As we approach the Nov. 1 general election, it is obvious that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have a clear game plan: To lure Turkish nationalists to the ballot box while trying to minimize voter turnout in Kurdish provinces. Will such tactics work?
The war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has already galvanized the nationalist public. Turkish nationalism is clearly on the rise. In the meantime, the security situation in Kurdish provinces appears to be out of control. It is even questionable whether elections can take place under such severe conditions. All these dynamics may serve the AKP well. But there is also a growing sense of anger against Erdoğan and the AKP. There are a lot of people from the right wing of the political spectrum who believe that Erdoğan and the AKP turned a blind eye to reports that the PKK was preparing for war during the peace process. They therefore blame the governing party for creating this chaos.
On the other hand, there are also many people from the left wing of the political spectrum who blame the AKP and Erdoğan for instigating this war against the PKK for electoral reasons aimed at stoking nationalism. At the end of the day, given the fluidity between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) political bases, there is still a reasonable chance that some MHP voters may decide to reward the AKP's new belligerence against the PKK. This would reward Erdoğan's insistence on holding "repeat" elections since all the AKP needs is an additional 2 to 3 percent to establish a parliamentary majority.
On the other hand, there are also many people from the left wing of the political spectrum who blame the AKP and Erdoğan for instigating this war against the PKK for electoral reasons aimed at stoking nationalism. At the end of the day, given the fluidity between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) political bases, there is still a reasonable chance that some MHP voters may decide to reward the AKP's new belligerence against the PKK. This would reward Erdoğan's insistence on holding "repeat" elections since all the AKP needs is an additional 2 to 3 percent to establish a parliamentary majority.
But despite this rosy scenario, there is also a more realistic scenario where the AKP vote drops to the 35-40 percent range. This can realistically happen for two main reasons. First, it is by now obvious that Erdoğan's strategy of "controlled chaos" is not working. Erdoğan believed that he could exploit the downturn in security and economic situation to his favor with the argument that only a strong AKP government can bring back stability and prosperity. But as recent opinion polls indicate, the number of people holding the AKP and Erdoğan responsible for the chaos is increasing. Recent opinion polls show that the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the MHP are holding their ground while the trend for the AKP is in the opposite direction. The second reason why AKP may go down to the 35-40 percent range is because Turkish voters are primarily concerned about the economy. The financial situation has considerably worsened in the last few weeks. Consumer confidence is clearly correlated with support for the incumbent. And since consumer confidence is now at a very low level, elections results will not bode well for the AKP.
How will Erdoğan react to this situation? If he realizes that the AKP will lose the Nov. 1 general election, Erdoğan could try to postpone the election on the grounds that the country is facing a major war. This scenario, however, would require a major ground operation to northern Iraq's Kandil Mountains where the PKK headquarters are located. This would be a very risky strategy. But desperate times call for desperate measures. Another option for Erdoğan would be to sideline HDP Co-chair Selahattin Demirtas and the HDP by legal measures. For instance, there could be a parliamentary vote to ban the HDP on the grounds that it supports terrorism. This scenario would pave the road for a general election without a Kurdish party in competition. The AKP would, of course, be the main beneficiary of this outcome. Finally, as I have previously argued, there is also a third option: To hold elections and prepare for an AKP-MHP coalition.
How will Erdoğan react to this situation? If he realizes that the AKP will lose the Nov. 1 general election, Erdoğan could try to postpone the election on the grounds that the country is facing a major war. This scenario, however, would require a major ground operation to northern Iraq's Kandil Mountains where the PKK headquarters are located. This would be a very risky strategy. But desperate times call for desperate measures. Another option for Erdoğan would be to sideline HDP Co-chair Selahattin Demirtas and the HDP by legal measures. For instance, there could be a parliamentary vote to ban the HDP on the grounds that it supports terrorism. This scenario would pave the road for a general election without a Kurdish party in competition. The AKP would, of course, be the main beneficiary of this outcome. Finally, as I have previously argued, there is also a third option: To hold elections and prepare for an AKP-MHP coalition.
In a coalition scenario between AKP and the MHP, both parties would have to compromise. The AKP would have the upper hand but Erdoğan would have to adopt a lower political profile. In return, the MHP would have to limit the corruption investigations only to AKP party members and refrain from implicating Erdoğan and his family. The two other scenarios -- postponing the elections or the closure of the HDP by a vote -- would lead to more political instability, an economic crisis and Kurdish backlash and violence. This means chaos for Turkey. If things unravel towards the semblance of civil war in urban areas, these two scenarios could even trigger a military coup. This is why as things stand today, despite animosity on the MHP front against the AKP, the most realistic scenario after the election is an AKP-MHP coalition.
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