What Mr. Putin Can’t Control

EDITORIAL

If there were questions about the legitimacy of the separatist referendums in eastern Ukraine, the farcical names of the entities on which people were asked to vote — the self-declared People’s Republics of Donetsk or Luhansk — surely answered them. But the gathering rumble of violence accompanying the votes is serious and is driving the Ukrainian crisis in a direction that before long no one — not President Vladimir Putin of Russia, not authorities in Kiev, not the West — will be able to control.

A “round table” of Ukrainian politicians and civil groups and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is scheduled to meet on Wednesday, and the O.S.C.E. is reported to be preparing a “road map” to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. But unless Mr. Putin can and does rein in the secessionists in southeastern Ukraine, and unless nationwide presidential elections can take place in Ukraine as scheduled on May 25, the talks will have little meaning.

The fact that the referendums were held despite Mr. Putin’s urging last week that they be postponed suggests that events are already developing a momentum of their own. There is talk now among the pro-Russia secessionists of another referendum, this time on joining Russia. The Kremlin’s response to the referendums was ambiguous, saying that Moscow “respects the will of the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” while urging that any follow-up be through dialogue between the government in Kiev and the separatists.

Mr. Putin has given every indication that his real goal is not to annex any more Ukrainian territory but to transform Ukraine into a federation under a weak and neutral Kiev government permanently dependent on Russia.

What that means is that even if the talks get underway, Kiev and its Western backers may well be confronted with unacceptable demands. Mr. Putin is likely to seek recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea; a level of regional self-government tantamount to partition; and guarantees against political and economic linkages to Europe.

Though some devolution of power from the center to the regions is unavoidable, Kiev must come out of the negotiations with a reasonable degree of central control and the freedom to forge normal relations with the West.

That will not be easy. Ukraine is broke, and Russia is claiming unrealistically large payments to continue supplying natural gas. The Ukrainian authorities have very few options at this point — any military action against the secessionists is certain to cause civilian casualties, which would invite Russian military intervention, but not responding to the separatists’ actions would encourage them to expand their control.

Yet Mr. Putin’s hand is not all aces. He must be aware that any Russian military drive into southeastern Ukraine would entail bloody resistance, serious trade sanctions, enormous costs and, if it led to annexation, a truncated but virulently anti-Russia and pro-West Ukraine.

While the Ukrainian crisis has sharply raised Mr. Putin’s standing at home, this could quickly change if actual fighting broke out. Even the modest sanctions already in place are provoking capital flight, choking foreign investment and slowing an already creaky Russian economy. And however hard he tries to shrug off Western opprobrium, Mr. Putin is not immune to the damage being done to his reputation, especially in Germany, the European country he seems to care most about.

In the end, there is no alternative to negotiations for either side. At this late stage, they cannot be another exercise in futility, like the last meeting in Geneva.

The O.S.C.E. must set out its road plan as soon as possible, and the Germans, above all others, must make clear to Mr. Putin that they won’t be lulled by more false promises; that unless he clears the way for presidential elections on May 25, gets his minions in southeastern Ukraine in line and really pulls back his armies, the European Union and the United States will impose sanctions that will cut Russia off for a long time from Western sources of technology, arms and finance.