Friday, August 21, 2020
Israel-UAE deal can boost India’s PoK plans. Modi just needs to keep the balancing act on
SESHADRI CHARI
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s refusal to allow a stand-alone meeting on Kashmir issue signals a new era of understanding of New Delhi’s position.
The agreement between Jewish Israel and the United Arab Emirates, known as the ‘Abraham Accord’ that has been brokered by the Christian US, holds little hope for the divided Middle East unless a true change of heart occurs among the followers of the three Abrahamic faiths. This uncertainty offers India a window of opportunity to not only participate in the common business platforms but also widen the scope and scale of the emerging security arrangements in the Middle East, which can have far-reaching and positive significance concerning any action plan on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
But even before the ink could dry, the UAE-Israel agreement has run into controversy on the Palestinian issue. The UAE has interpreted the reference in the relevant clause to mean an “immediate end” to Israeli plans to annex areas in the West Bank under its control. The Israeli officials have stuck to the word “suspend” to suggest negotiations with Palestine would continue.
Naturally then, New Delhi will have to study the accord, go into the background details and deeply ruminate over the likely fallout of the agreement in the Indian and regional context, especially in the emerging post-Covid-19 world order. The Palestinian cause has been relegated to the background in the wake of economic meltdown, falling demand for oil, and rising joblessness due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Moreover, this emerging non-Arab coalition would like to see the back of the US in the Arab world. But the Arab solidarity is not yet a thing of the past and it is too early to conclude that the US has vacated the Middle East.
The post-Covid-19 world order is likely to be very different from what it appears to be now. New Delhi should prepare itself for an enhanced and more active role in the new and emerging geopolitical architecture.
So far so good
It helps that when the Trump administration was moving its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, India was continuing with its “neutral posturing” with a view to balance its strategic engagement with the US and Israel and the economic and energy security pacts with the Arab World.
China, meanwhile, formalised its ‘four-point’ position on the Israel-Palestine conflict as enumerated by President Xi Jinping in his July 2017 speech with a close resemblance to India’s position of calibrated balancing with a realist approach to national interest. Interestingly, Pakistan has refused to toe the Arab big brother’s line in recognising Israel.
Invoking Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan Prime Minister, in a veiled reference to the UAE, has said that “whatever any country does we cannot ever accept Israel as long as Palestinians are not given their rights”. What is important to note is his reasoning that (if Pakistan accepted Israel and ignored the oppression of the Palestinians), “we will have to give up Kashmir as well then”.
Seen in this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made all the right moves so far.
Breaking all taboo, Modi in 2017 became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. India-Israel defence trade is likely to touch the $20-billion mark with India becoming one of the core countries to be dealing with the high-powered defence ministry department SIBAT in Israel. The best part of Modi’s balancing act was revealed when the Arab world took notice of the immense opportunities in India and signalled its readiness to work on trade and investments. More importantly, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)’s refusal to allow a stand-alone meeting on Kashmir issue signals a new era of understanding of New Delhi’s position.
But Delhi needs to watch out
One significant subject in the Abraham Accord is the increased security cooperation between Israel and the UAE against regional threats. Needless to say, the three parties to the accord have a common adversary in Iran. The Trump administration recently seized three Venezuela-bound Iranian oil tankers, with both countries facing heavily punitive sanctions by the US.
Given the effect of US sanctions and its strict implementation, the increased clout of the new partners in the Middle East and elsewhere and the emerging new alliances between China and Iran and Iran-Turkey-Malaysia, New Delhi has to go back to the drawing board for a fresh policy formulation.
China is deeply entrenched in Gwadar and the Indian Ocean region. Tehran is having serious rethink over India’s role in the Chabahar Port project. Turkey, which has threatened to recall its ambassador from Abu Dhabi, is busy forging a new non-Arab Islamic alliance to include Pakistan and Malaysia to achieve its dream of reviving the Khilafat-2, especially at a time when a section of the Arab world seems to be distancing itself from the Palestinian cause while cosying up to Israel. In the event of this non-Arab Islamic coalition gaining ground, it would be interesting to see which way Beijing tilts and what this portends for New Delhi and the region.
The economic catastrophe brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic is probably posing a real challenge and forcing new and hitherto unexpected alignments that will impact India seriously.
Behind Pakistan’s cartographic hallucination on Kashmir lies Imran’s domestic woes, China’s invisible hand
Sreemoy Talukdar
China has never been a disinterested party in Kashmir, and its interventions are getting more frequent in tune with Beijing’s hold over its client state Pakistan.
Imran Khan is in trouble, to put it mildly. The Pakistan prime minister initially dismissed COVID-19 as common flu and had advised citizens to stay at home even if showing symptoms. When the pandemic raged beyond control, Imran’s answer was to implement a ‘Corona tiger force’, a youth recruitment program to “wage jihad” against the virus.
The virus was unmoved by such gimmicks. As the crisis deepened, an alarmed World Health Organisation shot off a letter in June slamming hasty lifting of lockdown in provinces without meeting any of the requisite conditions and expressed concern over Pakistan’s high positivity rate and lack of testing.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s already fragile, debt-burdened economy is collapsing. According to World Bank estimates, Pakistan is heading towards “major recession”. The New York Times quoted Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, an independent research firm, to report that “up to 18 million of Pakistan’s 74 million jobs could be lost.”
A broke Pakistan is set to become the first large developing country to apply for a debt repayment relief under a G-20 initiative.
Alongside and unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s rickety public health infrastructure is also in a coma. Doctors and caregivers are functioning without basic protective gear and risking public ire to boot.
Amid the healthcare disaster, Pakistan is also staring at a food security crisis. Mishandling of the pandemic, lack of government planning, supply chain disruption, unseasonal rains and pestilence may result in a 3.5 million-ton shortfall of wheat, Pakistan’s staple, raising fears that the country is limping towards a famine. It is worth noting that Imran’s popularity was nosedivingeven before the pandemic. Last year, hardline Islamists hit the streets demanding his ouster. Forced to take a $6 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in last May — Pakistan’s 13th such bailout since 1980s — Imran had no option but to cut subsidies, devalue further the rupee and raise taxes — all unpopular moves in a struggling economy. While the interventions didn’t work, all that Imran managed to do was to trigger more inflation, slash consumption and witness mass layoffs in private sector. To quote Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) who led the protests against Imran last year, “Khan was ‘selected’ earlier but he has now been rejected.” Imran’s ascension to power was widely believed to have been engineered by Pakistan’s all-powerful military, and Rawalpindi was growing increasingly impatient with Imran’s hubris, inefficiency and incompetence. Imran’s botched response to coronavirus, falling popularity and waning influence saw Pakistan Army tighten its grip on the civilian government and squeeze further the space for democracy. At the best of times, Imran was a military puppet. His masters have now clipped his wings and taken full control. All major policy decisions on the pandemic are now being taken either by Rawalpindi or army-backed political appointees. Since March, the military has been overruling Imran and releasing public advisories on army letterheads. Imran is aware and unhappy, threatening abruptly to leave press conferences when questioned on his authority. Scholar Madiha Afzal, fellow of Center for Middle East Policy writes in Brookings, “For a time after his election, it seemed that Khan’s closeness with the military might give him the space to implement the domestic policies that he wanted. It seems that period is over. Khan is now clearly constrained by a military whose role has grown progressively through Khan’s term in office and has expanded to the ambit of domestic policy during the pandemic.” The picture that emerges is of a politician rapidly losing popularity, power, influence and control and increasingly given to ranting in Parliament. To add to his pressure, terror financing watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has kept up the squeeze. Last October, Pakistan received a “clear warning” from the FATF for addressing only five out of 27 action items to tackle terror financing. The FATF had threatened to blacklist Islamabad unless it does more and does so quickly. Pakistan has managed to get one more extension from FATF until October 2020 owing to the pandemic, but it received more setbacks on this front with the US state department bringing out a report on terrorism in June that continues to designate Pakistan as a “safe harbour for regionally focused terrorist groups.” Then there is Kashmir. India’s decision last year to remove Jammu and Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status and bring the erstwhile state under New Delhi’s direct control effectively buried Pakistan’s dreams of seizing the prized real estate for which it has launched multiple wars against India and used terrorism as a State policy since the 1990s to carry out a relentless proxy war and stoke militancy within Indian borders. Kashmir is not only Pakistan’s “jugular vein” or an article of faith, it is central to Pakistan’s national and ideological frontiers. Pakistan never had operation control over Kashmir that acceded to India during Partition except the portion that it had invaded, but a never-ending battle against India to grab Muslim-majority Kashmir remains the fulcrum of Pakistan’s existence as a nation-state. It also makes space for Pakistan military’s outsized role in its polity since it is deemed to be the only institution that can turn that improbability into a reality. As C Christine Fair, author and scholar of South Asian political and military affairs, noted in her book Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, for the Pakistan Army, failure lies not in unsuccessful attempts to wrest Kashmir from India but in abandoning the effort. In perpetual struggle lies victory. New Delhi’s move to abrogate Article 370 and turn Jammu and Kashmir into a Union Territory made it even more difficult for the Pakistan to sell its revisionist agenda back home — a despondency best expressed by Opposition leader Sherry Rehman.
In its latest edition of the Green Book, an internal confidential publication of the Pakistan military containing essays by serving officers and others (mostly for in-house consumption), Pakistan’s chief of army staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa admitted that Balakot airstrikes and abrogation of Article 370 have transformed the geopolitics of the region and restricted Pakistan’s options.
The battle for Kashmir isn’t just an existential totem, it is also the silver bullet to paper over all the cracks of a failing State. Stunned by India’s decision, and hamstrung by lack of options, an unprepared Imran launched a vitriolic campaign against India and threatened nuclear holocaust in a column for The New York Times and even from the podium of United Nations last year, but he had little to show for his efforts.
Not just the international community, Khan failed to gain sympathy for his anti-India campaign even in the Arab world.
Imran’s frustration was palpable. At the UN last year, the Pakistan prime minister admitted that he has failed to find any buyers for his apocalyptic narrative on Kashmir, and there was “no pressure on Narendra Modi”.
The reasons behind Pakistan’s failure to corner India on Kashmir have been explained well by Ashley Tellis, former top US government official and now a senior fellow at Carnegie in a report by London-based Financial Times: “India is seen as a great power in waiting, and nobody messes around with the claims of a great power… The Pakistanis have discredited themselves with their use of jihadi terrorism as a means to change the status quo.”
Imran had not only run out of options, but his inefficacy on Kashmir also had a bearing on Pakistan military’s domestic stature. The people in Pakistan were beginning to see that not only will they never get control over their promised land, their ‘infallible’ army actually had a very weak hand. What damaged Pakistan the most was that India’s move went a long way towards decoupling the adjective ‘disputed’ from Kashmir and made it an issue ‘internal’ to India.
Something had to give. And it did. On the first anniversary of India’s abrogation of Article 370, Pakistan released a “new political map” claiming the entire Kashmir and Ladakh, along with Sir Creek and Junagadh in Gujarat.
Among other oddities, the so-called map also has an “undefined frontier” to let China draw its own line while keeping Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin out of its parameters. There has also been another change in nomenclature. ‘Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir’ is now ‘Indian Illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir’ — the extra ‘i’ apparently loosens India’s and fortifies Pakistan’s claim.
The “undefined frontier” apart — which indicates that Pakistan is petrified of China and has no clue what Beijing will claim tomorrow — the so-called map evidently is Pakistan’s answer to India’s move on Kashmir.
While India has revoked Kashmir’s ‘semi-autonomous’ status — a temporary constitutional measure — abrogated Article 370 and 35-A, bifurcated the state into two union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and brought Kashmir under the ambit of Indian Constitution, Imran and his cabinet waited for a year to finally take some coloured pencils and redraw the map to snatch Kashmir away from India.
Depending on how one looks at it, Pakistan’s act was a strategic masterstroke or a fool’s errand. Imran will certainly hope that his countrymen believes the former. Not just ‘one mapmanship’, Imran had more aces up his sleeve to reclaim Kashmir — such as renaming Kashmir Highway in Islamabad as Srinagar Highway.
The claim on Junagadh (that voted to join India in 1947 in a plebiscite when Pakistan received 91 votes) isn’t new. Pakistan’s survey maps have included it on earlier instances unlike Sir Creek but in both of these cases as in Kashmir, Islamabad’s reliance on cartography reflects its helplessness on Kashmir and desperation at home.
At this point, Imran is less worried about his strategic and diplomatic options on Kashmir than in placating the Pakistani public and showing that within a span of a year, he has made some progress in wresting back the prized land. What better way than to redraw a map?
Imran was perhaps inspired by Nepal prime minister KP Sharma Oli, who recently pushed through a new map claiming sovereignty over Indian territories of Limpiyadhura, Lipu Lekh and Kalapani. Oli’s cynical plan had a political motive. Nepal’s beleaguered prime minister is battling to save his seat and political future and saw in the cartographic misadventure a chance to whip up nationalism to sail through the polls.
However, in Pakistan’s cartographic hallucination — that India has dismissed as “ridiculous”, “untenable” and a “political absurdity” lacking in “legal or international credibility” — lies a blunder and a self-inflicted wound.
By claiming the entire Valley, Pakistan has ended up exposing its own lies on Kashmir’s “self-determination” and UN-monitored plebiscite. In one stroke, Pakistan has also invalidated the so-called ‘self-determination’ movement by ‘separatists’ and revealed it for what it is — an asymmetric war planned and executed for decades by Pakistan through ‘non-State actors’ and jihadist forces to create unrest within India’s borders and seize Kashmir.
All Imran and his ‘crayon cabinet’ has managed to do is to bust its own lie and remove the fig leaf of legitimacy.
The dragon’s invisible hand
In dismissing Pakistan’s cartographic aggression, however, India has no reasons to be smug. A coordination on the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and its patron China is evident and increasingly intensifying.
China has never been a disinterested party in Kashmir, and its interventions are getting more frequent in tune with Beijing’s hold over its client State. The strategic importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Beijing’s holding of considerable real estate in Kashmir make China a crucial and influential third party in the Kashmir issue.
There’s one more good reason for China to get involved. Beijing uses Islamabad as a cat’s paw against India, and it is in China’s interest to stabilize Pakistan so that it may play the role Beijing wants it to play.
The client-patron relationship is evident from the fact that China — as ORF’s Sushant Sareen points out — “is not just emerging as the largest debtor to Pakistan but is also the largest investor. What is more, China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and the lender of last resort to bail out Pakistan from its chronic deficit on the external account. In short, China is virtually the only game in town as far as the tottering Pakistan economy is concerned.”
The Sino-Pakistan coordination on Kashmir since India’s move to abrogate Article 370 has played out in interesting ways. Security Council member China has initiated the issue three times at the United Nations — ostensibly to ‘internationalise’ the dispute at the behest of its iron brother — and while each of these attempts have proven unsuccessful, the calibrated steps leading to the first anniversary is worth noting.
On 27 July, China held a virtual foreign ministers’ meeting with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal — an alternative quadrilateral mechanism bang in India’s immediate neighbourhood — and Wang Yi urged his counterparts from Afghanistan and Nepal to follow Pakistan’s footsteps to promote CPEC and tighten interconnectivity. Chinese economic imperialism in India’s backyard raises New Delhi’s security and strategic concerns.
In addition, as ORF senior fellow Sareen points out in “Alt Quad+ with Chinese characteristics”, China has been openly interfering in Nepal’s political process to ensure Oli’s survival, debt-trapping Nepal with white elephant projects, offering trade deals to Bangladesh that Dhaka can’t refuse end up being dependent on Chinese market and “encouraging Imran Khan to reach out to Bangladesh and move towards normalisation of ties.”
Interestingly, just a few days before the ‘Alt Quad’ meeting was held, Imran made a rare phone call to Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina and ostensibly discussed Kashmir.
A day after Pakistan released its ‘new map’, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson on 5 August called India’s Kashmir move “unilateral, illegal and invalid” and glossed over a question on Pakistan’s cartographic aggression. On that very day, China initiated the third attempt to stir the Kashmir pot at UN.
These attempts have all been thwarted but, as Syed Akbaruddin, who served as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations points out in Hindustan Times, India should be ready for a diplomatic two-front war at the UN.
A short-on-options Pakistan may be blundering its way even more on Kashmir, but the real joker in this pack is China.
Pakistan denies Saudi Arabia rift, but Qureshi's rush to China soon after Bajwa snub tells different taleReports of strain in relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been doing the rounds ever since Riyadh declined to toe Islamabad's line on Kashmir
Pakistan on Thursday may have denied reports of a rift with Saudi Arabia, but its recent actions and comments tell a different tale.Reports of strain in relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been doing the rounds ever since Riyadh declined to toe Islamabad's line on Kashmir
Note how Shah Mahmood Qureshi rushed to China on Thursday for a two-day summit with its "all-weather friend" just days after army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa was denied an audience with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman during his visit to the Kingdom. Add to that Prime Minister Imran Khan's recent remarks that news of a breakdown in relations with Saudi Arabia is "completely baseless", but in the same breath adding that Pakistan's future is connected to China.Imran added that China had stood by Pakistan through good and bad times. "We are further strengthening our ties with China. China also needs Pakistan very much. Unfortunately, Western countries are using India against China," Imran said.Reports of strain in relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been doing the rounds ever since Riyadh declined to toe Islamabad's line on Kashmir.
Pakistan has been pushing the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the second largest intergovernmental body after the UN, for a meeting of foreign ministers since India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir last August.
Islamabad's attempts to garner international support against India for withdrawing Jammu and Kashmir's special status have not been successful, to say the least.
A large part of this can be chalked up to the Jeddah-based OIC, the largest bloc of Islamic countries in the world, which is dominated by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, not giving Pakistan an opportunity to take aim at India from their perch.
India has categorically told the international community that the scrapping Article 370 of the Constitution was its internal matter and advised Pakistan to accept reality and stop all anti-India propaganda.
Qureshi, a key player
Qureshi seems to be at the centre of this drama.
The foreign minister recently criticised the Saudi government in a TV interview (a first) and threatened to sidestep the Kingdom by calling an OIC meet.
Qureshi had said, "Today, I am telling the OIC to convene the meeting of the council of foreign ministers. If they cannot do it, then I will be compelled to ask the prime minister [Imran Khan] to call a meeting of Islamic countries [Iran, Turkey and Malaysia] that are ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir."
While the Saudis did not respond directly to Qureshi's remarks, they did stop renewing an oil credit of $3.2 billion to Pakistan and also demanded the repayment of a loan given to Islamabad in 2018 after a visit from Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Part of that loan was duly repaid with an assist from its deep-pocketed benefactor: China.
Pakistan draws China closer
In a video message ahead of his departure to China, Qureshi gushed about his “very important trip to China”. "I am leaving on a very important visit to China. I had a discussion with the prime minister regarding this visit yesterday. My delegation will represent the stance of the political and military leadership of the country. I am hopeful that my meeting with Foreign Minister Wang will prove to be beneficial for both countries,” Qureshi said.
The Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers, meeting at the island resort of Hainan, are slated to discuss a host of issues, including the progress of the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Islamabad’s request for a $1 billion loan. Meanwhile, Islamabad's relations with the Kingdom seem to be on a downward slope.
Kingdom puts distance
There are plenty of reasons for the Kingdom wanting to put space between itself and Pakistan.
Jeremy Garlick, author of The Impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative: From Asia to Europe, told Nikkei Asian Review Saudi Arabia's hesitance stems from its desire to avoid becoming part of China and Pakistan's attempts at containing India.
"Saudi Arabia is closely allied with the US, which may also be [applying behind-the-scenes pressure on] Saudi Arabia to stay away from Chinese initiatives," said Garlick, an assistant professor with the Jan Masaryk Center for International Studies at the University of Economics in Prague.
This snub to the all-powerful army chief Bajwa, whose visit to Riyadh was aimed at containing the fallout from Qureshi's explosive remarks, is sure to send a message to the Pakistani establishment, who are already said to be unhappy with Imran. As per this Economic Times piece, "While Imran Khan has sought to expand traditional close ties with Turkey riding on its president's ambitions to emerge as a leader of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia continues to matter for Pakistan’s most powerful institution: Army."
The piece argued that it is inconceivable that Qureshi did not have Imran's backing and that the entire episode did not sit well with the generals in Rawalpindi, and has left Imran in an unenviable situation.
Pakistan has historically been a strong military ally of Saudi Arabia.
But it seems that Beijing has, for the moment at least, supplanted Riyadh as Islamabad's main backer.
https://www.firstpost.com/world/pakistan-denies-saudi-arabia-rift-but-qureshis-rush-to-china-soon-after-bajwa-snub-tells-different-tale-8737751.html
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