Afghanistan: A long, hard war

EDITORIAL

Sunday saw the US cross the 11-year mark of its war in Afghanistan directly after the September 11 attacks. This has been the longest ever war that the US has engaged in, yielding little in terms of acceptable results with hardly anything to show to the US public, which is quite literally baying for blood now that the US economy is in a shambles. To add insult to injury, the insurgents, who are still a very strong force in the country, are openly mocking NATO and US troops by saying that they are “fleeing” their country in “disgrace” and “humiliation”. This outcome can hardly be called a surprise; anyone familiar with the history of Afghanistan since its independence in the 18th century will be able to vouch for the fact that any invading force — and there have been many — has been met with stiff resistance from the tribal culture and mountain warriors who have fought until the last man standing, defeating empires and never being conquered or vanquished for long. Former President Bush, in his ‘infinite wisdom’, tried to swat a fly with a sledgehammer when he ordered his troops to invade the rugged, mountainous country. At that time al Qaeda was a much smaller ragtag band of jihadists, hardly a fraction of what it is now. The Bush administration made one very profound mistake: it did not differentiate between al Qaeda and the Taliban and attacked both with equal zeal. While the Taliban regime was brutal and unpopular, the whole country was made the US’s battleground. Unfamiliar with the tradition of Pashtunwali (the Pashtun code) by which the tribal Afghan refuses to hand over guests no matter what the consequences, the US started a protracted war with an entire country, hoping to win through sheer shock and awe tactics, only to suffer for many years to come. Even in lining up its allies the US was not handed a favourable deal: Pakistan, its frontline ally, publicly agreed to fighting alongside the US but, as is widely known, preferred establishing its hegemony in the region through ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, providing safe havens to many of the Afghan Taliban. All this has cost the US dearly. The final withdrawal date for NATO troops in Afghanistan is somewhere at the end of 2014. To meet this target, foreign troops have been training and equipping the Afghan National Army and police to take charge when they leave. Instances of army and police personnel turning on their NATO ‘mentors’ are becoming more frequent, with loyalties switching sides and Taliban insurgents threatening those army and police officials who do not. In the game of intimidation, it seems the terrorists will win. If the Afghan Army disintegrates after all US hopes have been pinned on it, there is little doubt that the entire country will spiral into a bloody civil war, which may be much worse than the one before the Taliban took power in 1996 because now many Pashtuns are not in favour of the jihadists. It is very likely that the near future may see an intra-Pashtun war within a wider civil war. Meanwhile the Taliban have started escalating their attacks against NATO troops to show the world that they remain undefeated. Needless to say, the spillover effect of continuing conflict in Afghanistan will be devastating for Pakistan too. Our own homegrown terrorists, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have found safe havens with the Afghan Taliban, fighting their war with the Pakistani state from the safety of Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan’s best interests that it strive to find the middle ground for peace. The US will leave but we will be the ones left to manage the blowback of an Afghan civil war and emboldened TTP insurgents bent on spilling blood.