Tuesday, February 16, 2016

Profiting off of chaos: How the U.S. privatized its war in Afghanistan — Antony Loewenstein on “Disaster Capitalism”




By Ben Norton


Journalist Antony Loewenstein tells Salon how corporations exploit violent conflicts in Afghanistan and beyond.

“The corporation is now fundamentally more powerful than the nation-state,” writes journalist Antony Loewenstein in his new book “Disaster Capitalism: Making a Killing out of Catastrophe.”

“Many ongoing crises seem to have been sustained by businesses to fuel industries in which they have a financial stake,” he explains. “Companies that entrench a crisis and then sell themselves as the only ones who can resolve it.”
Loewenstein, a columnist for the Guardian, traveled the world in order to understand just how multinational corporations profit off of such chaos. The Australian-born yet decidedly cosmopolitan journalist devotes the meticulous and daring tome to reporting on the foreign exploitation he witnessed in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and the destructive mining boom in Papua New Guinea, along with seemingly dystopian prison privatization in the U.S., predatory for-profit detention centers for refugees in Australia and ruthless austerity in Greece.

In the book, Loewenstein expertly shows how corporate control of not just the domestic, but also the global political system has led to a drastic “erosion of democracy.”
A quote he chooses as the overture sets the tone for the ensuing pages. “It is profitable to let the world go to hell,” warns scholar Jørgen Randers, a professor of climate strategy at Norwegian Business School, while railing against “the tyranny of the short term.” This quote succinctly summarizes exactly how disaster capitalism operates.
The concept of disaster capitalism is derived from a similar work, “The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism,” an influential 2007 book by journalist Naomi Klein. In some ways, “Disaster Capitalism” can be seen as a sequel to Klein’s book, yet Loewenstein’s formidable work stands out in its own right.
Salon sat down with the journalist to discuss one of the more explosive controversies he uncovers in his book: how the U.S. war in Afghanistan was privatized.
Loewenstein spent time in war-torn Afghanistan, as well as neighboring Pakistan, researching for “Disaster Capitalism.” His compelling recounting of his experiences paints a picture of a crisis-stricken world in which virtually everything has been privatized, in which private military companies, or PMCs — 21st-century warlords — exercise more control over countries than their own inhabitants.
A slew of Western multinational corporations quite familiar to Americans appear throughout the chapter, including Northrop Grumman, DynCorp, Halliburton and more.
The personal interactions Loewenstein has with military contractors on the ground are some of the most fascinating. A British PMC managing director the journalist met in Kabul, whom he refers to simply as Jack, bluntly admits his corporation “survives off chaos.”
Predicting future U.S. wars in Africa, Iran and Korea, the corporate military executive tells Loewenstein, “If we can make money, we’ll go there.”
“I’m my own government,” Jack boldly declares.
“Disaster Capitalism” bolsters Loewenstein’s growing body of important work. Among his other books are “Profits of Doom: How Vulture Capitalism Is Swallowing the World,” a kind of 2013 prequel to “Disaster Capitalism”; “The Blogging Revolution,” a 2008 investigation of how bloggers around the world challenge their oppressive governments; and the best-selling “My Israel Question,” an exhaustive 2007 account of Israel’s crimes against the Palestinians, and a profound and intimate exploration of the author’s Jewish identity.
For his previous books, Loewenstein traveled widely, from Palestine to Iran, from Saudi Arabia to China, from Cuba to Egypt and beyond. For “Disaster Capitalism,” Loewenstein went even further. When Salon contacted him to schedule an interview, the intrepid journalist seemed every time to not only be in a different country, but even on a different continent.
This is the first in a two-part review of Loewenstein’s reporting in “Disaster Capitalism.” Another piece will be devoted to Loewenstein’s findings in Haiti, a small country that has been virtually taken over by Western NGOs. Loewenstein spoke with Salon about both little-discussed yet tremendously important issues.
Jack, the British PMC managing director you met in Kabul, said “we don’t call ourselves mercenaries.” Are they mercenaries? Should they be called that?
Not all private security interests in Afghanistan are mercenaries; many men are just security guards protecting embassies or Western interests. But mercenaries are a little-reported aspect of the war, either directly engaged in killing or capturing suspected insurgents (a key failing of the Western war in the country has been its insistence on designating any opponent of the conflict as “Taliban” and therefore “terrorist”) or training Afghan forces to do the same thing, often inflaming conflicts in local villages.
You call imperialism “the dirtiest word in modern English” and note, “There is not a country I visited for this book in which the legacy of imperialism does not scar the landscape and people.” You also point out that “there were often more contractors than soldiers in Afghanistan.” Jack said it is cheaper for countries to use PMCs than it is to put their own boots on the ground.
Do you see this as an outsourcing of imperialism and neo-colonialism, if you will? Is this how war will work in the future?
The U.S. government, along with its many allies, likes using private assets to further geo-political interests. The initial motivation when invading Afghanistan was revenge for 9/11, but this quickly morphed into a messy project to control the nation and partner with a corrupt central government and warlords across the country.
The reason I use the term “imperialism” to describe the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and beyond — along with U.S.-backed autocratic partners in the Middle East, South America, Asia and Africa — is that there’s no other way to describe attempts to secure energy reserves and economic influence in the modern age.
War has always worked this way, but the inclusion of globalized private entities removes one more level of accountability. Today in Afghanistan there are around30,000 contractors working for the Pentagon alongside the U.S. military and Special Forces. And the Pentagon won’t acknowledge how many soldiers are truly fighting ISIS in Iraq.
Can you talk more about Afghanistan’s enormous natural resources, the TAPI pipeline, drugs, etc.? This is little discussed. Why do you think that is?
During both the Soviet and American occupations of Afghanistan, huge discoveries of natural resources occurred. There is an estimated U.S. $1-4 trillion of untapped minerals, oil and gas and yet most of it is unreachable due to security concerns and corruption.
I have been investigating these issues for my book, and also the documentary in progress, “Disaster Capitalism,” with New York filmmaker Thor Neureiter.
Natural resources will not sustain Afghanistan after most of the Western aid dries up, and neither the U.S. government nor Afghan authorities have any answers for long-term sustainability (the proposed TAPI pipeline crossing Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Turkmenistan is ambitious but prone to problems).
Drug cultivation has soared during the U.S. occupation. Too many Western reporters have framed the Afghan war as simply between U.S. forces and the Taliban when in reality Afghanistan has a complex history that never tolerates long-term occupation.

You write about the “military-enforced bubble,” in which the foreign occupying army is completely out of touch with the locals. An Afghan translator told you the U.S. “only understood force.” Can you expand?
A constant refrain I heard in Afghanistan, during my visits there in 2012 and 2015, was the inability and unwillingness of U.S. and foreign forces to listen to the Afghan people. It’s one reason the U.S. relied on faulty intelligence to understand what Afghans were thinking about their presence.
As the security situation deteriorated after 2004-2005, and U.S. forces falsely framed any Afghan who opposed the occupation as Taliban, the U.S. used a failedcounterinsurgency program (designed by David Petraeus and Australian David Kilcullen) that inflamed Afghans.
There has never been accountability for this plan, including by the countless Western journalists seduced by U.S. military talking points.
You talk about the relationships between the U.S. military, USAID and private companies, and say “military and humanitarian work were all too often fused in the post-9/11 world.” Can you comment?
A key component of USAID in the post 9/11 world is using the military to deliver its goals. This fundamentally misunderstands the importance of maintaining neutrality when delivering aid.
The U.S. government’s SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) regularly reports on the U.S. $110 billion spent in Afghanistan on so-called nation building since October 2001, and how USAID was regularly used as a mask for a corporate and military agenda across the country.
Where else is the private security industry growing?
The definition of private security is expanding to include the growth of private armies in often unregulated and chaotic places (from Iraq to Afghanistan and Libya to Syria). South African mercenaries were working in Nigeria against Boko Haram and Colombian forces operated in Yemen thanks to the United Arab Emirates.
You write “the Bush administration saw its ‘war on terror’ as a boon for the private sector.” Has the Obama administration has done the same?
Post 9/11, the Bush administration saw an opportunity to implement an extreme neoconservative agenda with the support of its friends in the private sector. They claimed it would save money and be more efficient but the reality was uncontrolled mercenaries and private security in countless war zones.
When Barack Obama was a candidate for President in 2007, he pledged to change this out-of-control contracting since 9/11. However, nothing has improved since he took office due to a number of factors including failing campaign finance laws and Congressional inertia to punish corporations breaking the law.
You conclude the chapter saying, “we created chaos.” What do you think the legacy is of the now 15-year U.S. occupation, especially now, with the rise of ISIS and the resurgence of the Taliban?
The Taliban now control more of Afghanistan than at any time since October 2001. President Obama has now pledged to maintain an indefinite occupation and the U.S. military claims U.S. forces will need to stay in the country for decades to support a failing Afghan state.
The presence of ISIS only complicates the picture, especially for Afghan civilians.
The longest war in U.S. history has not achieved any of its stated goals and the Afghan people, often forced to choose between the Taliban and a U.S.-backed warlord, often pick the former. That’s the legacy of the U.S. war.

Pakistan - ‏چیرمین پی پی پی بلاول بھٹو زرداری کا ’’ہندو میریج بل‘‘ کی منظوری پر مبارکباد




Proud of  Govt &  4 being 1st in the nation 2 pass Hindu marriage bill.Leading the way towards 4 all.Jinnah's Pakistan.



 پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی کے چیئرمین بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے آج سندھ اسیمبلی کی جانب سے اقلیت ہندوبرادری کی شادیوں کے متعلق قانون سازی کے حوالے سے ’’ہندو میریج بل‘‘ منظور کرنے پرسندہ اسیمبلی ممبران کو خراج تحسین پیش کرتے ہوئے تمام ہندو برادری کو مبارکباد دی ہے، سندہ اسیمبلی پاکستان کی پہلی اسیمبلی ہے جس نے ہندو برادری کی شادیوں کے متعلق قانونسازی کا بل منظور کیا ہے، بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے کہا کہ پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی ، اس کے بانی شہید ذوالفقار علی بھٹو اور شہید محترمہ بینظیر بھٹو کے ویژن کے تحت پارٹی کی صوبائی حکومت نے سندھ اسیمبلی سے یہ بل منظور کرکے ایک بار پھر یہ ثابت کیا ہے کہ پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی ہی ملک کی اقلیتی آبادی کے بنیادی حقوق کا تحفظ اور برابری کے بنیاد پر شہری حقوق میسر کرسکتی ہے،بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے کہا کہ پاکستان کے وجود کے بعد پہلی بار پیپلزپارٹی نے ہندو برادری کے اس بنیادی مسئلے کو حل کرکے انہیں ملک کے تمام شہریوں کے برابر قانونسازی کا حق میسر کیا ہے کیونکہ شادی کی رجسٹریشن کے حوالے سے کوئی قانون نہ ہونے کی وجہ سے ملک میں بسنے والی اقلیت ہندو برادری متعدد حوالوں سے مسائل سے دوچار رہتی تھی، چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے کہا کہ پارٹی ہندو برادری سمیت تمام اقلیتوں کے بنیادی حقوق کے تحفظ لیے اپنی جدوجہد جاری رکھے گی۔

Pakistan - The Hindu Marriage Bill - Guilt-Edged Success





It is inconceivable in most countries that a legal and traditional institution as strong as the marriage cannot be given constitutional recognition.
The minorities of Pakistan, specifically the Hindu community, since the creation of the state could not register their marriages. They had no proof, and for 68 years wherever these communities had to face officialdom or any activity that required documentation they ran into trouble.
On Monday, the Sindh Assembly passed the Hindu Marriage Bill 2016, becoming the first assembly in Pakistan to pass the respective bill. The bill corrects this legal loophole and provides methods of enforcement of registration. While the Sindh assembly must be praised for paying attention to an area that required legislation and using their powers to fix it, any congratulations must be tinged with the knowledge that it took so long to give religious minorities this right, and that the other provinces are yet to do so.
However they are not far behind. A similar resolution is under discussion in the Punjab Assembly, meanwhile Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhawa have ceded the authority to legislate on this matter to the National Assembly - where the standing committee on law and justice has already approved the draft. If the political parties stay on course, soon Pakistan may have nationwide protection for religious minorities. One hopes that this will to reform outdated and insufficient laws continues, and other glaring lacunas as this one can be mopped up - for a beginning.
Keeping with the prevalent fashion in Pakistan, the Hindu Marriage Bill - the version being debated in the CA - does protect religious minorities, but one clause threatens to undo it all. Under the insistence of - you guessed it, the infamous Maulana Mohammad Khan Sheerani, the JUI-F MNA and chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) - a clause has been included that annuls a marriage if any one spouse changes their religion. Even if we forget the fact that minority leaders and civil rights activists are in clamour - since they are direct stakeholders, that in itself should be enough - equating legal sanctions with religious conversions is breach of the right to religious freedom. The bill would be useless if it adds to the oppression of minorities.

Pakistan's Sindh province allows Hindu marriages to be registered

A province in Pakistan has become the first in the largely Muslim country to give Hindus the right to register their marriage officially.
The bill was passed on Monday by lawmakers in Sindh - home to many of Pakistan's three million Hindus.
Activists say that without such a law, Hindu women are targets for forced conversions, abduction and rape, and there is a lack of rights for widows.
The national assembly is considering a wider law recognising Hindu marriages.
Pakistan's other main religious minority, Christians, have a colonial-era law recognising their marriages. However, Hindus have never had any legal framework to register their unions until now.
Many Hindu couples say this has given them logistical problems with basic activities such as opening bank accounts, applying for visas, getting national identity cards and getting shares of property, because they lacked proof of marriage.

Controversial clause

Under the new law, Hindus above the age of 18 in Sindh can register their marriages. It can be applied retroactively to existing unions.
However, the legislation also contains a controversial clause that allows the marriage to be annulled if any spouse converts.

Analysis: Shahzeb Jillani, BBC News, Karachi
A Hindu bride and her party prepare as they wait for their wedding to start during a mass marriage ceremony in Karachi in Pakistan's Sindh province on 24 January 2016Image copyrightReuters
Image captionHindus are said to make up more than 2% of Pakistan's population
For decades, Pakistan's Hindus have faced discrimination and religious persecution.
In rural Sindh, young Hindu girls have been a regular target for abductions, forced religious conversions and underage marriages. The perpetrators of these crimes are often protected by local influential figures linked to Islamic seminaries.
The provincial government says the new law will help discourage many of these crimes. Rights activists have described it as a progressive measure and a step in the right direction.
"Passing the law is one thing, the real test will be how the authorities will go about enforcing it," said Zohra Yusuf, of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
But the head of the Pakistan Hindu Council, Dr Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, told the BBC the law did not go far enough to protect Hindu women from forced conversions.
He said the provincial legislation was passed in haste at a time when the Pakistani parliament was debating some of the more controversial sections of the proposed national law.

Meanwhile, the National Assembly is considering a wider bill on recognising Hindu marriage rights, including issues such as inheritance, divorce, and child maintenance.
The bill comes at a time of increased violence against Pakistan's minorities. Some Hindus have fled to India in recent years citing discrimination and religious persecution.
Pakistan was created in 1947 after India was partitioned at the end of British rule. Today, Hindus are said to make up more than 2% of Pakistan's population.

Monday, February 15, 2016

The Syrian Endgame, “A Lost War is Dangerous” - “Losers on The Rampage”

By Prof. Tim Anderson

The Syrian Endgame, “A Lost War is Dangerous”. US-NATO, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, “Losers on The Rampage”


How a war is lost is a serious and dangerous business. After Henry Kissinger helped sabotage the 1968 Paris peace talks, for domestic political reasons, the War in Vietnam raged for another seven years. In the end Washington’s loss was more humiliating, and millions more lives were destroyed.
The Geneva process over Syria is in many respects different, because it is a charade. The NATO and Gulf monarchy sponsors pretend to support Syrian ‘opposition’ groups and pretend to fight the same extremist groups they created.
Yet the dangers are very real because the Saudis and Turkey might react unpredictably, faced with the failure of their five year project to carve up Syria. Both countries have threatened to invade Syria, to defend their ‘assets’ from inevitable defeat from the powerful alliance Syria has forged with Russia, Iran, Iraq and the better party of Lebanon.
It should be clear by now that every single anti-government armed group in Syria has been created by Washington and its allies. Several senior US officials have admitted the fact. Regime change has always been the goal. Nevertheless, the charade of a ‘War on ISIS’ goes on, with a compliant western media unwilling to point out that ‘the emperor has no clothes’.
Geneva 3 has actually brought some results. First, none of the NATO-backed ‘opposition’ groups managed to show a credible face. Second, and more importantly, the US and Russia kept talking and actually developed another de-escalation plan. It is not conclusive but it is encouraging.
The ‘moderate rebel’ masks are down, we now know who they are: the internationally proscribed terrorist group Jabhat al Nusra (al Qaeda in Syria) and its long term Salafist allies Jaysh al Islam (the Army of Islam) and Ahrar as Sham. The latter two are the remnants of the Syrian Salafist groups. In northern Syria they are also welded together by Turkey and the Saudis into the very non-moderate-sounding Jaysh al Fatah (the Army of Conquest).
These extremist groups represent very few in Syria, as MINT Press journalist Mnar Muhawesh pointed out in her editorial piece ‘The Syrian Opposition’s NATO Sponsored Apocalyptic Vision For Syria’: In ideology they are no different to ISIS.
It may be stating the obvious to say that al Qaeda groups have poor negotiating skills. In any event, they proved it in Geneva. Losing on the battlefield they demanded capitulation in Geneva, then stormed out.
Foreign backed terrorists aside, who are the real Syrian opposition?
Firstly, they are the groups that created the 2005 Damascus Declaration but who sided with the state and the army in early 2011, when the Salafist insurrection hijacked the reform demonstrations.
Some of them like Haytham Manna and former minister Qadri Jamil appeared in Geneva. Others like the powerful Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) backed Bashar al Assad’s government, back in 2011.
Still others sat on the sidelines, frustrated at the Muslim Brotherhood’s violent hijacking of the reform movement. Sharmine Narwani’s piece at RT ‘Will Geneva talks lead right back to Assad’s 2011 reforms?’illustrates this very well. As the Damascus Declaration made plain, most of the Syrian opposition rejected both foreign sponsorship and violent attacks on the state.
Second are the Syrian Kurds, who were open to foreign assistance but rejected attacks on the Syrian Army and state. They have received most of their arms from Damascus. Prefering to side with the Syrian Army than the Salafists, their presence in Geneva was not tolerated by Erdogan or his clients.
That left Russia and the USA to discuss their supposed common goals (destroying terrorists) while Erdogan and the Saudis seethed. The aims of the two big powers are worlds apart. Hat difference is seen in the loss of Washington’s proxies in Syria in face of the rise of the 4+1 (Russia, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah).
That shift, in turn, threatens to derail the Bush plan for a ‘New Middle East’. The US wanted to control the entire region, now it faces losing it all.
Russia for its part has pursued its own interests in the region, backing its allies in accordance with international law. Its use of air power in Syria followed the Syria-Iran-Iraq-Hezbollah accord on ground power forces. That is the force currently prevailing on Syrian soil.
The good news is that, despite these widely differing aims, Washington and Moscow have kept talking and managed a provisional agreement at Geneva, with three heads.
The first agreement is over humanitarian aid, which faces serious obstacles due to the series of sieges taking place. Some of these are al Qaeda groups’ sieges, such as that on Foua and Kafraya in the north; but increasingly they are becoming Syrian Army sieges on al Qaeda fighters who hole up in towns and cities, such as Madaya and Eastern Aleppo. Most ground aid is going in through the Government-supervised Syria Arab Red Crescent, but air drops are being organised for Deir eZorr, and some other places.
Second, there is a political process which (it has been agreed) must be exclusively between Syrians, unconditional and inclusive. Contrary to many outside reports, there is not yet any framework for this, nor plans for early elections. The Syrian position, backed by Russia, is that the Syrian constitution (and the legally mandated schedule of elections) prevails until the Syrian people vote to change it.
Finally the agreement on ‘cessation of hostilities’, due almost immediately, has a task force to oversee the details. This ceasefire does not apply to any group identified by the UN Security Council as a terrorist group. That immediately rules out ISIS or Jabhat al Nusra. The major obstacle here is that Russia wants Jaysh al Islam and Ahrar as Sham (which have both collaborated with al Nusra for many years) added to the UNSC list. If Washington agrees to this, they will virtually abandon their ‘moderate rebel’ option. There is no other force of substance on the ground. The Saudis and Erdogan would be furious.
How will the US manage these tensions? The Obama administration has always approached the Syrian conflict in an arms-length way, reminiscent of the CIA’s ‘plausible deniability’ over its death squads in Latin America. But credibility problems have grown and Washington does seem more concerned at finding a way out rather than risking a new desperate gambit. That would certainly lead to serious escalation, and without any guarantee of success.
Would Washington allow Erdogan and the Saudis to initiate a major escalation, without US approval? I think not. Obama resisted Saudi and Israeli provocations, when the Iran deal was imminent. Even Bush could not be provoked into a confrontation with Russia, when invited by Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili.
For its part, Russia is well prepared for a provocation across the Turkish border. Logic suggests that the losers must lose. But this is a dangerous time.

#Yemen war: Saudi Arabia accused of deploying illegal, US-supplied cluster bombs in conflict






By Alistair Dawber

Human Rights Watch says it has evidence of the bombs being used at least five times, including an attack in December last year that injured civilians.
 A leading international human rights group has accused the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen of using indiscriminate cluster bombs supplied by the United States, and says that their use could break US law. 
An international ban on the use of cluster munitions, which can kill and maim people long after being deployed, was agreed in 2008. Saudi Arabia, which joined the civil war in Yemen in March last year, is not a signatory. 
“Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners, as well as their US supplier, are blatantly disregarding the global standard that says cluster munitions should never be used under any circumstances,” said Steve Goose, arms director at Human Rights Watch (HRW) and chair of the international Cluster Munition Coalition. “The Saudi-led coalition should investigate evidence that civilians are being harmed in these attacks and immediately stop using them.”
Human Rights Watch first accused Riyadh of using cluster bombs in Yemen in May last year. The group now says that the supply and use of the weapons could violate strict conditions in American law, which regulates their use.
The organisation points out that one of the weapons being used by the Saudis is a CBU-105, which is made by Massachusetts company, Textron Systems Corporation. HRW says that it has evidence of the bombs being used at least five times, including an attack in December last year that injured civilians.
“US export law prohibits recipients of cluster munitions from using them in populated areas, as the Saudi coalition has clearly been doing. Second, US export law only allows the transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate of less than 1 per cent,” the group says, adding that the CBU-150 does not meet that standard.
Textron did not reply to a request for comment.
As much as half of Yemen’s population is facing shortages of food, water and vital medicines, with the UN estimating that 14.4 million people in the country are at risk from starvation.

Turkey, Saudi pursuing Syria invasion for 2 years: Assad

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad says Turkey and Saudi Arabia, widely considered as the major sponsors of Takfiri terrorist groups operating in the crisis-hit country, have been trying for two years to enter Syria militarily.
Assad made the remarks in a Monday televised speech amid reports suggesting that Turkish forces have entered Syria to help foreign-backed militants fighting against the Syrian government, and that Riyadh has dispatched warplanes to the southern Turkish air base of Incirlik in what is claimed to be a deployment to fight Daesh terrorists in Syria.
Referring to a ceasefire agreement reached during a meeting of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) in the German city of Munich on Friday, Assad said any truce means preventing terrorists from reinforcing their positions.
The ISSG statement says that the ceasefire in Syria does not include areas held by groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United Nations Security Council, including Daesh and al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.
"A ceasefire means in the first place halting the terrorists from strengthening their positions. Movement of weapons, equipment or terrorists, or fortification of positions, will not be allowed," he said, adding that if a truce “happened, it doesn't mean that each party will stop using weapons."
He also said that local reconciliation agreements are the solution to the nearly five-year-long crisis in Syria, Assad noted.
The Syrian president also stressed that fighting terrorism is the government’s first and foremost priority at present and in the future.
Syria has been gripped by foreign-backed militancy since March 2011. According to a new report by the Syrian Center for Policy Research, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 470,000 people, injured 1.9 million others, and displaced nearly half of the country’s pre-war population of about 23 million within or beyond its borders.
http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2016/02/15/450540/Syria-Assad-Turkey-Saudi-Arabia-terrorists/

How Bahrain’s crushed uprising spawned the Middle East’s sectarianism

 

Bahrain’s mostly forgotten uprising of February 2011 marked the turning point in the so-called Arab Spring. This is true both in the sense that mass demonstrations there were the first to be stamped out successfully by a besieged government, but also because Bahrain witnessed the beginning of, and in many ways supplied the impetus for, the fateful slide away from broad-based opposition movements into the poisonous sectarian and other factional conflicts that have since escaped beyond the Arab Gulf to consume a greater part of the Middle East and North Africa.
The Shiite- and secularist-led protests begun in Bahrain on Feb. 14, 2011, and the ensuing counter-mobilization by the state’s mainly Sunni supporters, presaged the sectarianism which would consume so much of the region in the following years. This sectarianism would be driven by political instrumentalization of latent social group divisions, foreign military intervention, and unwitting entanglement by local forces in the broader regional competition for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Bahrain is thus notable as the first failed revolution among the Arab uprisings, yet far more significant is why its protest movement failed, and what lessons can be drawn from Bahrain’s experience.
The perennially contentious politics of Bahrain, a tiny island kingdom in the generally placid waters of the Persian Gulf, are often overlooked as sui generis and so offering little by way of wider insight. This distancing of Bahrain from the broader narrative of the Arab uprisings should not be taken at face value, however. For beneath the notion of Bahraini exceptionalism lies a rhetorical battle of supreme political significance, between those who see in Bahrain an important case of citizen protest in a region not known for political opposition, and those whose who would deny the genuine popularity and legitimacy of the country’s February 2011 uprising.
There are, of course, distinctive aspects to Bahrain’s experience. Apart from Syria, the country features the region’s only remaining ruling ethnic minority in the face of a Shiite Muslim majority. Bahrain is a nominal oil exporter that long ago ran out of oil. Its regime is also a product of conquest by a foreign power — the ruling Al Khalifa family and its Sunni tribal allies — rather than of internal political consolidation such as describes the other Arab Gulf nations.
Bahrain thus developed a different type of rentier state than in other Gulf monarchies. Bahrain is an oil-dependent welfare state that does not possess sufficient oil revenues to provide for the welfare of all its citizens, Sunni and Shi‘i, nor has a particular political or normative interest in doing so. Rather than attempt to buy universal political support through financial patronage, Bahrain has resorted instead to a more economical (and politically expedient) ruling strategy: to extend a disproportionate share of state largesse to a core Sunni tribal support base, whose members then have a direct economic-cum-political stake in defending against challenges to the system.
Before and after the uprising, Bahraini Shiites are far less likely than Sunnis to obtain jobs in the public sector, and they are almost entirely disqualified from police and military service. Moreover, those Shiites who do hold government jobs fill lower ranking occupations on average compared to equally-qualified Sunnis. Public services in the highly-segregated neighborhoods and villages where a majority of Shiites reside tend to be inferior to those in Sunni-dominated areas. Finally, Shiite citizens are systematically underrepresented in Bahrain’s elected lower house of parliament due to rampant electoral gerrymandering. In the last fully-contested election in 2010, for example, the average Shiite-majority districtrepresented about 9,500 electors, the average Sunni district only about 6,000.
Not surprisingly, this stark inequality in distribution of economic and political resources has fomented widespread disaffection punctuated by outright revolt among those second-class citizens left out of Bahrain’s implicit ruling bargain. This includes, importantly, many Sunnis of non-tribal pedigree who share most of the same grievances articulated by the mainstream Shiite opposition: a lack of public housing and affordable land, wasteful corruption, and the dilution of Bahraini identity and nationality through the government’s decade-long program of naturalizing foreign Sunnis for service in the police and military.
For Bahrain’s rulers, then, the critical task has always been to ensure that these two constituencies — marginalized Shiites and similarly aggrieved but usually apolitical Sunnis — do not join together in a socially cross-cutting movement in pursuit of substantive reform. And, fortunately for the Al Khalifa but unfortunately for the region, Bahrain has relied to this end on a potent tool: the cultivation of distrust, fear, and even hatred between its two sectarian communities. Even before February 2011, government opposition had been made synonymous with an Iranian-inspired project to take control over the country in the manner of post-2003 Iraq. Afraid of being made pawns in a wider Shiite conspiracy, ordinary Sunnis have been loath to add their dissenting voices, and those who dare to do so are targeted for special retribution.
Beyond the utter undoing of Bahrain’s social fabric, this sectarian stratagem has had the equally disastrous effect of exporting the country’s internal political conflict abroad. The swift labeling of the February 14 uprising as an Iranian-backed coup attempt, followed by the decisive military intervention by Saudi Arabia to end mass protests, transformed a fundamentally domestic event into a new regional cold war. Incited by governments to take up the fight against the Shiite enemy, many Gulf Sunnis ultimately accepted the challenge in places like Syria, Iraq, and later Yemen, including severalBahraini nationals who would assume important positions within the Islamic State group.
However, rather than elicit diplomatic pressure from the United States, Britain and other allies with an interest in resolving Bahrain’s domestic dispute, the regionalization of the conflict paradoxically afforded Bahrain an even freer hand to act internally. For now the West required the Gulf states’ support in combating the very terrorist forces they helped create; and the price, in addition to long-coveted new military hardware, was to butt out of local politics. Five years after the uprising, then, all of Bahrain’s opposition leaders remain in prison, opposition parties remain outside of parliament, and no serious political dialogue — to say nothing of political reform — is being entertained.
Yet there are signs that outside pressure of a different sort may soon demand some compromise from Bahrain’s rulers. Where the international community has equivocated, the global oil market has come calling without regard for political convenience. Having run a fiscal deficit each year since 2011 and facing a potential shortfall of more than $13 billion — nearly a third of GDP — in 2015-2016 alone, Bahrain has followed the lead of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in beginning to scale back the financially onerous economic subsidies enjoyed by citizens on goods ranging from meat and fish to gasoline and electricity. At the same time, GCC governments have announced plans to raise new sources of non-oil revenue through previously-unthinkable excise and value-added taxes. And the reaction by Bahrain’s supposedly “opposition-less” parliament has been anything but.
On Jan. 11, the Bahraini cabinet announced a 40 to 60 percent increase in gasoline prices to take effect within mere hours. The following day, lawmakers stormed out of parliament in protest, some threatening to resign. An emergency session held a week later ended in similar chaos, with a bloc of MPs refusing to hold regular sessions until the ministers of energy and finance appeared before the chamber for interpolation. According to thechairman of the parliamentary committee tasked with quizzing the ministers, “MPs want the government to realize that they are not puppets and should have a say in what should be done to tackle the financial crisis.”
To be sure, if there is any issue with the potential to galvanize Bahrainis in spite of the sectarian barriers erected over the past five years, it is the state’s gradual introduction of taxation and simultaneous withdrawal of welfare benefits that citizens have come to expect and depend upon since the beginning of the oil era, and whose retrenchment impacts individuals irrespective of sect or tribe. In Bahrain and elsewhere, Gulf leaders appear confident that this unilateral revision of the longstanding social contract between citizens and rulers can be implemented without a corresponding alteration of the political power structure. One wonders how far ordinary citizens will agree.

Four American journalists arrested in Bahrain during protests



Independent journalist Anna Therese Day and three cameramen detained while covering anniversary of a Shia uprising.
 Bahraini authorities have arrested four Americans during protests marking the fifth anniversary of a Shia-led uprising in the kingdom.

The four are reporters and include an independent journalist named Anna Therese Day. The other three are members of her camera crew, according to a statement issued by Day’s family.


The US State Department said it was aware of reports that Americans had been arrested in Bahrain but declined further comment, citing privacy concerns.

A police statement published by the official Bahrain News Agency did not initially specify the identities or nationalities of those arrested, or who they work for. But a later update said the four were American and included a woman.

They were arrested in the Shia town of Sitra on Sunday during clashes between security forces and protesters, the statement said.

“One of them was masked and taking part with a group of saboteurs in Sitra in acts of rioting and sabotage and attacks on security officials.

“The other three were arrested at a security checkpoint in the same area,” the statement said.

The four entered Bahrain between 11 and 12 February and “provided false information to concerned authorities”, claiming to be tourists, police said on Monday.

However, “some of those arrested had carried out journalistic activities without permission from concerned authorities, in addition to carrying out illegal acts”.
A spokesman for Day’s family said the four were committed journalists and denied they had done anything wrong. The spokesman confirmed they were arrested on Sunday, and called for their immediate release.
“The allegation that they were in any way involved in illegal behaviour or anything other than journalistic activities is impossible,” the spokesman said in a statement.
Day is an award-winning journalist who has reported extensively from the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, and her work has been featured in news outlets including the New York Times and CNN, the statement added.
The four were arrested while working in Bahrain, it added without giving details.
Bahrain said the case of the four detainees has been referred to the public prosecution.
Home to the US Fifth Fleet, Bahrain was rocked by an Arab Spring-inspired uprising demanding reforms and a constitutional monarchy on February 14, 2011.
Authorities crushed the protest movement one month later. But demonstrators still take to the streets and clash with police in Shiite towns surrounding Manama.