EACH time there is a new or surprising attack by militants — or perhaps an attack similar to another in the not-too-recent past — the same questions are asked. And each time, before the right questions can be asked and meaningful answers provided, another crisis hits, drawing attention away from the last one. Remember Mohammad Sikander, the lone gunman who stood a stone’s throw from parliament last August and brought Islamabad and much of Pakistan to a halt with his televised antics? Even as it became clear that Sikander was not a militant on a terrorist mission, the obvious question then was, if the pampered, well-resourced and mighty law-enforcement of Islamabad could not deal with a Sikander, how would they manage a serious terrorist incident? On Monday, with the devastating attack on the court complex, came the sad and predictable answer: the law-enforcement agencies of Islamabad are as inadequate and outmatched as are agencies across the country.
To be sure, even with the best defensive systems, resources and personnel in the world, not every suicide attack can be stopped. Also, given that a district court complex necessarily draws a large number of visitors, litigants and lawyers every day, the balance between ease of access and security needs to be kept in mind. Still, ought the court to have been left so vulnerable and were there not measures that could have been taken to ensure any attack could be shut down quickly or even just prevent the attackers from entering the court complex so easily? The short, depressing answer is: yes. Given the amount of money and attention that is lavished on the Islamabad law-enforcement set-up — largely because of the high-profile foreign and local residents and offices — there is really no good reason at all for such a devastating attack to take place in the manner and with the ease that it did. But then, there was no good reason why Mohammad Sikander was able to do what he did for as long as he did last August.
The problem, as usual, seems to start at the top. Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan is almost indistinguishable from his predecessor in his penchant for three kinds of responses to terrorist attacks that raise the stakes further. First, there is the allusion to the vague and unnamed foreign hand — as though if the violence is foreign-sponsored (always alleged, never publicly established), it somehow explains the state’s failures here. Second, there is talk of installing more CCTVs — though little is ever said of the state of the existing cameras and their use. Third, there is recourse to more police checkposts and more intrusive road searches of vehicles and individuals — as though militants have not learned the art of reconnaissance and evasion. Will the interior ministry ever learn?
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Pakistan: Woeful inadequacy
EACH time there is a new or surprising attack by militants — or perhaps an attack similar to another in the not-too-recent past — the same questions are asked. And each time, before the right questions can be asked and meaningful answers provided, another crisis hits, drawing attention away from the last one. Remember Mohammad Sikander, the lone gunman who stood a stone’s throw from parliament last August and brought Islamabad and much of Pakistan to a halt with his televised antics? Even as it became clear that Sikander was not a militant on a terrorist mission, the obvious question then was, if the pampered, well-resourced and mighty law-enforcement of Islamabad could not deal with a Sikander, how would they manage a serious terrorist incident? On Monday, with the devastating attack on the court complex, came the sad and predictable answer: the law-enforcement agencies of Islamabad are as inadequate and outmatched as are agencies across the country.
To be sure, even with the best defensive systems, resources and personnel in the world, not every suicide attack can be stopped. Also, given that a district court complex necessarily draws a large number of visitors, litigants and lawyers every day, the balance between ease of access and security needs to be kept in mind. Still, ought the court to have been left so vulnerable and were there not measures that could have been taken to ensure any attack could be shut down quickly or even just prevent the attackers from entering the court complex so easily? The short, depressing answer is: yes. Given the amount of money and attention that is lavished on the Islamabad law-enforcement set-up — largely because of the high-profile foreign and local residents and offices — there is really no good reason at all for such a devastating attack to take place in the manner and with the ease that it did. But then, there was no good reason why Mohammad Sikander was able to do what he did for as long as he did last August.
The problem, as usual, seems to start at the top. Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan is almost indistinguishable from his predecessor in his penchant for three kinds of responses to terrorist attacks that raise the stakes further. First, there is the allusion to the vague and unnamed foreign hand — as though if the violence is foreign-sponsored (always alleged, never publicly established), it somehow explains the state’s failures here. Second, there is talk of installing more CCTVs — though little is ever said of the state of the existing cameras and their use. Third, there is recourse to more police checkposts and more intrusive road searches of vehicles and individuals — as though militants have not learned the art of reconnaissance and evasion. Will the interior ministry ever learn?
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