Signals from a failing state

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BOOK REVIEW: Signals from a failing state —by Khaled Ahmed

Pakistan Aik Nakaam Riyasat? By Mujahid Husain;



Politicians signing brilliantly democratic but unfamiliar charters confuse Pakistan by swearing that they will be friends and not destabilise each other in the old pavlovian reflex of toppling that the country is used to. In fact if you don’t topple, there is something seriously wrong with you

Mujahid Husain as a journalist is a man of the field but lately his columns in daily Aajkal have caught the attention of the reader who wants something new in Urdu journalism. He knows the facts that back his perceptions and is easy with the language so that the message gets across, and he keeps himself out of his message, which is quite unusual in Pakistan where the column has been reduced to anecdotal egotism that readers must accept as analysis.

He is alerted by yaksaniyat (uniformity) of thinking in a state where discord is the most threatening aspect of its failing health, a kind of brainwash absorbed from the centres of power within the state that patronise you only if you mouth their shibboleths. Hatred of America, hatred of India, and a kind of blind faith in the muslimhood of the Taliban is what this uniformity relies on for growth. The scene that these elements of identical thinking present becomes murkier when they start wrestling each other for power.

He thinks the fall of Peshawar to the domination of the terrorists is clearly indicated by the free run the Taliban have on the NATO trucks that pass through Peshawar to Torkham border in the Khyber Agency. The frequency with which these trucks are blown up and looted by the Taliban tells us how Peshawar has been ‘taken’; and if Peshawar is taken then one can imagine that a takeover of Islamabad would be the next easy step. Those who think that in case there is another Indo-Pak war the Taliban will stand with the Pakistan Army may be favouring a Taliban takeover of Islamabad as well.

One could actually link the looting of the NATO trucks to the way Islamabad has been reacting to the build-up of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In fact Islamabad is partly convinced that NATO presence in Afghanistan is against the interests of Pakistan and therefore the trucks for which Islamabad receives a hefty fee from the US are being targeted and looted freely by the Taliban. And when Islamabad realised that one billion dollars on account of the trucks were still outstanding from the US it must have realised that the stuck ‘truck money’ could be the American message for the free run on trucks that was allowed in Peshawar. The Americans lost nothing; we lost Peshawar.

Fifteen leaders of PMLQ have money in banks in France, Belgium Germany and Holland and they fear no disclosures because the accounts are held jointly with the local Pakistanis. Because the author lives in Belgium he has inside information about others too. But these ‘partners’ talk all the time; and information is therefore available. A former minister has a grand house in Brussels in the name of a Polish lady who makes him welcome and comfortable whenever he goes visiting to be home away from home. Big men in Pakistan imperiously survey Spain, Portugal, Italy and Holland for parking their excess money in the shape of properties. The local expat Pakistanis offer services of caretaking, and all is well after that.

A former federal minister of Musharraf lived in Germany for six months because he had bought four houses in Bonn and had to get them decorated properly in his presence. NAB, who got after the Bhuttos in a big way, was unaware of this ‘lota’ minister who had suddenly become rich after deserting his original party. The PMLN too is no sacred cow. Two of its office holders have vast properties worth 80 million euros in Belzano in Italy (p.236). Close relatives of a former ISI officer have a large property in Luxembourg and have ‘joint accounts in a well known local bank’. He visits now and then to look after the accounts of a relative of his who was also a minister for some time.

Politicians signing brilliantly democratic but unfamiliar charters confuse Pakistan by swearing that they will be friends and not destabilise each other in the old pavlovian reflex of toppling that the country is used to. In fact if you don’t topple, there is something seriously wrong with you. The book informs on page 254 that a meeting took place in which a plan to topple the Zardari-Gilani government was actually set on foot. The campaign of defamation to instrumentalise this was to be based on the amount of money Musharraf ‘returned’ to the Bhuttos after the NRO was put through by him.

It is said that the total assets returned to Zardari after the NRO were worth Rs 98 billion which was confiscated — courtesy Sardar Farooq Leghari as president — together with other assets it was thought had been acquired through corruption and fraud. The idea was to spread lethal rumours about the PPP leadership and bring them to a point where the 2008 government would have to leave. The obstacle was General Ashfaq Kayani who insisted on having a normal working relationship with the president and prime minister and was in no mood to go into the toppling mode.

Mujahid Husain keeps asking questions like why are Pakistanis so intent on taking revenge in all spheres of life, from foreign policy to family life; why are they determined to annihilate the opponent in political contest; why are the powerful intent on not using the law but punishing their perceived opponents with their own hands; why are Pakistanis using religion to vent their aggression till religion itself starts looking an evil inspiration to the world outside?