The military and the mullah: Priorities for the Imran Khan government

• KRITI M. SHAH

Is Pakistan simply incapable in securing terrorists or are they hand-in-glove with them?

 In less than two years since the Imran Khan government came to power in Pakistan, backed by military support, the PTI government has ceded a great amount of political space to the military. Since the start of this year in particular, the government has ensured that even though the country is over Rs 33 trillion in debt and battling an international pandemic, priority must always been given to the desires and wants of the military and the mullah.

Pakistan has struggled in dealing with the outbreak of COVID-19 ever since the first case was discovered in the country on 26 February. The government underplayed the seriousness of the virus, choosing to not evacuate its citizens from Wuhan to demonstrate to China that it supported and stood by its ally during its time of crisis. In fact, Pakistani President Arif Alvi travelled to China, at the request of Xi Jinping, during the peak of the crisis as a public display of the two countries’ friendship. In the meanwhile, pilgrims returning from the border with Iran were quarantined in the border town of Taftan in Balochistan. Thousands returning to the country from the holy city of Qom were confined in close quarters and unhygienic conditions, contributing to the further spread of the virus. The government specifically targeted Shia and Hazara neighbourhoods, prohibiting members of the community from attending work and restricting their movements. The sectarian discrimination was not confined only to the province, but at the federal level as well with two senior government ministers, who happen to be Shia, being accused of exacerbating the spread of the virus. The scapegoating of the persecuted communities during such a time is an example of the state of religious minorities in Khan’s Pakistan.

Pakistani President Arif Alvi travelled to China, at the request of Xi Jinping, during the peak of the crisis as a public display of the two countries’ friendship.

While many Muslim majority countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey have ordered the closure of mosques and religious gatherings, the Pakistani president met with religious leaders and prominent ulema to form a plan for congregational prayers during Ramazan, announcing a ‘20 point’ plan. Under this plan, put forward by the government, all mosques would remain open and religious leaders who were arrested for violating restrictions during the lockdown would be released. Vernacular Urdu newspapers which remain the main source of information amongst Pakistanis argued that COVID-19 was God’s punishment on people for the sins they have committed, while others stated that it was a conspiracy against Muslims and Islam. Khan government’s “Islam friendly” decision to open mosques on the suggestion of the ulema while ignoring the potential healthcare nightmare would pose for the public shows where the PTI government’s priorities lie.

While the spread of the coronavirus has demonstrated the government’s logistical and organisational incompetence, they have shown great skill and expertise in crushing dissent, crippling free speech and empowering militancy. There has been a longstanding tradition to label those who question the military establishment in Pakistan as traitors, “Indian agents” or anti-state elements. This practice has continued if not intensified under the Khan government. On 1 May, the body of missing journalist Sajid Hussain was discovered in Sweden two months after he went missing. Hussain, the editor of Balochistan Times had fled Pakistan in 2012 after receiving death threats on his reportage of enforced disappearances and crime in Balochistan. On the same day, Arif Wazir, a Pashtun nationalist and member of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) was shot outside his home in South Waziristan. Supporters of the government immediately launched an ugly social media campaign smearing Wazir after he succumbed to his injuries, accusing Afghanistan’s intelligence agency (NDS) of killing Wazir. It seems the establishment forgot that all this while they have blamed the NDS for fostering the PTM.

There has been a longstanding tradition to label those who question the military establishment in Pakistan as traitors, “Indian agents” or anti-state elements.

Attacks on the PTM and media have been a hallmark of the PTI government. In the runup to the general election in 2018 media organisations such as Dawn and Jang faced censorship and heavy pressure from the establishment for their coverage of Nawaz Sharif. Now, this has evolved to coverage of PTM rallies and gatherings which are banned. Senior leaders of the movement, including members of the National Assembly are routinely arrested, harassed and threatened.

Earlier this year in February, Ehsanullah Ehsan, the terrorist responsible for the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar and the shooting of Malala Yousafzai, announced that he had escaped from prison and had managed to flee the country. Given his high-profile nature, it is not only shocking that Ehsan managed to ‘escape’, but was able to leave the country and seek refuge in Turkey. It gives rise to the age-old question: is Pakistan simply incapable in securing terrorists or are they hand-in-glove with them?

While in the past, extending the tenure of the chief of the army has been common practice, this time around the court questioned the bureaucratic process for Bajwa’s extension, while not disapproving of it all together.

The military has also further extended its reach into matters of civil governance, with the Pakistan army overseeing all the coordination between federal and provincial governments in tackling COVID-19. The National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC), the government’s lead agency in tackling the virus is being led by the Commander of the Army’s Air Defence Command as the military continues to directly intensify its role in matters of policy. Last year after increasing pressure from China over delays in the completion of key CPEC projects, the army took control of the CPEC Authority body with Lt. Gen Asim Bajwa being appointed the chairman of the body in November. The body was given vast powers to summon any information related to CPEC activities and impose penalties on those who fail to do so. Bajwa who earlier served as the Director-General for the Inter-Services Public Relations or the military media wing was also recently appointed as the Prime Minister’s special assistant on information and broadcasting. The timing of the appointment is interesting to note, as the government faces increasing criticism over its tackling of COVID-19; Bajwa’s appointment can be viewed as an effort for the Khan government to make amends with the military.

Towards the end of last year, the government found itself in an unprecedented face-off with the Supreme Court as the top court temporarily halted the extension of Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa’s term. While in the past, extending the tenure of the chief of the army has been common practice, this time around the court questioned the bureaucratic process for Bajwa’s extension, while not disapproving of it altogether. Through careful wording, the chief justice directed the PTI government to pass legislation formalizing the extension, which it hurried to do, granting General Bajwa another three-year extension. This goes to show that in Pakistan, civilian institutions continue to strengthen the military at their own expense, not learning their lesson, that the major causes of instability in its past have come from the overcentralized rule and strong men at the center. Today, Imran Khan remains beholden to the military and bound to the mullah stronger than ever before.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-military-and-the-mullah-priorities-for-the-imran-khan-government-65996/