A PATTERN has quickly been established: the government will talk up every success, mostly minor, in the fight against militancy while simultaneously warning that the fight is a long-term one.
That has the benefit of gaining credit for even assumed successes while deflecting the blame in case — rather, when — something goes terribly wrong.
The post-Peshawar world is beginning to look very much like the pre-Peshawar world. On Wednesday, Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan took to the floor of parliament to claim a major breakthrough against anti-Shia Hazara militants, with a nationwide, possibly even a regional, network being broken up on the back of close civil-military intelligence cooperation here.
To the extent that the state is taking anti-Shia Hazara militancy seriously and even deploying significant resources to prevent attacks, the actions should be welcomed and the state should be encouraged to do more.
Shia Hazaras are perhaps uniquely vulnerable even in the spectrum of militant targets and given the savage, mind-numbing atrocities committed against them in recent years, they deserve to be accorded the very highest priority.
For all the credit the interior minister would like to take, however, there remains a basic problem: there is still no clarity on what exactly is the state’s strategy to fight all forms of extremism, terrorism and militancy.
It appears that government officials believe that the mere repetition of the National Action Plan or reference to it is enough by way of explanation.
Reality suggests that NAP is anything but a coherent, cohesive and well-delineated plan to fight militancy. But the government seems unconcerned and unhurried about trying to move towards such a plan.
Worse, it appears to believe that such a plan already exists. But it does not. Where, for example, are the lists of banned organisations, their leaderships, their financing networks and what specific legal steps have been taken to shut down the public and clandestine operation of such groups?
Can there really be said to be a National Action Plan if something as basic as a comprehensive listing of the enemy is yet to be created or made public?
That is not wanton criticism. If questions about the details can be obfuscated by counter-details by the government — mere claims of breaking up terrorist networks mean little unless identities, affiliations and roles are revealed — there is also a simpler route.
Yesterday was Kashmir Day and to mark the day a number of rallies were held in various parts of the country. Simply, how many extremists, terrorists and militants were present at those rallies?
How many of those rallies were organised and led by avowedly militant groups and their leaders? The state, both the civilian and military sides of it, can have little credibility when it claims to be fighting one side of the militancy spectrum while simultaneously enabling another part of it.
No comments:
Post a Comment