Tuesday, February 23, 2016

How opium defeated America in Afghanistan















After fighting the longest war in its history, the United States stands at the brink of defeat in Afghanistan. How can this be possible? How could the world’s sole superpower have battled continuously for 15 years, deploying 100,000 of its finest troops, sacrificing the lives of 2,200 of those soldiers, spending more than a trillion dollars on its military operations, lavishing a record hundred billion more on “nation-building” and “reconstruction,” helping raise, fund, equip, and train an army of 350,000 Afghan allies, and still not be able to pacify one of the world’s most impoverished nations? So dismal is the prospect for stability in Afghanistan in 2016 that the Obama White House has recently cancelled a planned further withdrawal of its forces and will leave an estimated 10,000 troops in the country indefinitely.
Were you to cut through the Gordian knot of complexity that is the Afghan War, you would find that in the American failure there lies the greatest policy paradox of the century: Washington’s massive military juggernaut has been stopped dead in its steel tracks by a pink flower, the opium poppy.
For more than three decades in Afghanistan, Washington’s military operations have succeeded only when they fit reasonably comfortably into Central Asia’s illicit traffic in opium, and suffered when they failed to complement it. The first U.S. intervention there began in 1979. It succeeded in part because the surrogate war the CIA launched to expel the Soviets from that country coincided with the way its Afghan allies used the country’s swelling drug traffic to sustain their decade-long struggle.
On the other hand, in the almost 15 years of continuous combat since the U.S. invasion of 2001, pacification efforts have failed to curtail the Taliban insurgency largely because the U.S. could not control the swelling surplus from the county’s heroin trade. As opium production surged from a minimal 180 tons to a monumental 8,200 in the first five years of U.S. occupation, Afghanistan’s soil seemed to have been sown with the dragon’s teeth of ancient Greek myth. Every poppy harvest yielded a new crop of teenaged fighters for the Taliban’s growing guerrilla army.
At each stage in Afghanistan’s tragic, tumultuous history over the past 40 years — the covert war of the 1980s, the civil war of the 1990s, and the U.S. occupation since 2001 — opium played a surprisingly significant role in shaping the country’s destiny. In one of history’s bitter twists of fate, the way Afghanistan’s unique ecology converged with American military technology transformed this remote, landlocked nation into the world’s first true narco-state — a country where illicit drugs dominate the economy, define political choices, and determine the fate of foreign interventions.
Covert Warfare (1979-1992)
The CIA’s secret war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s helped transform the lawless Afghan-Pakistani borderlands into the seedbed for a sustained expansion of the global heroin trade. “In the tribal area,” the State Department would report in 1986, “there is no police force. There are no courts. There is no taxation. No weapon is illegal… Hashish and opium are often on display.” By then, the process had long been underway.  Instead of forming its own coalition of resistance leaders, the Agency relied on Pakistan’s crucial Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and its Afghan clients who soon became principals in the burgeoning cross-border opium traffic.
Not surprisingly, the Agency looked the other way while Afghanistan’s opium production grew unchecked from about 100 tons annually in the 1970s to 2,000 tons by 1991. In 1979 and 1980, just as the CIA effort was beginning to ramp up, a network of heroin laboratories opened along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier.  That region soon became the world’s largest heroin producer. By 1984, it supplied a staggering 60% of the U.S. market and 80% of the European one. Inside Pakistan, the number of heroin addicts went from near zero (yes, zero) in 1979 to 5,000 in 1980 and 1,300,000 by 1985 — a rate of addiction so high the U.N. called it “particularly shocking.”
According to the 1986 State Department report, opium “is an ideal crop in a war-torn country since it requires little capital investment, is fast growing, and is easily transported and traded.” Moreover, Afghanistan’s climate was well suited to this temperate crop, with average yields two to three times higher than in Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle region, the previous capital of the opium trade. As relentless warfare between CIA and Soviet surrogates generated at least three million refugees and disrupted food production, Afghan farmers began to turn to opium “in desperation” since it produced such easy “high profits” which could cover rising food prices. At the same time, resistance elements, according to the State Department, engaged in opium production and trafficking “to provide staples for [the] population under their control and to fund weapons purchases.”
As the mujahedeen resistance gained strength and began to create liberated zones inside Afghanistan in the early 1980s, it helped fund its operations by collecting taxes from peasants producing lucrative opium poppies, particularly in the fertile Helmand Valley, once the breadbasket of southern Afghanistan. Caravans carrying CIA arms into that region for the resistance often returned to Pakistan loaded down with opium — sometimes, the New York Times reported, “with the assent of Pakistani or American intelligence officers who supported the resistance.”
Once the mujahedeen fighters brought the opium across the border, they sold it to Pakistani heroin refiners operating in the country’s North-West Frontier Province, a covert-war zone administered by the CIA’s close ally General Fazle Haq. By 1988, there were an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the province’s Khyber district alone. Further south in the Koh-i-Soltan district of Baluchistan Province, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the CIA’s favored Afghan asset, controlled six refineries that processed much of the opium harvest from the Helmand Valley into heroin. Trucks of the Pakistani army’s National Logistics Cell, arriving in these borderlands from the port of Karachi with crates of weaponry from the CIA, left with cargos of heroin for ports and airports where it would be exported to world markets.
In May 1990, as this covert operation was ending, the Washington Post reported that the CIA’s chief asset Hekmatyar was also the rebels’ leading heroin trafficker. American officials, the Post claimed, had long refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by Hekmatyar, as well as Pakistan’s ISI, largely “because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there.”
Indeed, Charles Cogan, former director of the CIA’s Afghan operation, later spoke frankly about his Agency’s choices. “Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets,” he told Australian television in 1995. “We didn’t really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade. I don’t think that we need to apologize for this… There was fallout in term of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.”
The Afghan Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban (1989-2001)
Over the longer term, such a “clandestine” intervention (so openly written and bragged about) produced a black hole of geopolitical instability never sealed or healed thereafter.
Lying at the northern reaches of the seasonal monsoon, where rain clouds arrive already squeezed dry, arid Afghanistan never recovered from the unprecedented devastation it suffered in the years of the first American intervention. Other than irrigated areas like the Helmand Valley, the country’s semi-arid highlands were already a fragile ecosystem straining to sustain sizeable populations when war first broke out in 1979. As that war wound down between 1989 and 1992, the Washington-led alliance essentially abandoned the country, failing either to sponsor a peace settlement or finance reconstruction.
Washington simply turned elsewhere as a vicious civil war broke out in a country with 1.5 million dead, three million refugees, a ravaged economy, and a bevy of well-armed warlords primed to fight for power. During the years of vicious civil strife that followed, Afghan farmers raised the only crop that ensured instant profits, the opium poppy.  The opium harvest, having multiplied twentyfold to 2,000 tons during the covert-war era of the 1980s, would double during the civil war of the 1990s.
In this period of turmoil, opium’s ascent should be seen as a response to the severe damage two decades of warfare had inflicted. With the return of those three million refugees to a war-ravaged land, the opium fields were an employment godsend, since they required nine times as many laborers to cultivate as wheat, the country’s traditional staple. In addition, opium merchants alone were capable of accumulating capital rapidly enough to be able to provide much-needed cash advances to poor poppy farmers that equaled more than half their annual income. That credit would prove critical to the survival of many poor villagers.
In the civil war’s first phase from 1992 to 1994, ruthless local warlords combined arms and opium in a countrywide struggle for power. Determined to install its Pashtun allies in Kabul, the Afghan capital, Pakistan worked through the ISI to deliver arms and funds to its chief client Hekmatyar.  By now, he was the nominal prime minister of a fractious coalition whose troops would spend two years shelling and rocketing Kabul in fighting that left the city in ruins and some 50,000 more Afghans dead. When he nonetheless failed to take the capital, Pakistan threw its backing behind a newly arisen Pashtun force, the Taliban, a fundamentalist movement that had emerged from militant Islamic schools.
After seizing Kabul in 1996 and taking control of much of the country, the Taliban regime encouraged local opium cultivation, offering government protection to the export trade and collecting much needed taxes on both the opium produced and the heroin manufactured from it. U.N. opium surveys showed that, during their first three years in power, the Taliban raised the country’s opium crop to 4,600 tons, or 75% percent of world production at that moment.
In July 2000, however, as a devastating drought entered its second year and mass starvation spread across Afghanistan, the Taliban government suddenly ordered a ban on all opium cultivation in an apparent appeal for international recognition and aid. A subsequent U.N. crop survey of 10,030 villages found that this prohibition hadreduced the harvest by 94% to a mere 185 tons.
Three months later, the Taliban sent a delegation headed by its deputy foreign minister, Abdur Rahman Zahid, to U.N. headquarters in New York to barter a continuing drug prohibition for diplomatic recognition. That body instead imposed new sanctions on the regime for protecting Osama bin Laden. The U.S., on the other hand, actually rewarded the Taliban with $43 million in humanitarian aid, even as it seconded U.N. criticism over bin Laden. Announcing this aid in May 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell praised “the ban on poppy cultivation, a decision by the Taliban that we welcome” and urged the regime to “act on a number of fundamental issues that separate us: their support for terrorism; their violation of internationally recognized human rights standards, especially their treatment of women and girls.”
The War on Terror (2001-2016)
After a decade of ignoring Afghanistan, Washington rediscovered the place with a vengeance in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Only weeks later, in October 2001, the U.S. began bombing the country and then launched an “invasion” spearheaded by local warlords. The Taliban regime collapsed, in the words of veteran New York Times reporter R.W. Apple, with a speed “so sudden and so unexpected that government officials and commentators on strategy… are finding it hard to explain.” Although the U.S. air attacks did considerable physical and psychological damage, many other societies have withstood far more massive bombardments without collapsing in this fashion. In retrospect, it seems likely that the opium prohibition had economically eviscerated the Taliban, leaving its theocracy a hollow shell that shattered with the first American bombs.
To an extent not generally appreciated, for the previous two decades Afghanistan had devoted a growing share of its resources — capital, land, water, and labor — to the production of opium and heroin. By the time the Taliban outlawed cultivation, the country had become, agriculturally, little more than an opium monocrop. The drug trade accounted for most of its tax revenues, almost all its export income, and much of its employment. In this context, opium eradication proved to be an act of economic suicide that brought an already weakened society to the brink of collapse. Indeed, a 2001 U.N. survey found that the ban had “resulted in a severe loss of income for an estimated 3.3 million people,” 15% of the population, including 80,000 farmers, 480,000 itinerant laborers, and their millions of dependents.
While the U.S. bombing campaign raged throughout October 2001, the CIA spent $70 million “in direct cash outlays on the ground” to mobilize its old coalition of tribal warlords to take down the Taliban, an expenditure President George W. Bush would later hail as one of history’s biggest “bargains.” To capture Kabul and other key cities, the CIA put its money behind the leaders of the Northern Alliance, which the Taliban had never fully defeated. They, in turn, had long dominated the drug traffic in the area of northeastern Afghanistan they controlled in the Taliban years. In the meantime, the CIA also turned to a group of rising Pashtun warlords who had been active as drug smugglers in the southeastern part of the country.  As a result, when the Taliban went down, the groundwork had already been laid for the resumption of opium cultivation and the drug trade on a major scale.
Once Kabul and the provincial capitals were taken, the CIA quickly ceded operational control to uniformed allied forces and civilian officials whose inept drug suppressionprograms in the years to come would, in the end, leave the heroin traffic’s growing profits first to those warlords and, in later years, largely to the Taliban guerrillas. In the first year of U.S. occupation, before that movement had even reconstituted itself, the opium harvest surged to 3,400 tons. In a development without historical precedent, illicit drugs would be responsible for an extraordinary 62% percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003. For the first few years of the U.S. occupation, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld “dismissed growing signs that drug money was being funneled to the Taliban,” while the CIA and the U.S. military “turned a blind eye to drug-related activities by prominent warlords.”
In late 2004, after nearly two years in which it showed next to no interest in the subject, outsourcing opium control to its British allies and police training to the Germans, the White House was suddenly confronted with troubling CIA intelligence suggesting that the escalating drug trade was fueling a revival of the Taliban. Backed by President Bush, Secretary of State Powell then urged an aggressive counter-narcotics strategy, including a Vietnam-style aerial defoliation of parts of rural Afghanistan. But U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad resisted this approach, seconded by his local ally Ashraf Ghani, then the country’s finance minister (and now its president), who warned that such an eradication program would mean “widespread impoverishment” in the country without $20 billion in foreign aid to create “genuine alternative livelihood[s].”
As a compromise, Washington came to rely on private contractors like DynCorp to train Afghan manual eradication teams. However, by 2005, according to New York Times correspondent Carlotta Gall, that approach had already become “something of a joke.” Two years later, as the Taliban insurgency and opium cultivation both spread in what seemed to be a synergistic fashion, the U.S. Embassy again pressed Kabul to accept the kind of aerial defoliation the U.S. had sponsored in Colombia. President Hamid Karzai refused, leaving this critical problem unresolved.
The U.N.’s Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 found that the annual harvest was up 24% to a record 8,200 tons, which translated into 53% of the country’s GDP and 93% of the world’s illicit heroin supply. Significantly, the U.N. stated that Taliban guerrillas had “started to extract from the drug economy resources for arms, logistics, and militia pay.” A study for the U.S. Institute of Peace concluded that, by 2008, the movement had 50 heroin labs in its territory and controlled 98% of the country’s poppy fields.  That year, it reportedly collected $425 million in “taxes” levied on opium traffic, and with every harvest, it gained the necessary funds to recruit a new crop of young fighters from the villages. Each of those prospective guerrillas could count on monthly payments of $300, far above the wages they would have made as agricultural laborers.
In mid-2008, to contain the spreading insurgency, Washington decided to commit40,000 more American combat troops to the country, raising allied forces to 70,000. Recognizing the crucial role of opium revenues in Taliban recruitment practices, the U.S. Treasury also formed the Afghan Threat Finance Cell and embedded 60 of its analysts in combat units charged with launching strategic strikes against the drug trade.
Using quantitative methods of “social network analysis” and “influence network modeling,” those instant civilian experts would often, according to one veteran analyst, “point to hawala brokers [rural creditors] as critical nodes within an insurgent group’s network,” prompting U.S. combat soldiers to take “kinetic courses of action — quite literally, kicking down the door of the hawala office and shutting down the operation.” Such “highly controversial” acts might “temporarily degrade the financial network of an insurgent group,” but those gains came “at the cost of upsetting an entire village” dependent on the lender for legitimate credit that was the “vast majority of the hawalador’s business.” In this way, once again, support for the Taliban grew.
By 2009, the guerrillas were expanding so rapidly that the new Obama administration opted for a “surge” in U.S. troop strength to 102,000 in a bid to cripple the Taliban. After months of rising troop deployments, President Obama’s new war strategy was officially launched on February 13, 2010, in Marja, a remote market town in Helmand Province. As waves of helicopters descended on its outskirts spitting up clouds of dust, hundreds of Marines sprinted through fields of sprouting opium poppies toward the town’s mud-walled compounds. Though their target was the local Taliban guerrillas, the Marines were in fact occupying the capital of the global heroin trade. Forty percent of the world’s illicit opium supply was grown in the surrounding districts and much of that crop was traded in Marja.
A week later, U.S. Commander General Stanley McChrystal choppered into town with Karim Khalili, Afghanistan’s vice president, for the media rollout of a new-look counterinsurgency strategy that, he told reporters, was rock-solid certain to pacify villages like Marja. Only it would never be so because the opium trade would spoil the party. “If they come with tractors,” one Afghan widow announced to a chorus of supportive shouts from her fellow farmers, “they will have to roll over me and kill me before they can kill my poppy.” Speaking by satellite telephone from the region’s opium fields, a U.S. Embassy official told me: “You can’t win this war without taking on drug production in Helmand Province.”
Watching these events unfold nearly six years ago, I wrote an essay for TomDispatchwarning of a defeat foretold. “So the choice is clear enough,” I said at the time. “We can continue to fertilize this deadly soil with yet more blood in a brutal war with an uncertain outcome… or we can help renew this ancient, arid land by re-planting the orchards, replenishing the flocks, and rebuilding the farming destroyed in decades of war… until food crops become a viable alternative to opium. To put it simply, so simply that even Washington might understand, we can only pacify a narco-state when it is no longer a narco-state.”
By attacking the guerrillas but ignoring the opium harvest that funded new insurgents every spring, Obama’s surge soon suffered that defeat foretold. As 2012 ended, the Taliban guerrillas had, according to the New York Times, “weathered the biggest push the American-led coalition is going to make against them.” Amid the rapid drawdown of allied forces to meet President Obama’s December 2014 deadline for “ending” U.S. combat operations, reduced air operations allowed the Taliban to launch mass-formation attacks in the north, northeast, and south, killing record numbers of Afghan army troops and police.
At the time, John Sopko, the U.S. special inspector for Afghanistan, offered a tellingexplanation for the Taliban’s survival. Despite the expenditure of a staggering $7.6 billion on “drug eradication” programs during the previous decade, he concluded that, “by every conceivable metric, we’ve failed. Production and cultivation are up, interdiction and eradication are down, financial support to the insurgency is up, and addiction and abuse are at unprecedented levels in Afghanistan.”
Indeed, the 2013 opium crop covered a record 209,000 hectares, raising the harvest by 50% to 5,500 tons. That massive harvest generated some $3 billion in illicit income, of which the Taliban’s tax took an estimated $320 million, well over half its revenues. The U.S. Embassy corroborated this dismal assessment, calling the illicit income “a windfall for the insurgency, which profits from the drug trade at almost every level.”
As the 2014 opium crop was harvested, fresh U.N. figures suggested that the dismal trend only continued, with the areas under cultivation rising to a record 224,000 hectares and production at 6,400 tons remaining near historic highs. In May 2015, having watched this flood of drugs enter the global market as U.S. counter-narcotics spending climbed to $8.4 billion, Sopko tried to translate what was happening into a single all-American image. “Afghanistan,” he said, “has roughly 500,000 acres, or about 780 square miles, devoted to growing opium poppy. That’s equivalent to more than 400,000 U.S. football fields — including the end zones.”
In the fighting season of 2015, the Taliban decisively seized the combat initiative and opium seemed ever more deeply embedded in its operations. The New York Times reported that the movement’s new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was “among the first major Taliban officials to be linked to the drug trade… and later became the Taliban’s main tax collector for the narcotics trade — creating immense profits.” After months of relentless pressure on government forces in three northern provinces, the group’s first major operation under his command was the two-week seizure of the strategic city of Kunduz, which just happened to be located on “the country’s most lucrative drug routes… moving opium from the poppy prolific provinces in the south to Tajikistan… and to Russia and Europe.” Washington felt forced to slam down the brakes on planned further withdrawals of its combat forces.
Amid a rushed evacuation of its regional offices in the threatened northern provinces, the U.N. released a map in October showing that the Taliban had “high” or“extreme” control in more than half the country’s rural districts, including many where they had not previously been a significant presence. Within a month, the Taliban unleashed offensives countrywide that aimed at seizing and holding territory, threatening military bases in northern Faryab Province and encircling entire districts in western Herat.
Not surprisingly, the strongest attacks came in the poppy heartland of Helmand Province, where half the country’s opium crop was then grown and, said the New York Times, “the lucrative opium trade made it crucial to the insurgents’ economic designs.” By mid-December, after overrunning checkpoints, winning back much of the province, and setting government security forces back on their heels, the guerrillas came close to capturing that heart of the heroin trade, Marja, the very site of President Obama’s media-saturated surge rollout in 2010.  Had U.S. Special Operations forces and the U.S. Air Force not intervened to relieve “demoralized” Afghan forces, the town and the province would undoubtedly have fallen. By early 2016, 14-plus years after Afghanistan was “liberated” by a U.S. invasion, and in a significant reversal of Obama administration drawdown policies, the U.S. wasreportedly dispatching “hundreds” of new U.S. troops in a mini-surge into Helmand Province to shore up the government’s faltering forces and deny the insurgents the “economic prize” of the world’s most productive poppy fields.
After a disastrous 2015 fighting season that inflicted what U.S. officials have termed“unsustainable” casualties on the Afghan army and what the UN called the “real horror” of record civilian losses, the long, harsh winter that has settled across the country is offering no respite. As cold and snow slowed combat in the countryside, the Taliban shifted operations to the cities, with five massive bombings in Kabul and other key urban areas in the first week of January, followed by a suicide attack on a police complex in the capital that killed 20 officers.
Meanwhile, as the 2015 harvest ended, the country’s opium cultivation, after six years of sustained growth, slipped by 18% to 183,000 hectares and the crop yield dropped steeply to 3,300 tons. While U.N. officials attributed much of the decline todrought and the spread of a poppy fungus, conditions that might not continue into 2016, long-term trends are still an unclear mix of positive and negative news. Buried in the mass of data published in the U.N.’s drug reports is one significant statistic: as Afghanistan’s economy grew from years of international aid, opium’s share of GDP dropped steadily from a daunting 63% in 2003 to a far more manageable 13% in 2014. Even so, the U.N. says, “dependency on the opiate economy at the farmer level in many rural communities is still high.”
At that local level in Helmand Province, “Afghan government officials have also become directly involved in the opium trade,” the New York Times recently reported. In doing so, they expanded “their competition with the Taliban… into a struggle for control of the drug traffic,” while imposing “a tax on farmers practically identical to the one the Taliban uses,” and kicking a portion of their illicit profits “up the chain, all the way to officials in Kabul… ensuring that the local authorities maintain support from higher-ups and keeping the opium growing.”
Simultaneously, a recent U.N. Security Council investigation found that the Taliban has systematically tapped “into the supply chain at each stage of the narcotics trade,” collecting a 10% user tax on opium cultivation in Helmand, fighting for control of heroin laboratories, and acting as “the major guarantors for the trafficking of raw opium and heroin out of Afghanistan.” No longer simply taxing the traffic, the Taliban is now so deeply and directly involved that, adds the Times, it “has become difficult to distinguish the group from a dedicated drug cartel.” Whatever the long-term trends might be, for the foreseeable future opium remains deeply entangled with the rural economy, the Taliban insurgency, and government corruption whose sum is the Afghan conundrum.
With ample revenues from past bumper crops, the Taliban will undoubtedly be ready for the new fighting season that will come with the start of spring. As snow melts from the mountain slopes and poppy shoots spring from the soil, there will be, as in the past 40 years, a new crop of teenaged recruits ready to fight for the rebel forces.
Cutting the Afghan Gordian Knot
For most people globally, economic activity, the production and exchange of goods, is the prime point of contact with government, as is manifest in the coins and currency stamped by the state that everyone carries in their pockets.  But when a country’s most significant commodity is illegal, then political loyalties naturally shift to the clandestine networks that move that product safely from fields to foreign markets, providing finance, loans, and employment every step of the way. “The narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector and fuels a growing illicit economy,” John Sopko explains. “This, in turn, undermines the Afghan state’s legitimacy by stoking corruption, nourishing criminal networks, and providing significant financial support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.”
After 15 years of continuous warfare in Afghanistan, Washington is faced with the same choice it had five years ago when Obama’s generals heli-lifted those Marines into Marja to start its surge. Just as it has been over the past decade and a half, the U.S. can remain trapped in the same endless cycle, fighting each new crop of village warriors who annually seem to spring fully armed from that country’s poppy fields. At this point, history tells us one thing: in this land sown with dragon’s teeth, there will be a new crop of guerrillas this year, next year, and the year after that.
Even in troubled Afghanistan, however, there are alternatives whose sum could potentially slice through this Gordian knot of a policy problem. As a first and fundamental step, maybe it’s time to stop talking about the next sets of boots on the ground and for President Obama to complete his planned troop withdrawal.
Next, investing even a small portion of all that misspent military funding in rural Afghanistan could produce economic alternatives for the millions of farmers who depend upon the opium crop for employment. Such money could help rebuild that land’s ruined orchards, ravaged flocks, wasted seed stocks, and wrecked snowmelt irrigation systems that, before these decades of war, sustained a diverse agriculture. If the international community can continue to nudge the country’s dependence on illicit opium down from the current 13% of GDP through such sustained rural development, then perhaps Afghanistan will cease to be the planet’s leading narco-state and just maybe that annual cycle can at long last be broken.

Balochistan: Reports of extrajudicial killings, enforced-disappearances as Pakistani military offensives continue

Several abducted and their houses destroyed during air strikes in Dera Bugti, Sibbi and Mastung. Five bodies of previously abducted persons, killed in a staged encounter, have been identified.
Balochistan national media sources reported Friday that Pakistani forces’ ground attacks and air strikes against Baloch people continue across Balochistan.
Pakistan Air Force reportedly pounded several regions of Dera Bugti Balochistan resulting several casualties and damage to properties.
Spokesperson of the Baloch Republican Party, Sher Mohammad Bugti, in a statement said that Pakistani forces have intensified their attacks against civilians.
“Gunship helicopters and thousands of ground forces have attacked civilian populations in Pailawagh, Ledav Patti, Chubdar, Loup, Sohrabi, Peeshani, Seekhun and Doe Wadh regions. Dozens of houses have been destroyed in these attacks and its feared that several people including women and children have been killed,” Mr Bugti’s statement read.
He said the affected areas were still under military siege and the lives of thousands of people were in danger.
Separately, on Friday evening Pakistani forces have abducted 19 people, mostly farmers, from Jaladi region of Sibbi Balochistan.
On Friday Pakistani FC and Levis in a joint operation have also abducted four people from Dasht area of Mastung Balochistan. The victims have been named as Mohammad Hanif son of Shahbaz, Allah Bakhsh son of Bakhtiyar Khan, Safar Khan son of Haji Sikandar and Mohammad Amin/Ameen son of Durani Khan.
Meanwhile, the identity of five bodies of previously abducted persons have been confirmed on Friday as that of Qaisar Khan son of Abdul Nabi Sumalani Baloch – resident of Sanjawal, Ramzan Pahlawanzai – resident of Sanjawal, Ahmad Khan Marri – resident of Yakho, Zaman Khan son of Mohammad Raheem Sumalani – resident of Sangaan and Mohammad Khan son of Yaro Marri – resident of Shahrag.
It is worth mentioning that Mohammad Khan Marri is brother of Pasta Khan Chalgari Marri whose body was identified three days ago on (17/02/2015). The body of 70-year-old Chamu Mazarani Marri was also identified on the same day.
Local sources reported that all the victims were innocent civilians who were either farmers or nomads living in the areas. Pakistani forces abducted and disappeared these people during military attacks in Harnai, Sibbi and surrounding regions.
On 13 February, 2016 Pakistani media, security forces and Balochistan Home Minister lied to the public by saying that these people were armed Sarmachaars (freedom fighters) and that they were killed in a gun battle.
Local people told Balochwarna News that these ten people were victims of enforced-disappearances and were abducted by Pakistani forces during previous military attacks.
On 15 February the pro-liberation Baloch resistance organisation – Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has also issue a statement to media and rubbished the claims of Pakistani media and officials saying that Pakistani forces have killed many unarmed civilians and abducted more than 60 others during their attacks in Jaladi, Sangaan, Yakho, Sanjawal, Babar Kach and other surrounding area of Harnai, Sibbi and Bolan regions of Balochistan.
The BLA in their statement said that Pakistani army was trying to conceal its crimes against humanity and killing of innocent people by issuing false statement about killing of Baloch fighters.
The BLA in their statement has issued the name of following civilians who were abducted by Pakistani forces during different attacks. The people listed below are still in custody of Pakistani forces and kept at undisclosed locations.
  1. Molla Madato along with two sons (3 persons from same family)
  2. Bacho
  3. Gullo
  4. Neko (Nek Mohammad)
  5. Fakeer Dur Khan along with three sons (4 persons from same family)
  6. Noor Khan
  7. Derak
  8. Haji Mirz Ali along with two sons (3 persons from same family)
  9. Wali Khan along with four brothers (5 persons from same family)
  10. Imam Khan along with three sons (4 persons from same family)
  11. Malik Tangai
  12. Mir Mohammad Raheem along with three sons (4 Persons form same family)
  13. Jalal Khan
  14. Dohalo
  15. Murad Ali along with his son (2 persons from same family)
  16. Ghazo along with two sons (3 Persons from same family)
  17. Azal Khan along with his brother (2 persons from same family)
  18. Salam along with his brother (2 persons from same family)
  19. Lohar along with his son (2 persons from same family)
  20. Maula Bakhsh along with his brother (2 people from same family)
  21. Ghulam Shah along with two brothers and four children – sons and nephews) (7 persons from same family)
  22. master Gull Hasan
  23. Haji Aziz
  24. Haji Mehrullah
  25. Qazu
  26. Akbar
  27. Jalat
  28. Mehrab
News in Brief from elsewhere in Balochistan
16/02/2016: In early morning the Pakistani ground surrounded and attacked several regions of district Kalat including Shor, Paarod, Samalu and adjoining areas. Later in the day six gunship helicopters also arrived to the support of ground forces and bombed the sieged regions killing livestock and destroying houses.
16/02/2016: Pakistani intelligence agencies and FC arrested 74 people from different localities of Quetta Balochistan and handed them over to Police for interrogation.
16/02/2016: Armed men (presumably plain clothed Pakistani officials) abducted Lal Mohammad Dehwar resident of Pareng Abad Mastung from Bolan Hotel near Luck Pass Balochistan.
17/02/2016: Pakistani forces attacked a houses in Naserabad region of district Kech Balochistan 4 am in the morning and abducted two persons. The victims were named as Nouroz Baloch son of Khodad and Aalam Baloch son of Fekeer. The FC spokesperson admitted arresting and shifting the two ‘suspects’ to an undisclosed location for interrogation.
18/02/2016: Pakistani FC, Police and security agencies abducted 18 people from Double Road and surrounding area of Quetta.
19/02/2016: Pakistani forced abducted two people from Lasbela and Harnai regions of Balochistan. 23 people have been arrested from Quetta’s Nawa Killi and Saryab Mill regions.

Balochistan: Human Rights activists and lawyers should visit war torn regions: VBMP

The chairman of Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, Nasrullah Baloch, has appealed None Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to form an impartial committee comprising Political & Human Rights activists and lawyers to visit Balochistan’s affected areas and compile a fact finding report.
Mr Baloch made this appeal after a delegation from Bolan Balochistan called on him on Friday to raise the issue of military attacks and abduction of innocent civilians including women and children.
The delegation informed the VBMP representatives that Pakistani forces have targeted unarmed civilians and abducted women and children during their offensives in Bolan and surrounding areas.
They also complained that few days ago Pakistani forces claimed to have killed 10 fighters in gun battle but in reality they were poor people who had been abducted in previous military operations.
Nasrullah Baloch said, “before the abduction of Baloch women and children, VBMP has also received reports discovery of mutilated bodies, burning of houses and torture against women security forces in different areas of Balochistan.”
He said that such acts on part of security forces are violation of human rights and that VBMP strongly condemns targeting of unarmed civilians.

http://balochwarna.com/2016/02/20/balochistan-human-rights-activists-and-lawyers-should-visit-war-torn-regions-vbmp/

Terrorist outfits aim to destabilise Pakistan


Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari has said incidents of terrorism, sectarian violence and unrest in Balochistan are part of a larger conspiracy to destabilise Pakistan.
“Taliban, other terrorist and criminal organisations as well as separatists are working to destabilise the country at the behest of their foreign masters,” he said in a statement issued from Dubai on Tuesday.
Organised crimes in Karachi coupled with extortion and inciting terror at educational institutions are part of a mischievous plan of our enemies, Zardari added.
While admiring the Army chief General Raheel Sharif’s decision to refuse an extension in his tenure, the PPP leader called for taking the war on terror to its logical conclusion.
“The nation is united, hopeful and is counting on the success of the war against terrorism with the leadership’s consistency and resilience of armed forces playing a major role,” Zardari said.
The nation and army, he said, are fighting this war shoulder-to-shoulder.
The PPP co-chairman also called for dispelling any rumours against the cause. ”Certain quarters are pointing out the military’s role in political matters, accountability and national affairs should refrain from doing so.”
Pakistan Army should be given credit for its significant achievements in leading decisive operation Zarb-e-Azb which has surely broken the backbone of terrorists, Zardari said, adding that the entire nation is fully cognisant of this fact and stood by them.

Bogus help centres spark Pakistan ID card fraud warning


Fraudulent UK help centres are charging hundreds of pounds for fake identity cards for visa-free travel to Pakistan.
National Identity Cards for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) were launched in 2012 to simplify travel. Online applications opened in August 2015.
Self-styled advice bureaux - some run from homes - have since opened, charging for help to submit web forms.
But some are not authorised and put people at risk of identity fraud, the High Commission of Pakistan has warned.
Anyone fraudulently using logos belonging to the Government of Pakistan will be prosecuted and the High Commission will not be responsible any money lost or information stolen from applicants, it warned.
The benefits of NICOP cards include visa-free entry into Pakistan, official citizenship and the right to open a bank account and buy or sell property.
One woman told BBC Asian Network they lost £300 when they used a fake advisor.
They had to travel to consulates in Birmingham and Manchester to get real ID cards.
She said: "We heard that a man in the community was offering the service; we thought he was something to do with consulate.
"He applied for our cards online but, when they arrived, one had the wrong name on it, another the wrong address and one stated the person lived in the United States."
She said they paid £90 for each card and were told it would cost £100 per card to have the details amended.
Another advice session was closed down by authorities after a businessman advertised the service at a mosque in Greater Manchester.
Consul General of Pakistan in Manchester, Zahoor Ahmad, said: "The Consulate does not hold surgeries in private places and had not authorised it."

There are around 1.17 million Pakistanis living in the UK and around 3,5000 NICOP applications are processed each week.

Monday, February 22, 2016

China - Foreign Minister's US visit set to 'tackle sensitive issues'

Foreign minister's trip this week also expected to boost 'pragmatic cooperation' Visit Ahead of Foreign Minister Wang Yi's US visit this week.

Beijing has noted the US defense deployment in Hawaii, hitting back at the latest US criticism that China's presence on its South China Sea islands is boosting "militarization".
"China's deploying necessary, limited defensive facilities on its own territory is not substantively different from the US defending Hawaii," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said on Monday.
Hua confirmed at a daily news conference in Beijing that Wang will visit the US from Tuesday to Thursday, and said the visit will see efforts "to deepen pragmatic cooperation and to constructively tackle sensitive issues".
Although Beijing unveiled few details of the schedule, the visit is likely to bring the third meeting within a month between Wang and his counterpart, US Secretary of State John Kerry.
Responding to looming UN sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its rocket launches, Hua said that "China and the US are expected to exchange views on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue during Wang's visit".
All the parties are urged to bring the nuclear issue back onto the track of dialogue, to discuss a dual-track mechanism that seeks both the denuclearization of the peninsula and a shift from truce to peace, Hua added. Since January, diplomatic contacts between Beijing and Washington have geared up after a US Navy warship incursion into China's territorial waters in the South China Sea and Pyongyang's nuclear test. Kerry visited China and talked with Wang on Jan 27 in Beijing, and they met again in Munich, Germany, on Feb 12.
Asked what message Beijing will send to Washington on the South China Sea, Hua said the US is expected to be "fully committed to its promise of not taking positions on the relevant disputes". The US should "stop hyping the South China Sea issue and the tense atmosphere there" and should play a "constructive" role in the region rather than "making an issue", Hua said.
Teng Jianqun, a senior research fellow on US studies at the China Institute of International Studies, said Wang's expected visit is "needed and helpful" for more dialogue to tackle the issues. Teng said that the US forces "possibly will remain tough and will continue challenging China militarily as they have done recently".
Besides addressing hot spots, the senior diplomats need the meetings to prepare for annual bilateral events, such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and to discuss expected contacts between leaders on international occasions, Teng added.
The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies said on its website that Wang will address the think tank's "Statesmen's Forum" on Thursday morning local time. Wang will be part of "a discussion on Chinese foreign policy and US-China relations", the center said.
Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, said that "competition and cooperation co-exist in China-US ties, and the reinforced competition in the South China Sea brings no change to such a big picture".
"The situation in the South China Sea is controllable, and so will it be in the future," Jin said, adding that the US allies in the region, unlike the US, are not likely to resort to military approaches there.

Video - Russian defense minister makes surprise visit to Iran

Video - Ceasefire Agreement: Syrian proposal to begin at midnight on Feb. 27th

Breaking down the US-Russia ceasefire plan for Syria

Following Moscow and Washington’s announcement of a joint ceasefire deal for Syria, the war-torn country may be on the verge of the biggest peacemaking breakthrough since fighting broke out there five years ago. Here is how the proposed truce should work:

When does it start?

The ceasefire will become official at midnight Damascus time on Saturday, February 27 (or on Friday at 22:00 GMT). Those who subscribe to the agreement have to publicly declare that they will desist from hostilities by a deadline 12 hours before the ceasefire comes into effect, and inform the White House or the Kremlin.

Who does it apply to?

It is clearer which parties it doesn’t apply to: “‘Daesh’ [Islamic State], ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ [an al-Qaeda offshoot], or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council,” according to the Joint Statement. The Syrian government, as well as the oft-mentioned “moderate opposition” factions and the Kurds, will have to take it upon themselves to put down arms – or face consequences.

If the sides agree, what will be expected of them?

Participants are obligated to “cease attacks with any weapons, including rockets, mortars, and anti-tank guided missiles” and “refrain from acquiring or seeking to acquire territory from other parties to the ceasefire.” They must also allow “unhindered and sustained” access to humanitarian assistance missions and employ only “proportional force” in self-defense against those not party to the agreement.

How will the ceasefire function in practice?

Moscow and Washington will “work together to exchange pertinent information,” such as up-to-date maps indicating which sides have agreed to the ceasefire, and where they are located. The parties that are confirmed to have agreed to the ceasefire conditions should no longer come under fire from either side. The firepower is then expected to be concentrated on Islamic State and other jihadists.

How will it be monitored?

A Task Force will be set up, co-chaired by Moscow and Washington, which will “promote compliance and rapidly de-escalate tensions,” serve as an arbiter to “resolve allegations of non-compliance,” and refer “persistent” truce-breakers to senior officials to “determine appropriate action, including the exclusion of such parties from the arrangements of the cessation of hostilities.” A direct hotline will be set up between Moscow and Washington to avoid internal squabbles and improve contact inside the Task Force. The statement also leaves a role for public institutions and journalists in keeping the peace, promising that the ceasefire “will be monitored in an impartial and transparent manner and with broad media coverage.”

President - Putin: Syrian truce is real chance to end bloodshed





A ceasefire in Syria will come into effect on February 27, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, said in a special address, in which he also expressed hope that all of the warring parties will support the action plan agreed upon by Moscow and Washington.
The statement was first published on the Kremlin’s official website on Monday. This is the full text:
Friends,
I just had a telephone conversation with President of the United States of America Barack Obama. The phone call was initiated by the Russian side, but the interest was certainly mutual.
During our conversation, we approved joint statements of Russia and the US, as co-chairs of the ISSG, on the cessation of hostilities in Syria. Adoption of the statement was preceded by intensive work by Russian and American experts. We also made use of the positive experience we accumulated over the course of cooperation in eliminating chemical weapons in Syria.

Our negotiators held several rounds of closed consultations. As a result, we were able to reach an important, specific result. It was agreed that the cessation of hostilities in Syria commences at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016 on terms and conditions that are a part of the Russian-American statement.
The essence of these conditions is as follows: by 12:00 pm on February 26, 2016, all parties warring in Syria must indicate to the Russian Federation or our American partners their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Russian and American troops will jointly delineate the territories where these groups are active. No military action will be taken against them by the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, Russian Armed Forces and the US-led coalition. In turn, the opposition will cease all military action against the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic and other groups supporting them.
ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nursa, and other terrorist organisations designated by the United Nations Security Council, are excluded from the cessation of hostilities. Strikes against them will continue.
It is fundamentally important that Russia and the US, as co-chairs of the ISSG, are prepared to launch effective mechanisms to promote and monitor compliance with the ceasefire by both the Syrian Government and the armed opposition groups.
To achieve this goal, we will establish a communication hotline and, if necessary, a working group to exchange relevant information. Russia will conduct the necessary work with Damascus and the legitimate Syrian leadership. We expect that the United States will do the same with regard to their allies and the groups they support.
I am sure that the joint actions agreed upon with the American side will be enough to radically reverse the crisis situation in Syria. We are finally seeing a real chance to bring an end to the long-standing bloodshed and violence. As a result, humanitarian access to all Syrian citizens in need should be made easier.
Most important is the creation of conditions for launching a long-term political process through a broad inter-Syrian dialogue in Geneva, under the auspices of the UN.
Unfortunately, recent history has many examples where one-sided actions not sanctioned by the UN, which favour short-term political or opportunistic interests, have led to dramatic results. These examples are on everyone’s lips: Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen.
Against this background, Russian-American agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Syria, and their joint implementation in coordination with all nations participating in the International Syria Support Group, can become an example of responsible actions the global community takes against the threat of terrorism, which are based on international law and UN principles.
I would like to hope that the Syrian leadership and all our partners in the region and beyond will support the set of actions chosen by representatives of Russia and the US.

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Video Report - After Bush v. Gore

The dramatic controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election led to sweeping voting reforms, but opened the door to a new set of problems that continue to impact elections today.

Hillary Clinton Receives Unanimous Endorsement from Columbus City Council

Democratic Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton has received an unanimous endorsement from members of the Columbus City Council.
“As a public servant, father, and Ohioan, I’m proud to join each of my colleagues on the Columbus City Council and endorse Hillary Clinton for president,” Columbus City Council President Zach Klein said.
Klein said he knows that Hillary Clinton is the only candidate capable of getting things done in Washington so Ohioans back home can get ahead and stay ahead.
“Hillary Clinton is a progressive who will fight for every American to have the equal opportunity to succeed, so students can afford college, and parents can put food on the table for their loved ones. That is why I urge every Columbus citizen to help move our country forward by voting for Hillary Clinton.”
Clinton has also received endorsements from Ohio politicians Sen. Sherrod Brown, Rep. Joyce Beatty, Columbus Mayor Andrew Ginther and former Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman.
http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2016/02/22/hillary-clinton-endorsed-by-columbus-city-council.html

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#BlackHistoryMonth - 106 years old Virginia McLaurin fulfill her dream of meeting President Obama

Pakistan Teen Killed In 'Terror' Campaign Against Christian Women, Girls

Rights activists say Christian women and girls in Pakistan are facing a wave of terror that has already claimed at least one life and injured two others this year alone.

The British Pakistani Christian Association (BPCA) says the terror has included a January 13 deadly incident in the city of Lahore where three young Christian girls, identified as Kiran, 17, Shamroza, 18, and Sumble, 20, were approached at night while walking home by four allegedly drunk Muslim men in a car.

Because the girls refused their sexual advances the men became enraged to the point that the driver targeted them with the car, according to investigators. Kiran died after she landed on the hood of the car, which had increased in speed before coming to an abrupt halt. Christians said the teen was catapulted through the air before falling to the ground.

The two other women received severe injuries and broken bones, rights activists said.

"Women have a low status in Pakistan, but none more so than Christian women who find themselves under the grip or terror, especially after this attack." added Wilson Chowdhry, chairman of the BPCA. "Evidence exists that some rogue imams declare that such acts of conversion through violence are rewarded in heaven, what a terrifying thought."

MORE INCIDENTS

This isn't an isolated incident. Last year in November, American Center for Law and Justice affiliated group Organization for Legal Aid in Pakistan, reportedly prepared charges in the case of an 8-year-old Christian girl who was beaten and left naked on the streets by a Muslim family that wanted to punish her uncle for an interreligious relationship.

BPCA says it has started a petition for victims like Kiran, and set up a donations fund where people can financially contribute to the work that goes into helping Christian families.

"This act of violence should be met with the strong arm of the law. In any other nation the perpetrators would be arrested, convicted for murder and sentenced for a long term. In Pakistan, however, the poor go to prison and the wealthy commit whatever crime they wish with impunity. Violence against Christians is rarely
investigated and highly unlikely to be met with justice," Chowdhry complained.

Additionally the BCPA says it has written to the British Embassy and the United Nations refugee agency UNHCR, both in Pakistan's capital Islamabad, urging them to give a persecuted Christian mother of three a humanitarian visa and "allow her safety in the West".

Fouzia Sadiq, 30, was allegedly abducted by a Muslim man who forced her to marry him and "convert" to Islam following an impromptu request for cleaning services at his home on July 23 2015. "Two days ago Fouzia Sadiq with the help of her brother Paris, was able to escape the clutches of Muhammed Nazir, 60, who
had tortured, raped and subjected her to a life of personal servitude."

CHRISTIANS ABDUCTED

BosNewsLife published the names of the victim and suspect as they were already publicly identified.

At least 700 Christian women and girls in Pakistan are abducted, raped and forced into Islamic marriage every year – almost two a day, according to Christian rights groups.

Some of them have been accused of blasphemy against Islam, including Asia Bibi, a Christian mother of five who has been on death row for nearly six years and faces execution by hanging under the country's controversial blasphemy legislation.

Advocacy and aid group Open Doors says these and other incidents contributed to its decision to place the Asian nation number 8 on its annual World Watch List of 50 countries where it says Christians face severe persecution.

http://www.bosnewslife.com/36460-pakistan-teen-killed-in-terror-campaign-against-christian-women-girls

Pakistan - NAB criticism



Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N) criticism of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) continues unabated, with Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Shahbaz Sharif joining his brother Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif in voicing his disapproval of the watchdog organisation. Tersely, the CM warned NAB to “stay within its limits”, adding in the same breath that the government would not allow any department to influence “projects of national importance”. Shahbaz Sharif was of course responding to NAB’s recent interest in auditing the CM’s pet projects, i.e. the Metro Bus Service and the Orange Line Metro Train. With this latest statement, it has become manifestly clear what was behind the sudden change of tone of the PM and the ruling PML-N vis-à-vis NAB.

The controversy began on February 16 when PM Sharif, while making a speech in Bahawalpur, took aim at NAB and warned it against the “wrongful persecution” of ‘honest’ government employees, stating that the watchdog had been descending on the offices and houses of innocent people, harassing and discrediting them under the guise of ensuring accountability. This rebuke was surprising to many, and started a still ongoing debate about the nature of accountability and the need for an empowered watchdog organisation. The surprising aspect about the PM’s criticism was precisely its novelty — for multiple months the PML-N leadership dismissed similar concerns and allegations of an overreaching NAB and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) expressed by leaders of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the government of Sindh. The Sharif brothers and Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan had steadfastly rejected criticism that federal organisations were targeting the governments of other provinces. Chaudhry Nisar even went as far as to threaten governor’s rule in Sindh if the provincial government persisted in passing legislation that curbed the powers of Rangers and the FIA to raid government and party offices without a warrant. But now that the shoe is on the other foot and Punjab and PML-N officials have come under scrutiny, the federal government has predictably altered its stance and opened itself to fresh accusations of having double standards.

Attempts are underway to curb the powers of NAB and clip its wings; given the history of the PML-N’s respect for parliamentary procedures it is likely that the government will once again employ the steamroller. NAB’s response to the criticism has been mixed; on the one hand the NAB chairman has taken a deferential tone, almost meekly apologising to the PM, while on the other hand there are reports emerging that NAB is set to continue its investigations and unearth reports regarding mega scams that are bound to embarrass and anger the government, as well as the PPP. As such, the PPP and PML-N once again find themselves converged on the same side of a thorny issue. Since it can provide support to the PML-N in its endeavours to change the standard operating procedures of NAB, the PPP is jumping at the opportunity and using these developments to push for a judicial inquiry.

Discussions of double standards and political opportunism aside, the NAB episode has once again brought the topic of accountability to the forefront. For instance, the Orange Line Metro Train as well as CM Sharif’s other mega infrastructure projects that take up a substantial amount of public resources have proved to be deeply divisive and contentious. By most accounts, the CM is assailed on all corners for belligerently pursuing such projects without seeking consensus. In this sense, it is imperative that such projects are scrutinised and audited so that the public is aware of how funds are being spent and directed. Principled arguments in favour of accountability aside, it is also useful to be mindful of the reality and history of NAB and other accountability drives in Pakistan. The entire concept of accountability is tainted by a history of political targeting and score settling. The scope of accountability is limited only to politicians. For ‘accountability’ to be authentic it should encompass politicians, bureaucrats, judges and generals equally. To solve this problem, it is imperative under the given circumstances to have a parliamentary committee overseeing NAB’s affairs. 

Pakistan - MAJOR OPERATION EXPECTED IN PUNJAB UNDER THE NAP

Federal Interior Ministry has asked the interior ministry of Punjab for details regarding extremist groups, including Daesh, in accordance with NAP. Security agencies have started collecting the data about mosques, Imambargahs and people living on rent in Punjab, in order to ensure security in the province and a major operation is also expected in Punjan during the month of March.
According to online sources, Punjab government has started collecting all the details regarding extremist organizations, mosques, imambargahs and people living on rent in Punjab, upon directives of federal interior ministry, in order to ensure implementation of NAP and citizens have been directed to submit complete details in police stations within two weeks’ time. Serious measures would be taken against those who try to hide the details or would not submit it within the designated time.
Sources told that the details include number of citizens, proof of residence, details of people living on rent, number of people studying and residing in mosques and madarsas, complete addresses of offices and details about bank accounts.
Sources also told that a major operation is also expected in Punjab during the month of March under the NAP for which security agencies will be provided with all the material. Rangers will also take part in the operation.
http://shiitenews.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=21302:major-operation-expected-in-punjab-under-the-nap&Itemid=227

US drones target jihadist ‘hideouts’ in Pakistan’s tribal areas




BY  

The US targeted a jihadist safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal agency of Kurram today. The drone strike, which possibly targeted the Haqqani Network, is just the second reported inside Pakistan this year.
The remotely piloted Reapers fired four missiles at “suspected militant hideouts,” according to Dawn. Three jihadist encampments and two vehicles were destroyed in the airstrike. Additionally, “three suspected militants,” whose identities were not disclosed, were killed during the US attack, Xinhua reported.
The strike took place in the Shahidano Dhand area in Kurram. US drones rarely target jihadists outside of the tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan.
Haqqani Network operates in Kurram
While the target of the strike has not been disclosed, the Haqqani Network – a Taliban subgroup closely allied with al Qaeda which operates in both Pakistan and Afghanistan – is known to shelter in Kurram. The Haqqanis also are supported by Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.
The Haqqani Notwork moved its base of operations from North Waziristan to Kurram after the Pakistani military launched an operation against select jihadist groups in June 2014. The Haqqanis were not targeted in the Pakistani military operation, despite claims to the contrary. No Haqqani commanders have been killed or captured since the operation was launched.
The US has targeted the Haqqani Network in many drone strikes inside Pakistan since first launching the program in 2004. Of the 391 strikes recorded by The Long War Journal, at least 93 have focused on the Haqqanis or took place in areas administered by the group.
Several top Haqqani leaders have been killed by the US inside Pakistan, including Badruddin Haqqani – the top deputy and a brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the network who is also the deputy emir of the Taliban. The last Haqqani commander reportedly killed inside Pakistan wasAbdullah Haqqani, who served as the group’s director of suicide operations for Pakistan.
Strikes in Pakistan continue to taper off
Today’s drone attack in Kurram is just the second recorded inside Pakistan in 2016. On Jan. 9, the US issaid to have killed five members of the al Qaeda-linked Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in a strike in South Waziristan.
Drone strikes have dramatically tapered off since reaching their peak in 2010, with 117 recorded by The Long War Journal. The US launched 64 the following year, 46 in 2012, 28 in 2013, 24 in 2014, and 11 in 2015.
One explanation for the reduction in strikes is that US intelligence officials have claimed that al Qaeda, a primary target of the program, has been “decimated” and “neutralized” in Pakistan and Afghanistan and its global operations have been rendered ineffective. However the data does not support these assertions. For instance, al Qaeda is know to have operated at least three training camps in Afghanistan in 2015, including a massive facility that covered 30 square miles. The existence of these camps was only disclosed after US military officials reported on raids against two camps in Shorabak.
Al Qaeda has responded to the US drone campaign, which is primarily focused on North and South Waziristan (of the 391 strikes, only 21 have taken place outside of these two tribal agencies), by moving personnel to other locations. Osama bin Laden directed that al Qaeda move key personnel from Waziristan into Afghan provinces. Additionally, al Qaeda maintains a large footprint inside Pakistan, far from the tribal agencies.

From Egypt to Indonesia, all Islamic nations must learn from Pakistan’s mistakes


Farahnaz Ispahani
When Pakistan was founded in 1947, its secular founding fathers did not speak of an Islamic state.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, recognized as Pakistan’s Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), clearly declared that non-Muslims would be equal citizens in the new country. Reflecting his secular views, Jinnah—himself a Shia—nominated a Hindu, several Shias and an Ahmadi to Pakistan’s first cabinet. Now, non-Muslim representation at the Cabinet level is limited to symbolic appointments, while Shias face smear campaigns from Sunni Muslims that declare them non-Muslims. And the Ahmadis—who were some of Jinnah’s most ardent supporters in his quest for a Muslim homeland on the subcontinent—are completely unrepresented; they live as virtual outcasts in modern Pakistan.

In his famous speech of 11 August 1947, Jinnah had stated that, in order to make Pakistan ‘happy and prosperous’, every person living in the country, ‘no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, [should be] first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations’. His speech advanced the case for a secular, albeit Muslim-majority, Pakistan: ‘I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community … will vanish.’

Jinnah also declared,

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State … We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State … Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
The vision outlined by Pakistan’s founder remains unfulfilled. Indeed, it appears further from realization than at any time since this hopeful declaration of religious pluralism was made. At the time of partition in 1947, almost 23% of Pakistan’s population (which then included Bangladesh) comprised non-Muslim citizens. The proportion of non-Muslims has since fallen to approximately 3%.
Furthermore, the distinctions among Muslim denominations have become far more accentuated over the years. Muslim groups such as the Shias, which account for approximately 20-25% of Pakistan’s Muslim population, are often targeted by violent extremists. Ahmadis, barely 1% of the Muslim population, have been declared non-Muslim by the writ of the state. Non-Muslim minorities such as Christians, Hindus and Sikhs have been the victims of suicide bomb attacks on their neighbourhoods, and their community members have been converted to Islam against their will. Houses of worship of non-Muslims as well as of Muslim minority sects have been attacked and bombed while filled with worshippers.

Pakistan has descended to its current state of religious intolerance through a series of political decisions by Jinnah’s successors. The descent began in 1949 with the Constituent Assembly declaring the objective of Pakistan’s Constitution to be the creation of an Islamic state. It reached a nadir with the ‘Islamization’ drive under General Zia during the 1980s. Now, the country is dealing with armed militias and terrorist groups—many of which were sponsored by the state under the Zia regime and in the civil and military governments since—each intent on imposing its version of Islam by violent means.

Pakistan’s most prominent human rights activist, Asma Jahangir, warns that the worst is yet to come. ‘Past experience has shown that the Islamists gain space when civilian authority weakens,’ she pointed out in an article a few years ago. ‘The proliferation of arms and official sanction for jihad have made militant groups a frightening challenge for the government. Pakistan’s future remains uncertain and its will to fight against rising religious intolerance is waning.’ The purpose of examining Pakistan’s embrace of religious extremism is not revealed merely in the recognition of the country’s ill treatment of its religious minorities.

In the context of a Muslim world comprising a youthful population of somewhere in the order of 1.4 billion people, it is equally critical to note the actions of state-sponsored organizations or extremist groups against religious minorities in all Muslim countries. Attacks on religious minorities occur in several Muslim-majority nations, from Egypt to Indonesia, just as they do in Pakistan. But as Pakistan is the first country to declare itself an Islamic republic in modern times, the study of Pakistan’s handling of its minorities can be a helpful guide in understanding and anticipating the threats that would arise wherever Islamist militancy is on the ascendant.