Peshawar airport saga

Gratifying though it is that the accursed terrorists couldn't penetrate into the Peshawar airport to perpetrate their vileness, the saga nonetheless exposes chinks in the counter-terrorism armour of the state apparatus. What else could it be that despite the intelligence forewarning, the wicked gunmen did succeed in accessing the airport periphery with deadly arsenal of automatic weapons, rocket launchers, suicide jackets and an explosive-laden vehicle? Fortunately, they were beaten down with strong security action. Their target, unarguably, was not the civilian assets but the air force base. And that speaks of a sinister plan of terrorists' masterminds, handlers and financiers to diminish Pakistan's airpower. In their earlier attacks on the Mehran and Kamra airbases too, they had aimed at the military aircraft. And so would have been at the Peshawar airport, had they been able to intrude into its high-security area. All these attacks were decidedly no work of riff-raff scoundrels. Those bore the stamp of adept professionalism and extraordinary acumen in military planning, strategy and execution. And that tells tellingly that what the state security apparatus is up against is terrorism masterminded by elements inimical to Pakistan that are well-versed in military matters and warfare. More precisely, the apparatus is pitted against the brigands, whose patrons, believably aliens, have the experience of fueling wars against the foreign states, poaching native recruits to be their proxies and have all the means to train, arm and bankroll them lethally. That clearly stipulates that the state counter action has to be matching in every manner and stronger and more effective in every way. And that is where lies the weak spot of our state security apparatus in countering the terrorism of these foreign proxies. There indeed is a bewildering hiatus to the counter-terrorism response of our state. Although the country has been in the lap of a predominantly foreign-fueled prowling terrorism now for years on end, our top echelons are yet to learn that a successful counterterrorism campaign can only be conducted by combining up the state's military power and civil power. Here, the chariot is being run mainly on one wheel, leaving the other stuck up and immobile. It is the military alone whose shoulder has been pushed forward to carry almost the entire burden while the civil armed forces and the civilian administrations have been relegated to the backseat. This is intrinsically wrong, harmful and perilous. As a matter of fact, it is the civil armed forces and the civilian administration that play the leading role in fighting out urban terrorism, of which the country has become such a bleeding quarry. But the woe is that this time-tested strategy is nowhere in play all over the country. Not even in cases where the military has dealt the crippling blows to terrorists, making their commanders and ranks to take to their heels. The military's success needed to be consolidated and built upon by strengthening the civil armed forces to curb the remnants and prevent them from raising their heads and by plunging into massive development efforts to marginalise the extremists and marauding gunmen. More than two years have passed since the army cleared Swat and Malakand of the murder brigands of Swati thug Fazlullah, yet the civilian administration is still to show its state face to the natives to boost their morale and provide them civic services so as to shun the extremists or their sympathisers. Fazlullah along with many of his thugs had though decamped in the face of a strong and no-nonsense army operation. But since terrorism is like a creeper that doesn't die instantly but some of its offshoots linger on for a time, the provincial administration should have worked on a war-footing to build up a powerful civilian security apparatus in the region to deal with the rumpus of Fazlullah's brigands. It has not as yet any impressively. Nor is it showing any big development or administrative hand there to win the love and affection of the people lastingly. Only recently, the provincial government has begun talking of phased withdrawal of army from the region, but only unconvincingly. Far worse is, however, the situation in FATA region, which for whatever reason has become the nursery and wellspring of militancy and terrorism. The army clears an area of the militants, but has no mentionable civilian backup to consolidate and build upon its gains. The linchpin of the civilian administration is the political agent of the tribal agency. But recruitment to this crucial post is not based on competence, merit or administrative acumen. It is on every tongue in the region that the post is literally sold out. And the incumbent is more intent on recouping his investment and making bigger fortunes on it than lending a support to the military power by way of consolidating its successes. The civil armed forces at his command likewise are more swayed by the lust for filthy riches than for serving the cause of peace, tranquility, normality and stability in the region. This isn't on. This must change. By every consideration, the top echelons need to review the counter-terrorism campaign of the state urgently. The state is being challenged by professionally-guided, richly-funded and lethally-armed thugs. A very powerful, coordinated and orchestrated state action is called for to take on them. But time is of essence.