Sunday, October 8, 2017

Pakistan - Mainstreaming militants? Not without a political strategy





By Raza Rumi
The current efforts appear to be another attempt to continue the strategic goals vis-a-vis India and cut Nawaz Sharif, the errant boy, down to size.
The powers-that-be are all set to undertake a new experiment — mainstreaming of militants into national politics. This is yet another rushed plan that is being pushed without an open debate and a comprehensive strategy that ordinarily would require input from the Parliament and the civil society. If history is any guide, a decade later, the state might reluctantly acknowledge that it made yet another mistake.
The so-called ‘policy’ was first confirmed by a retired military general and some leaders of the ruling party and picked up by local and international press. Later, the usual denials were issued but succeeding events proved that the efforts were afoot to implement this mainstreaming experiment. Milli Muslim League (MML), a new ‘political party’ backed by Hafiz Saeed fielded an unofficial candidate in the NA 120 by-election in Lahore. Another extremist outfit -—Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan — fielded its candidate in the election who secured more than 6 percent of votes. The key election plank of this group was to glorify killer Mumtaz Qadri and called him a ‘martyr’.
Another jihadist leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has indicated that he is also working on creating his own political party. Both Hafiz Saeed and Khalil are designated as international terrorists by the United States. Under Indian pressure, the US has already put a $10 million bounty on Saeed’s head.
Without developing an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategy, the current move will only radicalize the society further Pakistan Army’s spokesman recently confirmed that there was a plan to develop a ‘constructive’ role for these groups. It’s official now.
The implementation of this mainstreaming plan was accelerated within a fortnight of Nawaz Sharif’s ouster on July 28. Media reports and statements of Sharif’s aides suggest that this plan was presented to the former Prime Minister who rejected it. Sharif’s successor may have agreed to it but civilian assent is a mere formality given how the security policy is crafted and implemented in Pakistan.
Three factors are at work here. First, there is growing international pressure for the Pakistani state to distance itself and curb the private jihad enterprises that have mushroomed in the last three decades. The Americans and Indians are now joined by China that gave a clear signal through the BRICS declaration a few weeks ago. Second, the security establishment has been grappling with this issue since Operation Zarb e Azab started. They have effectively fought the Pakistani Taliban but evidently are in a fix about the future of the erstwhile proxies. Third and perhaps more immediate in the current context is how to cut Nawaz Sharif’s vote-base — -that traditionally included the conservative groups — to size. Nawaz’s gradual shift to the centre has annoyed the Barelvi-Islamist voter.
This is not a new plan. In the 1980s, the establishment used similar schemes to undercut the popular support of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Sectarian and ethnic groups were facilitated and even armed. The country paid a price. Today when credit is taken to clean-up Karachi, no mention is made as to how armed groups in the country’s largest metropolis emerged and why. The electoral manifestation of 80’s formula emerged with the formation of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) when all the shades of rightwing groups were merged to defeat the PPP. Ironically, Nawaz Sharif was a participant in that political engineering. Three decades later, the tables have turned. Now as Imran Khan’s confidantes Sheikh Rasheed and actor Hamza Ali Abbasi’s statements suggest: the old formula wine might be served in new bottles.
The difference between IJI and the (emerging) coalition of 2017-2018 is that the latter includes groups that are armed. Without developing an effective disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) strategy, the current move will only radicalise the society further. As we witnessed during recent Lahore by-election and its aftermath, militants-based parties mobilised in the name of ‘blasphemy.’ Even more ludicrous are the calls to punish Nawaz Sharif for hanging Mumtaz Qadri thereby confirming that, when all is said and done, the state apparatus uses this law for its own benefit. Such pandering has had pernicious consequences. For instance, the regular mob lynching in the country over allegations of blasphemy.
Similarly, within the religious discourse the idea that jihad can only be declared and waged by the state, has gained currency in the wake of counter-narratives to terrorists’ propaganda. The jihadists, if they are not demobilised, will take this discourse into the mainstream. Such narratives will also intensify political competition between political actors as to who is more loyal to Islamic causes. Nothing sells like religion in our part of the world. The case of India’s religious nationalism testifies that it is not religion-specific phenomena but a function of post-colonial societies adjusting to issues of identity, neo-liberalism and modernity.
If mainstreaming is the way forward then de-mobilisation and de-weaponsation are its crucial pre-requisites. These steps must precede the reintegration of militants in the political system. Security apparatus of the state has to publicly and verifiably distance from all political activities of the militant groups. The militant groups, under the supervision of a national commission should demobilise their cadres, and deweaponise them.
Experiences from DDR in Africa and parts of Latin America have underscored that reintegrationonly works when it is framed through an organic political process. This is where the role of Pakistan’s Parliament becomes even more important. Pakistan is not a post-conflict state in tatters. It has functioning political institutions, howsoever stymied they might be. The key issue here is that the military cannot do this alone. It would require the support and input from political parties, civil society, academia (not just those who work in its ambit) and find ways that the process mainstreaming takes place within the constitutional framework.
Sadly, so far there are no signs that such an inclusive national debate is occurring. Instead, the current mainstreaming appears to be another attempt to continue the strategic goals vis-a-vis India and cut Nawaz Sharif, the errant boy, down to size. This is why the media must monitor it and urge more transparency as the process unfolds in the months to come.

Pakistan - NAB arrests Captain (retd) Safdar from outside Islamabad airport

The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has apprehended Captain (retd) Safdar, the son-in-law of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, from outside Islamabad airport, Geo News learnt late Sunday.
Maryam Nawaz, daughter of Nawaz Sharif, and her husband, Captain (retd) Safdar arrived at Benazir Bhutto International Airport, late on Sunday night. 
The six-member NAB team waited outside Rawal lounge for the arrest of Capt (retd) Safdar, as the airport staff stopped them from entering the lounge.
Safdar's arrest came minutes after Maryam Nawaz departed for Punjab House alone.
A number of PML-N leaders including Asif Kirmani, Marriyum Aurangzeb and Tariq Fazal Chaudhry were present at the airport.
Scores of PML-N workers gathered outside the airport, who have been protesting against the arrest of Captain (retd) Safdar. They have blocked the vehicle in which Safdar has been taken to NAB Rawalpindi office.
The workers seem adamant not to let the vehicle pass through, despite repeated calls by the party leaders present outside the airport.

Pakistan - The new PPP




Dr Asim Hussain’s statements upon his return to Pakistan speak volumes for the Peoples Party’s new political position.
The under-trial PPP leader had gone to London after the Apex court ordered removal of his name from the ECL. On arrival at Karachi airport on Friday, Asim warned former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against criticising the establishment.
Not too long ago, PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari had to go on self-exile following a fiery speech he delivered in 2015. Zardari had referred to Dr Asim’s case as an example of political victimisation of the PPP. But after returning to the country last year, the PPP co-chairman went into the appeasement mode.
Ever since the Panama Papers scandal broke out and the matter went to the Supreme Court, the PPP has refrained from standing up with the ruling party, the way it did in 2014 at the time of PTI and PAT dharnas in Islamabad. Perhaps, this is because the PPP has realised that the politics of reconciliation was not working — especially in Punjab.
PPP chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari often mentions that the party is in a revival phase and he refers to the party as ‘new PPP’. It turns out that the new PPP isn’t too new after all. The party has been unable to come up with any concrete policy prescriptions for the country’s numerous problems. It has yet to offer any ground-breaking solutions to issues like extremism, macroeconomic woes and socio-economic development needs.
It seems that the PPP has started to think that reviving the party is only possible if the leadership refrains from angering the powers-that-be, come what may. Whether or not this new strategy will help the party regain its lost ground in Punjab remains to be seen.
A more certain path to revival would have been improvement of the performance of the party’s government in Sindh province. In the past nine years, the provincial government’s performance has remained disappointing to say the least. Most importantly, if PPP improves itself on that front, it won’t need to compromise on its ideological principles to gain political mileage.

Who killed former Pakistan prime minister Benazir Bhutto?










On a late September evening at a tea stall in Lyari, one of the poorest and until recently one of the most dangerous neighbourhoods in Karachi, a small group of Pakistan People’s Party members were discussing the verdict of a special Pakistani court on the murder of Benazir Bhutto.
Their former party chief and the first female prime minister of an Islamic state was killed on December 27, 2007 outside a large electoral gathering of her supporters in Rawalpindi when a gunman shot her and set off a bomb. At least 24 other people were killed and several more were injured.
After nearly ten years of repeated investigation by Pakistan’s chaotic judicial system and a distinct lack of interest from the government, on August 31 an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi declared Pervez Musharraf, the country’s former president and army chief to be a fugitive from justice in the Bhutto assassination case. The court also acquitted five suspected members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, a Pakistani terror group, of all charges of conspiring to murder Bhutto.
Seven TTP militants accused of involvement in the murder have been killed in military operations since 2007. The head of the outfit, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan in August 2009.
The court also sentenced two high-ranking police officers, Khurram Shahzad and Saud Aziz, to 17 years in prison for negligence for failing to properly guard Bhutto. Shahzad hosed down the crime scene with water in less than two hours after the attack while Aziz refused repeatedly to allow a postmortem on the prime minister's body.
“I am not satisfied with the court decree. There is no clue on who killed Bhutto. The court released all the suspected militants and only punished two police officers,” said Muhammad Ali, one of the supporters of the PPP, a Pakistani liberal political party.
“It shows that no one is serious about bringing the real killers of Bhutto to justice and the government just wants to get rid of the case.”
Two months before Bhuttos’ killing, on October 18, 2007, at least 130 people, most of them also from Lyari neighbourhood, were killed when two bombs exploded in the crowd celebrating Bhutto's return to Pakistan after eight years of self-imposed exile in Dubai and London. Mr Ali was there and was slightly injured. Bhutto was unhurt.
Most party workers, like Mr Ali - indeed, many Pakistanis - are disappointed with the court verdict, as it explains nothing.
Conspiracy theories abound: was it the TTP chief Mehsud? Was the suicide bomber a TTP member? Was it Musharraf? Was the lax security the fault of Pervez Ilahi, chief minister of Punjab at the time, or Bhutto's own bodyguards? Pakistanis love conspiracy theories, says Owais Tohid, an Islamabad-based journalist who interviewed Bhutto twice after her return to Pakistan. “We as people still love to believe that America must be behind 9/11 or military dictator General Ziaul Haq's plane was blown into pieces by America's CIA or Bin laden is still alive.”

Yet from anti-terrorism courts to Scotland Yard detectives to a United Nations fact-finding mission, no one has produced anything concrete on Bhutto’s killers.
Bhutto’s children were also disappointed. Her son Bilawal, who now leads the party after graduating from Oxord University (like his mother) called the August 31 verdict “unacceptable” on Twitter and said he would "explore legal options.” His sister Aseefa said: “10 years later and we still await justice. Abettors punished but those truly guilty of my mother’s murder roam free.”
Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto’s husband and former president challenged the acquittal of five TTP suspects in Lahore High Court. He also objected to the 17-year prison terms for the two police officers and questioned why a case against Musharraf was separated from the Bhutto assassination case. Musharraf, who came to power in a nonviolent coup in 1999, was charged in 2014 with high treason. He spent some time under house arrest but left the country in 2016 on the pretext of needing medical treatment. Sixty-eight witnesses gave evidence in the murder trial, but legal analysts say the case lacked credibility throughout.
“The Bhutto investigation seemed to be a deliberate sabotage to not allow the investigation to lead to the logical conclusion, which in my opinion led to Musharraf and his cronies,” said Saroop Ijaz, a Lahore-based lawyer and researcher for Human Rights Watch. “The anti-terrorism court’s judgment is a farce, it fails to hold anyone directly accountable and lacks legal reasoning and moral courage.”
The court found the two police officers guilty of aiding and abetting and destroying evidence but no one guilty of the actual murder. “This is without precedent and shameful. The Benazir Bhutto trial was about holding the powerful responsible [Musharraf] and closure for hundreds of millions of Pakistanis and the investigation and the court has failed on both counts,” Mr Ijaz said. “A cataclysmic event in the country’s history appears to have ended with a whimper in court,” was the verdict of Dawn, Pakistan’s leading English newspaper. Musharraf’s political party, the All Pakistan Muslim League, also protested against the court verdict and said it would challenge it.

“Previously, it was informed that Musharraf’s case had been separated from the main case, but the decision reflected that it was given in haste, which is totally contradictory to the charges, evidences and statement in the case,” said secretary-general Dr Mohammad Amjad.

In a video posted on social media on September 21, Musharraf accused Asif Zardari of "murdering" his wife Bhutto and her brother, Murtaza, who was killed in September 1996 in a police shootout in Karachi.
In the Lahore high court, On September 29, Pakistan's civilian intelligence agency, the Federal Investigation Agency, also challenged the verdict, arguing that the five TTP members, who were acquitted in a lower court despite confessing their involvement in Bhutto's death, and the two guilty police officers should all be sentenced to death.
But lawyers for the five acquitted said the FIA's case against them was full of flaws.
Naseer Tanoli, who represents Aitzaz Shah, one of the five, said his client had been arrested a month before his arrest was recorded. “The police recovered a Tasbih [prayer beads] and some cash from him. No weapons or anything prohibited was recovered from his possession,” he said.
In April 2010, a three-member UN commission declared Musharraf’s administration responsible for failing to provide Bhutto with adequate security.
“A range of government officials failed profoundly in their efforts first to protect Ms Bhutto, and second to investigate with vigour all those responsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also in its conception, planning and financing,” the UN report concluded.
Born in 1953 in Sindh province, educated at Oxford and Harvard, as a politician, Bhutto presented herself as moderate and democratic. Her fanily had known violence: her father, Zulfikar, who was also Pakistan’s premier in the early 1970s, was executed.
She was twice prime minister of Pakistan, from 1988 to 1990, and from 1993 to 1996, and both times, the presiding president dismissed her government for alleged corruption. After her last term, she fled abroad, returning after eight years to stand in the 2008 general election.


Tohid, the journalist, says the assassins were chasing Bhutto the moment she landed in Karachi.

“My people badly need me and I need them to end this terrorism and extremism. But it's going to be a long battle,” Bhutto told Tohid after the attack at her homecoming rally.
Analysts believe her death left a political vacuum in the country and weakened her own political party. The wave of popular sympathy triggered by her assassination strengthened the PPP's showing in the 2008 general elections. The party vowed to unravel the plot behind her death and to punish her killers. Bhutto's widower became president after the election and the party has slumped into its worst crisis ever, with poor organisation, bad governance and, most importantly, a lack of dynamic political leadership.
Cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan exploited that vacuum and his party, Tehreek-e-Insaf, and its aggressive campaigns against corruption, has taken the place of the PPP.
In a by-election on September 17, the PPP came fifth in a Lahore district once considered one of its strongholds, bagging a mere 1,414 votes. The winner, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz secured 61,254 votes.
No one from the PPP turned up to hear the court's judgment on August 31 and during its time in office, from 2008 to 2013, the party did little to investigate their leader's murder. They handed the job to the UN instead.
Not that that has stopped them using the Bhutto name when it suits them. A decade on, PPP leaders still promise to bring her murderer to justice.
“That will probably be the slogan in the next elections as well,” Tohid said.
____________
TIMELINE
June 1953: Born in Karachi
1969: Gains degree from Harvard
1973: Her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founder of Pakistan People’s Party, becomes prime minister
1977: Awarded a second degree from Oxford University. Days after returning to Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq seizes power from her father
1979: Her father executed by the military government
1979-84: Arrested several times and placed under house arrest for three years
1984: Returns to London and becomes leader in exile of PPP
1986: Returns to Pakistan after martial law lifted


1988: Becomes the first woman elected as prime minister of an Islamic country

1990: Dismissed from office for alleged corruption
1993: Re-elected as prime minister but faces fierce opposition.
1996: Again dismissed from office on corruption charges
1997: Her husband Asif Ali Zardari imprisoned and Bhutto goes into self-imposed exile




1999: Army chief Pervez Musharraf takes power in bloodless coup
2001: Bhutto sentenced to three years in prison for failing to appear in court to face corruption charges
2004: Bhutto and her husband receive six-month suspended sentences from a Swiss court for money laundering
October 2007: Bhutto returns to Pakistan ahead of elections
October 19: Survives suicide bombing that kills 150 people at a rally in Karachi
December 27: Bhutto is assassinated in a gun and suicide bomb attack at an election rally in Rawalpindi. Another 24 people killed

August 31, 2017: Anti-terrorism court acquits five members of Tehreek-e-Taliban of her killing and declares Musharraf a fugitive from justice in the case.

https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/who-killed-former-pakistan-prime-minister-benazir-bhutto-1.665423

Saturday, October 7, 2017

Ghazal - Awargi - Ghulam Ali

Sharab Cheez He Aisi Hai - Pankaj Udhas -Jashn-

Aur is Dil Mein Kya Rakha Hai Tera Hi Pyaar - Sanjay Dutt - Farah - Imaandar

Music Video - Lokan do do yaar banaye Afshan Zebi

Pakistan - ''The HIV crisis''



WITH HIV infection rates climbing in Pakistan, a new national survey has found that 133,529 people are believed to have contracted the virus. This $1m study — funded by the Global Fund and with UNAIDS support — not only warns of a resurging HIV/AIDS epidemic, but identifies new cases among injecting drug users, who comprise 33pc of all HIV cases in Pakistan, and commercial sex workers.

Meanwhile, on Thursday this newspaper published a report on the rise in HIV cases and the need to scale up national response programmes before the virus spreads. Concurring with the findings of the national survey, our report investigates instances of institutional inadequacies and inequitable fund distribution in the treatment of HIV.

The lack of political will, bureaucratic challenges and the stigma attached to HIV/AIDS not only prevent early diagnosis and treatment but also leave marginalised and poor sufferers — especially drug-users — with fewer healthcare options. Differing levels of treatment offered in the provinces has made it impossible to curb new cases. Halting treatment in KP, for instance, because of the lack of disbursement of funds, justifies the concerns of non-governmental partners working with the national HIV programme. They attribute this failure to poor administration, nonexistent health policies and lapsing funds.
Sexual health campaigns that target high-risk groups such as drug users, transgenders, returning migrant workers and sex workers is one way to address the stigma attached to sufferers of HIV and to mitigate the risk of transmission. Comprehensive control programmes must be integrated with other health strategies so that people have access to testing opportunities in healthcare settings and are provided lifesaving antiretroviral therapy. If accessible, these interventions will improve early diagnosis and fast-track treatment. Preventing further transmission and moving towards eradicating AIDs by 2030, as pledged by Pakistan as part of its SDG commitments, requires political will with a focus on education and treatment for all HIV sufferers.

How War Altered Pakistan's Tribal Areas




By 

                   ''Cultural Change Comes to FATA''

On June 28, Naghma, a 13-year-old girl living in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, was taken by her uncle and five other relatives to an empty room in a house nearby and shot five times with an AK-47. She had apparently brought shame to the family by trying to run away with a young man from her neighborhood and one of his friends. Although her murder was but one of the thousands of “honor killings” that occur in Pakistan each year, it was different in one sense: it was technically legal.
Pakistan criminalized honor killings in 2016, making them punishable by mandatory life sentence. But the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—a 10,500-square-mile strip of land wedged between Afghanistan and the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—is governed not by Pakistani law but a century-old set of regulations that leaves the enforcement of law and order to locals.
The result is that for centuries, the tribal areas were lawless, run not by a government but by a romanticized system of tribal customs dubbed Pakhtunwali. Pakhtunwali is what was used to explain the Afghan Taliban’s decision not to hand over Osama bin Laden after 9/11; even a mortal enemy is to be kept safe if they show up at your doorstep, the custom ostensibly dictates.
But 16 years of war have torn apart the old social fabric in FATA. Thousands of tribal elders, who have traditionally overseen life in FATA, have been killed in the conflict between the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and the Pakistani state, and thousands more have been forced to flee for their lives. More than three million have been displaced from FATA, and the tribesmen and women no longer want nor understand Pakhtunwali.
What has enabled Pakhtunwali to flourish is a 1901 law called the Frontiers Crimes Regulations (FCR) that governs FATA. Its original title, when enacted by British colonial officers, was the “Frontier Murderous Outrages Regulations.” Tribal elders and the tribesmen that the English claimed they represented were collectively responsible for any offense against British India. If, say, a tribesman ambushed a British colonial servant on a British colonial road and absconded into the wilderness beyond the control of government troops, an official called a political agent would summon the tribe’s elders and demand they find and turn in the brigand. To ensure compliance, the FCR allowed the political agent to blockade the tribes, bar members from traveling to Peshawar for trade, hold tribesmen hostage, or raze villages until the fugitive was produced.
The idea was to let the tribesmen, aside from any such offense against the British, largely govern themselves. Everything from deciding how to distribute collectively owned land to what to do with an eloping couple was to be decided upon by a jirga, or tribal council. The FCR was kept in place after Pakistan’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, during which the British colonial officers who had the power to impose collective punishment were replaced with Pakistani civil servants, often from outside the tribal areas, who continue to hold the romanticized view that locals would never accept the laws imposed in the rest of the country.
Today, Pakistan’s constitution explicitly bars Parliament and the judiciary from having any jurisdiction there, and only the president has the authority to decide where and how any given law is applied in the tribal areas.
The only reforms to the FCR in more than a century took place in 2011, when Pakistan began allowing political parties to operate in the region and introduced changes aimed at upholding human rights. Whipping could no longer be a prescribed sentence, and only men between 16 and 60 years old could be arrested for cases of collective responsibility. A new appellate body consisting of three senior civil servants, the FATA Tribunal, was established, where defendants could lodge an appeal within 90 days of a sentence from a political agent. The tribunal also received a mandate to inspect jails in the tribal areas twice a year. But none of those reforms have been implemented. The tribunal, for instance, cannot even give an accurate count of how many people are held in FATA prisons.
Around 200,000 soldiers are now stationed in FATA, an effort by Pakistan to hold regions that were cleared out after scores of military operations carried out there since 2001. Their presence is largely welcomed by locals, who have spent more than a decade watching helplessly as government forces played a cat-and-mouse game with thousands of Taliban and al Qaeda militants. The military had first tried making peace deals with the jihadists, enlisting tribal elders to sign agreements that they would root out the heavily armed Arabs and Central Asians living among them. But since they were outgunned, locals inevitably found themselves being collectively punished when the deals fell through.
Sixteen years of war have torn apart the old social fabric in FATA.
Every IED blast or ambush on soldiers cost the tribesmen dearly, for example. Tens of thousands of homes along with once-bustling bazaars were razed and tribes with hundreds of thousands of members were blockaded or exiled for years. Thousands of tribesmen were arrested by political agents in attempts to punish the tribesmen for failing to uphold their end of an impossible deal. Suicide bombers struck jirgas, as did U.S. drones. In all, at least 1,100 tribal elders were killed in the war.
The majority of FATA’s population are too young to sit in jirgas and have watched the war lay bare the flaws of Pakhtunwali with which they had grown up.
“The youth are against the formal jirga institution in FATA, and they are equally against their elders,” said Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, who heads the Community Appraisal and Motivation Program, an NGO that tracks social change in the tribal areas. “They are not against all the elders, but the young generation understands the elders to be part of the problem. They have, in a way, revolted against them.”
The rebellion stems in part from a cultural awareness among young people from FATA—a realization that even if they themselves are ready to move past antiquated notions of tribal loyalty, the rest of Pakistan seems stuck.
“Before the war, in the settled areas, we used to get people asking if we are from Afghanistan,” said Samreena Khan Wazir, who grew up in South Waziristan but now works in Islamabad and is one of only a handful of female lawyers from the tribal areas. “They wouldn’t know Waziristan was in Pakistan. Then after 9/11, we just got a bad reputation. We never had a chance to show any positive image of ourselves.”
Pakistanis outside the tribal areas, from the general public to the military, still refer to colonial British accounts of life in FATA, said Wazir—accounts that leave little room for recognizing individuality and instead make a person’s tribal affiliation their most important characteristic. “We are still valued based on whether we are treacherous, or brave, or hospitable, or honorable,” she said.
There are practical reasons for discarding the old ways as well. During the war, entire families within FATA were displaced, creating a host of unique problems for women. Literacy rates in FATA, especially among women, are far lower than in the rest of the country, with some surveys estimating that as little as three percent of women can read and write.
“The most suffering in this war on terror was borne by women and children,” said Wazir. “The women didn’t even know how to find their way on the road, how to read signs, how to find where rations were distributed.”
The very act of living in close proximity to strangers, whether in a rented apartment in a city or a tent in a camp for the displaced, has sparked a change in what is considered acceptable behavior for women.

Why provoke Pakistan?


The air chief waxes eloquent about taking out Pakistan’s nukes. Even the tactical ones–the Nasrs–spread across hundreds of field commanders. How are his planes going to do that?
Pakistan’s nukes are its crown jewels. Until 1971, the country was full of braggadocio and machismo, in equal measure, and launched 1948 and 1965, with arguable success. 1971 knocked off its nose. And made it paranoid about India.
PMs since 1971, except Morarji, but Indira and Rajiv certainly, contemplated, seriously, knocking out Pakistan’s nuke program. But both realized that they wouldn’t succeed. Vajpayee did 1998, in part, to ferret out if indeed Pakistan had nukes. To his utter disappointment, and shock, it did, and as efficient or inefficient as India’s.
By then Pakistan had had a successful nose transplant. India could never pull a 1971 on it again.
Donald Trump ranted and railed against Pakistan in August and commanded and commandeered India to do its fair share in Afghanistan. But any man who throws a roll of paper towel at his hurricane-ravaged subjects as if he was throwing a basketball and then eyes it as keenly as if he were in the process of making a three-pointer, is such a man fit enough to be king?
His administration is collapsing. As we speak, one of the mature adults in his cabinet, Rex Tillerson, the foreign minister, is about to quit or be fired. Take your pick. Trump surrounds himself by “winning” generals. Really? All the three generals that he has close to him–McMaster, the national security advisor; Mattis, the defence minister; Kelley, his chief of staff–have fought and failed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Oh, but who cares about the war; each of us won our individual battles. In Anbar in Iraq and Helmand in Afghanistan and the lord knows where else. So we can all claim to be modern-day Douglas MacArthurs. And now that we are finally in charge, we will surely turn the tide and win the war.
Pakistan is not impressed. Especially with its nukes and missiles. It has been hearing warlike rhetoric from American presidents and foreign ministers and defence ministers and ambassadors since 9/11. The fusillade from Trump is one in a series of many emanating from Washington. Empty of course.
Pakistan is as close to military rule without technically being under military rule. The current prime minister is a non-entity. The ousted prime minister is trying to stay alive politically, but he will not be able to do so. The military hates him. In part because the military hates India and Nawaz likes India.
The military is convinced that India is up to no good in Balochistan. To what extent and of what kind, no one really knows. One Jadhav doesn’t a summer make. Or make India the mother of South Asian terror.
I mean, if India is the mother of South Asian terror, and Pakistan the father of South Asian terror, imagine how pugnacious the baby will be. But let’s not bring love-jihad in between jihad-jihad.
Pakistan sees red whenever India and Afghanistan are mentioned together. All this air talk from India makes it seethe further and gives it a potent handle to show the world that India is eternally hostile to it.
The air chief claimed that India can win a two-front war. That is entirely debatable. He said that he has a Plan B. Well, his Plan B, obvious as it is, is Pakistan’s Plan A.
The Soviets fled Afghanistan in 1989 in part because half their army was opiated by Afghan poppies. They also faced a decade-long war by proxy by the then-other superpower, the US. The Soviets had lost all appetite for war. Yet the puppet Afghan regime left behind by them lasted three years.
The Americans have been beaten and bruised but haven’t fallen as yet. They are not going to just up and leave. The trick for them, and for India, is to fatigue out the Taliban as much as they can. Who knows in three to four years the balance will tilt somewhat towards the Yanks and the Taliban will be ready to negotiate?
But this Pakistan doesn’t want. It wants the Taliban to grab Kabul now. That would be disastrous for America. And India. So what should India do? Instead of boots on ground in Afghanistan, send military “advisors” and trainers to support the Americans and keep propping up the puppet regime in Kabul until the Taliban sees sense.
And keep all the airy-fairy talk to itself.

SHIA GENOCIDE IN PAKISTAN - Death toll rises to 24 of Shia shrine suicide bombing





By Abdul Sattar 



The death toll from a suicide bombing at a Shiite shrine in the country’s southwest increased to 24 after four victims died at a hospital overnight, police said Saturday.
A suicide bomber struck the shrine packed with worshippers in a remote village in Jhal Magsi district, about 400 kilometers (240 miles) east of Quetta in Baluchistan province on Thursday.
Senior police officer Mohammad Iqbal said that more than 20 victims were still receiving treatment, some with critical wounds.
The bomber detonated his explosives vest when he was stopped for a routine search by a police officer guarding the shrine. Five children, a woman and two police officers were among those killed.
The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for the attack. The IS has claimed responsibility for several past attacks in Baluchistan, which has been the scene of a low-level insurgency by Baluch nationalists and separatists demanding more autonomy and a greater share in the region’s natural resources of oil and gas.
Sunni extremists and the IS perceive minority Shiites as apostates and have carried out many such attacks across the country.
At least 75 Shiites were killed in twin bombings at a market in Parachinar in the country’s northwest In June this year. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a sectarian Sunni extremist group, claimed responsibility. In February, an Islamic State group suicide bomber struck inside a famed Sufi shrine in southern Sindh province, killing 88 worshippes engaged in ‘Dhamal,’ a devotional dance.
Also on Saturday in Baluchistan, at least 13 people were killed and 20 others wounded when a passenger van collided head on with a bus on a highway near the provincial capital of Quetta.
Muqeem Baig, a spokesman for Quetta’s main hospital, said victims were brought to the hospital from the accident site some 20 miles (32 kilometers) south of the city. Such accidents are common in Pakistan, where motorists often disregard traffic rules and safety standards.

There is no justice for Bhuttos; courts have failed us once again: Aseefa Bhutto.



Aseefa Bhutto Zardari, the daughter of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has said that there was no justice for Bhuttos and the courts had failed them once again.
”There is no justice for Bhuttos. The courts have failed us once again” Aseefa tweeted.

http://www.thesindhtimes.com/sindh/no-justice-bhuttos-courts-failed-us-aseefa-bhutto/

I want every kid in school, Bilawal Bhutto tells Sindh Govt




Chairman Pakistan Peoples Party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has said that he wants every kid, whether boy or girl, should be enrolled for education in Sindh and rest of the country.
“Education is the only weapon to defeat evils spread by ignorance and illiteracy and for grooming a harmonious society,” Chairman Bilawal Bhutto stated while presiding over a meeting about efforts being made by Sindh government for improving education and literacy in the province.
The meeting was attended by Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah, Minister Education Jam Mehtab Dehar, Managing Director of Sindh Education Foundation (SEF) Ms. Naheed S. Durrani and others.
Team led by Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah briefed the Chairman about steps and actions taken by the Sindh government in education sector and improvement in enrolment of out-of-school children.
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said that education has always been a key priority in the Party manifesto and urged Sindh government to play more proactive role in achieving the goals.
PPP Chairman said that though Sindh government has reopened thousands of closed schools but he wants this syndrome should be completely eradicated.
He pointed out that World Bank has appreciated the smart solutions adopted by the Sindh government to improve education.
It may be recalled that World Bank highlighted in a report that the Sindh School Monitoring System, which spreads across 15 districts and to the remotest parts of the province. Plans are underway to expand it to the entire province. This first digital system in the education sector in Pakistan allows transparent and effective monitoring of staff, students and school infrastructure. More than 210,000 teaching and non-teaching staff have been profiled using biometric information, covering more than 26,200 schools.

Friday, October 6, 2017

Kal Bhi Bhutto Zinda Tha,Ajj Bhi Bhutto Zinda Hai

Golden jubilee of Foundation Day of PPP will be celebrated with great enthusiasm and Jiyala fervor on November 30: Bilawal Bhutto



Chairman Pakistan Peoples Party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has said that golden jubilee of Foundation Day (Youm-e-Tasees) of PPP will be celebrated with great enthusiasm and Jiyala fervor on November 30.
A meeting was held at Bilawal House today to discuss the programme and its preparations to observe the day, when Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had founded the PPP 50 years ago. Meeting was attended by Chaudhry Manzoor Ahmed, Senator Sherry Rehman and former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and General Secretary PPP Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Faisal Karim Kundi.
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said that PPP leaders, workers and Jiyalas will reiterate their commitment, conviction and allegiance to the Party and its ideology for a peaceful, prosperous, egalitarian and democratic Pakistan on the golden jubilee celebrations.

https://mediacellppp.wordpress.com/2017/10/06/golden-jubilee-of-foundation-day-of-ppp-will-be-celebrated-with-great-enthusiasm-and-jiyala-fervor-on-november-30-bilawal-bhutto/

Afghanistan: US offers Pakistan yet another ‘last chance’




By Hussain Nadim
Following US President Donald Trump's address on Afghanistan policy in August, US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said in a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing that the US is willing to work with Pakistan 'one more time' in Afghanistan. In another hearing, General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alleged that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintains links with terrorist groups.
For Pakistan, neither calls for 'one last chance' nor allegations of ISI links with terrorist groups are anything new. As such, the same old US policy repackaged by a new administration is likely to get the same old response from Pakistan.
For US policymakers to get results with Pakistan, they must realise two things:
To fix Pakistan, the US must fix its approach to dealing with Pakistan, especially in terms of engaging the security establishment.
US threats are not seen as credible and are unlikely to work, given the safeguards Pakistan has against extreme measures from the US. Pakistan is likely to call the US bluff on its recent threats. From extensive interviews with the members of the security establishment in Pakistan, there are clear indicators that mounting US pressure is seen not as threat to isolate Pakistan, but an attempt to isolate the Pakistan Army in particular and upset the civil-military divide by characterising ISI as a rogue agency. The sense in the Pakistan Army and the ISI is that the US is playing up the civil-military divide in Pakistan to align Pakistan's national security policy with its own. This 'divide and conquer' approach has motivated Pakistan's security establishment to aggressively thwart any US attempts (especially via the civilian government) to change Pakistan's position on the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
If the US is looking for security cooperation with Pakistan, it cannot extend an olive branch with one hand while holding a whip in the other. The US needs to find a way to restore trust and working relations with a security establishment that mistrusts not just US adventurism in the region and its negative role in Pakistan's domestic affairs, but also (and perhaps more so) the US approach to solving the Afghanistan issue.
Pakistan's security establishment continues to believe (rightly so, in some ways) that it is squashed between two enemy states in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan wants a peaceful solution in Afghanistan, but not one that compromises its national interest and sovereignty. This is a concern that US policymakers understand on the surface but do very little to resolve on the ground.
Over at least the past decade, Pakistan has become inured to US threats, and has established measures to ensure that the cost of translating those threats into action have increased substantially. With Trump's low global standing and US inability to intimidate North Korea, Pakistan's interest in backing off from its long-held position on Afghanistan is limited. Over the years, Pakistan has created its own safeguards, such as through accelerating the development of its nuclear and missile technology systems. The Pakistani security establishment believes that if it were not for nuclear weapons, Pakistan would have suffered the same fate as Iraq.
Nuclear weapons are not the only safeguard. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $46 billion infrastructure project with China, Pakistan has bolstered its security by allowing China to take major stakes in Pakistan. The US-Pakistan issue now is more of a US-Pakistan-China issue, providing Pakistan with another layer of protection.
After billions of dollars of US aid, anti-American sentiment in Pakistan is still abundant. Some of this ill will is America's own doing, but some is also orchestrated by the deep state. There are over 100 million Pakistanis under the age of 25, who often hold very negative opinions about US policies in Pakistan and the Islamic world at large. US attempts to pursue any particularly extreme measures against Pakistan would be a potential time bomb that could have catastrophic results in terms of growth in terrorism and instability in the region.
And then there are the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) that go through Pakistan to provide supply to US troops in Afghanistan. In 2011, Pakistan briefly shut down the GLOCs after the Salala attack and the refusal of the US to apologise for killing Pakistani troops. With the US highly dependent on these GLOCs, Pakistan has some leverage to defy the US.
In a 16 year-long war, the US has gone through several rounds of 'last chances' with Pakistan, facing similar results each time. The problem is that in Afghanistan, the US is looking for a military solution to a problem that is essentially political in nature. With Pakistan, US policymakers expect to coerce a country to give up its long-held national interest for that of the US short-term interests, without any guarantees or assurances. Pakistan has a direct interest to work with the US to resolve the crisis in Afghanistan – but for that to happen the US has to first develop trust and credibility that it wants a long-term solution that works for everyone, not just for the US.
A good way for President Trump to start would be by not threatening its long-standing ally and frontline state in the war on terror, and end the Obama era strategy of 'fixing' the civil-military divide in Pakistan from the inside, in the hope that it serves US strategic interests.

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/fix-pakistan-us-must-fix-its-approach

Pakistan’s duplicity must not be rewarded with US’ forgiveness




United States secretary of defence Jim Mattis’ tough words on Pakistan, especially on its adverse role in security in the subcontinent and stability in Afghanistan, is reassuring to India. However, these concerns must translate into action.
The security of the larger subcontinent as defined by the United States secretary of defence, Jim Mattis, is a perspective that should give India some comfort. The question is whether his testimony before the US Senate will necessarily translate into policy on the ground in the coming years.
The most important element of his testimony was his unequivocal belief that any US military withdrawal from Afghanistan would be inimical to his country’s security. Kabul must, at the very least, negotiate from a position of strength if it has to come to terms with the Taliban. This will come as music to India’s ears. New Delhi has long argued that any intemperate US withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead to a Taliban takeover — and potentially convert Afghanistan back into a terrorist hub as the Pakistani military had done in the past.
Mr Mattis had a more mixed message regarding Pakistan. While speaking of the double-faced policies of Islamabad — pretending to fight Islamicist terror even while secretly promoting and shielding some of its worst practitioners — he said he was prepared to give Pakistan one last chance. Indian eyes will roll at this, having experienced similar US admissions of Pakistani perfidy followed by a statement of limited forgiveness.
Pakistan is a past expert at exploiting such loopholes and it remains to be seen if the Trump administration will be wise enough to understand when it is being taken for a well-worn ride. He also spoke of how much better Pakistan would be economically if it focussed on trade and investment ties with India. This is an argument grounded in sound reason and economics but wholly irrelevant to the geopolitical drivers of the India-Pakistan relationship.
Mr Mattis also threw in support for India’s official argument against endorsing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by noting such projects needed to be sensitive to sovereignty issues. But New Delhi still awaits a more comprehensive statement by Washington accepting the larger Indian concern that the Belt Road Initiative, of which the CPEC is the flagship, is being used by Beijing to financially suborn smaller countries both economically and politically.
Nonetheless, this and similar statements by senior members of the Trump administration are reassuring in that they provide clarity to what remains an otherwise incoherent US strategic vision of the world. They also seem refreshingly politically incorrect in publicly stating what US officials would often admit about Pakistan in private. All that remains is for the words to be converted into deeds.

The U.S. says Pakistan must work with Afghanistan on terrorism. It won’t be easy.




By Pamela Constable
When Pakistan’s army chief visited the Afghan capital last Sunday, he did his best to disarm his hosts. He offered to train and equip Afghan troops, and he promised to cooperate in peace and counterterrorism efforts. Afghan officials, in turn, received him with a military honor guard and issued an upbeat statement heralding “a new season” in the troubled relationship.
But behind the diplomatic gestures, there was little to indicate that anything had changed. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, humiliated in previous attempts to mend fences and take Pakistani officials at their word, demanded coolly that monitoring teams and mechanisms be established to ensure all promises and deadlines were implemented.
And even before Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa’s plane departed, the barrage of criticism had begun. Afghan analysts, politicians and former officials pronounced his visit another attempt by Pakistan to “deceive” their country while secretly supporting anti-Afghan militants. Bajwa had come calling only out of desperation, they said, because of intense pressure from the Trump administration.
“Pakistan is trying to pretend it is changing, but after 16 years of double games, these are only tactical moves,” said Rahmatullah Nabil, a former Afghan intelligence chief. “Pakistan has been using terrorism as a tool of state policy for decades, and Afghanistan has been the victim of terrorism for decades. As long as Pakistan does not change this policy, no equilibrium can be established.”
Pakistan has reason to feel desperate. Faced with the threat of unprecedented U.S. sanctions and fresh accusations that it has not done enough to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, its military has responded with a variety of tactics: indignant denials, aid offers, history lessons, helicopter tours of pacified border zones, condolence messages to Afghan bombing victims and high-profile efforts to build a wall along their 1,800-mile border.
But nothing seems to be working.
Last week in Washington, senior U.S. officials repeated charges that Pakistan is providing sanctuary for an aggressive Taliban faction known as the Haqqani network. Marine Corps Gen. James Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional panel it was “clear” that Pakistan’s intelligence agency “has connections with terrorist groups.”
At a separate hearing, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the Trump administration would try “one more time” to work with Pakistan on the Taliban issue, but that if it failed, “the president is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary.” He said that could include revoking Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally, a harsh blow to the former Cold War partner.
Pakistan has consistently denied providing shelter to anti-Afghan militants. Its prime minister told the U.N. General Assembly recently it was “especially galling” to hear such criticism when Pakistan has suffered from years of terrorist attacks. Its foreign minister told another audience in New York this week that Washington had no right to condemn Pakistan for supporting militant leaders it had “wined and dined” during past conflicts.
Asked Thursday about the latest U.S. comments, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Pakistan has “successfully erased the footprint of terrorists from our soil” and that most insurgent activities, including attacks on Pakistan, emanate from “ungoverned spaces inside Afghanistan” rather than from Pakistani havens.
Despite their doubts, some Afghan officials say they believe Pakistan’s security establishment is being forced to pivot in its thinking on Afghanistan. They see Bajwa’s visit to Kabul as a sign of this shift — especially his one-on-one meeting with Ghani, which one Afghan diplomat described as unusually candid, “constructive and encouraging.”
Pakistan once backed Taliban rule in Kabul, and it has long sought to keep Afghanistan weak and dependent as a counterweight to India, its powerful neighbor and rival to the east. But now, Pakistan’s region
al partners and investors are echoing new U.S. demands that it help end the 16-year Afghan conflict, which they see as a threat to stability.
“From our past experience, no Afghan should be optimistic about Pakistan supporting our cause. But the new American strategy has created an opportunity that it should explore,” said Javed Faisal, a senior aide to Afghanistan’s chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah. He said Pakistan’s support for militants abroad had backfired.
“If they don’t change, they will face isolation from the world,” Faisal said. “We should work with them to build trust and tackle terrorism together.” Skeptical Afghans point to years of broken promises, failed meetings and peace initiatives that went nowhere. Former president Hamid Karzai made an unprecedented trip to Islamabad a decade ago, carrying a list of Taliban hideouts, and came back empty-handed. Ghani praised Pakistan in 2015 for hosting peace talks, only to be mortified when Pakistan suddenly revealed the death of former Taliban leader Mohammad Omar and canceled the talks.
Within Pakistan, there is also resistance to rapprochement or concessions. Last week, the new interior minister was reprimanded by Parliament for suggesting that the country should “put its own house in order” before seeking foreign support. Even Bajwa, the most powerful official in Pakistan, faced some pushback for his diplomatic foray. The military spokesman, while touting the initiative, noted that “there was some discomfort in security and civil quarters” about it.
Munir Akram, a former Pakistani diplomat with strong nationalist views, wrote recently that efforts to engage with the United States will prove fruitless and that President Trump’s new policy of sending more troops and putting pressure on Islamabad is not aimed at pacifying Afghanistan but at imposing a broad “Pax Indo-Americana” on the region.
“Pakistan should prepare itself to bear the pain of threatened U.S. sanctions. It should draw its own red lines,” Munir wrote in Dawn, a major daily newspaper in Pakistan. “Any sign of weakness will intensify, not ameliorate, US coercion.”
Even if it is in Pakistan’s urgent interest to smooth its relations with Afghanistan, some analysts said, the most intractable obstacle is the gulf between Afghan and Pakistani perceptions of regional reality. Afghans see the Taliban insurgency as the main threat to their security and Pakistan as its backer; Pakistan sees India as a permanent threat to its existence and its friendship with Afghanistan as an extension of that threat.
“For all the complimentary rhetoric on both sides now, there is a total disconnect between how they define the problem,” said Davood Moradian, president of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. “They both face the threat of terrorism, and they have to come to an understanding, but it is not happening. At this point, I can see no positive outcome.”