I.A. Rehman
While absence of good governance is an open secret, the recent sparring between the government and the military has created an opportunity to discuss the military’s claim to the right to oversee the state of governance.
The recent verbal skirmish between the government and the military, which was quite unnecessary, has left a bad taste not only in the mouths of the parties concerned but also on the tongues of the people at large.
The sequence of events began with some comments made by the Chief of the Army Staff at the corps commanders’ meeting on the government’s ‘inadequate’ fulfilment of its obligations under the National Action Plan. Since the army chief was reported to have communicated these views directly to the prime minister, the justification for the issuance of a press release by the ISPR, thus bringing an intra-government exchange into public domain, was not clear. Nor does one have a credible explanation for the government’s somewhat curt rejoinder that was soon issued.
While the army chief’s observations pertained to only three points (out of 20) in the National Action Plan — lack of progress on the implementation of NAP, delay in introducing reforms in FATA, and unsatisfactory action on the report of joint investigation teams — the government reply gave the impression that it considered itself under attack for the entire scheme of governance.
The result was that political actors started taking up positions behind the parties to the exchange of statements. Some affirmed their loyalty to the system of representative government while others endorsed what the army chief had said and thus kept their options to choose their favourite open.
Now, absence of good governance is an open secret. The citizens complain of poor governance every day and so do the media and the opposition parties. Even the professional drum beaters in the ruling party’s fold sometimes concede weaknesses in governance. But when the military raised its finger against the government the entire scenario of civil-military confrontation, or imbalance, was revived and with it came the question whether the military was thinking of formalising its undeclared assumption of control over the state’s functioning.
However true or untrue these fears may be, the situation has created an opportunity to discuss the military’s claim to the right to oversee the state of governance. The issue is rooted partly in Pakistan’s constitutional history.
Treating India as a territory acquired by conquest, the British gave the Commander-in-chief of the Army a special place in their scheme of governance. The 1935 Act had special provisions for the armed forces. Unlike India, which explicitly declared the defence forces as services, and hence not entitled to be mentioned separately in the constitution, Pakistan retained in its basic law some of the provisions of the 1935 Act.
The area where reconciliation between civil and military’s points of view might not be easy is the requisites of rule of law. By virtue of its training and temperament, the military has difficulty in appreciating the sanctity of the due process.
The military was also able to acquire a special status in view of the emphasis on security in the aftermath of the Kashmir conflict and tension with India. Thus, the military has always believed that it has a right to keep an eye on governance and to intervene in situations for which no constitutional remedy is available, a myth that has unfortunately been sanctified by the judiciary.
General Ziaul Haq enlarged the concept of military’s superintendence of government functions by proposing a constitutional role for it. He created a National Security Council (NSC) with wide powers but the relevant amendment to the constitution had to be sacrificed in favour of the Eighth Amendment. An NSC was again created by President Farooq Leghari by simply changing the Rules of Business but this body was soon overtaken by events.
At the moment, without a change in the constitution or the Rules of Business, the task of NSC is performed by several committees and even otherwise the Nawaz Government hardly does anything without clearance by the military top brass and evidently depends on its goodwill.
Regardless of what the future holds for the government with disabilities it has become necessary to examine the impact of the military having a say in matters of governance.
Theoretically speaking governance is a subject completely outside the military’s jurisdiction except for matters related to the country’s defence against external aggression, when the military may ask the government for its concerns to be taken into consideration.
However, in view of the present circumstances, and for the sake of argument at least, it may be assumed that the government has to accommodate, to put it mildly, the military’s point of view in practically all matters concerning governance.
There should be no difficulty in appreciating the military’s insistence on quick disposal of matters by cutting red-tape, clear identification of the links in the chain of command, and respect for merit in matters of appointment, posting and transfer. These conditions should be as much inviolable in the eyes of the government as with the military or any other state organ (judiciary / civil bureaucracy) or the civil society.
The area where reconciliation between civil and military’s points of view might not be easy is the requisites of rule of law. By virtue of its training and temperament, the military has difficulty in appreciating the sanctity of the due process. The military mind sees all things in black and white, dividing the people between patriots and traitors, and the only justice process it favours is summary trial and maximum punishment.
It is commonly believed that in the case of recently promulgated security laws and amendments to the existing laws, the government essentially tried to respect the military’s wishes. The creation of military courts for the trial of civilians, and the deviations from due process and presumption of innocence in laws such as the Protection of Pakistan Act, Actions in Aid of Civil Power Regulation and the new provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act are incompatible not only with universally accepted features of a modern justice system but also with Pakistan’s constitutional order. It will be necessary to convince the military that all deviations from the due process will have to be ended sooner rather than later.
The military’s views on the place of human rights in the scheme of governance have rarely been spelt out in detail but they are likely to be determined by its emphasis on the role of religion in the affairs of the state. One does not know how much the military is still loyal to General Ziaul Haq’s thesis of a combative Islam. It will be difficult to believe that the military has completely grown out of the Zia legacy. There are some signs that on the rights of women the military has moved a step or two ahead of Ziaul Haq but its views on matters relating to religious minorities are shrouded in a mist. For instance, how does the military view the employment of Ahmadis as officers in civil administration, considering the enforcement of restrictions on their employment in military services, especially the bar to their receiving commissions in the army?
One supposes foreign policy matters fall under the rubric of governance. The military has traditionally been shy of allowing the civilian governments freedom of action in relation to policies on India and Afghanistan. This situation has extremely adverse effects on governance in general and on socio-economic planning in particular. The fiction of the government and the military being on the same page may have to be given up in favour of restoring to the government its privilege to define foreign policy in all directions.
The most critical area where the civil and military wings of the executive must bridge their differences is regarding the status of the federation. Unity of command and highly centralised administrative structures are fundamental articles of faith with the military. It may have genuine difficulty in appreciating the logic of the federating units’ aspiration for maximum autonomy and the ongoing process of devolution.
There is considerable speculation about the military’s unhappiness with the 18th amendment, the NFC Award and the prospect of more funds being allowed to the provinces. In particular, the military is often said to be averse to any change in its prescription for Balochistan. These assumptions may not be correct and yet there can be no two opinions on the urgency of evolving a national consensus on all issues relating to Pakistan’s transition to a genuine and functional federation that should be binding on all wings and branches of the executive.
There is no need to look for a forum for achieving national consensus on any issue — that forum is already there in the form of the parliament. All controversies about governance must be resolved in the houses of people’s representatives and the entire executive, including its civil and military wings, is answerable only to them.
