Musharraf again

The News
Editorial:
Political analysts and psychologists have written extensively on the phenomenon of power – and how it can nurture a hunger for more. In the case of Pakistan's leaders, there is a marked reluctance to accept that their days in power are over. From his flat in London former president Pervez Musharraf continues to lay plans for a return to power, though it is far from certain if these are shared by anyone other than the few cronies he retains. But this does not deter the retired general from expressing, yet again, his 'vision' for Pakistan – a country with a "constitutional role" for the army. As we knew already, for him this is the panacea for Pakistan's instability. He would like to remake Gen Kayani in his own image and would have him effect a coup. How that will lead to stability is a secret known only to Musharraf, unless he has redefined the word stability to mean the havoc his regime played with this country's institutions. May we remind the retired general that for all his tough talk during the days he held sway, about not shedding his "skin"– i.e., his military uniform – he had to lose it, and with it his teeth too, in terms of power. The army has had to make a conscious effort to repair the damage done to its standing and reputation under his misrule.
Musharraf apparently hopes to use the new party he has launched, the grandiosely named All-Pakistan Muslim League, as a means to propel himself back into political office and to the power he was always reluctant to part with. To his credit, the general, at the press conference he addressed in London, did confess to having made "mistakes" – notably the NRO. To describe the NRO as a mistake is something of a coy understatement, given the terrible repercussions it has had and for which Pakistan continues to suffer to this day. Other wrongs too were spoken of and an apology made for them, call it graciousness. What Musharraf does not appear to realise, continuing to predict new military coups and other events in typically bombastic fashion, is that almost no one wants him back. While they may indeed by fed up with President Zardari and a government that has failed to deliver on virtually every front, this does not necessarily mean they wish to have their own future and that of their country thrust into Musharraf's hands once more. After all, his last stint in power amounted to little less than a disaster. The militancy, despite his claims that he was combating it, witnessed a sharp growth: it was under his watch that terrorism degenerated into suicide attacks. Among the tactics he used to create a political vacuum and sideline popular mainstream parties, he oversaw the establishment of the MMA. A large number of Pakistanis believe that the results of his hidden deals with Washington were tantamount to Pakistan's surrendering its sovereignty to the US. What makes his talk of "constitutional role" for the military infuriating, and annoying, is the way he behaved with the judiciary, doing everything in his power to destroy it. It is for this specific purpose that he staged his virtual coup of Nov 3, 2007– which ultimately led to his own political demise.
It is no surprise, therefore, that successive surveys in the past have demonstrated Musharraf's lack of popularity, as did the general elections of February 2008. There is no reason for us to believe that he has somehow become popular now. This is a reality the 'exiled' leader needs to accept. Today he remains a man rejected by the people of his own land. He would do them and himself a service by rather pursuing the games of golf and cards with which he reportedly occupies his time. He should leave politics for those better able to lead Pakistan out of its crisis, much of which is his legacy.