Friday, January 10, 2020

After Soleimani killing, Iran's proxy war to impact Afghanistan and Pakistan

While it's unlikely that Iran will directly attack the US over the killing of Qassem Soleimani, it could attempt to indirectly harm US interests in Afghanistan. If this happens, Pakistan could be drawn into the conflict.
The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force, by the US on January 3 has created a sense of unease in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, which is already vulnerable to Islamist militancy.
Both the Afghan and Pakistani governments have urged restraint by Washington and Tehran, fearing that an all-out US-Iran war could unleash uncontrollable violence on their soil.  
Iran has vowed retaliation for the US' airstrike against Soleimani in Iraq, but experts say the hardline Shiite regime in Tehran is not in a position to directly confront Washington. Instead, it could attempt to harm US interests in the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, they say.
Saudi Arabia — a longtime US ally in the Middle East — and Iran are already engaged in a proxy war in places across the region. 
The Iranian regime has also expanded its influence in Afghanistan over the past decade, and more recently by directly engaging with the Taliban. 
Taliban commanders have traditionally been allied to Riyadh due to the Sunni-Wahhabi ideology they share with Saudi monarchs.
But the influence of both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the Islamist group has been substantially reduced in the past few years. Tehran has made inroads in the region, and security analysts say it could complicate matters for US President Donald Trump's administration, which has been trying to finalize a peace deal with the Taliban for a respectable departure from the war-torn country.
The Taliban as Iran's proxies?
The Afghan government said Friday it was concerned about an escalation of violence in the region after Soleimani's death.
"We call on the Islamic Republic of Iran, our big neighbor, with whom we have a common language, religious, historic and cultural [values], and on the US, who is Afghanistan's strategic and fundamental partner, to prevent conflict escalation, and we hope that both sides solve their differences through negotiations," said a statement from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's office.
The statement depicts Kabul's dilemma, as it does not want to offend the US, nor does it need another violent conflict on Afghanistan's long border with Iran. And yet, Soleimani's killing is likely to sabotage the peace process with the Taliban.
Attiqullah Amarkhail, a retired Afghan general, and security analyst, praised President Ghani's "neutral" stance on the US-Iran conflict, but at the same time acknowledged potential risks.
"Soleimani had supporters in a number of extremist groups in Afghanistan, and they could act against the US. Iran is not capable of directly attacking US targets in the country; the only force that can do that is the Taliban," Amarkhail told DW, referring to Soleimani's alleged role in recruiting Afghans to fight for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
The situation will have a negative impact on the ongoing peace process as well as the overall security situation in Afghanistan, the expert added.
Abdul Baqi Amin, the head of the QASED Strategic Research Center in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government must remain neutral in the conflict, although he admitted that Iran can influence Afghan politicians.
Rahmatullah Nabil, the former head of Afghanistan's NSD intelligence agency, said Kabul should try to stay away from the conflict.
"Soleimani was an asset for Iran as well as a threat to the region. He was a master of proxy wars, credited with the creation of a number of regional militant groups. His death will increase tension in the region. If the Afghan government fails to maintain a neutral position, the current circumstances will destabilize Afghanistan even further," Nabil said.
But Afghan neutrality does not guarantee that US forces in Afghanistan will ignore a possible Iranian threat.
"Iran must be assured that its interests will not be threatened from Afghanistan, but Afghan authorities have no control over US forces in the country. Also, Kabul can't rein in pro-Iran fighters, who have fought in the Middle East, especially in Syria," analyst Amin underlined.
Upper hand for Pakistan's military
The complicated situation in Afghanistan is likely to draw in Pakistan, another important player in the region, and one of the few countries in the world that recognized the Taliban government in Kabul in 1996.
Security analysts say the Islamic country still has considerable influence on the insurgent group, made evident by the fact that it has been playing a pivotal role in brokering a deal between the US and the Taliban.
The US is aware of Islamabad's significance in the aftermath of Soleimani's assassination. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo promptly made a telephone call to Pakistan's army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, after the assassination on Friday.
"Pakistan's Chief of Staff General Bajwa and I spoke today about US defensive action to kill Qassem Soleimani. The Iran regime's actions in the region are destabilizing and our resolve in protecting American interests, personnel, facilities, and partners will not waver," Pompeo said on Twitter.
Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has a powerful and well-trained military, which has assisted the US in its past interventions in Afghanistan. The Trump administration might hope that Pakistan's generals could use their influence to stop the Taliban from falling into Iran's orbit. 
Ties between Iran and Pakistan have been tense for many years due to a deep mutual mistrust. Islamabad and Tehran accuse each other of backing separatist groups, which are active in Pakistan's and Iran's Baluchistan provinces.
Shiite-majority Iran is wary of Islamabad's alleged support for various Sunni militant groups, which have been involved in launching attacks in Iran's eastern areas, and massacring Shiite citizens inside Pakistan.
Will Pakistan support the US on Iran? 
Supporting the US on Iran "would be a tough decision for the Pakistani government," Hasil Bezenjo, an opposition politician in Islamabad, told DW.
"Pakistan has a large Shiite population and if Islamabad sides with Washington, it would unleash a sectarian war in the country."
At the same time, Pakistan cannot afford to go against the US and Saudi Arabia, as its economy is heavily dependent on the two countries.
"An independent approach would be best for Pakistan, but I fear the government won't be able to remain neutral in this conflict. Pakistan desperately needs funds from the IMF and the World Bank," Najamuddin, an Islamabad-based analyst, told DW.
Shiite groups in Pakistan are already skeptical of the government's neutrality claims. "Pakistan is not neutral. If a war breaks out between Iran and the US, Washington would even demand military bases in the country. Pakistani officials have not directly condemned Soleimani's killing, which shows that the country has already sided with Saudi Arabia and the US," Rashid Rizvi, the head of a Shiite organization, told DW.
Experts contend that the Pakistani army would benefit from a US-Iran confrontation, as it would give generals more leverage domestically and internationally. Soon after Soleimani's killing, Washington revived a military training program for Pakistan, and the Trump administration could soon restore suspended military aid for the South Asian country.

#Pakistan Mosque Bombing Kills 15


Authorities in southwestern Pakistan say a powerful bomb blast ripped through a packed mosque during Friday evening prayers, killing at least 15 worshipers and injuring around 20 others.
A senior police official was among those killed in the bombing in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province bordering Iran and Afghanistan.
A senior provincial police official, Abdul Razzaq Cheema, told reporters most of the victims were civilians. An investigation into the deadly attack was underway but it was not immediately known whether the slain officer was the target, Cheema added.  
Doctors said the death toll could rise because some of the wounded were brought to Quetta hospitals in “critical condition.”
The Islamic State terror group claimed responsibility for Friday's attack, saying it was carried out by a suicide bomber. IS claimed the blast caused 60 casualties, including 20 dead, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which provides alerts and translations of jihadist threats.
On Tuesday, a bomb went off near a security personnel vehicle in Quetta, killing at least two people and injuring 14 others. The explosives were planted in a motorcycle parked on a main road in the city. Hizbul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the outlawed Pakistani Taliban, took credit for that attack.
Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest but sparsely populated province, is rich in mineral resources and has routinely experienced militant violence.  
The province is home to a separatist Baluch insurgency and it allegedly also shelters Afghan Taliban leaders and fighters in areas hosting hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees.
Pakistani security officials, however, say sustained counter-militancy operations have significantly improved the law and order situation in Baluchistan in recent years.  
The province is at the center of major infrastructure, transportation and power generation projects being built under the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) collaboration, a flagship of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Thursday, January 9, 2020

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The U.S. is weakened by Soleimani’s killing

Vijay Prashad
Trump’s recklessness has isolated the U.S. further and deepened anxieties in Israel and Saudi Arabia On January 3 , Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the powerful Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, arrived in Baghdad from Damascus. He had been invited to the country by Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who had been asked by the Trump administration to mediate between Iran and the U.S. after the U.S. embassy in Baghdad was nearly overrun. Tensions between the two countries have been at a fever pitch ever since U.S. President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign forced Iran to withdraw its ‘strategic patience’ approach. Soleimani was met at the airport by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, an umbrella organisation of several Iraqi Shia militias formed in 2014. Soleimani and al-Muhandis were partners in the fight against the Islamic State. As they drove out of the airport, a U.S. Reaper drone fired a missile, which killed them instantly.
Escalating tensions
The Trump administration realised quickly that it had made a strategic mistake. Even U.S. allies were shocked to see Mr. Trump brazenly kill a senior Iranian official, who has a diplomatic passport, and an Iraqi political leader who commands a militia which is understood to be part of the Iraqi army. These assassinations were seen in Iraq and Iran as a declaration of war. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei warned that “a harsh retaliation is waiting”, and President Hassan Rouhani told Soleimani’s family that the U.S. would “feel the impact” of its criminal act for “years ahead”. Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi said that the killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis was an “act of aggression against Iraq” that would “light the fuse of war”. He called for an emergency session of the Iraqi parliament, which on January 5th night voted to expel the thousands of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and deny them access to its airspace, land or water. The parliament also called upon the Prime Minister to make a formal complaint to the UN against the U.S. for “serious violations and breaches of Iraqi sovereignty”.
If President Trump thought that this was an attack on Iran, he miscalculated; it was already being seen as an attack on Iraq and on the pro-Iranian movements from Lebanon (Hezbollah) to Afghanistan (Liwa Fatemiyoun). It is not an Iranian retaliation that should scare the U.S., but attacks by pro-Iranian groups across the region where thousands of U.S. troops and official personnel are stationed.
The Iraqi and Iranian governments did not hasten to bury Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Their remains travelled from town to town, memorial services broadcast on TV, tens of thousands of people gathering on the streets to protest the killing and to vow revenge. Soleimani will be buried in his hometown, Kerman, after large funeral mobilisations in Mashhad, Tehran, and Qom. In Iran, officials say that this funeral cavalcade has brought more people to the streets than the funeral of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
Soleimani’s assassination has awakened the deep strain of Iranian patriotism. Last year, Iran was struck by protests over the rise of fuel prices. Now there is a tidal wave of patriotism washing across Iran; people are asking for revenge. In the holy city of Qom, a red flag was flown on the dome of Jamkaran Mosque signifying that Iran is prepared for a long war.
And Iran is not alone. In Beirut, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called Soleimani the “glue that held the Resistance Axis together”. The Resistance Axis is a concept that refers to the pro-Iranian groups in the region. Mr. Nasrallah said Soleimani’s assassination “is a turning point in the history of the region, not just for Iran or Iraq”. It is “the start of a new U.S. war in the region,” he said.
It did not help the U.S.’s cause that its political leaders made dangerous statements after the assassination. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence falsely linked Soleimani to the 9/11 attacks. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo posted a video that showed Iraqis running down the street “thankful that General Soleimani is no more”. The video seemed to be part of an information war — only a handful of people on the street were running away from the tens of thousands protesting the killing. Finally, Mr. Trump tweeted saying that the U.S. would target and strike “52 Iranian sites”, including cultural ones, a flagrant war crime. None of this won the U.S. any support on the international stage.
Even the Europeans, otherwise steadfast with the U.S. in these sorts of adventures, hesitated. Mr. Pompeo criticised France, Germany, and the U.K. for not being “as helpful as I wish that they could be”. It is telling that the Arab League’s Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit expressed concern over the situation and asked for calm. This is the same man who had, only a few weeks ago, accused Iran of sowing chaos in the region, and was forced to adopt a less belligerent position under pressure from the Arab capitals.
A few hours after the assassination, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, wrote to the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, and the UN Security Council president to condemn the assassination. Mr. Guterres said that he is “deeply concerned” about the U.S. attack but went no further. It is likely that China and Russia will table a resolution at the UN that calls for calm as well as criticises the U.S.; this will certainly be vetoed by the U.S.
Desperate and irrational policy
Till now the U.S. has not been able to extricate itself from its illegal war against Iraq that began in 2003. That war provided a massive advantage to Iran not only in Iraq, but also across the region. This is what terrified two of the U.S.’s allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of whom pressured Washington to increase its threats against Iran. Not only did the U.S. create the conditions for the rise of the worst kind of violence in Iraq, and later Syria, but also weakened the strategic position of its allies. No attempt by the U.S. to regain its authority has worked — neither the attempt to overthrow the government in Syria nor the sanctions against Iran. U.S. policy against Iran and Iraq appear desperate and irrational.
As the U.S. edges towards the end of two decades in Iraq, its military appears vulnerable. A handful of rockets fired into a military base in Kirkuk in Iraq killed a military contractor, whose death was avenged through U.S. air strikes against a pro-Iranian militia. This, in turn, saw thousands of Iraqis overrun the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. This attack showed the weakness of the U.S. position, which is why President Trump felt the need to retaliate in a dramatic way. Mr. Trump’s recklessness has isolated the U.S. further and deepened anxieties amongst its increasingly isolated regional allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-us-is-weakened-by-soleimanis-killing/article30496111.ece

Pashto Music - ساقي | اجمل خټک | سردارعلي ټکر

Sardar Ali Takkar | زما نه مه بېلېږه | حسينه ګل تنها | سردار علي ټکر

Nashenas _ زه خو شرابي یم شیخه څه را سره جنګ کړې

Opinion - How Pakistan Plans to Cash in on Conflict in the Middle East






Pakistan constantly touts its neutrality in the Iran - Saudi Arabia proxy wars. The reality, especially after the drone strike on Soleimani, is quite different.
For five days after the most far-reaching crisis of Imran Khan's tenure had struck the wider region - the killing of Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani by a U.S. drone strike – the prime minister's response was conspicuous silence.
The reasons for his strangely delayed reaction reveal much about who really holds the reins of power in Pakistan – both within its borders and outside of them, and how that could impact the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The country's first official response came not from the executive branch or any civilian political leader, but, unsurprisingly, from the military: in a call from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Pakistan's army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa "emphasized the need for maximum restraint." 

In the days that followed, the Army spokesperson hyperactively trotted out rhetorical flourishes backing the claim that in the fight between Iran and the U.S., Pakistan chose both neutrality, and clichés: We "won’t allow our soil to be used against anyone," "We’re on the side of peace," and "We will not take any sides." 
Khan finally found his voice Wednesday, as the immediate crisis was already subsiding, tweeting that he'd "asked" Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi to "visit Iran, KSA [Saudi Arabia] & USA to meet with respective foreign ministers," and for army chief Gen Bajwa to "contact relevant military leaders to convey a clear message: Pakistan is ready to play it's [sic] role for peace but it can never again be part of any war."
"Neutral" is the go-to word Pakistan uses – with equal measures of populist instinct and real-world deceit – to describe its position in the Saudi-Iran conflict. Having now spent four decades training Saudi troops, and supplying its own to Riyadh and its proxies, there's already no need to explain the Middle Eastern adage, "Saudi Arabia will fight until the last Pakistani."



Over the years, Pakistan-backed Saudi proxies in the Middle East have directly confronted their Iranian counterparts orchestrated Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), lately commanded by Qasem Soleimani. Over the last decade, the battlefields have extended ever further - into Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. 

Iran's proxies, too, have found recruits from within Pakistan’s Shia population, with the Syria-based Liwa Zainabiyoun claiming to have "thousands" of Pakistani volunteers, trained by the Qods Force in Mashhad. The Shia recruits largely come from the border area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where Iran-bound Salafi military groups like Jundallah, and its reincarnation Jaish ul-Adl, maintain their presence.
Camped on the opposite end of the Middle East's proxy warfare from Pakistan, Soleimani was a harsh critic of his Pakistani counterparts’ allegiance to Tehran's enemies. As recently as February 2019, he had accused Pakistan of "taking Saudi cash" to "stir insecurity" in Iran.
In 2017, Tehran had threatened to strike "terrorist safe havens" in Pakistan after Jaish ul-Adl – based in Pakistani territory - killed 10 Iranian soldiers. In February 2019, a suicide bomber killed 27 Revolutionary Guards just over the Pakistani border; Tehran announces that Iran would "take revenge for the blood of the martyrs of this incident." 
Despite Pakistan’s support for Saudi-backed Middle East militia - which enjoys popular support within the country as well - Islamabad has had to be careful how it voices its allegiances, owing to a sizeable Shia population, estimated to be around 40-45 million – the second largest Shia community in the Muslim world.

On the Sunday after the Soleimani strike, there were nationwide protests led by Shia organizations against his killing, with banners echoing holy Shia slogans, chants against the U.S. and Israel – customary targets for protests in Pakistan, across ideological and sectarian divides.
Even though, like any other religious group, the Shia Muslims in Pakistan aren’t a monolith, they’re still perceived as "Iran-sympathizers," just as their Sunni counterparts are supposed to instinctually back the Saudis. While radicals from both sects have been recruited on either side of the Saudi-Iran military conflict, the proxy warfare of the 1980s has gradually evolved into the mass killings of Pakistani Shia Muslims, resulting in the local Shia querying whether it can survive in safety in Pakistan.
Khan has traditionally enjoyed the support of large sections of the Shia population, mostly thanks to the contrast with his predecessor Nawaz Sharif, whose party formed alliances with groups calling for the genocide of Shia, and who is still considered a stooge of Saudi Arabia, where he has spent many years in exile.
However, in his year and a half as premier, Khan’s cozying up to Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has evolved from a position of geopolitical acquiescence to the virtual establishment of Pakistan as a Saudi client state. 
Not only was Khan in Riyadh to provide diplomatic support to MBS amid global outcry over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, he recently backed out from attending an international Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur last month, after Saudi Arabia complained that the Malaysian conference was intended to rival the Saudi-friendly Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
But there's another reason why Khan, who has largely reduced himself to trolling the Indian government’s abuses against minorities – often amidst parallel violations in his own country – took so long to respond in public to the Soleimani crisis, and it's the same reason that both Pompeo and the U.S. defense secretary Mark Esper spoke with Army Chief Bajwa without any need for the façade of a diplomatic channel with the civilian leadership.

During that five-day period, Khan had been busy spearheading amendments to the Army Act, For many, the controversially worded bills have formalized a "controlled democracy" managed entirely by the military establishment, with even the self-avowed custodians of civilian supremacy among opposition parties falling completely in line. 
The recent escalation of the perpetual conflict with India had bizarrely been used as a rationale to extend Gen Bajwa’s tenure, one key part of the legislation. But then the killing of Soleimani and the ensuing "new regional situation" was cited as additional justification on the day the bill was bulldozed through the National Assembly.
With that formality out of the way, the country's real – military – rulers can shout "neutrality" and "Pakistan first" as much as they want at home, while negotiating rates for Pakistani troops to serve Saudi Arabia. The same two-faced tactics were used by former military dictators Gen Zia-ul-Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf, who signed up for lucrative U.S.-sponsored assignments in Afghanistan in 1979 and 2001 respectively.   
Khan’s subservience to MBS is the consequence of a skewed policy carved out by Pakistan's military rulers, not its elected leaders, based on what they see as a perfect symbiosis between Pakistan’s economic needs and Saudi military requirements. A similar correlation is permanently scribbled on the drawing board at Pakistan's army HQ in Rawalpindi, with regards to the U.S. and its ambitions in the region.
And Pakistan's real rulers are keen to cash in on the post-Soleimani turmoil. Its ex-Army Chief General Raheel Sharif commands the so-called Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) –formed to counter precisely the kind of threats that Tehran has been making in the aftermath of Soleimani’s killing. Washington resumed military training with Pakistani troops this week.
Pakistan indeed has boots on the ground and expertise to offer the Saudis. It can offer intelligence sharing – despite its duplicitous past – and swathes of territory near its western border, to the U.S. for any period of deployment.
Pakistan needs the payback. In addition to funds earmarked for military assistance, Pakistan would expect bailouts and investments from Saudi Arabia, and U.S. backing for consolidating financial support from the International Monetary Fund and to relax its fiscal crackdown on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. 
The Soleimani aftermath provided a very clear reminder that Pakistan's military is the country's undisputed hegemon – and now its first-amongst-unequals is enshrined in law, the army has no qualms about how publicly that status is confirmed.
And for both Washington and Riyadh, a military-run Pakistan, with the window-dressing of a democratically-elected prime minister, is their preference: it facilitates direct coordination with those who are actually in charge of the country.
What remains of Imran Khan’s remaining credibility – if not his seat in the PM's office – is the ultimate victim of the military's power-grab and its particular view of geopolitics, given that almost the entirety of his political career has been founded on the now-quixotic and fantastical idea of an autonomous Pakistan that would no longer be a mercenary for the U.S. or for Saudi Arabia.