PPP and Pakistani politics

M Ahmad Hassan

The new zest with which the PPP is pushing itself forward can only achieve real change if it builds its party machinery with the aim of providing a replacement to the current system of patronage politics. And the new party manifesto will be an indication.

Pakistan’s current political landscape is dominated by mainstream political parties that subscribe to the same centre-right neoliberal policy of reinforcing the status quo. This might not to be a particularly bad thing, except that the status quo in Pakistan has left a majority of the country’s population in crippling poverty. And to add to their misery, there is, in practice, next to no protective umbrella provided to the vulnerable public by the state. There is nothing novel about this as right from the start, the transformation of Pakistan’s state structures has taken place in a manner that has strengthened existing power structures of the landed elite and the bourgeoise. The system that protects the interests of these groups has been firmly entrenched, while powerful groups have been created and recreated within it.

The sense of deprivation and alienation resulting from this exploitative system was what fuelled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s success in the electoral arena. Couched in a simple yet brilliant phrase “roti, kapra, makan” (food, clothe, shelter), the election slogan of Bhutto’s campaign galvanised the people across Pakistan, cutting across socioeconomic classes from peasants to labourers, into organising into a political force. Bhutto educated people about their rights and laid bare the exploitation that was previously passed off as national duty for the development of the country. In a country in which no mainstream party represented the disadvantaged majority, Bhutto at least talked about them.

These are the bases on which the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was founded on. It was a voice for the oppressed and a rejuvenation of the Pakistani Left. The PPP was there to fill the void left in the wake of a concerted drive of the state, informed by Cold War imperatives, to push out the Pakistani Left from the political sphere. However, somewhere along the line, the PPP lost that vision, and got reduced to another party of the largely centre-right political spectrum. The same elites were seen occupying political office that the PPP was initially set out to oppose.

The matter is further muddied by the networks of patronage politics that dominate the electoral landscape of Pakistani politics. The firm position of the landed elite in Pakistan’s electoral arena stems from the social capital that it gains by owning the primary means of employment in the country side: land. Since there is always an excess of labourers, the peasants who work on these lands feel indebted to their landlord. Moreover, even though this system is fundamentally exploitative, the peasants still get a limited degree of access to the state from it, in the absence of which their already unenviable lives would be far more miserable. This phenomenon can be viewed in everyday political parlance as the term ‘electable’ is frequently used to refer to these members of the landed elite because their ability to garner votes irrespective of the party they represent. The implicit assumption of those who advocate the co-option of these ‘electables’ is that ideology is second to the power of these individuals, and they are the ones who should be approached by anyone aspiring for political office.

However, for real change to take place, it is this system of patronage politics that has to be challenged, not co-opted. And one place from where that challenge is coming from is the religious right, even the terrifying militant manifestations of it. By playing on the religious sentiments of the people and by misappropriating religious scripture, these groups spread their message of hate and in turn give the people a palliative for their abject poverty. The result of the provincial by-election in Jhang has shown how some of these militant outfits continue to thrive despite the national consensus to act against them. In addition to showing the clear failure of the National Action Plan in eliminating the militant infrastructure in Punjab, that win also shows how if the challenge to the system of patronage politics does not come from progressive parties, then militant networks will fill that void.

This is the site where the PPP has to focus in order to breath new life into itself and reclaim its old status of a party of change. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) tried to mould itself in the same way, but it has failed so far. In an ironic manner, the Jhang election saw the PPP candidate collecting more votes than the PTI candidate, which is, perhaps, a symbolic overture to a new era of a strengthened PPP wresting space back from the PTI. However, that depends on how PPP, under the leadership of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is able to steer itself away from stagnation and towards electoral dominance.

Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has shown that he has the potential to effect that change. He has been more outspoken against religious extremism and intolerance than any other political leader at present. Taking forward the Bhutto tradition of speaking without fear, Bilawal has broken the silence of the plight of minorities in the country and charted on a course of reclaiming the very basis on which Pakistan was founded: protection against religious majoritarianism. Bilawal has promised a new progressive party manifesto for the 2018 elections, and the success of that manifesto depends on whether the PPP is able to offer a fresh alternative to the rest of the centre-right political parties. The new zest with which the PPP is pushing itself forward can only achieve real change if it builds its party machinery with the aim of providing a replacement to the current system of patronage politics. And the new party manifesto will be an indication of whether the party is moving towards achieving that change.