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Afghans in Pakistan

PAKISTAN’S western border has been famously porous through much of the country’s history. But flows of migrants intensified from the 1970s onwards, as Pakistan formally played host to Afghans fleeing turmoil, conflict and dictatorial regimes.
At the height of the Soviet occupation, in 1986-87, there were an estimated three million Afghans resident in Pakistan as per UNHCR (the UN refugee agency) and government data. There were no serious efforts to repatriate Afghans till 2002, when the government of Pakistan began to work with UNHCR to encourage Afghans to return to what was then perceived as a stable environment.
The repatriation effort gathered steam after Pakistan started closing down refugee camps in 2005, and the distribution of rations, etc, stopped. However, the reverse flows began to peter out after the Taliban resurgence of 2007-08. In 2021, according to Nadra, there were 2.8m Afghans in Pakistan; 1.6m of whom hold Proof of Registration (POR) cards identifying them as having been registered with the UNHCR. The rest hold ACCs or Afghan Citizen Cards, a form of documentation launched in 2017 to cover Afghan migrants who were essentially undocumented.
Notwithstanding the relatively recent (POR card issuance did not begin till 2006) efforts to document the number of Afghans in Pakistan, there is little doubt that the numbers do not tell the full story. A census of Afghan refugees was not held till 2005, 26 years after the larger flows began. From 1979 to 2005, numbers were estimated based on discussions with tribal elders and household heads, who were asked to state how many family members or dependents they had with them. These numbers were supposed to determine the volume of rations given out, and were almost certainly exaggerated.
In spite of the integration of Afghans into Pakistan’s economy, the official policy is to treat them as temporary residents.
In subsequent years, as families settled in and grew; and more marriages and births took place, this initial (likely) exaggeration was almost certainly offset, however. The census of 2005 did not reach many Afghans who were scared of talking to the authorities and preferred to lie low. Meanwhile, inflows and outflows continued over the years (the border fencing project did not begin till 2016), many Afghans acquired Pakistani citizenship papers, many children were born who have never known any country other than Pakistan.
With more than 40 years having passed since the Soviet invasion, the concept of who is Afghan has become fuzzy to say the least. This is a natural consequence of a policy where Pakistani authorities were initially a) reluctant to count exact numbers coming in from Afghanistan; and b) reluctant to confine them to camps. In fact, the latter was impossible given the tribal, familial, linguistic and religious links with the local population, particularly in the border regions. There are other factors also which preclude the classification of the Afghan community in Pakistan as refugees in the strict sense of the term. Refugees are formally defined (as per international law) as people who cannot go back to their homeland for fear of persecution or death. However, Afghans had been moving back and forth across the border with few restrictions from the late 1970s till 2016-17. Many of those who came to Pakistan as refugees, and have been resident here for years, have also made frequent trips back to visit relatives, get married, check up on land and property, etc. Until recently, it was not a problem to cross the border using the POR card, or the Afghan tazkira, or indeed nothing at all. In spite of the obvious integration of Afghans into Pakistan’s economy, notably their presence in transport and logistics; construction, retail and wholesale trade, and the food business to name just a few, Pakistan’s official policy is to treat them as temporary residents. Afghans are not allowed to own property or businesses. Until recently, they were not allowed to open bank accounts (this only changed in 2020) or have cellphone SIMs registered in their names. They were not allowed to hold driver’s licences — a fact that leaves one incredulous given that they were clearly running a significant portion of the cross-country freight business. In fact, Afghans have done everything that they have officially been barred from, by circumventing official protocols and using informal economic networks to their advantage. This was inevitable given the extended stays in this country, and the societal/linguistic links.
Pakistan is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention of 1951, or the accompanying Protocol of 1967. The government of Pakistan says that it has actually given the Afghans many facilities above and beyond what the convention stipulates. This can be debated. But what is true is that Pakistan, in spite of hosting a large migrant/refugee population for over 40 years, has not developed a comprehensive policy on what to do with migrants.
Pakistan adheres to international law in that it does not practise forcible repatriation, at least officially. But there are still too many unanswered questions. Why is there no path to citizenship, and what purpose does it serve to not have one? Why were people allowed to freely move around in the country and settle here, yet not allowed to legally work or run businesses or own property? How can one facilitate students to take examinations when their parents do not have the requisite citizenship or refugee status documentation?
It is important to start working on these issues. It does not serve the larger interests of the state or society to host a large population that is overlooked by social services or social protection systems, is not documented and is perpetually vulnerable to the whims of law enforcement and security agencies. The recent protests by Afghan migrants in Islamabad must be taken notice of, and a clear policy enacted.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1702123/afghans-in-pakistan

#Pakistan - Indian and Pakistani FMs avoid ‘bilateral tiffs’ at SCO

Pakistani and Ind­ian foreign ministers on Friday toge­ther attended the Shanghai Coopera­tion Org­anisation’s (SCO) Council of For­eign Ministers’ meeting and events on its margins, but avoided handshakes.The SCO meeting was the first multilateral event where Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari and S. Jaishankar came together since the former became the foreign minister after the change of government in Pakistan in April.Even in informal settings, for instance when the foreign ministers of SCO member countries waited for a joint call on Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the two foreign ministers sat away from each other.
Relations between the two neighbouring nuclear-armed rivals have been bitter for long. Islamabad had lowered diplomatic ties with New Delhi after the BJP government revo­ked the autonomous status of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir in 2019.
Despite being in same room, Bilawal, Jaishankar steer clear of handshakes.
Subsequent events in Kashmir and Hindu supremacists’ actions against Muslims in India have so far prevented re-engagement. Islamabad’s position has been that it wants normalisation, but it is for India to provide a conducive environment for that to happen.
Foreign Minister Bhutto-Zardari, while speaking at a government-run think tank in Islamabad last month, emphasised the need to engage India. He had argued at the time that despite a “long history of war and conflict” and Indian government’s actions in Occupied Kashmir and its anti-Muslim agenda, it was not in Pakistan’s interest to remain disengaged.But soon afterwards, the Foreign Office clarified that there was no change in Pakistan’s policy on India, on which there is national consensus.However, Mr Bhutto-Zardari and Mr Jaishankar, in line with SCO rules and charter, neither mentioned bilateral disputes, nor accused each other.
There is a clause in SCO charter barring member states from bringing their bilateral acrimony to the organisation’s meetings.
The Pakistani FM, in his speech at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, highlighted Pakistan’s perspective on important regional and international issues of concern to SCO member states. He emphasised that “shared prosperity” was essential for peace, stability and development in the SCO region and globally.
The foreign minister also shared Pakistan’s vision for the future direction and growth of SCO which could be achieved through joint efforts to enhance greater connectivity; road/rail links within the SCO region; building network of businessmen and entrepreneurs of SCO; harnessing the potential of technology and digitalization; and removing barriers to intra-SCO trade.
About strengthening connectivity in the SCO region, Mr Bhutto-Zardari proposed the construction of railways and roads, and the opening of trade routes. He said Pakistan backs the proposed “strategy for the development of interconnectedness and the creation of efficient transport corridors.”Pakistan is working with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan on a planned railway project. This project, if it is realised, could provide an important access for Central Asian countries to the seaports of Pakistan, and will become an important component of the transport system of the SCO region.The foreign minister also spoke about the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and reminded the member states about their responsibility to help the war ravaged country.Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar, meanwhile, touched upon the challenges facing the region and expansion of the organization.
According to the FO, the SCO Foreign Ministers deliberated upon important topical issues facing the organization after 20 years of its establishment, including expansion in its membership; improvement in the mechanisms of the SCO Secretariat; and SCO’s stance on global economic and political developments and the challenges for SCO countries.
The foreign ministers signed sixteen decisions endorsing proposals on diverse areas of socio-economic cooperation and adopted a Joint Statement on Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. FM Bhutto-Zardari, on the sidelines of the conferences, also met with his counterparts from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
“In these bilateral meetings, the Foreign Minister exchanged views on issues of common interest as well as matters relating to bilateral cooperation and further strengthening of political, economic and trade relations with these countries,” the FO said.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1702279