It is tempting to wipe from the record 13 years of western military engagement in a faraway land that has cost much treasure for very questionable results in terms of nation-building. Afghanistan is a very imperfect example of international intervention.
The initial and legitimate reason for landing British, US and other troops back in 2001 was to eliminate the al-Qaida bases (and the Taliban government that refused to cooperate) in the country that had made 9/11 possible. But over the years, the operation morphed into a complex, overblown, high-maintenance coalition of 140,000 soldiers and more than 40 nations. One of the issues experts debate is whether it was right to deploy large numbers of western soldiers in the Pashtun territories after 2004-05, which may have fuelled a Taliban insurgency that found its roots in the age-old instincts of Afghan resistance to outside invaders. The ancient name of these lands, “kingdom of insolence”, could have served as a reminder of how difficult the enterprise was bound to be. Now we are faced with another question: as 31 December, the day set for the completion of the withdrawal of Nato combat troops from Afghanistan, approaches, what will be left behind?
If there is one lesson to be drawn from the rise of Islamic State (Isis) in Iraq this year, it is that hasty or mismanaged withdrawals will return to haunt you. Public opinion in America and Europe is tired of military expeditions that seem to create more problems than they solve, that strain western budgets and leave an obligation to prop up weak states in remote parts of the world. Against this backdrop, Afghanistan could all too easily be allowed to become a forgotten cause. That must not happen.
Fortunately the US administration and some of its allies appear acutely aware of the risks of closing down western involvement in Afghanistan too quickly. In 2011, Barack Obama was clearly over-confident when he declared: “we are leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq”. Three years on, Iraq is the theatre of a new international military engagement, as an extremist Islamist force carves out swaths of land and attracts jihadists from around the world.
A similar scenario in Afghanistan is the stuff of nightmares. The London donor conference this week will have this in mind. Garnering enough support for the newly elected Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, will be crucial. After the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, it took just three years for their man, Mohammad Najibullah, to be toppled, and for the country to plunge into the abyss of all-out civil war after Moscow abruptly cut off all financial support.
Clearly fearing the worst, Barack Obama has partly reversed the narrative of complete western combat-troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of the year. He has widened the spectrum of operations that the remaining 10,000 or so US soldiers will be able to undertake. But it is less clear how the international community will sustain Afghanistan’s national security forces, which now number 350,000 soldiers and police.
An Iraqi scenario is by no means a certainty in Afghanistan. First, the political leadership elected this year has a much more inclusive approach than the sectarian, Shia-centred government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq. President Ghani is in a better position to prevent a break-up of Afghanistan along ethnic or religious lines. Second, he has signed an agreement allowing US troops to remain to try to reinforce stability, something that turned out to be impossible in Iraq.
Yet the situation remains perilous. As the weekend attacks in Kabul illustrated, in anticipation of the withdrawal, the Taliban is on the offensive. But for all its flaws, it is international commitment to Afghanistan that has allowed the country to undergo the first democratic handing-over of power in its history. The scale of the achievement in the development of education and civil society should be recognised too. The fate of millions of Afghan women will be at stake if the Taliban is allowed to return to power. Western policy should not be short-sighted. There should be no dashing for the door. Financial aid, commitment to bolster security, and strong regional diplomacy will all be required. To allow Afghanistan to become a forgotten cause would be, as it was in the 1990s, at our peril.
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