Baloch solution

editorial:

WHAT is sadder than Jalil Reki’s story is how common a tale it is. The mutilated body of this Baloch activist was found nearly three years after he disappeared, events his father has described in searing detail for a report in this paper. Meanwhile, the interior minister was holding a ‘third force’ responsible for Balochistan’s troubles in the Senate on Friday. But external powers cannot conjure up an internal problem to exploit. Holding them responsible shifts the burden away from the state’s responsibility to answer two interconnected questions that have gone unaddressed for too long. First, who actually runs Balochistan? Certainly not the elected provincial government, which owns up to its own powerlessness. If the federal government does, the extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, terrorism, crime and lack of development point to an abysmal failure of governance on its part. And if the province is, as many Baloch and others feel, controlled by the military establishment, is the government doing anything to try to wrest away some of its power? For an administration that has recently been more than willing to take on Rawalpindi when threatened by its own removal, it is remarkably silent about the erosion of civilian authority in Balochistan.

Second is the question of a solution. Aghaz-i-Huqooq-i-Balochistan has proved that a top-down approach and a few development projects and jobs will not address the fundamental issues. The government could be doing a lot more just to kick-start a process of trying to find an answer, which will hinge on listening to what the Baloch want, rethinking what the government can provide, and genuinely attempting to move towards some middle ground. That would mean a broad-based, open-minded effort to hear from them, including separatists, rather than giving them what Islamabad thinks they need. It would mean partnering with politicians from across the spectrum, including the opposition, who might have relationships with Baloch leaders. And it would require a genuine effort, including pressuring the security establishment, to meet some of the key demands for justice and security.

But none of this will happen as long as politicians continue to suffer from the Bangladesh syndrome: believing that the concerns of certain Pakistanis are less important than those of others. The Awami League’s demands were unacceptable to West Pakistan’s political establishment at the time. In hindsight, after losing East Pakistan, they are no longer seen that way. The federal government needs to get its act together on the issue before we reach a point when, looking back, we wish we hadn’t been so dismissive of Balochistan’s demands.