کندهار کې د شيعه ګانو يوه جومات کې چاودنې لسګونه کسان وژلي او ګڼ نور ژوبل کړي - بي بي سي نړۍ دا وخت

Video Report - #NayaDaur #SaleemSafi #ImranKhan Imran Khan Shouldn't Compare His Govt With Hazrat Umar's (RA): Saleem Safi

Video Report - #MJtv : ملک نازک موڑ پر، حساس ادارہ بیچ چوراہے میں، سویلین بالا دستی والے یو ٹیوبرز کا یو ٹرن

How Corruption Played a Role in the Demise of the Afghan Government

 

By Wahidullah Azizi

As Afghanistan heads toward an uncertain future, many wonder what went wrong in the two decades leading up to the present crisis.

October marks the 20th anniversary of Operation Enduring Freedom and the start of the U.S. state-building project in Afghanistan. The main focus of this effort — the Afghan government — did not make it to the anniversary.

The overnight collapse of the Afghan government on August 15 caught many by surprise. Certainly, no one anticipated the chaotic situation that unfolded at Kabul International Airport in the last days of the U.S. evacuation. Even so, the writing was on the wall; cracks had appeared long ago. Years of excessive corruption at all levels of the Afghan government, enabled partly by the international community, crippled the Afghan government. This created a legitimacy crisis that contributed to the rapid downfall of the government in Kabul.

Corruption in the Shadows In June 2020, John Sopko, head of the leading U.S. government oversight agency for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR), warned that corruption was “the

most insidious threat” facing the Afghan government at the moment. He argued that the gap between the public and the government had widened due to corruption, resulting in a situation where Afghans had to bribe officials to be able to access the most basic public services. As quoted by the Economist, Ahmad Shah Katawazai, a former Afghan diplomat, said that in Afghanistan, “from your birth certificate to your dead certificate and whatever comes in between, somehow you have to bribe.” Graeme Smith, a journalist and author of “The Dogs Are Eating Them Now: Our War in Afghanistan,” on the eve of a recent screening of his documentary “The Ghosts of Afghanistan” in Berlin told me that corruption in the last 20 years was treated as a side issue, despite it playing a central role in the collapse of the Afghan government.

As noted by U.N. Special Rapporteur Diego Gracia-Sayán, corruption has “direct damaging consequences” on governance, weakening the capacity of the judicial system while, on the other hand, decreasing citizens’ trust in judicial institutions. It would appear, therefore, that there exists a correlation between delaying the provision of justice and the subsequent growth of corruption. In Afghanistan, the weak judiciary has often bent before the will of the powerful, who can take advantage of their political connections. Others, less fortunate and unable to use such advantages, pay bribes and suffer from frustration due to lengthy processes. As a result, people (as much as 80 percent by one estimate) made use of an informal justice system or turned to the Taliban for assistance. These actions had a compounding effect on weakening the Afghan government’s legitimacy, something which it was in strong need of.

Anti-corruption Efforts

Following the controversial 2014 presidential election, which resulted in the creation of the National Unity Government (NUG) led by President Ashraf Ghani, hopes were high. Many believed that the former World Bank technocrat was the right man for the job of tackling corruption. Ghani’s initials steps, including establishing the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) to address major corruption crimes, were promising. Reforms in other sectors such as public procurement resulted in some degree of success. In 2020, the World Bank noted that the procurement reforms saved the Afghan government an estimated $868 million – a considerable amount, given that the entire Afghan government budget was $5.5 billion that year.

Working with civil society, the Afghan government took steps to introduce anti-corruption measures. For instance, Afghanistan’s Access to Information Law, approved in 2018, ranks first in the world. In addition, Afghanistan’s remarkably free media allowed investigative journalists to exert greater scrutiny on government abuse of public funds.

That being said, the government’s fight against corruption can hardly be seen as a success story. While the government initiated well-intentioned reform programs to fight corruption, it did the opposite in other areas. The government’s shortcoming on adequate funding for more than a dozen anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), and limited political support to relevant actors, weakened anti-corruption efforts writ large. Furthermore, skilled staff were lacking, with overlapping mandates hindering their work. Surprising few, some of the ACAs ended up blackmailing rather than helping the government fight corruption. Furthermore, political interference from Arg, the Afghan presidential palace, and MPs did little to help the matter. Both former presidents Ashraf Ghani and his predecessor Hamid Karzai used the ACAs as “attack dogs” against political opponents. In a final attempt to draft an anti-corruption law and bring the many ACAs under one roof, the government disregarded inputs provided by civil society members. International Community

Equally complicit was the international community, due in large part to its mismanagement of assistance. A complete analysis of how financial assistance coming into Afghanistan was handled by donors raises important questions. Too much money, with little or no oversight, was flooded into Afghanistan, which had no institutional mechanism to properly handle such resources. One estimate by SIGAR puts the total amount donated by the United States alone to be valued at $145 billion in development assistance over the past 20 years. As noted by the U.S. watchdog, there were notable allegations of “waste, fraud and abuse” against the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. A CNN summary of SIGAR’s reports highlighted 10 examples, including a cargo fleet with an initial value of half a billion dollars selling for scraps at a paltry $40,000, a fancy $85 million hotel which never opened, and a health care facility which had coordinates placing it in the Mediterranean Sea. These are only a few examples of such rampant waste of resources.

Some, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, argue that the May 2020 troop withdrawal under the Doha agreement with the Taliban provided the basis for the collapse of the government. There is certainly some truth to that. The Taliban saw no incentive to truly engage in further talks or to agree to a power-sharing deal with Kabul while the Americans were already on their way out. The decisive blow came earlier, however, when the U.S. decided not to include the Afghan government in the peace negotiations in the first place. Years of excessive corruption in the Afghan government had weakened its position at the negotiation table. The U.S. prioritizing security over state-building and development resulted in achieving neither.

Challenges Before the Taliban

There is no understanding of what a Taliban anti-corruption policy may eventually look like – at least not at the moment. Although the Taliban are known for having little tolerance for corruption, they are still vulnerable. Fighting corruption and governing, in general, is more challenging than achieving success on the battleground. Endemic corruption has infiltrated every level of Afghan society. Afghanistan ranks 165th out of 180 countries and territories on Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). As the Taliban pushes for international recognition, it should ensure that good anti-corruption laws, such as the access to information law from the past government, should be in place. Furthermore, the increasingly shrinking space available for media and civil society to participate is worrisome and will not help in the fight against corruption.

Any future Afghan government that ignores prioritizing anti-corruption will find itself in hot water sooner or later. Creating an environment that includes a vibrant civil society and free media is essential for tackling corruption in developing economies such as Afghanistan.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/how-corruption-played-a-role-in-the-demise-of-the-afghan-government/

Violence surges in Pakistan's tribal belt as Taliban, IS-K go on attack

By Abid Hussain

Seventeen-year-old Israr was fast asleep when his phone rang.

It was 2am and the teenager was exhausted. He'd been working all day as a guard. On the other end of the line was his brother, who told Israr that men had barged into their family house, dragged their father outside, and shot him dead.

"He asked me to rush back home," recalled Israr, whose name has been changed for his safety.

I met Israr in Orakzai, one of seven districts in Pakistan's tribal belt. Like the provinces just over the border in Afghanistan, Orakzai is home to a predominantly Pashtun population.Three days after Israr's father was killed, a branch of the extremist organisation Islamic State known as Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), claimed responsibility for the murder.

IS-K accused Israr's father of being a Pakistani military informant, a claim rejected by Israr.

"My father just had a shop in Orakzai. He would help his tribe, especially those people who were returning to the area after being displaced due to war," Israr said.

"He had no enemies. He was one of the elders of the area."

In Afghanistan, the Taliban and IS-K are fighting a bloody war for pre-eminence.

Rising violence

The attack on Israr's father wasn't a one-off. On the same day, another man was shot dead in Orakzai, also for allegedly being an "informant" for the Pakistani military. IS-K also claimed responsibility for that attack.Orakzai is one of seven tribal areas including Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan which were previously governed under British colonial-era law.It was only in May 2018 that they were merged with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and turned into districts, bringing them into the Pakistani civilian fold.There has been a surge in violence this year, according to data compiled by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based research organisation.Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the "ideological twin" of the Afghan Taliban, is mainly responsible. TTP wants to follow in the footsteps of its Afghan counterparts and establish their interpretation of Sharia - a hard-line form of Islamic governance - in Pakistan.

According to PIPS data, the TTP carried out 95 attacks last year, killing 140 people, and 44 attacks in the first six months of this year.

As the Afghan Taliban made rapid progress in Afghanistan and started gaining control of various provinces from July onwards, the TTP increased their activity. From July until September, the group carried out another 44 attacks, claiming 73 lives. Those killed were mostly members of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies.

Threats and intimidation

And beyond the overt violence, the region has been simmering for months with threats and tension.

Some residents say they have received calls from Afghan and Pakistani numbers demanding extortion money. Ahmed - not his real name - is a social worker and businessman from Bajaur district. He told the BBC that he kept receiving calls from different numbers in July and August.

The men would introduce themselves as being from the Taliban and demand money.

"They were asking for extortion money," Ahmed said. "And despite my refusal, they kept sending me voice notes and messages on WhatsApp, threatening that if I didn't pay up they would harm me and my family."

Ahmed said he contacted the district administration and presented evidence to both civilian and military authorities.

"I repeatedly informed them about it but I was told by the administration that I am not the only person receiving these calls, and many others have received the same threats here in Bajaur.

"They told me that it's impossible to provide security to everyone, and that I must take precautions myself and install security cameras at my house."

Who are the TTP? The TTP was founded by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan at the end of 2007. The militant movement was formed in response to a Pakistani military operation clearing the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad where a radical preacher held sway. He was once considered close to Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI.

According to Dr Amira Jadoon, an assistant professor at the US Military Academy at West Point, the links between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban date back to 9/11 and the fall of the first Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001.Analysts say that after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan the Pakistani Taliban's leaders fought alongside the Afghan Taliban, providing food, shelter, and financial aid to the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas, and also pledging allegiance to them.But after its formation, the TTP went on a rampage against the Pakistani state, targeting both civilians and security forces. The Pakistani Army retaliated and pushed the TTP leadership to Afghanistan, where it has been based since 2015, conducting a "low-intensity" warfare against Pakistan.

As the Afghan Taliban started their march on Kabul this past July, the TTP became more visible.

Pakistani Taliban chief Noor Wali Mehsud told CNN that the Afghan Taliban's victory would be a "victory for the entire Muslim people". He also had a warning for Pakistan.

"Our fight is only in Pakistan where we are at war with Pakistani security forces," he said.

"We are hoping to take control of Pakistan's border tribal region and make them independent."

Singapore-based terrorism scholar Abdul Basit believes the victory of the Afghan Taliban has "definitely emboldened" the TTP.

"They feel that if America has lost out in Afghanistan, what can Pakistan do," he said. "Plus, they have been stoking ethnic tensions and playing up local grievances ... Essentially, the TTP is trying to exploit Pashtun victimhood." But according to Pakistan's former national security adviser and retired three-star General, Nasir Janjua, the TTP are a "receding phenomenon". "The TTP has lost its appeal among the masses. Their narrative to fight Pakistan because it sided with the US has outlived its shelf life since the Americans are no more in Afghanistan," he said.

"Their increased violence is their struggle for survival."

The public relations wing of the Pakistani military, the ISPR, played down the increasing number of attacks by the TTP and affiliated militants in the tribal region."Terrorist groups have been largely defeated. However, isolated incidents do happen," a spokesperson told the BBC.

Good Taliban, Bad Taliban

It is commonly accepted that the Pakistani state has a historically strong relationship with the Afghan Taliban and is encouraging the world to accept their new regime in Afghanistan.But it has also fought a bloody battle against the Pakistani Taliban over the past decade, resulting in thousands of civilian and security forces deaths across the country.It is often referred to as Pakistan's "good and bad Taliban" strategy, where the Afghan Taliban are seen in a good light but the Pakistani Taliban in a bad light.

The military launched multiple operations to eliminate the militants from the tribal areas with hundreds of thousands of people forcibly displaced.

But the Pakistani government has also sought to negotiate a peace deal with various factions within the Pakistan Taliban down through the years.

However, the presence of IS-K in the tribal region causes yet another headache for the Pakistani authorities.

In Afghanistan, IS-K also has major differences with the Taliban, accusing them of abandoning Jihad for a negotiated settlement signed last year in Doha. IS-K considers the Taliban "apostates" and legitimate targets. IS now represents a major security challenge for the incoming Afghan Taliban government, something the Taliban leadership shares in common with Western intelligence agencies.

"IS-K has sectarian differences with the TTP (Pakistani Taliban) and consider them to be misguided Muslims, who are agents of Pakistan, Iran and other regional forces," said Abdul Sayed, a Sweden-based independent researcher on jihadism. But experts believe that the low-level cadre of TTP and IS-K in Pakistan consist of the same members who are fluid in their allegiance and often work for both organisations.

According to Dr Jadoon, IS-K has a bigger objective in mind than the TTP.

"IS-K seeks territorial control in pursuit of a caliphate and sees itself as the only legitimate leader of the global ummah (Muslim people)," she said.

Forced to flee

With so many militant groups in operation, life is hard for people who must live in their midst.

A former militia leader who fought the TTP alongside the Pakistani military a few years ago told me his entire family had to relocate from his village in Mohmand, a tribal district bordering Afghanistan. "My father was martyred, my cousin was martyred, our family homes destroyed," said the former militant, Shehzad - not his real name. "Some of our men lost their hands, some lost their legs, and some don't have either. None of us wanted to leave our village but what else can you do when there's no place to live," he said. Ahmed, the businessman from Bajaur, also painted a gloomy picture. "It often compels me to think about leaving my home and taking the family away. But then, where can I possibly go. How can I just walk away from my home," he said.

Israr, the young man from Orakzai, was more forthright.

"We had no choice but to leave our home when the war started 14, 15 years ago. My parents returned two years ago but now my mother has become a widow," he said.

"The government assured us that the peace has returned in the area and we should go back, but where is the peace?"

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58891613