Afghanistan: Harder than it should have been

AFTER nearly a year of intense negotiations, it still came down to the wire. As The Economist went to press, a consultative loya jirga called by Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president, was poised to give its approval for a bilateral security agreement (BSA) with America. The agreement will provide the legal basis for foreign (mainly American) forces to stay in the country after the 2014 deadline for ending combat operations. Without a deal, not only would America have exercised the “zero option” of pulling all troops out of Afghanistan, but the $4.1 billion a year it and allies have pledged to fund Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would also have been in jeopardy, as well as much civil aid. All the contentious issues had appeared settled 48 hours earlier, but at almost the last moment Mr Karzai (in character) found a way of keeping up the suspense. He reportedly demanded a letter from President Barack Obama expressing contrition for military mistakes in the past and a commitment to avoid them in the future. Otherwise, the deal would be off.

American frustration and irritation was palpable. Talk of a presidential apology was wide of the mark, according to Susan Rice, Mr Obama’s national security adviser; an expression of gratitude for the blood spilled and money spent on behalf of Afghans might have been more appropriate.

Amid denials on both sides over the insistence on an apology, a form of words has been cobbled together expressing American regret (not for the first time) for civilian casualties in the 12-year war with the Taliban. There was also assurance that forced entry by American troops into Afghan homes, a huge bone of contention, would be only a last resort when lives were at risk. This will be read out to the loya jirga, an assembly of more than 2,500 members of parliament, tribal elders and local officials, largely picked by the president. With Mr Karzai’s backing, a vote against the BSA is almost inconceivable. The agreement sets out the terms under which American forces will operate for the next ten years. It will be followed by another covering NATO troops from other countries, who will join the Americans in a mission described officially as confined to training, advising and assisting the ANSF. Among its duties will be providing security for the many thousands of civilian officials and contractors who are expected to stay on after 2014. The force is likely to be 8,000-12,000 strong (compared with 87,000 today), with America providing a little over two-thirds of the manpower and rather more of the so-called “enablers” needed by the ANSF in areas such as logistics, intelligence and some air support. America will also keep special forces in the country to maintain a strong front against counter-terrorism, since a resurgence of al-Qaeda is, many think, a distinct possibility.

Apart from the night raids on Afghan homes, the most vexed issue for the Afghans has been foreign troops’ “immunity” from prosecution in Afghan courts. The Americans and their European allies insisted that any transgressions of the law by their forces must be dealt with by courts at home. The Afghan government knew that this was a deal-breaker. They had only to look at the example of Iraq, where the absence of such an agreement led to the premature withdrawal of all American forces, with baleful consequences for the country’s security.

Another difficulty has been the extent to which America would be obliged to defend Afghanistan against aggression from outside. Reluctant to accept a blanket obligation, American negotiators wanted to limit the definition of aggression to (unlikely) conventional attacks by land, sea or air. The Afghans, however, demanded that it should include countries (eg, Pakistan) that give safe haven to Afghan insurgents trying to bring down the government. A compromise seems to have been reached. Among other aspects of the BSA, America will retain independent control of the giant Bagram air base some 25 miles (40km) from Kabul, as well as freedom of movement for its military personnel at several more bases around the country.

Quite why it has proved so difficult to reach a deal is puzzling. It is clearly in the interests of America and its NATO allies to try to lock in some of the real gains that their involvement has made possible in Afghanistan, for a fraction of the financial and military effort that has been expended in the past. In many ways, the policy of handing over security to the ANSF is working. Afghan soldiers lead 99% of all combat operations and despite taking 200 or so fatalities a month are not flinching. With support, the Afghan government, despite its many deficiencies, looks resilient enough to repel the Taliban from the main cities and economic centres. The threat of a “zero option” was intended as a warning to Mr Karzai, but would have been bad for America, too.

As for Mr Karzai, the loya jirga may well be his last opportunity to play to an influential gallery before he steps down after a presidential election next April, one which he is constitutionally barred from contesting. He wishes to be seen as a great Afghan rather than as a stooge of the Americans. But for a man who cares so much about his legacy, overplaying his hand over an agreement of such overwhelming benefit to his country was foolhardy of Mr Karzai. A security agreement entered into by both sides with some enthusiasm and a sense of shared destiny would have been stronger and potentially more enduring than one demeaned by haggling.