Lessons from Sri Lanka

Najmuddin A Shaikh
Daily Times

This is a war for Pakistan’s survival. It must be fought without illusions and without yielding to the temptation to believe that one has credible and willing partners with whom a negotiated peace could be worked out

The curtain has at long last fallen on the destructive and polarising campaign of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, which claimed more than 70,000 lives over the last 26 years. Led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, the Tamil Tigers pioneered the use of suicide bombers and were responsible for the assassination not only of Sri Lankan leaders but also of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Prabhakaran’s ruthlessness and total disregard for human rights did not appear to dent his hold on his people in the areas he controlled or even on the Tamils living abroad.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa, as the defence minister, adopted the same ruthlessness and disregard for human rights to achieve victory. From the Sri Lankan perspective, theirs was a desperate battle for survival as a united state. Previous efforts at finding a negotiated settlement had all foundered on the rocks of LTTE intransigence. Humanitarian concern about the innocent Tamils trapped and kept trapped by the LTTE for use as human shields was understandable but for the Sri Lankan army there was, in their view, no alternative to seeking an unconditional surrender, whatever the ‘collateral damage’.

Today there is outcry in the West about the manner in which the Sri Lankan army conducted operations and about the suppression of dissent in the Sri Lankan media. There is talk of denying Sri Lanka the IMF loan it desperately needs and withdrawing the preferential trading sights that it enjoys with the European Union. Yet the need of the hour is assistance for the refugees and for the more than a quarter of a million people who were more or less held hostage by the Tamil Tigers in their “last stand”.

There is further need to provide the political backing which ensures that the reconciliation process does not become hostage to the activities of Tigers sympathisers from across the narrow strait that separates Sri Lanka from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Much has been written about the role that external forces — be it the national government in India or the state government of Tamil Nadu or non-state actors — had played in fomenting the Sinhalese-Tamil divide or the rise of the LTTE. The international community must play its part in ensuring that this does not recur.

This should not be too difficult. The greatly strengthened Manmohan Singh government, with a minimal dependence on the regional political parties, will have the capacity to guarantee non-interference in Sri Lankan affairs.

All that the international community should insist upon thereafter as a condition for its assistance is that a clear path for reconciliation should be set out and be acted upon.

It is perhaps true that when the government was able to establish control in eastern Sri Lanka, it did not move in this direction. Perhaps the Rajapaksa government was too preoccupied with the continuing military campaign to do so. Perhaps it was because the long years of conflict have created distrust and even hatred that will take time to overcome. Many Tamils who opposed Prabhakaran and the LTTE have not joined the Sinhalese in celebrating the Tigers’ defeat because they did not hear in Rajapaksa’s victory speech any word on what his government intended doing to move towards reconciliation. Reconciliation is, however, the only way forward.

Are there any parallels between the situation in Sri Lanka and the counter-insurgency operation that we are now waging? If there are none, is there any prospect of such parallels developing in the future?

Currently there appear to be no parallels. The Taliban in Malakand are not reflecting Pashtun or Swati aspirations. Their agenda is to push their distorted interpretation of Islam down the throat of all Pakistanis and then move further afield. Whatever the movement started as, there is no doubt that it has been infiltrated and perhaps even taken over by criminal elements.

Underneath the surface, however, lies a simmering resentment that pervades all Pashtuns, be they in Afghanistan, Pukhtunkhwa or Karachi (which has more Pashtuns than either Peshawar or Kabul). In their perspective, whatever the reasons for the conflict or its prolongation, Pashtun blood is being spilled on both sides. It is Pashtuns who are branded as extremists even though it is Pashtuns who are the principal victims of the extremists. Many in this community have become paranoid enough to suggest that the “authorities” are using them as pawns to carry forward an agenda that has little to do with the genuine aspirations of the moderate Pashtuns.

For the Pashtuns, the massive exodus from Malakand, occasioned as much by fear of military action as by the atrocities committed by the Taliban is yet another indicator of the miseries that have been inflicted upon them for no fault of their own. Many can perhaps be persuaded that the fault lay with the American invasion of Afghanistan, but too many others recall how the setting up of Taliban recruitment centres in Swat and the tribal areas, long after the Soviets had left, contributed to the radicalisation of the region.

If we are not to return to the dreaded days of the past when many Pashtuns argued that there was no place for them in Pakistan, there are two things that must be done. First, the IDPs must be looked after not only in Pukhtunkhwa but also anywhere else in Pakistan. Equally or perhaps more importantly, the military operation must be brought to closure quickly. It is encouraging that people, at least in the thousands, have started returning to Buner and one can hope that the clearing of Sultanwas will hasten the process further. We must not, however, make the mistake of withdrawing the army immediately. The area must be cleared and then held.

We should acknowledge that the resistance has been stiffer than expected and that our present effort may need to be reinforced by further contingents from our eastern border, particularly if areas are to be held after they are cleared. The development of our civil armed forces and police will take time and the area cannot be abandoned.

I saw some evidence of a willingness to do this in the ISPR statement that the eastern border remained a long term threat while the internal threat was, at least by implication, more immediate. That resistance would be strong became evident when it was revealed that in the Peochar Valley, under the very eyes of our intelligence agencies, the militants had been able to build 80ft deep bunkers and other such defensive positions. In areas where the civil administration and the intelligence agencies were less visible, even more must have been done.

Sri Lanka does one offer one lesson. This is a war for Pakistan’s survival. It must be fought without illusions and without yielding to the temptation to believe that one has credible and willing partners with whom a negotiated peace could be worked out. The time for that has passed. The time for reconciliation will come when military victory has been achieved just as it has now come in Sri Lanka.

The writer is a former foreign secretary