Monday, September 13, 2021
Germany: Free Balochistan Movement held a protest rally in Hanover
The Free Balochistan Movement, Germany Branch, staged a protest rally on Saturday against the murder of previously disappeared Baloch in fake encounters at the hands of the so call “Counter-Terrorism Department” (CTD) of Pakistani forces in Balochistan.
The protest began at 2:00 pm German time in front of the Hannover Central Station in Germany after the protesters marched through various busy streets to George Platz.
The rally participants held banners and placards with slogans against torture, human rights abuses and illegal occupation of Balochistan by Pakistan and Iran.
Participants also carried pictures of enforced disappeared people who were killed in staged encounters by the CTD.
Participants chanted slogans during the demonstration and distributed hundreds of pamphlets to spread awareness among the people.
The protesters were addressed by Mahgonag Baloch, Mohammad Baloch, Najib Baloch, Abdul Jabbar Baloch, Abdul Wajid Baloch, Khuda Dad Baloch and Abu Bakar Baloch who exposed the atrocities of Pakistan and Iran in occupied Balochistan.
The speakers said that Pakistan was pursuing its earlier infamous “kill and dump” policy of forcibly disappearing Baloch, it continued the same process by killing the disappeared Baloch and burying them in mass graves.
The speakers explained that now the Pakistan state forces have adopted a new policy under which the victims of enforced disappearances are fake encounters. The murder of more than 20 Baloch youth in fake encounters in a single month is a question mark for organisations that claim to protect human rights.
The Free Balochistan Movement in its statement further said that Pakistan has changed the method of Baloch genocide to misled the world. Pakistan is trying to give the impression to the world that it is taking action against the terrorists by killing the Baloch in its custody in the name of encounters by its “terrorist force CTD”.
The statement emphatically clarified that the people killed in CTD’s encounters were previously abducted and disappeared by Pakistani forces and they were being killed in staged encounters to cover up Pakistan’s crimes against humanity in Balochistan.
The speakers further said that while Pakistan is trying to deceive the world and unsuccessfully trying to prove that the victims of enforced disappearances in its custody are terrorists, we, Baloch, should inform the world with the same intensity about the crimes that Pakistan is committing in occupied Balochistan.
https://balochwarna.com/2021/09/12/germany-free-balochistan-movement-held-a-protest-rally-in-hanover/
چیئرمین پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی بلاول بھٹو زرداری کی کنٹونمنٹ بورڈز کے انتخابات جیتنے والے پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی کے امیدواروں اور پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی کے حمایت یافتہ امیدواروں کو مبارکباد
چیئرمین پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے کنٹونمنٹ بورڈز کے انتخابات جیتنے والے پی پی پی
امیدواروں کو مبارکباد دی ہے۔ چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے پی پی پی کی حمایت یافتہ آزاد امیدواروں کو بھی کامیابی پر مبارکباد دی ہے۔ ایک بیان میں چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے کہا کہ پشاور کے کنٹونمنٹ بورڈ نے ماضی کی ایک نشست کے مقابلے میں پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی کو دو نشستوں پر کامیابی ہوئی۔
پی ٹی آئی کا گڑھ کہلائے جانے والے پشاور کنٹونمنٹ میں جو نشستیں دوسری جماعتوں نے جیتیں وہاں بھی پیپلزپارٹی کے امیدوار میدان میں رہے۔ چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے کہا کہ ایبٹ آباد کنٹونمنٹ سے جیالے امیدوار کی کامیابی ملک میں بھٹوازم کی مقبولیت کا منہ بولتا ثبوت ہے۔ چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے لاہور، اوکاڑہ، کوہاٹ اور پنو عاقل کنٹونمنٹ کے انتخابات کی مخصوص نشستوں پر حریف امیدوار کو کم ووٹوں کی برتری پر جتوائے جانے پر تحفظات کا اظہار کیا ہے۔
چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے کراچی سے پشاور اور ایبٹ آباد تک کنٹونمنٹ انتخابات میں کامیاب ہونے والے اور رنر اپ رہنے والے پی پی پی کے امیدواروں کو شاباش کا مستحق قرار دیا۔ بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے کہا کہ کنٹونمنٹ انتخابات میں ماضی کی تین نشستوں کے مقابلے میں پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی نے کراچی میں 11نشستیں حاصل کیں۔ پیپلزپارٹی وہ واحد سیاسی جماعت ہے جس نے کراچی کے تمام کنٹونمنٹ بورڈ سے نشستیں حاصل کی ہیں اور پیپلزپارٹی کو تمام سیاسی پارٹیوں کے مقابلے میں سب سے زیادہ ووٹ ملے ہیں۔
چیئرمین پیپلزپارٹی نے کہا کہ پی ٹی آئی کے ہوم گراﺅنڈ کہلانے والے کلفٹن کنٹونمنٹ سے پیپلزپارٹی کو سب سے زیادہ ووٹ ملے۔ صدر مملکت اور گورنر سندھ کے انتخابی حلقے کلفٹن کنٹونمنٹ میں پیپلزپارٹی کی جیت سے 2018ءکے انتخابات کے دھاندلی کے تمام خدشات درست ثابت ہوگئے ہیں۔
Sunday, September 12, 2021
پنجاب میں سلیکٹڈ کو فری ہینڈ دینے والے دوست ہم سے ناراض ہیں، بلاول بھٹو
پاکستان پیپلز پارٹی کے چیئر مین بلاول بھٹو نے کہا ہے کہ میدان چھوڑ کر
پنجاب میں سلیکٹڈ کو فری ہینڈ دینے والے دوست بھی ہماری سرگرمیوں سے خوش نہیں، ہماری اتحادی جماعتیں سیاسی میدان چھوڑ چکی ہیں۔
عوام اب سلیکٹڈ کا راج بھگت رہے ہیں، عوام کو لاوارث نہیں چھوڑ سکتے، عوام کو تاریخی بے روزگاری اور مہنگائی کا سامنا ہے، اگرمولانا فضل الرحمان،(ن)لیگ چاہے توہم کل ان کوگراسکتے ہیں، عوام پیپلز پارٹی کا ساتھ دیں، عمران خان کو گھر بھیج دیں گے۔
بلاول بھٹوکروڑ لعل عیسن لیہ میں ورکرز کنونشن سے خطاب کررہے تھے، اس دوران بہادر خان سیہڑ باضابطہ طور پر پاکستان پیپلزپارٹی کا حصہ بن گئے، بہادر خان سیہڑ دو مرتبہ رکن قومی اسمبلی منتخب ہوئے، وفاقی کابینہ میں وزیر بھی رہے۔
ورکرز کنونشن سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے پیپلز پارٹی کے چیئرمین بلاول بھٹو زرداری نے کہا کہ ہمارے سیاسی دوستوں نے پنجاب میں عمران خان کو فری ہینڈ دیا ہوا ہے بلاول بھٹو نے کہا کہ پیپلز پارٹی پنجاب کے عوام کو لاوارث نہیں چھوڑ سکتی، پنجاب کے عوام کے ساتھ تاریخی ظلم ہو رہا ہے، موجودہ حکومت چینی، چاول اور گندم درآمد کر رہی ہے۔
ہر روز مہنگائی کا بم پھٹتا ہے، حکومت نے ٹیکسز بڑھا کر عوام کا جینا محال کر دیا ہے، عوام عوامی حکومت کو ترس رہے ہیں۔چیئرمین پیپلز پارٹی نے کہا کہ عوام تاریخی بے روزگاری اور مہنگائی کا سامنا کر رہے ہیں، کبھی بجلی، کبھی گیس تو کبھی پیٹرول کی قیمت میں اضافہ ہو رہا ہے۔
انہوں نے کہا کہ پیپلزپارٹی نے کسانوں اور مزدوروں کو حقوق دلوائے، غریب مزدور اور کسان کے لیے بینظیر بھٹو کے منشور کا نفاذ کریں گے، بینظیر بھٹو ایک ماں کی طرح عوام کا خیال رکھتی تھی، بلاول بھٹو کا کہنا تھا کہ سینیٹ میں ہم نے یوسف رضا گیلانی کو منتخب کراکرثابت کردیا عمران کے پاس میجورٹی نہیں، ساتھیوں سے مطالبہ ہے اٹھو شیر بنو، نکلو، جدوجہد کرو، ہم نے ساتھیوں کو راستہ دکھادیا ہے۔
پی ڈی ایم کی طرف اشارہ کرتے ہوئے انہوں نے کہا کہ عثمان بزدارکے خلاف عدم اعتماد لیکر آ، ہم پنجاب کے عوام کو لاوارث نہیں چھوڑ سکتے، پہلے عثمان بزدار پھر عمران کے خلاف عدم اعتماد لا۔
ہم نے یوسف رضا گیلانی کوجتوا کرثابت کردیا عمران کو گراسکتے ہیں، اگر مولانا فضل الرحمان، (ن)لیگ چاہے توہم کل ان کوگراسکتے ہیں،ایک کروڑ نوکریاں دینے کا وعدہ کرنے والے کا بتائیں لیہ میں کتنی نوکریاں دی گئی ہیں،دس ہزار خاندان کو سٹیل ملز سے بے روزگار کر دیا یے۔
شہید بی بی نے 90کی دہا ئی میں جن بیس ہزار خاندانوں کو روزگار دیا تھا ان سب کو ایک بار پھر بے روزگار کردیا گیا۔ہم مذمت کرتے ہیں۔شہید بی بی کا دیا ہوا روزگار ہے ہم یہ ظلم نہیں کرنے دیں گے۔
https://jang.com.pk/news/983505
#Pakistan #PPP - Historical oppression taking place with people of Punjab: Bilawal
https://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/619307-Historical-oppression-taking-place-with-people-of-Punjab-Bilawal
#Pakistan - Takht-e-Raiwind has no room in politics: Bilawal
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/891574-takht-e-raiwind-has-no-room-in-politics-bilawal
Saturday, September 11, 2021
The U.S. branded the Haqqanis terrorists and issued $5 million bounties. Now they’re in power in the Taliban government.
By Sudarsan Raghavan
Twenty years after al-Qaeda attacked the United States — a plot hatched in Afghanistan — its loyalists hold senior positions in the Taliban's new transitional government. There is one name that stands out: Haqqani. A U.N. report in June described the Haqqani network as the “primary liaison between the Taliban and Al-Qaida.” Its leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani — a brutal insurgent commander known for dispatching suicide bombers who’ve killed or maimed hundreds of civilians — was “assessed to be a member of the wider Al-Qaida leadership, but not of the Al-Qaida core leadership.” Today, he is Afghanistan’s acting interior minister, overseeing the nation’s police, intelligence services and other security forces. He is also in charge of combating terrorism. “It’s a major concern,” said Colin P. Clarke, director of policy and research at The Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consulting firm. “You are one step removed from having the group that attacked us on 9/11 running the country.”The appointment of Haqqani, as well as relatives and members of his network, underscores his immense influence inside the Taliban. It also raises concerns that the new government will pursue a hard line agenda, even as Taliban leaders publicly claim to be gentler and more moderate than their brutal image in an effort to curry favor with donors and foreign governments.
Haqqani's political rise puts the Biden administration and other Western governments in a precarious position, particularly in countering terrorist threats. They are forced to have relationships with people they have sanctioned, many with bounties on their heads, for committing or sponsoring terrorism — or targeting Americans. In the interim government, at least 14 of the 33 cabinet members are on U.N. sanctions lists.
A Taliban spokesman did not immediately respond to questions about the Haqqani’s alleged al-Qaeda ties and concerns it could complicate much-needed relationships with foreign governments, the United Nations and international donors.Sirajuddin Haqqani is on the FBI’s most wanted list with a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest. The State Department, through its Rewards For Justice Program, is offering $10 million, describing him as “a specially designated global terrorist.”He is wanted for “questioning in connection with” a January 2008 attack on a Kabul hotel that killed six people, including a U.S. citizen. He is also believed to have orchestrated attacks against U.S. and coalition forces and in planning an assassination attempt of former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, the State Department says.Khalil Haqqani, the uncle of Sirajuddin, is the acting Taliban minister for refugees. The State Department is offering up to $5 million for his capture, in part because he “acted on behalf of al-Qaida and has been linked to al-Qaida terrorist operations.” In 2012, the United States designated the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organization. Secretary of State of Antony Blinken told reporters at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on Wednesday that the Taliban interim government “does not meet the test of inclusivity and it includes people who have very challenging track records.” “Our engagement with the Taliban and with the government — interim or longer — will be for purposes of advancing the national interest, our national interest and that of our partners,” said Blinken. “We have and we will find ways to engage the Taliban, the interim government, a future government, to do just that and to do it in ways that are fully consistent with our laws.”
On Thursday, the Taliban demanded that the United States and the United Nationsremove the Haqqanis and other cabinet members from their “blacklists,” declaring that they violated the agreements of a peace deal signed in Doha. The movement also criticized Pentagon officials for noting that the Haqqanis were still targets. “That America and other countries are making such provocative statements and trying to meddle the internal affairs of Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate condemns it in the strongest terms,” the Taliban said in a statement. “Such remarks by U.S. officials are a repetition of past failed experiments and such positions are detrimental for America.” “It’s a pretty difficult spot for the Biden administration,” Clarke said. “If you deal with the Taliban in these confines, you are essentially dealing with a terrorist group or members of a terrorist organization. And if you don’t, you have no leverage and no influence to control events in Afghanistan.”The Haqqanis trace their roots to the Soviet Cold War occupation of the 1980s and the Afghan mujahideen struggle to liberate their nation. Sirajuddin’s father, Jalaluddin, was a famed commander and CIA asset who forged a close alliance with Osama bin Laden and other foreign Islamist militants who arrived to push the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan.In 1996, the elder Haqqani aligned with the Taliban, helping the movement seize the country for the first time. He served as a cabinet minister and a provincial governor. When the Taliban was toppled in 2001 following the September 11th attacks, the Haqqanis became an integral part of the insurgency against U.S.-led NATO forces. In 2018, the Taliban announced the death of Jalaluddin due to an undisclosed illness. By then, Sirajuddin was already in charge of the Haqqani network, which was based in eastern Afghanistan as well as in bases inside Pakistan’s Northwest Territories; three years earlier the Taliban had appointed him as a deputy leader. The Haqqanis became known as “the most lethal and sophisticated insurgent group targeting US, Coalition and Afghans forces,” often attacking with small-arms, rocket, suicide bombers and bomb-laden vehicles, according to the National Counterterrorism Center. The network orchestrated some of the highest-profile attacks in the past two decades of war. This included a June 2011 assault on Kabul’s Intercontinental hotel, two suicide bombings against the Indian embassy and a day-long assault on the U.S. Embassy and other high profile targets in Kabul a decade ago. “People must be both reassured and terrified by the fact that an entity seen as responsible for some of the worst crimes of the war is now in charge of securing the population,” said Ashley Jackson, an expert on the Taliban at the Overseas Development Institute. “But there is a certain logic from inside the Taliban … if anyone can bring security, one assumes it’s the Haqqani network.” But that could also pose a threat to Sirajuddin Haqqani’s influence inside the movement, where he has several rivals, including Mohammad Yaqoob, the acting defense minister and son of the Taliban’s late founder Mohammad Omar. One of Haqqani's primary challenges will be to prevent large-scale bombings by the Islamic State and other militant groups that are against the Taliban — like the attack on Kabul's airport last month that killed 13 U.S. service members and more than 170 Afghans. The flights to a new life were in sight: Portraits of Afghans lost in the airport bombing. “Since he’s number one now, it’s his responsibility to prevent these urban attacks,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors at the Brookings Institution. “If he doesn’t, there’s going to be people unhappy, including within the Taliban. They will say ‘you have this important portfolio, what the hell are you doing?’” Haqqani has also shown he can think strategically off the battlefield. Last year, he shared his visions in an op-ed in the New York Times with the headline: “What We, the Taliban, Want.” Many analysts viewed it as a shrewd tactical move to soothe the concerns of the United States and the international community following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. “Everyone is tired of war,” the op-ed from the brutal warlord read. “I am convinced that the killing and the maiming must stop.” “We are committed to working with other parties in a consultative manner of genuine respect to agree on a new, inclusive political system in which the voice of every Afghan is reflected and where no Afghan feels excluded,” the op-ed continued. Today, the acting Taliban government is anything but inclusive. And there are already signs that Haqqani’s interior ministry will not tolerate dissent. Protests by women seeking basic rights have been broken up by Taliban fighters firing weapons and assaulting local journalists. An interior ministry statement this week decreed that all protests must be approved by the government at the risk of arrests. “The Haqqani network is the kind of hammer that comes back down and doesn’t allow the Taliban to be perceived as moderate,” Clarke said. “That’s part of the reason why the Haqqanis are stacked in the government. It’s to make sure there is no deviation from what they have been working on for the past two decades.” A key concern for the United States is whether Haqqani’s rising profile will open the gateway for al-Qaeda to resurrect itself in Afghanistan. In the U.N. report, investigators found that the Taliban and al-Qaeda “remain closely aligned and show no signs of breaking ties.” Al-Qaeda members live in at least 15 provinces. At the moment, said both Jackson and Clarke, the Haqqanis appear more interested in growing their influence in the country, the region and within the Taliban movement rather than waging global jihad. “They waited 20 years to get back into power,” Clarke said. “Now, they are, and they want to hold on to that power.” Karen DeYoung in Washington and Haq Nawaz Khan in Peshawar, Pakistan, contributed to this report.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/haqqanis-afghanistan-taliban/2021/09/10/71f82620-123b-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html
#September11 - 9/11 IN ISLAMABAD: THE FIRST 72 HOURS
DAVID O. SMITH
It was a typical late summer day at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad — oppressively hot when the sun was out with a twinge of cool air in the evening that brought momentary relief. The weekly “Pol-Core” meeting was called to order at 0915 by recently arrived Amb. Wendy Chamberlin. This group included the deputy chief of mission, the political counselor, the chief of station, the chief of the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan, the regional security officer, and me as the senior Defense Attaché Office representative. I was the Army attaché at the embassy. The defense attaché was out of the country and remained so for weeks. The agenda included the ambassador’s credentialing ceremony two days later on Sept. 13, the forthcoming visit of the commander of U.S. Central Command, and the Bush administration’s plan to begin lifting the decade-long sanctions regime that had failed to halt Pakistan’s nuclear program. The ambassador emphasized it was time to move on to issues like counter-terrorism cooperation in which the United States needed Pakistan as a friend, not an adversary.
Routine embassy business filled the remainder of the day on Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001. I had scarcely returned home when the telephone rang. “Turn on the news, right now!” our office administrative non-commissioned officer shouted and hung up. I complied immediately. On CNN, a reporter was standing on a New York City rooftop with a burning World Trade Center tower in the distant background. Shocked, I sat down to watch, wondering what had happened. Within minutes, the answer came when an airliner struck the building’s second tower. For two hours, I watched with a mixture of fascination and horror as more news trickled in: A third plane had struck the Pentagon, a fourth was not responding to air traffic control instructions and later crashed in Pennsylvania. My wife and I fell silent when one tower collapsed, then the second.
The phone rang to notify me that the ambassador would convene the embassy emergency action committee in thirty minutes. At the residence, we went upstairs to her office suite where she was on the phone while we quietly filed in and took our seats. There was no doubt in my mind that Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan was responsible for the day’s events. He and his al-Qaeda organization had long been the focus of the chief of station’s intelligence collection efforts. It dawned on me that America would soon be a nation at war and we would be the frontline embassy in the war effort.
The ambassador hung up the phone and said this meeting had been expressly directed by the State Department. Pakistan’s foreign minister had just called to express “shock and horror” at what had happened. He hoped the United States would be able to trace the perpetrators and take action against them, and said President Pervez Musharraf would be on television soon to say the same thing. The State Department Operations Center, she continued, was warning of attacks on overseas diplomatic missions and many embassies had decided to close until the situation clarified. “What should we do?” she asked. I replied immediately that closing the embassy was absolutely the wrong message to send. If we hunkered down in place, Pakistanis would interpret this as a sign of fear. We should project strength and confidence by remaining open for regular business and attend all scheduled social functions to “show the flag.” The others agreed. The meeting was interrupted by a call from Secretary of State Colin Powell. She hung up, paused briefly to collect her thoughts, and turned to us. The crisis, she emphasized, was in Washington, not overseas. We needed cool heads and not to let our emotions get away from us.
I wore my uniform to the embassy the next day for a later call at General Headquarters with Maj. Gen. Tariq Majid, the director general for military intelligence and my classmate from the Pakistan Army Staff College course I took in 1982. I had prepared a lengthy list of talking points and questions. I began by mentioning the condolence calls from a wide variety of Pakistanis that had lit up the embassy switchboard all morning. But what was most needed now, I continued, was not condolences, but genuine cooperation from Pakistan in tracking down the perpetrators. Not since the Civil War, I emphasized, had Americans witnessed such destruction on their soil and the level of emotion in the country was as great if not greater than after Pearl Harbor. I then read off my long list of questions and asked for his response. Tariq first offered his personal condolences and said that everyone in Pakistan condemned the acts, even the anti-western Urdu press. He admitted bin Laden was the most likely suspect, but opined it was wise to look in all directions rather than concentrate solely on the most likely. In any case, he added, there was obviously a complete intelligence breakdown on the U.S. side. That four hijackings could take place within one hour with three targets hit simultaneously indicated a high degree of sophistication. “We’ve been hurt as well,” he complained, “our strategic interests have likewise been damaged.” As Tariq deftly segued into the familiar Pakistan-as-victim theme I had grown used to hearing, I realized that no decision on U.S.-Pakistani cooperation had yet been made by Musharraf. I politely thanked him for his time and departed.
Sept. 13 began with a Defense Attaché Office staff meeting to apportion our growing workload. Urgent requests for information had flowed in steadily for the past 36 hours. The majority came through the Defense Human Intelligence Service, but others came from the service’s support elements in the regional commands and still others came from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon and other intelligence centers: How stable was Musharraf’s government? Would the rank and file in the Pakistan Army support a decision to abandon the Taliban? What was the domestic reaction? Were nine corps commanders — influential players in the Pakistan Army — fully on board with a decision to cooperate? How much sympathy for the Taliban was there within the army? Was there any possibility of a coup against Musharraf? Were Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safe and under positive control? Who precisely were the Taliban? What were the names of key leaders? Which ones were more important than others? Did anyone have a picture of Mullah Omar? How well equipped and supplied were the Taliban armed forces? How was their military campaign against the Northern Alliance going? Could we work with the Northern Alliance? Who could be trusted? Who could not? What would India do? What would the -stans do (the neighboring countries of Central Asia)? What about Iran? China? Russia? Was the embassy at risk?
Dozens of similar requests arrived hourly from other U.S. agencies and headquarters by encrypted telephone. Just answering the telephone, let alone the questions, was a time-consuming task.
Securing Pakistan’s Cooperation
I decided to skip the pageantry of the ambassador’s credentialing ceremony and send the Navy attaché instead. Later that afternoon, she hastily convened a meeting to disseminate what had transpired at her brief one-on-one meeting with Musharraf that followed. Like my meeting with the director general for military intelligence the day before, it was a disappointment. She opined that Musharraf was still pondering his response to seven specific demands made on Pakistan by the U.S. government. The seven demands were (1) stop al-Qaeda operatives at the border (Durand Line) if they tried to enter Pakistan, and end all logistical support to al-Qaeda; (2) give blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; (3) provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against al-Qaeda; (4) provide any requested intelligence information; (5) publicly condemn terrorist acts; (6) cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban government and stop any Pakistani recruits from going to Afghanistan; and (7), if the evidence implicated bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban continued to harbor them, sever all relations with the Taliban government.
When the “with us or against us” demand was raised, Musharraf deflected it by raising the familiar trope of repeated American betrayals of Pakistan that had become the staple of Pakistan’s diplomacy ever since sanctions had been imposed in 1990. Brushing this aside, the ambassador bluntly told him this was a past issue and Pakistan now had to choose to become an ally of the United States or an enemy. She reminded him that in the 1980s when Pakistan last played the role of a frontline state on Afghanistan, many good things had flowed from the United States. Sanctions relief might happen if Pakistan made the right decision, and perhaps other things like support in international financial institutions, debt relief, and the resumption of military and economic assistance. Musharraf complained it was difficult to sign up to cooperate in a military operation without knowing the details of what was being planned, and that India was equating Pakistan with the Taliban because of its earlier recognition of their regime. Cutting him off abruptly, the ambassador snapped that “9/11 changed all that, and there will be no dialogue EVER with the Taliban.” Their meeting ended on that sour note.
The next day — Friday — I met again with the director general for military intelligence while Chamberlin met with Musharraf. I asked Tariq straightaway if the chief executive had made a decision about the seven U.S. demands. Tariq replied obliquely, “The answer is very much there.” He said there should not be any confusion about it, but he cautioned that “precise modalities of cooperation” needed to be worked out. This was the sort of non-response that Pentagon action officers for decades had derisively termed “the usual humma-humma.” I had no time for it. I interrupted Tariq and asked him to respond to specific questions: What if U.S. actions were oriented solely on bin Laden and al-Qaeda? This would likely not be viewed unfavorably by the ranks, he replied. What actions had been taken to prepare the public and the army for cooperation with the United States? The Inter-services Public Relations directorate had already begun this work, he replied, but the United States must also publicly support Pakistan. Tariq did not answer any questions fully, but pledged Pakistani cooperation while emphasizing that certain “modalities” — he used that word several times — must still be worked out. When I returned to the embassy, Chamberlin had returned from a ninety-minute meeting with Musharraf. At an impromptu Pol-Core meeting, she disclosed the specific reservations about cooperation about which Tariq had hinted.
Her meeting apparently was more cordial than mine. The president began by stating he accepted all seven U.S. requests, joking that Pakistan was “in for penny, in for a pound.” The corps commanders, he stressed, were in “total agreement” with the decision, but several things required clarification and a number of Pakistani concerns had to be addressed. He quickly ticked off the seven requests and voiced several concerns: Sealing the 2,500-kilometer border with Afghanistan was “totally impossible” due to the difficulty of the terrain, but pledged Pakistan would do its best. Blanket overflight of Pakistani territory was “no problem” as long as no-fly zones over strategic areas — Pakistan’s nuclear sites — were established and honored. The use of Pakistani ports was fine although Karachi should not be used because it was too public and the city was not completely safe. Similarly, the use of major air bases should be avoided in favor of rarely used bases in remote areas of Balochistan. Intelligence sharing was fine so long as neither India nor Israel received any of the information provided by Pakistan and that nothing should involve Kashmir — “we will handle that.” Pakistan agreed to condemn terrorism if Kashmir was not included in the definition. On the fuel cut-off to the Taliban, Pakistan provided only kerosene to the Afghan government and that would be stopped. Breaking diplomatic relations with the Taliban was already in progress and Pakistan had recalled its ambassador in Kabul.
Musharraf emphasized his concern that the longer any military campaign went on, the greater was the possibility of negative feelings. A quick action and extraction of U.S. troops was in both countries’ interests. It would also be good to have a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the operation, buy-in from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and diplomatic support from Islamic countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. When the ambassador interrupted to ask if he was setting conditions on Pakistani cooperation, he assured her that all seven demands were accepted unconditionally and that he wished only to point out things that perhaps were not fully understood in Washington about the risk Pakistan (and he personally) was taking. “We’re compromising a hell of a lot [for you]. This will undermine my personal standing.” As for India, “Tell the Indians to lay off and stay off,” was the blunt message he wanted conveyed to New Delhi. He ended their conversation by restating a third time that he accepted all U.S. demands and advised the ambassador, “We both need to review our rusty knowledge of how to work with each other.”
The last event on my schedule that day was an evening reception at Joint Staff Headquarters where I had a long conversation with the director of the Joint Staff, the second-ranking officer in that headquarters. Lt. Gen. S.P. Shahid was a friendly and approachable officer, always with a broad smile on his face. It helped that he had once studied at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and knew American military jargon and which buttons to press when talking with American officers. He stressed the need for both the United States and Pakistan to work together to change the negative perceptions each country had about the other. He stated he would be the point of contact for future cooperation with the U.S. armed forces and that he looked forward to working together once more.
Pakistan and the Taliban
It had taken three days to convince Pakistan to cooperate with the United States and many in the embassy remained skeptical that Musharraf and the senior generals were fully on board. This was signaled at an embassy briefing ten days later for a team of officers from the Joint Staff headed by Maj. Gen. Kevin Chilton. At this briefing, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, made an impassioned plea to the ambassador and the team not to attack the Taliban, but to let Pakistan work with them to hand over bin Laden. This was bluntly rejected by the ambassador and in the next few days, the Joint Staff team worked with Pakistani counterparts to nail down logistic support for Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on Oct. 7.
It didn’t take long to validate the embassy’s concern that Pakistan would prove to be a duplicitous ally. The Pakistan Army deployed troops to the Durand Line for the first time in history, and was assiduous in capturing and turning over foreign al-Qaeda fighters fleeing the mountains of Tora Bora. However, it allowed Taliban fighters to seek sanctuary with tribal kinsmen in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and relocated senior leaders to Quetta, the capital of neighboring Balochistan province.
Why did they do this? Pakistani support for the Taliban was rooted in a hostile relationship with Kabul for three decades after 1947. No government in Kabul has ever accepted the Durand Line imposed as a de facto border by Britain in 1893 that split the Pashtun-dominated area between Afghanistan and British India, the so-called Pashtunistan region. On Pakistan’s creation in 1947, Afghanistan refused to accept it as Britain’s successor and sought to redraw the boundary further east. The 1979 Soviet invasion afforded Pakistan the opportunity to reshape Afghanistan and end 30 years of hostility.
Every Pakistani government since then has sought a stable Afghanistan. It defines stability as having a government in Kabul not overtly hostile to Pakistan; that is Pashtun-dominated (so that Pashtuns have a divided loyalty between Afghanistan and Pakistan); and that keeps Indian influence to an absolute minimum to ensure that a future war with India is confined to Pakistan’s eastern border. Only the Taliban government ever met this definition. This failure to acknowledge — much less understand —Pakistan’s strategic imperatives was America’s first major mistake.
The second, perceived at the time by several in the embassy, was the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. Having largely accomplished America’s announced military objectives in Afghanistan, the United States put in place a government whose military and intelligence services were dominated by non-Pashtuns who ignored Pakistani concerns, was totally corrupt, and was inevitably doomed to fail. The United States ought to have learned from the abrupt collapse of the South Vietnamese armed forces in 1975 and the Lebanese Army in 1984 that soldiers will not fight and die for corrupt and faction-ridden governments no matter how much U.S. training and equipment they receive. Things might have turned out much better from the standpoint of U.S. security interests if the United States had withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2001 instead of embarking on a two-decade experiment in nation building.
The United States and Pakistan After the Taliban Takeover
With the Taliban now in charge in Kabul, where does this leave the United States and Pakistan? Both sides may indulge in a period of finger pointing for the social and humanitarian disasters sure to follow, and the temptation will be great to cut Pakistan adrift. The United States walked away from Pakistan before — in 1965 and 1971 after two wars with India and in 1990 after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan — but these were grave mistakes that should not be repeated.
U.S. officials should understand two key things going forward. First, the bilateral relationship with Pakistan needs to be confined solely to areas of agreed mutual interest. There is absolutely no basis for rebuilding the close military relationship that all but collapsed in 2011 after a series of events that alienated the Pakistani government and military: the special forces raid to kill bin Laden in Abbottabad which was considered to be a gross violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, a series of Wikileaks disclosures that embarrassed the Army chief, the shooting death of two Pakistanis by CIA contractor Raymond Davis, and the Salala border post incident in which U.S. airstrikes killed 28 Pakistani soldiers. Second, the United States has three key interests connected to Pakistan: the continuing risk of terrorism directed against the United States by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan, the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and preventing a future war between India and Pakistan that could escalate to the nuclear level. Prioritizing these interests will provide focus to a relationship that has often gone off the rails.
What then does a limited relationship look like? It means that the era of generous U.S. military and economic assistance is over. Future assistance should be limited solely to modest economic investments, humanitarian aid, and counternarcotics programs. The United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in stability in Afghanistan and limiting future Taliban excesses, and Pakistan might cooperate in leveraging its influence with the Taliban government to deliver humanitarian assistance to displaced Afghans. Intelligence sharing is possible if limited to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan on Afghan soil that attack the Pakistani state. And finally, there are abundant opportunities to stabilize Pakistan’s shaky economy because the last thing the region needs is another failed state possessing hundreds of nuclear weapons. To that end a constructive blueprint published last year by the Middle East Institute contains several initiatives that both sides can beneficially pursue.
No one could possibly have foreseen that the 20th year observation of the events of 9/11 would be bookended by Taliban governments in power in Kabul. What is needed now is less recrimination about the causes of this catastrophic outcome and more careful, somber — and humble — reflection on the limits of U.S. power and America’s inability to understand the social, political, and cultural dynamics in this and other volatile regions of the world.
https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/9-11-in-islamabad-the-first-72-hours/
Friday, September 10, 2021
OPINION: Spotlight Still on Saudi Arabia 20 Years After 9/11
It was these attacks that prompted the Saudi government to take Al-Qaeda seriously. Under the stewardship of Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef (MBN), who was the deputy interior minister at the time, Saudi Arabia developed a highly effective internal counterterrorism capability that managed to wipe out Al-Qaeda fighters in the kingdom and dismantle numerous cells throughout the country. Former CIA Director George Tenet considered MBN to be a highly valuable counterterrorism partner for the United States (MBN, who would rise to become crown prince, is now living in pain under a form of house arrest courtesy of his younger cousin, current Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman). That high distinction was illustrated in 2010, when a Saudi intelligence tip helped foil an Al-Qaeda bombing of UPS and FedEx cargo aircraft that were set to land in Chicago.
The Saudis, however, are hardly fool-proof U.S. partners. While the kingdom has gotten better at interdicting money before it gets into the hands of charities, companies and individuals associated with terrorism, it took prodding from the Financial Action Task Force for Riyadh to adequately implement U.N. Security Council terrorism sanctions. In a 2009 State Department memo, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote that "donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide." Saudis also made up a big proportion of foreign terrorist fighters in both the Islamic State and its predecessor organization, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. And in December 2019, a Saudi air force cadet training with the U.S. military in Pensacola, Fla. killed three people, purportedly at the encouragement of Al-Qaeda (a month later, the Trump administration expelled 21 Saudi cadets over possession of jihadist material).These examples, of course, don't mean that Saudis themselves are somehow predisposed to engaging in acts of terrorism. Many Saudis are terrific people who pride themselves on their history and warm hospitality. But let's face it: two decades after 9/11, Saudi Arabia's political leadership has a long way to go in cracking down on the sources of terrorism funding. At the same time Washington maintains a constructive, mutually beneficial security relationship with Saudi Arabia when necessary, it shouldn't shy away from reprimanding Riyadh when it doesn't live up to high standards. While the Saudi royal family may be fortunate enough to sit on about a quarter of the world's crude oil reserves, they aren't infallible. https://www.newsweek.com/spotlight-still-saudi-arabia-20-years-after-9-11-opinion-1627581
From Chine: Commentary: The hypocrisy of Western politicians' concern over Hong Kong
The recent preposterous accusations by a bunch of Western politicians against the Hong Kong police's law-based arrests of some members of a notorious anti-China group have once again revealed their hypocrisy on issues related to the Chinese city.
Hong Kong is a society under the rule of law. No organization or individual has any privilege above the law. The Hong Kong police's operations are in line with the national security law, and have defended the sanctity of the rule of law.
A year after the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, the city has returned from chaos to stability and tranquility. The law has deterred anti-China forces in Hong Kong and blocked the intervention of external forces.
However, as stability returns to Hong Kong, some Western politicians are getting increasingly agitated. The reason is that they want to continue intervening in Hong Kong affairs and stirring up chaos there so as to disrupt China's development.
Those Western politicians have been used to tap human rights, democracy or freedom of speech as excuses to justify unlawful groups and individuals in Hong Kong. Their remarks and actions have already exposed their sinister intention to sabotage the rule of law in Hong Kong, obstruct the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's law-based governance, and undermine the city's long-term peace and stability.
The double standards held by those Western politicians have also been brought into the sunlight.
While those Western politicians attempt to justify the criminal actions that put Hong Kong's stability in jeopardy, Western governments have never been weak in cracking down on acts that challenge national security, unity and social stability in their own countries.
The United States itself has the world's strictest national security laws, which applies to every inch of its territory. Washington has been relentless in cracking down on national security crimes and even willfully abuses the pretext of national security to undermine the legitimate rights and interests of other countries.
With the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, the city has already built up a solid law-based fortress against anti-China and destabilizing forces. The people in Hong Kong can now continue to enjoy their basic rights and freedom in accordance with the law.
As for those ill-intentioned Western politicians, no matter how hard they will try in the future, their scheme of intervention will always be doomed to fail.
http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0910/c90000-9894525.html
Russia 'Keeps Powder Dry' in Connection With Situation in Afghanistan, Lavrov Says
Pakistan Is an Arsonist That Wants You to Think It’s a Firefighter
By C. Christine Fair
Washington has an endless appetite for Islamabad’s con games.On Aug. 27, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted, “Any sustainable solution in Afghanistan must include Pakistan,” while also expressing his appreciation for the “efforts of the Pakistani government to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens, our allies, and other nations.” His comments reflect a familiar play: Pakistan has spent decades setting fires in South Asia—and then expected praise and renumeration for offering to put them out. It’s astonishing that U.S. officials continue to peddle Pakistan’s own fictions—alongside such media outlets as the BBC, as I discovered recently when I was cut off in the middle of an interview for speaking about it. But with the Afghanistan debacle on policymakers’ minds, it’s a good time to think critically about Washington’s perpetual vulnerability to Pakistan’s rent-seeking ruses. Both political parties have long been responsible for coddling Pakistan in hopes that there is some mystical U.S. policy that could reform its supposed wayward ally. Even though Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan goes back some seven decades, the Washington elite continues to fall for Pakistan’s efforts to sell itself as the solution to the very problems it created. Pakistani officials tell a heart-wrenching story. Pakistan was minding its business when, in 1979, the United States persuaded Pakistan to shoulder the burden of the struggle against communism in Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Pakistani officials contend that they were a victim of American perfidy when the latter forgot Pakistan existed in the 1990s, leaving Islamabad to contend with the mess—while Washington had the effrontery to impose sanctions on a bamboozled ally because of its well-known efforts to secure a nuclear weapon. But Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan have deep roots. As Husain Haqqani, Rizwan Hussain, and I have shown, Islamabad inherited the British conception of Afghanistan as a buffer state with Russia. From the point of view of the security managers of a newly minted Pakistan, Pakistan inherited the most turbulent threat frontier with a fraction of the British Raj’s resources. Afghanistan made early fateful decisions that would lock the country in an unwinnable security competition with Pakistan. Afghanistan initially attempted to block Pakistan’s bid to join the United Nations. Beginning in September 1950, Afghanistan began military incursions into Pakistan’s tribal agencies and Baluchistan province. Afghanistan’s efforts to antagonize its much stronger neighbor continued well into the 1970s. Pakistan, seeking to influence its obstinate western neighbor, began supporting the growth of the reformist Islamist organization Jamaat-e-Islami in Afghanistan, where it originally had little support. This development was propitious. The majority of the so-called mujahideen groups that would eventually be mobilized by Pakistan were rooted in Jamaat-e-Islami. After Mohammed Daoud Khan came to power in Afghanistan in 1973 and established a one-party republic that embarked on an aggressive top-down social reform program and purged Islamists and communists alike, Pakistan saw an opportunity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took the helm of a vivisected Pakistan, which lost half of its population when Bangladesh gained independence in a 1971 war. Bhutto resolved to lose nothing else. In August 1973, Bhutto set up the Afghan working group within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Despite a brief interregnum, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq continued with this policy after he ousted Bhutto in a July 1977 coup. Fifty or so Afghan resistance groups were consolidated by the ISI into a smaller, more manageable number. The ISI was tasked with deepening the links between Pakistani and Afghan Islamist groups. These efforts resulted in seven major Sunni Afghan Islamist militant groups, as well as several Shiite groups. By the time the Soviets had crossed the Amu Darya river into Afghanistan, Zia-ul-Haq’s army and the ISI had already created the key Islamist groups that would become the cornerstone of the so-called anti-Soviet jihad. As I wrote recently in Foreign Policy, that involvement continues today. The ISI nurtured, created, and supported the Taliban in their first incarnation; it returned to doing the same after the Taliban regime’s fall in late 2001. Pakistan has deployed its spin doctors to claim otherwise—using the same old strategy. Pakistan opines that it is the real victim of terrorism, that it is being unjustly maligned, and that if the West wants to fight terrorism, it needs to give Pakistan more money—and ignore its wrongdoings, which include sponsoring numerous Islamist terrorist groups as well as vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Ordinary Pakistanis are, indeed, the victims of terrorist monsters—monsters bred and trained by the military-intelligence establishment. As then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a gathering of Pakistanis in 2011, “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.” Yet Islamabad continues to do so—and to offer its snake-catching expertise when they escape. Pakistan’s ability to convince Americans of its signal importance might seem baffling—but it represents a sophisticated and strategic diplomatic approach. First and foremost, Pakistan exploits information asymmetries. As Teresita and Howard Schaffer wrote in 2011, the United States is one of the most important portfolios for diplomatic, political, and military officials. They are required to know their briefs and recite them convincingly. Most often their American counterparts lack the most rudimentary knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations and tend to be persuaded by the narratives on offer. Even intelligence officials will have little operational familiarity with Pakistan, in part because substantive international contacts and travel pose problems for obtaining clearances. The easiest hires are young graduates with little international experience. Islamabad understands the value of congressional delegations in shaping policymakers’ opinions. Unlike protocol-bound India, Pakistan dispenses with all diplomatic protocol on these occasions. Delegates meet the army chief, the ISI chief, and the prime minister, and they are often treated to military tourism opportunities. In addition to having lavish budgets for legal lobbyists, Pakistan also has a history of cultivating shadowy figures who launder Islamabad’s dirty laundry and promote its pet projects to American policymakers and opinion-makers. It discourages criticism by denying visas, restricting access, or outright threatening violence to those who dare expose the dark side of Pakistan’s deep state. Conversely, Pakistan incentivizes apologists: It offers free trips where beneficiaries are treated to the famous Pakistani hospitality, which includes private meetings with important Pakistanis across the civilian and military spectrums, helicopter rides to places ordinarily forbidden to foreigners, and a cultivated practice of appearing open and affable. Such access is critical for people working in think tanks who eat from the grants they secure, which require such access to Pakistan’s corridors of power. The combination of these various measures results in a silenced coterie of critics and a sprawling ecosystem of those who happily promote Pakistan’s narratives in exchange for access. With the U.S. Embassy in Kabul shuttered, the United States is very likely to do what it usually does: go back to the arsonist and sustain the pretense that it is in fact the fire brigade. The United States will likely find itself more dependent on Pakistan as it seeks a foothold to retain intelligence cooperation and likely drone basing for targeting the terrorist refuges in Pakistan, even while Pakistan continues to cultivate the same refuges. As in the past, whether it was the use of Pakistan territory for U-2 flights or for drones, Pakistan and the United States will likely establish yet another pay-to-play scheme. Pakistan will continue to provide the minimal results to justify the expenditures to a U.S. Congress that is always wary of Pakistan but not enough to do anything meaningful to curtail its myriad outrages. In the meantime, Pakistan’s militant assets cultivated for action in India will benefit enormously from the terrorist safe havens protected by the Taliban-led house of horrors that is the Afghan government. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/10/pakistan-us-relations-taliban-afghanistan-arsonist/
#Pakistan - Only #PPP can give Waseb Province- Chairman PPP Bilawal Bhutto Zardari
https://www.ppp.org.pk/pr/25477/
Thursday, September 9, 2021
OPINION: God Has No Place in Supreme Court Opinions
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
One hundred fifty years ago, a woman named Myra Bradwell brought a Supreme Court case claiming a constitutional right to be admitted to the Illinois bar. She had passed the state’s bar exam with high honors, but the Illinois Supreme Court refused her application, saying that when the State Legislature gave the court the power to grant law licenses, “it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege would be extended to women.”
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state court, with Justice Joseph Bradley writing in a concurring opinion that “the paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”
“This,” Justice Bradley explained, “is the law of the Creator.”
The case of Bradwell v. Illinois is regarded today as a low point in Supreme Court history, at least by those of us who reject the notion of God as the ultimate personnel administrator. But it turns out that God has a role in the country’s civic life after all: that of supreme legislator.
Republican politicians used to offer secular rationales for their anti-abortion zealotry: They claimed that abortion hurt women or that abortion procedures demeaned the medical profession. In the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic, some opportunistic states imposed temporary bans on abortion, making the demonstrably false assertion that abortion patients would take up scarce hospital beds.
But now, sensing the wind at their backs and the Supreme Court on their side, Republican officeholders are no longer coy about their religion-driven mission to stop abortion. In May, when Gov. Greg Abbott of Texas signed S.B. 8, the vigilante bill that bans abortion after six weeks of pregnancy, he claimed that “our creator endowed us with the right to life, and yet millions of children lose their right to life every year because of abortion. In Texas we work to save those lives.” (There are actually fewer than one million abortions a year in the United States, but let’s not get picky with the facts.)
Two years earlier, signing a bill that criminalized nearly all abortions in Alabama, Gov. Kay Ivey called the measure a “testament to Alabamians’ deeply held belief that every life is precious and that every life is a sacred gift from God.”And this year, a Republican state senator in Arkansas, Jason Rapert, declared in explaining his sponsorship of a bill to ban nearly all abortions that “there’s six things God hates, and one of those is people who shed innocent blood,” as if it were self-evident that he was referring to abortion rather than to the “stand your ground” bill that he co-sponsored.I could go on with this list, but these examples are sufficient to raise the question for those of us not on board with the theocratizing of America: Who let God into the legislative chamber?
The answer is that we did. Our silence has turned us into enablers of those who are now foisting their religious beliefs on a country founded on opposition to an established church.
The Supreme Court has come in for plenty of well-deserved criticism for last week’s midnight maneuver allowing Texas to enforce its new abortion law. The fact that the four of the court’s six Roman Catholic justices and a fifth who was raised Catholic but is now Episcopalian, all conservative, allowed a blatantly unconstitutional law to remain in place pending appeal has barely been noted publicly. (Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who are also Catholic, joined with two other justices in dissent.)
The five who voted for Texas (and the chief justice) were placed on the court by Republican presidents who ran on a party platform that called for the appointment of judges who would overturn Roe v. Wade. Those presidents may well have calculated that the religious background of their nominees would incline them to oppose abortion, sparing those presidents from asking a direct question that their nominees would be bound not to answer.
When Amy Coney Barrett was a law professor at Notre Dame, the university’s Faculty for Life, of which she was a member, unanimously denounced the university’s decision to honor then-Vice President Joe Biden, a Catholic, with an award recognizing “outstanding service to church and society.” The faculty group’s specific objection was to his support for the right to abortion. “Saying that Mr. Biden rejects church teaching could make it sound like he is merely disobeying the rules of his religious group,” the Faculty for Life’s resolution stated. “But the church’s teaching about the sanctity of life is true.”
Justice Barrett’s personal religious views are, of course, her personal business, but her support of this aggressive public intervention into a matter of public concern was fair game for questions, or should have been. It remained, however, far under the radar during the unseemly sprint to her Supreme Court confirmation.
Religion is American society’s last taboo. We can talk about sexual identity, gender nonconformity, all manner of topics once considered too intimate for open discussion. But we have yet to find deft and effective ways to question the role of religion in a public official’s political or judicial agenda without opening ourselves to accusations of being anti-religious.
The Mississippi abortion case the Supreme Court will hear this fall (the date has not been set) has attracted nearly 80 briefs in support of the state’s defense of its ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy and its request that the justices overturn Roe v. Wade. Well over half of the briefs are from organizations and individuals with overtly religious identities. Many of the remainder have more subtle affiliations with the religious right.
That shouldn’t be surprising. What reason other than religious doctrine is there, really, for turning back the clock on a decision that nearly a half-century ago freed women from the choice between the terror of the back alley and the tyranny of enforced motherhood? About one-third of Americans, according to a recent Gallup poll, want the court to overturn Roe. And yet, as we saw last week, the right to abortion is already functionally dead in Texas, and its fate may soon be left to the whims of Republican politicians everywhere else. It’s incumbent on the rest of us to call out those who invoke God as their legislative drafting partner.
The major step that Mexico’s Supreme Court took this week toward decriminalizing abortion in that country, which is predominantly Catholic, raises the head-snapping prospect of Texas women traveling across the border for legal abortions, as many did for illegal ones in the years before Roe v. Wade. The bishops denounced the court’s unanimous ruling, of course, but antipathy toward the church’s power over civic affairs is part of Mexico’s DNA.
In this country, the clash between church and state over abortion is an old story. Thirty-seven years ago, one of the country’s most prominent Catholic public officials, Gov. Mario Cuomo of New York, was caught up in a debate with the church over his support for using public money to pay for abortions for poor women. The Supreme Court had recently upheld the Hyde Amendment, which cut off federal Medicaid funding for that purpose. But states remained free to spend their own money, and New York had chosen to do so. On Sept. 13, 1984, Mr. Cuomo addressed the controversy, defending the state’s policy in a speech at Notre Dame that he titled “Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective.”
While he accepted the church’s teaching on abortion as a matter of personal belief, he said, “there is no church teaching that mandates the best political course for making our belief everyone’s rule.”
He went on:
The hard truth is that abortion isn’t a failure of government. No agency or department of government forces women to have abortions, but abortion goes on. Catholics, the statistics show, support the right to abortion in equal proportion to the rest of the population. Despite the teaching in our homes and schools and pulpits, despite the sermons and pleadings of parents and priests and prelates, despite all the effort at defining our opposition to the sin of abortion, collectively we Catholics apparently believe — and perhaps act — little differently from those who don’t share our commitment. Are we asking government to make criminal what we believe to be sinful because we ourselves can’t stop committing the sin?
(What was true in 1984 remains true; Catholic women obtain nearly one-quarter of U.S. abortions, roughly proportional to their representation in the population.)
“Persuading, not coercing” had to be the goal “in our unique pluralistic democracy,” the governor said. “And we can do it even as politicians.”
It was a remarkable performance, reminiscent of John F. Kennedy’s speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association during the 1960 presidential campaign, in which he sought to reassure skeptical Protestant clergy members about his candidacy. “I am not the Catholic candidate for president,” he told the ministers. “I am the Democratic Party’s candidate for president who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters — and the church does not speak for me.”
A generation separated the Kennedy and Cuomo speeches, and a generation or more has passed since Mr. Cuomo’s declaration of independence at the University of Notre Dame. As the country lurches toward theocracy, we need voices like those more than ever.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/opinion/abortion-supreme-court-religion.html
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