Saturday, September 27, 2014

Pakistan: Targeted assassinations

Karachi was rocked by another terrorist attack targeting a senior police official on Thursday, when a vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was used to target the convoy of Senior Superintendent Police (SSP) Farooq Awan, head of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU). Three people were killed and eight were injured, while SSP Awan managed to escape with minor injuries. The blast occurred near Gizri, which was also where Inspector Shafiq Tanoli was attacked and killed in April. Police say that a 50 kilogram device was placed in the vehicle, and CCTV footage shows the car being left in the area by a man just a few minutes before the explosion occurred at 9.04 pm. Police believe the device was detonated via remote control. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) associated Jundullah group claimed responsibility. In the same way that former SSP Chaudhry Aslam was targeted earlier this year, the attackers chose a point along SSP Awan’s route home. This is not the first time he has been targeted by terrorists. An official described him as “a marked man” because of the blows he has dealt to terrorists in Karachi. SSP Awan was involved in the arrests of several high-profile militants, including Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was convicted in the 2002 killing of Daniel Pearl, and he is an expert in kidnapping-for-ransom investigations, directly affecting one of the Taliban’s leading sources of income in Karachi. This will probably not be the last attempt on his life either. Inspector Tanoli was targeted by terrorists seven times prior to his assassination while SSP Aslam was targeted in a mammoth blast that destroyed half his home in 2011, before being killed in 2014. Coupled with the attack on a senior official of the Frontier Corps in Peshawar two days ago, this and previous incidents suggest a pattern of terrorists targeting critical individuals in the law enforcement and paramilitary agencies who are spearheading investigations against terrorists in urban areas.
As has been argued in this space before, the blowback from operation Zarb-e-Azb that many people thought had been defused appears to be beginning. Attacks are coming thick and fast after the lull since the operation began. At least two attacks targeted critical airbase facilities, while one targeted the navy dockyards in Karachi. The latter was believed to have had inside help, but terrorists have found it far easier to infiltrate the police than it is to infiltrate the military. As the assassination of former Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer showed, it is also possible for them to turn police officers with radical inclinations to their cause. The police were never known for their efficiency in the first place, but distracted by multiple law enforcement problems at a time, including providing security for sit-ins and protests, operational resources and readiness are under severe strain. These are just some of the problems police in Karachi and other parts of the country face. Others include a lack of funding and proper equipment, and not the least, political interference that keeps criminals on the streets because of their connections to officials. The link between terrorism and organised crime has been exposed on more than one occasion, and with the Taliban this connection goes deeper because much of their funding comes from extortion, kidnapping, drug running and smuggling. According to a 2012 UN report, the Taliban has an estimated annual budget of over $ 400 million, half of which comes from smuggling.
Terrorists view the police and paramilitary groups as the weak link in the security chain, and have made efforts to target effective officers and individuals because of their rarity in these organisations. Their focus on urban areas suggests that rather than attacking the military directly, their aim will be to target major cities making it impossible for the army to fight them because it is not built for urban policing. In the cities the police and paramilitary units that support them will be in the frontlines against terrorists, leading to the disturbing conclusion that by targeting critical individuals within the police structure, they can bring the edifice of urban anti-terrorism operations to a grinding halt.

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