Pakistan: ‘Enemy’ of the state

THE interior ministry’s report on the internal security threat presented before the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Interior is at once an eye-opener and a confirmation of long-held suspicions. The cities of Pakistan — not just faraway Fata or obscure corners — have thoroughly been infiltrated by militants of every stripe, local and foreign. The names are as familiar as they are scary: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. So are the targets: ethnic, sectarian, provincial, sub-national. Equally telling, however, is what was left off the list: whereas Indian-sponsored militancy in AJK and arms being smuggled into the country across both the eastern and western borders were highlighted by the interior ministry official, nothing was said of the pro-state non-state actors who have also proliferated across the country. And therein lies the real tragedy of Pakistan today: not only has the state been negligent in securing the peace internally, it has actively colluded with elements along the very spectrum that is threatening the existence and moorings of the state as we know it today. Start though with the strands of militancy the state ostensibly does not support or condone, groups such as LJ and Al Qaeda. These are not new threats and, despite the creative rewriting of history in some quarters, existed long before 9/11 or the American return to the region. How seriously has the state taken the elimination of such strands of militancy on Pakistani soil? Officials may point to the dozens, if not hundreds, who have been captured or killed over the last decade — but the success rate is neither particularly high nor adequate. If it were, then why is the interior ministry today warning of swathes of the country being at risk from such groups? Yet, as is well known, the problem is not just one of state inaction — or inadequate action — but of collusion and complicity too. Set aside the Kashmir- and India-centric groups that the state, or at least the security establishment, has little interest in reining in. Consider just the sectarian elements that the security establishment and political parties have either co-opted or turned a blind eye towards for parochial reasons. In Balochistan, for example, there are persistent rumours of sectarian killers being recruited for eliminating Baloch separatists. In Punjab, nearly every political party has followed the lead of the PML-N in learning how to either buy off or co-opt sectarian elements for electoral purposes. The idea that violent extremist groups and mainstream politics or the state can peacefully coexist is a nonsensical one of course. All the security establishment and parts of the political spectrum have managed to do is to create a bigger, more formidable problem than they could ever have imagined.