Pakistan in perpetual crisis

S P Seth

Zia’s stewardship of Pakistan changed the internal dynamics of Pakistan’s politics and society by making religion and religious politics much more relevant.

Pakistan is in a state of perpetual crisis. Its political theatre has the appearance of a long running drama that seems familiar, going back almost to the country’s birth. There is the usual manufactured rage of its lead political characters, promising to put the country on its rightful course if only they were given a chance to govern. And each time they make a mess of it, starting the same game all over again. In the late 1950s, the army chipped in to rescue the country from the sordid game of politicians. Many people felt a sense of relief, believing that the army would fix things and put the country on its forward trajectory. But, lo and behold, it did not take long for the generals to become adept at the political game themselves, including making money, lots of it, from this new political lottery. Since then, everyone who is anyone in Pakistan has his/her finger in the cookie jar to make the most of it. Therefore, when everyone is compromised — almost everyone — the easiest way is to become self-righteous and attack others for political thuggery and all that goes with it.

There was a change for the worse, if one can imagine it, towards the late 1970s when the then military chief, Ziaul Haq, staged a coup against then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and, subsequently, managed to secure his judicial execution. The military, which till then had been known to usurp power and rule by decree, now seemed also to have the power of life and death over the country’s highest elected leader, if they so wished. In other words, the supremacy of the military over the civilian order was so brazenly established that military rule directly, or behind the scenes, is now a sad fact of life in Pakistan. Another thing happened under Zia that was even more pernicious. He gave the country a turn towards religious conservatism and orthodoxy, which further legitimised and even entrenched the role of Islamic politics. It is true that electorally religious parties were not as significant but their significance and influence socially and culturally became quite pervasive.

And this was happening even as Pakistan, under Zia, became increasingly enmeshed in the Cold War politics of the 1980s centred on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state for the US-led western bloc that used religion (Islam) to prop up the mujahideen in a crusade against ‘Godless’ communist invaders from the Soviet Union. With money and weapons pouring in from the US, as well as from Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan performing a coordinating role of sorts, the Soviet army was bogged down and then finally withdrew, even as the Soviet Union was crumbling. However, in the meantime, Afghanistan’s feuding groups of Islamic militants turned on each other until the Pakistan-supported Taliban prevailed and the new, still truncated Afghanistan, became Islamabad’s strategic backyard, or so it was thought. But it was still too early to be complacent, as the Taliban sheltered al Qaeda and its leadership that had incubated during the mujahideen struggle against the Soviet forces. They were to make or break history with the al Qaeda-inspired 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.

Zia’s stewardship of Pakistan changed the internal dynamics of Pakistan’s politics and society by making religion and religious politics much more relevant. The role of the mujahideen crusade against the Soviet army and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support led to the rise of militant Islam of which the Pakistani version of the Taliban was most telling, with disastrous results. And with the army involved deeply in sponsoring and promoting different militant groups, it became part of the violent culture that spawned in Pakistan, as well as the target of those it opposed. The army had obviously reckoned that different militant groups it had sponsored would follow its writ. And some did but others, like the Taliban in Pakistan, wanted to play their own game, bringing them into violent confrontation with the army, currently being played out in North Waziristan. While the current government sought to open up peace negotiations with the Taliban leadership, even as the army was militarily engaged against them, the military leadership was not amused. This created tensions between the Nawaz Sharif government and the army high command. Coincidentally, or by design, the opposition PTI started to get cozy with the army and started a mass movement to bring down the government, accusing it of having rigged the 2013 elections. The army chief found himself in the middle of it all as a mediator but, eventually, decided to hold back for the time being at least. As things stand, a military coup cannot be ruled out, which will further complicate things.

Going back a little, when the Taliban-sheltered al Qaeda became the ideological centre of global Islamic militancy and brought the wrath of the US to Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US soil, Pakistan’s then dictator, Pervez Musharraf, found himself aligned, willingly or unwillingly, in the US’s war on terror. Despite this, the top leadership of the Taliban still found refuge in Pakistan from where they are still operating. In other words, while Pakistan was a US ally in the war on terror, it had not altogether ditched the Taliban. This led to the US accusation of Islamabad playing both sides. Therefore, the US-Pakistan relationship was marked by deep suspicion and distrust. After the US commando attack killed Osama bin Laden sheltering in Abbottabad, the relationship virtually reached breaking point. Though things have improved somewhat, the US’s drone strikes continue to plague their relations.

The upshot of all this is that the US drone strikes and Washington possibly leaning on the army against a military takeover have made Imran Khan even shriller than usual. Whatever the result of the current political impasse with the PTI on the warpath to bring down the Sharif government, Pakistan’s situation will remain dire. According to Anatol Lieven (writing in a recent issue of the British magazine, Prospect), who recently visited Pakistan and has access to high levels of government and military brass: “Pakistan today, as so often in the past, presents a Janus-faced appearance. On the one hand, Pakistan is not northern Iraq [where ISIS is now entrenched]. As my experience in South Waziristan and the military offensive in North Waziristan demonstrate, the Islamist insurgency which has caused such terrible losses and raised such fears in the west is not about to overthrow the state.” Elaborating, he wrote, “On the other hand, the political elites do not appear capable of the unity, the vision, or the resolution necessary to carry out the reforms that Pakistan needs if it is to survive in the long term.” It is not a pretty picture but the Pakistani governing establishment surely knows it because they have created the mess in the first place.