US withdrawal from Afghanistan

Relations between the US and the Karzai government have remained on a downward slide ever since the first round of official talks between the US and the Taliban in Doha, ran aground at the last minute over Afghan officials' objections to what they said amounted to giving legitimacy to the Taliban as a government in exile. According to reports, negotiations between Washington and Kabul on a long-term security deal under which the US was to maintain residual troop presence after the 2014 combat troops withdrawal date also came to an abrupt end as Karzai insisted that in order for the negotiations to move forward the Taliban must be persuaded to meet directly with the Afghan government representatives. If that demand was not unrealistic enough, reports also point out that the long-term security deal talks had already faltered in recent months as Karzai government demanded that the US commit to declaring Pakistan the main obstacle in the fight against militancy in the region. As American officials have been publicly acknowledging, Pakistan has played a key role in persuading the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Washington will not want to harm a helpful friend on the say-so of others. In any case, the US has to watch its own interests in determining the nature of its relations with the region's countries. It can ill-afford to alienate Pakistan, especially at a time it needs to find an honourable exit from Afghanistan. Frustrated over Karzai's behaviour, American officials are now said to have made it clear to him that President Obama was also considering the "zero option" of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan after 2014. In fact, that option is said to have moved from being considered as worst-case scenario to a serious option. It could be a mere pressure tactic; it could also mean that the US has gone on to conduct informal negotiations with the Taliban, and is willing to ignore Karzai as long as it gets necessary assurances from them. Karzai personally does not have much of a stake in the future of Afghanistan. His second and last term in office is to end next year. He can get up and leave when the going gets bad. He has amassed enough wealth that will stand him in good stead for the rest of his life. But the Afghan people who have endured nearly thirty-four years of conflict, two wars involving foreign powers and years of internecine fighting in between, deserve better. As for the US' two earlier stated policy objectives of maintaining troop presence in Afghanistan post the end 2014 withdrawal date to pursue al Qaeda remnants and train and equip Afghan security forces, those may well have changed. A Taliban spokesman addressed the US' primary concern when he stated in Doha last month that the "movement is not intending to harm any other parties, and will not allow anybody to use Afghan territory to threaten other countries." Considering that the Taliban have been fighting to oust foreign forces they are unlikely to allow any American troop presence as part of a peace deal. 'Zero Option' policy, however, should not mean the US would walk away like it did at the end of its last Afghan war without clearing the mess the conflict had created, leaving regional warlords and the two main political forces, the Taliban and the erstwhile Northern Alliance, to fight a protracted intra-Afghan war. Its talks with the Taliban must focus on achieving an orderly transition agreement that ensures lasting peace and stability.