Pakistan Army Rejects TTP Demands

shiapost.com

The army commanders in a special meeting on Friday decided they will not be part of the negotiating team with the Taliban as the generals think “militaries sitting on the table do not negotiate anywhere” with the militants and also have rejected the three reported demands of the Taliban, including evacuation from Waziristan, release of prisoners and compensation for those killed. By some it was described as a “wish list.”

Here is the detailed inside story of the Corps Commanders meeting held on Friday. They started at 1000 hrs. They ended seven hours later. An attendee said that longer meetings have been held before, but this one was “very serious”. Corps Commanders’ Conferences are named inappropriately.Actually, the Commanders sit on the Chief’s left, as the Commander Southern Command, from Quetta, begins the quorum, followed by the I, then II, and so on, Corps’ Commanders.

However, the Chief’s staff, starting from his Chief of General Staff, take his right-hand side, indicating their administrative and political importance.Thus, if you take into account the Principal Staff Officers, as well as the key two-stars and adjutants who line up the second rows, the Corps Commanders are actually outnumbered almost 2:1. Still, the chaps are bent on calling this function the Corps Commander’s Conference. It’s a classic example of the Army’s logic: the number of men in the room don’t count. The Army isn’t a democracy, though these days, it claims to be supporting one. Instead, the number of men each man in the room commands matter. And the command of the world’s fifth largest fighting force is controlled by the Corps Commanders. Period.

On Friday, for the 170th Conference, presentations were made. A prayer break was taken. Cigarettes were smoked. Karachi was discussed. The effectivity of the air strikes was debated. Also mulled was the National Security Policy. The NACTA bit, it was claimed, is for the civvies to figure out. “The [National Security Policy’s] parts about intelligence fusion and the reaction forces were talked about,” said a source. “It was assessed that they would be supported through quick operationalisation when required.” Three new terror attacks – the F8 Katchery attack in Islamabad, the IED attack on the FC in Bannu, and the assault on Khasadars in Khyber – were discussed, and according to a source “it was decided that if there is a connection of these attacks with any party, they will be hit back hard.” As for the jaw-jaw versus the pow-pow – or the talk versus fight – narrative, it was hoped, according to a source, that “the negotiations convince the Taliban to identify those parties which are with them and those who are not and where they all stand so that everyone knows how to proceed forward.” Translated: The talks should start bi-producing the names and addresses of the bad Taliban versus the not too bad Taliban (this, assuming, that the Army knows the same for the good Taliban, who are not a part of the public face of this negotiation equation yet). As for the structure of the talks and the Army/ISI’s potential role as an active participant in the negotiations, it was clarified: “That was never really a decision or a directive, and was prematurely floated in the press. It was just a suggestion from the negotiators to the PM, that’s it.” It was also clearly suggested by a source that militaries sitting on a table and negotiating with militants “is not done anywhere”. Fair enough. Lets remember that this “participation clause” was really a Talib demand, and not the PM’s idea. Anyway, this army is in no mood to comply with the TTP’s three-tier wish list – prisoner releases, South Waziristan evacuation, and compensation – unless really pressed on by Raiwind. And Raiwind is in no mood to press the Army on anything; instead, it wants things to settle themselves. That’s why the GHQ is such a serene place to visit these days. And that’s why neither side – the Shers and the Soldiers – has unleashed an assault on the other. As for the talks: “Intel agencies provide input, of course, but the defence minister has already clarified how that would work in the talks,” said the source, referring to Khawaja Asif’s ‘March in March’and ‘Army input is valuable’’ comments on Friday.Translated: No Boots or Spooks will directly participate in the talks. It’s a risk-averse approach. Succeed, and they will look like they cooperated and provided key data. Fail, and they will look like they were right not to negotiate with the thugs. Meanwhile, the Khawaja Asifs will provide the right wicket keeping and appeals. That’s the secret of the Raiwind/GHQ combine. The right guys are working with tough guys, more or less.But there are missing links, and hints.

Local audiences – the Parliament, for example – are being told by the War Cabinet’s jaw-jaws that “third powers” are in motion, that not all of the TTP is evil and anti-state, and that there is light at the end of this dark, bloody tunnel.

But foreign audiences – a wires agency, for example – are being told by the War Cabinet’s not-so jaw-jaws war is coming if this frustrating ‘talk-fight-deny-talk-fight’ construct continues. Is this ‘different horses for different courses’ approach a part of the PM’s brilliant stratagem, or just an indication of his ambivalence?Is the PM colour blind, or does his approach of making every red-line that is crossed by the terrorists a pink-line; the political equivalent of a tiger trap… Luring in the beast closer till it is within shooting range? Is this PM, who evidently signed off on Kargil after just one briefing, exacting his revenge by over-analysing through this deliberation? Or is his master plan to expose the TTP as it shoots itself in the foot, leave them no moral quarter, and then charge in?

Are Nawaz’s generals getting restless, or is their paranoia about public engagement forcing them to play along? Or is everyone on the same page because the plan is working? And lets not forget that the Americans like where all of this going. The Coalition Support Funds are flowing like a river. That’s the best indication of Washington’s mood, for now.Also, as for the operation itself: does the Army have a battle plan?

Yes, say junior and senior officers. Is it a very good one? We don’t know, and we never will, till the fighting actually begins, but when it does, it’s going to be “days, maybe weeks, but not months”. It’s name? There are several, but for the history books, the Operation Al-Mizan umbrella will continue. A foreseeable problem? How long will the divisions that are deployed to liberate North Waziristan going to be stationed there for? There is fresh blood on the ground, by the way: The new General Officer Commanding of the 7th ‘Golden Arrow’ Division in Miranshah, Zafarullah Khan, a Piffer like the Chief himself who had Chief of Staff stint in Lahore, just got promoted and sent in to replace a very worn out Maj Gen Ali Abbas. Will GHQ give him the green light to go to town even before he’s familiarised with the terrain and targets? It’s highly unlikely.

Bottomline: The war will not be self-inflicted. The war will be forced. Lets not forget that peace negotiations are meant to deliver peace, not some sort of metaphysical relationship of the State with the TTP. This is a game of inverted brinksmanship. Interestingly, blinking is allowed. Magnanimity will get you points. The loser will be one who fires first.