the constitution in 1975 introduced six additional seats for minority groups in the National Assembly.
After Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims through an amendment to the constitution in 1974, their name was also added to the list of minorities with reserved seats. But these reserved seats were in addition to the minorities’ right to vote and contest elections in the general elections.
In 1984, Zia ul Haq introduced separate electorate by raising the number of seats for minorities from 6 to 10 in the National Assembly, and 9 to 23 in provincial assemblies. Ahmadis were allotted one National Assembly seat.
The separate electorate barred minorities from contesting or voting on general seats. This meant that there was, for example, only one seat available in the National Assembly to the Ahmadi community. So, the community could only vote on that one seat regardless of location of the candidate’s geography. Minorities lost the right to have a say in who governed them in their own constituencies.
In 2002, General (retd) Pervez Musharaf reintroduced the joint electorate system through The Conduct of General Elections Order. Shortly after, he added two more clauses to the 7th Article of the Order that specified a joint electorate system.
Sub-article 7B of the Order dictates that the status of Ahmadis remains unchanged. Article 7C of the Order suggests that if anyone has an objection to any name on the common voters’ list, an objection could be filed before the Revising Authority within 10 days of the issuance of the order. The Revising Authority is then bound to issue a notice to the person against which the application was made to appear and sign a declaration affirming his belief in the finality of the prophethood. Refusal to do so would result in the removal of his name from the joint electoral list and added to a supplementary list of voters as non-Muslim.
This order appears to be a compromise between Musharraf and the religious clerics and did not specifically call for a separate list for Ahmadis. Yet, the Election Commission obtained data from Nadra and published a supplementary list of all Ahmadis in the country. The list, which includes home addresses of the people has been published for all elections since. This effectively means that there is one electoral list for all Pakistanis, and one supplementary list for the Ahmadi community.
Kunwar Idris, on behalf of the community, filed a petition in the Supreme Court in September 2007, claiming Musharraf’s Order “committed an invidious and impermissible discrimination”. The petition was admitted for hearing in February 2010 but is still pending after over a dozen hearings.
Bilawal Bhutto reiterates commitment to protect minorities
pakobserver.netBilawal Bhutto Zardari, Patron-In-Chief, Pakistan Peoples Party has reiterated the commitment of his Party towards complete protection of minorities and equal rights on the eve of National Minority Day being observed in Pakistan today. It may be recalled that August 11 was official declared National Minority Day by former President Asif Ali Zardari during PPP government in 2009 in line with the historic speech of Founder of the Nation Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State”. In the same speech, Quaid-e-Azam said “We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one’s caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State.”
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said it was imperative to follow the foot-steps and vision of Quaid-e-Azam, Quaid-e-Awam Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, the PPP continues to struggle the for rights and protection of Minorities amid A rise in bigotry and extremism. “PPP gave representation to the Minorities in the Senate in 2012 for the first time in the history,” he added. He said the PPP and its leadership has an unshakable commitment to the protection and safeguard of the minorities as equal citizens with the same rights as that of the majority. It is with this commitment and pledge that the Party is fighting against the forces and elements who are bent upon targeting the innocent people of minorities. He said his Party is concerned at the wave of violence against minorities in Punjab, Sindh and KPK where families and homes minority communities were burnt in Gujranwala, Gojra and Hindu traders were killed in Umerkot while Sikh traders were attacked and gunned down in Peshawar. PPP condemned these incidents in unequivocal terms and stands by the bruised communities for justice. PPP Patron-In-Chief further said PPP always stood in the frontlines to safeguard minority communities and the places of worships.
Asif Ali Zardari - Champion of the politics of reconciliation

Zulfikar Shaheed laid the foundation of a people-friendly politics which put the country and the nation as his top-most priority and sacrificed his life for this mission. His great daughter Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto Shaheed whole-heartedly followed in the footsteps of her great father in politics and proved herself to be a true leader of the nation. Benazir Shaheed literally became the binding force between all the four provinces, but the enemy of the people of Pakistan could not bear this and brutally murdered her in a cowardly terrorist attack to pave way for their nefarious agenda. After the demise of Ouaid-e-Awam (People's Leader) and Shaheed-e- Jamhooriat (Martyr of Democracy), it was Asif Ali Zardari who took the responsibility at this critical time to shoulder the burden of the leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the only party which represents all the four provinces with an ideology deeply rooted in the hearts of almost all Pakistanis. At a time when the martyrdom of Mohtarma Benazir brought grief and rage among the masses and inter-provincial harmony was at stake, it was Asif Ali Zardari who not only kept the party united by raising the slogan of Pakistan Khappay' (Long Live Pakistan) but also brought harmony among a grieved nation. Being a man of vision, he has bravely faced all the challenges that came his way and fought his political rivals with such a sagacity, deep insight, broad vision and unwavering resolve that even his opponents are forced to admit that he is the true successor of Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the best politician of Pakistan. Pakistan Peoples Party registered huge victory in 2008 elections and it brought a new and fresh change in Pakistani politics, as Asif Zardari kept all the political differences aside for the greater good. The most effective weapon through which he has conquered his political opponents is his politics of reconciliation. It was first time in the history of Pakistan politics that a winning party shared the power with all major political stakeholders. It was the result of this politics of reconciliation that democracy has got a chance to strengthen its roots after a long period of dictatorship. Pakistan Peoples Party's five years in the central government is a bright example of this reconciliation policy. The democracy is strengthening in Pakistan today and it is only due to Asif Zardari, who not only consolidated the base of democracy during his five years in power but also handed over the power to next government in a peaceful manner which has guaranteed the country a bright and democratic political future. In Sindh Province too, the people's government of the PPP is following this golden principle of political reconciliation under the leadership of Asif Ali Zardari, as per his vision. Despite having a majority in the provincial assembly, Sindh government has shared power with the MOM, which has a large representation of the people of Urban Sindh, just to respect the people's mandate and paving way for development and prosperity of the province. One year of Pakistan Peoples Party in Sindh is a golden period for the development of the province and is also an example to follow for the other provinces. Sindh's people's government is leaving no stone unturned to bring prosperity and progress to the masses of the province and it is working day and night to achieve this goal under the able leadership of true political heir of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Shaheed and Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Shaheed, Asif Ali Zardari. And this journey towards a bright future will remain continue. After the demise of Quaid-e-Awam and Shaheed-e-Jamhooriat, the burden of the leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the only Party which represents all the four Provinces, fell on the shoulders of Asif Ali Zardari. Pakistan Peoples Party registered huge victory in 2008 elections, bringing a new turn to the Pakistani politics, when Asif Zardari introduced his policy of political reconciliation by keeping all the political differences aside.
'India under polio threat from Pakistan'

Pakistan: Not to let terrorists return, regroup: corps commanders

De-radicalisation programme for North Waziristan IDPs
Dr Fawad Kaiser
While efforts to tackle polarisation are likely to have a positive long-term impact on radicalisation, their success will be inhibited if they are conducted through the lens of securityA total of 570 terrorists and 34 security forces personnel have been killed since Operation Zarb-e-Azb began. Around one million internally displaced persons (IDPs), belonging to 90,750 families, have been registered since the beginning of the operation. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif has said, “Now that their command and communication infrastructure has been disrupted, we will never allow them to return.” In my view, simply referring to the risk of violence and terrorism is not enough to justify the plight and the fear these IDPs will have when they are being rehabilitated. Intervening in this non-violent or pre-violent radicalisation phase with a robust de-radicalisation programme is necessary. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), in consultation with other institutions, can develop a national de-radicalisation screening programme to help counter terrorism and extremism in this cohort. A national de-radicalisation programme can then be implemented for people who are found to be vulnerable to extremism and need to be rehabilitated and reintegrated in society. Such de-radicalisation programmes aim to discover whether rehabilitative forms of counter ideology can be used on Islamist extremists and terrorists in order to de-radicalise them and prevent them from committing acts of terrorism. In the 10 years following the 9/11 attacks of 2001, similar schemes were set up in almost every country where extremism became a problem, from the Far East to Europe. Some were lavishly funded, others poorly resourced. Based on classic criminal rehabilitation programmes, most involve a mix of vocational training and counselling, with a religious component designed to challenge the single narrative of Islamic extremism. They have been lauded by policymakers, counterterrorism experts and pundits as a critical part of the campaign to defend states and societies against militancy. Notwithstanding the difficulties IDPs are going through, virtue ethics gives clear moral justification for programmes to prevent or stop radicalisation, provided that the programmes focus on developing participants’ capabilities to define and live their own good life. This justification for programmes that prevent radicalisation, or are aimed to stop a radicalisation process, poses constraints on the types of programmes that should be developed and the way participants are selected. Because the quest for a good life is a struggle for all human beings, it might not be stigmatising to point to a specific group that needs guidance or support. It needs to be carefully considered whether specific groups are targeted but, in principle, programmes should be open for every person in the camps. De-radicalisation seeks to reverse the radicalisation process for those already or partly radicalised or help them to disengage with radical or extreme groups, whether or not they change their ideas. As a result, it tends to work. The unique approach of the de-radicalisation programme among IDPs can bring together social work with civic education in order to disentangle the individual’s sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world, and help in tackling both the factors driving their anger and also re-educating them in the ways of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing and answering their concerns. The programme can talk them through a ‘hierarchy of needs’: first is self-responsibility and leaving violence, and second is leaving the ideology. Both are important but if you attack the ideology first, you leave the individual with nothing and no sense of meaning or worth. In a very few, the programme cases have been in danger of failing because they were too quick to focus on ideology. This is the key issue. De-radicalisation does not take place in a vacuum. One of the reasons for the disappointment of the on-going intelligence and police led de-radicalisation programme in Pakistan is that, when released, its subjects return directly to villages in areas where support for the Taliban insurgents is strong. Even if individuals are convinced by what they have heard during the programme, they have to be very brave men to go back to their community and start saying that everyone else is wrong. Critically, research analysis shows that de-radicalisation screening and rehabilitation programmes work best when an insurgency or an extremist movement is losing. However, most agree that projects need a mixture of those with direct experience alongside professionals with other skills, such as psychologists, social workers and mental health practitioners. This blended approach brings a more holistic response. For ethical reasons, it is also important that the programme obtains consent from the participants and continues to provide financial and rehabilitative support for families even if they decide not to take part in this programme, as exposure may have harmful effects on them by opening up old wounds. While efforts to tackle polarisation are likely to have a positive long-term impact on radicalisation, their success will be inhibited if they are conducted through the lens of security. This immediately reinforces the uneven power dynamic between government and army, which can hamper efforts at partnership and risk leaving communities more marginalised and fragile rather than empowered and included. Governments must also be mindful of who engages IDPs on counter-polarisation work. Heavy involvement of the army and intelligence agencies in integration work, for example, is not only inappropriate but reinforces suspicions on the part of communities that they are under surveillance and undermines government messages about “partnership”. Broadly speaking, the essential question is whether the objective of these programmes should be disengagement i.e. a change in behaviour or de-radicalisation, meaning a change in beliefs. Counter-radicalisation efforts seek to tackle divisions, grievances, narratives and means, and de-radicalisation projects should aim at influencing both cognitive and behavioural aspects. Current de-radicalisation programmes focus largely on the ideological factor seeking to de-radicalise programme participants through disputation of the content of terrorist groups’ doctrines and religious interpretations. The process through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is intent towards, or support for, violence requires being stopped. Programmes for IDPs can be directed against identified individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence. Governments play an important role in this regard in setting the policy framework, providing funding and addressing structural issues but communities also need to play their part for the overall approach to be successful. The government can sometimes struggle to conduct community-level intervention work at the local level, so there needs to be a partnership approach. Civil society responses in this regard will often occur in the normal pattern of every day life and interactions, rather than specific projects or interventions but it requires communities to be equipped to play this role and have established intergenerational relationships. There is also a role for frontline workers such as teachers, doctors, social workers and mental health professionals to offer support and further help.
Pakistan: Shahbaz Trying To Kill A Fly With A Cannon

Pakistan: Police State

Pakistan: The elite war
by Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
Pakistan: Iftikahr Ch, Sethi, Ramday, Ishtiaq Ahmed played key role in poll rigging

Pakistan: Two wrongs never make a right
Pakistan: Undemocratic actions

Determined to quell the protests of Tahirul Qadri and his supporters, the Punjab government — with, surely, the backing of the prime minister — has raised the stakes alarmingly.A siege mentality combined with a reckless willingness to use the coercive power of the state against political opponents left the provincial capital, Lahore, in a state of virtual lockdown over the weekend and disrupted the transport infrastructure in many parts of the province. To be sure, neither are Mr Qadri’s demands legitimate nor have his supporters been entirely peaceful during various run-ins with the provincial law-enforcement authorities. Yet, this is the same Mr Qadri and the same set of supporters who a year and a half ago set out for Islamabad from Lahore, camped on the streets of Islamabad for days to press their unlawful and unconstitutional demands, and then disbanded — with little to no violence. So it is clearly more than a little disingenuous for the PML-N leadership to claim that Mr Qadri and his supporters are now some great threat to the public peace and so, implicitly, responsible for whatever actions the PML-N government has decided to take against them. Perhaps the larger tragedy here is that a political party that has been in power in Punjab for over six years, has an overwhelming mandate in the province and faces absolutely no threat of being toppled by Mr Qadri’s antics is showing itself to be so undemocratic in its actions. Using the police and the administrative apparatus of the province in such a partisan manner, denying the citizenry its right to free movement and creating an artificial shortage of basic necessities — this is truly the stuff of undemocratic regimes. Elected — legitimately — and twice in a row by the voters of Punjab, the PML-N is proving yet again why genuine and meaningful reform of the police and bureaucracy is so difficult regardless of who is in power. Were there a more independent and rules-bound police and public administration in Punjab — something surely six years of being in charge would have made possible if there had been the political will — the PML-N would be unable to try and crush its political opponents. And so long as that is the basic approach to power (crush or be crushed), the necessary institutional reforms will be resisted by civilian, elected leaders too. Yet, the problems for the PML-N, predictably, have only increased thanks to the events in Lahore over the weekend. Mr Qadri has announced he and his supporters will join the PTI’s Aug 14 rally in Islamabad — signalling an expected convergence of anti-PML-N forces. Meanwhile, the PML-N’s strong-arm tactics will have alienated a few more potential political allies and surely left sections of the public unhappy as well. Political isolation is never a winning political strategy — but it appears to be where the PML-N is headed at the moment.
Pakistan: PTI, Qadri long march: Situation getting dangerous

Pakistan: Kaira condemns Punjab Govt actions

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