By Adeel Khalid
Pakistan is at inflexion point while the talks with Taliban are taking centre stage in political arena. According to a recent news report, the committees representing the government and the Taliban agreed on to extend the ceasefire and take measures to speed up the dialogue process. The head of the TTP committee, Maulana Samiul haq, confirmed that the ceasefire would be maintained beyond March. However it is a crucial developmental stage in negotiating with Taliban but on government side, but it is reactive incoherent at policy front to border a defined agenda to put forth accordingly in this peace process which is evident from the contradictory rhetoric and unplanned agenda emanating from within the polity of different discourses; reflects inconsistency and irresoluteness on government part to tackle this existential threat.
However, the objectives sought to be achieved unclear and opaque. Obliviously the government cannot afford to accommodate any of the main demands of the TTP without compromising the Pakistan’s Constitution and the prosperity of the country. These demands include the release of hundreds of prisoners, including some high-profile people, and setting up of a “peace zone” to allow free movement of the Taliban. Finally they resist for Sunni (Sharia) rule in Pakistan and the creation of an Islamic Emirate in Pakistan and Afghanistan which are beyond negotiable point for the public, policy-makers and politicians alike.
What is required in essence is the TTP’s surrender? Can this be achieved through talks and at this time? The right time to negotiate with the TTP would be once it is militarily and politically on the defensive. Negotiations can succeed provided these are conducted with the “principles” drafted by the government of Pakistan. These principles should be in aligning with the Constitution of Pakistan.
The recent issued internal security policy of Pakistan; though it aims to continue dialogue and enhance deterrence but inadequacies liquidate; as it is too centralize and narrow to implement in its existence. Certainly it has other shortcomings as well. The TTP is a hydra-headed monster, which includes a score of extremist parties and groups, with diverse aims, composition, locations and affiliations.
A large number of its members are foreigners—-Arabs, Uzbeks, Afghans. Its affiliations are complex in nature: al Qaeda supports it; Afghan intelligence collaborates with it and Indian intelligence has infiltrated in it. It is not only difficult to dismantle a Frankenstein but also to engage such a diversified body of threat which is penetrated in every nook and corner of the country.
Can talks and negotiations succeed in such environment? Perhaps that is why the government has distinguished Taliban into good, bad, and ugly Taliban respectively. Whatever the policy be, but it needs to be clearly defined and more importantly secure public support vis-a-vis media. Else, it will fail. As in the case of Ukraine crisis where the internal confusion, corruption and chaos illustrate, can quickly become a self-created threat to a nation.
It is important to identify major irritants which may thwart this peace process as it did in the past. Drones attack can halt this peace process as in case of killing of Hakeemullah Masud, Pakistan interior minister proclaimed it had killed the chances of negotiating peace with Taliban. So the US should maneuver while keeping in mind the ground realities along with the consent of all major stake-holders. Secondly, the experience with negotiating with Taliban has been never happy one and cannot succeed unless they are pursued from a position of strength. Such an incident has been experienced in Swat. Though, lessons should be learnt from the recent examples of successful counter-insurgency operations, such as Colombia, and Sri Lanka.
How to draft a coherent policy at this stage? Pakistan needs to get its policy house in order which is the prerequisite for a coherent policy drafting process and implementing it. This policy should be crafted after establishing the consensus of all major stake-holders coupled with the visionary leadership; it would enable them to evolve a counter-insurgency and counterterrorism strategy in a holistic fashion. The strategy should incorporate the orthodox four Ds formula of dismantling, defeating, decapitating and de radicalization the militants, terrorists, and extremists.
Dismantling all the leadership expulsion of the foreigners within the TTP, end to collaborate with external powers should be the main concern of this political fiesta. Asserting Pakistan’s sovereignty must be the central principle of this policy which should not be allowed to sabotage at any cost. Pakistan army has the numbers and capability to conduct multiple and simultaneous operations to kill or capture TTP militants in Fata, Swat, Peshawar, and Karachi. It should be authorized by the civilian government to do so. Decapitation involves those leaders who remain recalcitrant would be legitimate targets for elimination. Pakistan’s security forces should acquire capabilities to conduct such operations. De-radicalization TTP prevents them to replenish them to gain power which creates anguish and distress in the society.
Talks have been rejected in the past by the elected governments as talks abject the legitimacy of the elected leadership and undermine the democratic spirit in Pakistan.
https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6906155786122195046#editor/target=post;postID=2901949404725551458
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