By SaleemASethi
More than incompetence and lack of will, it is the incapacity of civilian institutions that comes in the way of their showing a matching performance vis-à-vis the armed forces.
Qazi Faez Isa-led commission into August 8 Quetta massacre has charged the state with incompetence, negligence and failure on multiple counts in its fight against the menace of terrorism. It has also blamed it for utter confusion and lack of an official counter-narrative to fight this long-drawn war against terrorism.
To many there is nothing new except that this time it is formal indictment of the state and that it is official now. Commentators have declared it unique, comprehensive and the most damning report by any commission so far. In many respects, it is. But it seems the report is not as comprehensive as it appears at first glance. Nor it is all-encompassing. It has mostly blamed the civilian side for all the failures. And though the shortcomings pointed out can't be denied, it has left the role of the military side untouched. It hasn’t discussed — in so many words — its contribution to the menace of terrorism becoming an existential threat to the state. And though right in its findings, the report seems at places to have gone out of its legitimate mandate of inquiring into that single unfortunate incident.
But a big step forward it is, no doubt. It has shed light on almost the whole phenomenon of terrorism — and not just that massacre of Quetta lawyers — and how it is being countered at the administrative level. It has pointed to the confusion at the implementation and policy levels. It has identified the ‘one side’ responsible for many of the failures. And it has opened a debate about the lack of counter-narrative that we should carry forward in all earnest.
The buzzwords in the report, therefore, can be summed up as; incompetence, complacency, confusion and lack (of plan, strategy, narrative and, may be, will). But all of these factors can’t be discussed in black and white terms or thrown at the doorstep of politicians (or of one government) alone. There are blurred frontiers.
For one, there is a lack of ‘political will’ on the part of the present government. Yes, it has a considerable vote-bank among the ultra-right mindset, particularly in Punjab. And its MPs and ministers are dependent on the support of, some say, banned organisations and jihadist elements to win elections. PML-N leadership also has a natural rightist bend. These are reasons indeed which are responsible for the slowing down of the action against extremist, terrorist and jihadist groups, particularly in its ideological bastion, Punjab.
But the question is, is it the sole reason? What has made Punjab the ideological HQ of extremist mindset? Who pampered jihadists and sectarian elements there? Why they became so powerful that politicians were compelled to go on their knees and beg support for coming into power, staying there and remaining safe, too? If their continued existence was compromising and weakening politicians’ position and standing, then whose policies and objectives the Punjab-based jihadist groups have been furthering to keep them thriving?
PML-N’s lack of political will and clarity of mind are valid reasons to be sighted for an ineffective and confused approach to tackle the existential threat. But this wasn’t the case with the PPP and its allies, ANP and MQM, as far as fighting terrorism and extremism was concerned. Then why did they fail to put up a decisive resistance to those forces? The fact of the matter is that these three parties weren’t even allowed to reach to the masses and run their election campaigns during the previous elections. Benazir Bhutto and other PPP leaders and workers lost their limbs and lives in this fight; yet the party faced aspirations cast on its patriotism and some of its leaders are accused of sponsoring terrorism. ANP leaders and workers are dying to this day in the terror-hit KP — even in Swat where military is ruling the roost. Why? Who failed in its duties to provide protection to those element who were natural allies of the state and the armed forces in the war against its existence? Who can be held responsible for that?
More than incompetence and lack of will, it is the incapacity of civilian institutions that comes in the way of their showing a matching performance vis-a-vis the armed forces. Police and other law-enforcing and intelligence agencies’ have historically remained weak due to the state’s fixation with external threats and its prioritising of the armed forces. Nobody tried to address this issue whether it was a politician in power or a military dictator calling the shots.
Besides everything else, the civil-military divide within the state stood in the way of presenting a united front to the non-state actors. Even that would have been fine, were there not the presence of this complacency phenomenon among certain elements within state institutions and the miscreants at certain times in the past; or there was no state policy of using miscreants as foreign policy tools.
It is a fact that we can’t identify the true reasons and reach an honest conclusion unless we accept that extremism and terrorism are two sides of one coin. And both of these are byproducts of the states ideological leanings; embedded in religious identity. Whether we accept it or not, a religious-based identity is what the state is promoting even today. Not to say anything about today’s political leadership, which truly believes in the state’s Islamic destiny and which uses Islam for its political purposes, the military leadership is also doing the same in its public discourse.
But this is not just a coincidence or political expediency on their part. This is serving their institutional interests vis-a-vis the civilian side and ensures their continued dominance in the political sphere. This is a well thought-out strategy. Gen Kayani, who signified a change of heart inside the military talked about the state’s ultimate ideological goals during the very first days when he was declaring hometown terrorism as an existential threat. Gen Bajwa pledged solemnly in APS Peshawar on last Friday to strive for the achievement of those goals.
Justice Faez Isa says there is a lack of counter-narrative. And there is a confusion within the Ministry of Interior about its role in combating terrorism. Not as such. The fact of the matter is there is no lack of counter-narrative. There is confusion in this basic thing. At best the state’s counter-narrative can be termed as a ‘variation’ of the prevailing narrative that has been fuelling extremism and which in turn made terrorism a new-norm.
Faez Isa commission also concludes that, “The National Action Plan is not a plan in any structural or meaningful way.” Nothing can be officially more true or damning. NAP in fact is Objectives Resolution — Part 2 — the goals of which apparently are to do away with those who have taken up arms against the state apparatus. The state can look the other way still, if the non-combating lot serves political purposes of vested interest without challenging the state in an armed fashion and embarrassing it.
No comments:
Post a Comment