Balochistan : TWO WARS

The Baloch Hal

By Sajjad Hussain Changezi

Troubled Balochistan, in its unending series of sufferings, went through two most highlighted and yet insufficiently identified incidents of violence just a few days back. On the night between June 14 and 15 2013, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s historical residence in Ziarat was burnt down by the separatist outfit, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The following day Quetta witnessed students of Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University blown up by the first female suicide bomber in the history of Balochistan. This attack was followed by two more suicide attacks inside Bolan Medical Complex where the injured were being treated. The events that unfolded on June 15 were claimed by the sectarian outfit, Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ). Balochistan is at war on two fronts – the militant nationalist insurgency led by the BLA to separate Balochistan from Pakistan and the sectarian ‘jihad’ launched by the LeJ with the mission to wipe off Shias (predominantly Hazaras) from Balochistan (and ultimately Pakistan). While Balochistan remains lost in the myths of national security, sovereignty and integrity, the two wars continue to be confused when we must be able to distinguish between them. Why is there a need to distinguish between the LeJ and the BLA? Don’t both deny the writ of the state and the constitution in practice? Shouldn’t all militant organisations be treated absolutely the same way? Any serious student of conflict resolution will warn against ignoring the dynamics of a certain conflict and imposing a single ideal solution to resolve any and all conflicts. The BLA and the LeJ have much less in common than was repeatedly claimed by former interior minister Rehman Malik. The two militant organisations draw inspiration from different ideological sources, the tactics of their insurgencies are different, the targets to hit and the goals to achieve are different and, most importantly, their capacity to cause havoc are different. What are partially overlapping are the time and area of their actions. They are also similar to the extent that they use the Baloch youth as foot soldiers and at times government officials as their targets. Baloch insurgent groups are an expression of anger and desperation from those who politically identify themselves as Baloch and who are afraid of being absorbed by the giant demographic and political structure of the rest of Pakistan. The separatist groups vow to ‘rescue’ the Baloch (and break up Pakistan) in the face of decades of marginalisation, neglect and exploitation by the centre. On the other hand, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, unprovoked in the context of Balochistan, has taken up the voluntary task to eliminate the Shia community and declare Pakistan a Sunni state. Taking pride in its socio-political secular history, the BLA condemns the jihadists’ agenda and disassociate itself with the Baloch separatist movement of Jundullah that is at war with neighbouring Iran. Tactically speaking, the BLA and its fellow insurgent groups have never deployed suicide bombers and their modes of attacks often include rockets, cycle bombs, domestic IEDs and hand grenades. The LeJ, like its fellow Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has, however, demonstrated its capacity to attack via target killings, IEDs, suicide bombings, liquid bombs, and heavy vehicles laden with explosives. These attacks have killed at least 1200 members of the Hazara Shia community alone, apart from scores of policemen, judges, lawyers and non-Shia, non-Hazara citizens. On the contrary, Baloch insurgent groups mostly target the infrastructure of mega projects, representatives and symbols of the state and its institutions, as clearly demonstrated by their attack in Ziarat. It seems the two organisations have different strengths. While the Baloch insurgency has a deep-rooted political base due to the decades of negligence and exploitation increasingly admitted by Pakistani intellectuals as well, the LeJ has its militancy and potential for violence as its peculiarity. It is therefore a rational recommendation that if we are to win Balochistan back, we need to tackle the Baloch issue on political grounds and the LeJ’s sectarian agenda with strategic might. Challenging this notion of delicately applying two different strategies to the two different conflicts and their stakeholders, there is a strong voice advocating ‘absolutely zero tolerance towards any form of aggression that amounts to terrorism’. This approach recommends painting both militant organisations with the same brush. Instead, what happens is different treatment meted out to the two. Baloch insurgents and activists – perceived as Enemy No. 1 – are abducted, tortured, killed and dumped, or made to disappear. On the other hand, the LeJ and its mother organisation, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) currently known as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), have held mass rallies in the biggest cities right under the eye of security agencies. Hate literature by sectarian groups goes unchecked whereas Baloch websites, even moderate ones like The Baloch Hal, stay banned. If Pakistan continues this way, we are doomed to lose both battles, for we are offering space to the LeJ by making obvious and silent ‘deals’ with them, and by crushing the Baloch nationalist movement with brute force, we are deepening their sense of deprivation, desperation and anger. Of the two organisations, the one that needs to be tackled using physical might is permitted socio-political space while the one that deserves political understanding is being dealt with using uncompromised force. As wrong policies continue to be implemented, it’s the non-combatant citizens of Balochistan that pay the heaviest price.