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#Pakistan - Exiting #Afghanistan


Zahid Hussain
IT may not be a Saigon moment for the American forces, yet an imminent deal with the Taliban clearing the way for gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan is no less ignominious for Washington. It may not be a document of surrender, but neither is it a declaration of victory for the most powerful military power on earth.
After fighting for nearly 18 years, the Americans seem desperate to end an unwinnable war in a region often described as the “graveyard of empires”. Even if the United States believes it has not lost the war, it has not won it either. But will the accord between the US and the Taliban bring peace to a country devastated and fragmented by four decades of conflict?
In what could be termed a remarkable twist of irony, US officials sat for more than one year across the table to negotiate peace with the very insurgent leaders who the US had once declared terrorists and sought to annihilate. The presence in the negotiations of Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s second in command who was incarcerated for nine years by the Pakistani government at the behest of the US, made the agreement possible. Among the Taliban’s negotiating team were also four former inmates of Guantanamo. The travel ban on them has just been lifted.Unsurprisingly, the Taliban see the agreement on withdrawal of foreign forces, which has been its main demand, as a victory. Although still to be approved by the Kabul government, the agreement would see 5,000 US troops leave the country within five months. The time frame for the withdrawal of the remainder of foreign troops would depend on security guarantees by the Taliban, including a pledge that the country will not become a safe haven for terror groups. According to one report, the troop withdrawal could be completed in 16 months, provided the Taliban stick to their promise.
It is still unclear what kind of political setup the Taliban would be willing to work within.
Kabul’s consent to the agreement could open a path for direct negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan officials over the country’s political future. But that would be the most difficult part of the Afghan peace process. The Ghani government was completely sidelined while the Americans directly negotiated with the Taliban. There is no word from the Taliban leadership as yet that they would be willing to talk to the Kabul government now about the future political setup.
For many Afghans the prospect of the return of Taliban rule, however exaggerated the fear may be, is disconcerting. To alleviate the concerns, chief US negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad has assured the Afghan leaders, that as part of the agreement, the US would reserve the right to assist Afghan forces should they be attacked by the Taliban.
Intriguingly, the Taliban have yet to define their political agenda, adding to a sense of confusion. There has been some indication that the conservative Islamist movement would be willing to work within a pluralistic political system. Yet there is no clarity whether the group would take part in the elections.In their interaction with various Afghan factions and delegations, the Taliban leaders have held out assurances that they recognise women’s rights and would not oppose female education, but that has not helped remove the concerns about the Taliban returning to their old ways after the withdrawal of foreign forces.Surely the Taliban political leadership appears more moderate and flexible in their views. But it is not clear whether the commanders leading the fighting would also be amenable to change. There is also the question about the modalities of the Taliban’s participation in Afghanistan’s future political power structure.It will also be important to see the Taliban’s position on the coming presidential election later this month. The campaign has remained lukewarm, as most candidates believe the polls could be delayed because of peace negotiations. It seems improbable that the Taliban would participate in the election even after an agreement.
The situation has become more complex with the Taliban having extended their control and influence over a large part of the country. Moreover, they have never ceased fighting while negotiating with the Americans.
Hours after Mr Khalilzad briefed the Afghan government on the agreement, the Taliban carried out a devastating suicide bomb attack in a high-security zone that is home to several international organisations in Kabul, killing more than a dozen people.
Meanwhile, the advance of the Taliban forces in various Afghan provinces has also intensified. The insurgents have launched assaults on two northern Afghan cities in two days, which seemed a clear attempt to increase their leverage at the negotiating table. More alarming is the escalation in terrorist attacks by the militant Islamic State group whereby it is sending a clear message that it could play the spoiler in any peace agreement. Last month the terrorist group that has a significant presence in parts of Afghanistan carried out a suicide bomb attack on a wedding celebration in Kabul, killing more than 60 people.
It was among the most horrific attacks in Afghanistan claimed by the group since it first established a foothold in the eastern part of the country. American officials are hopeful that the level of violence could be brought down after the agreement is concluded.The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan will also have a huge impact on regional geopolitics. The country’s strategic location has historically made it vulnerable to the involvement of outside powers and proxy battles.There is still a long way to go before peace can return to the war-torn country. Decades of conflict that have exacted a severe toll on the lives of millions of Afghans and wrought destruction cannot be ended easily even if the two sides reach an agreement. Complete withdrawal of foreign troops may have its own complications. The long war has left the country more divided. With their battlefield victories and expanding territorial control, the insurgents have certainly gained the upper hand as the Afghan endgame draws nearer.

Pakistan: JuD Another Eyewash – Analysis

By Sanchita Bhattacharya
On August 27, 2019, the Lahore High Court reportedly issued notices to the parties concerned on a petition seeking to quash the First Information Reports (FIRs) against Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) ‘chief’ and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and 65 others. The Court sought replies in the matter from the Federal Government, Punjab Government and the regional headquarters of the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) within two weeks.
Significantly, Malik Zafar Iqbal, Secretary, Al-Infal Trust (a subsidiary of JuD), contended in his petition that there were 23 FIRs registered at different Police Stations against Hafiz Saeed and others, under false charges. He claimed that the impugned FIRs described the petitioner as the head of LeT, which, Iqbal asserted, was both factually and legally incorrect. The petition sought the quashing of all the FIRs.
On July 3, 2019, CTD had registered 23 FIRs against JuD leaders, including Saeed, on charges of terror financing, in different cities of the Punjab Province, specifically, Lahore, Gujranwala and Multan. The FIRs contained allegations of collection of funds for terrorism financing through assets/properties made and held in the names of Trusts/Non-Profit Organisations (NPO) including Al-Anfaal Trust, Dawatul Irshad Trust, and Muaz Bin Jabal Education Trust.
Saeed was arrested on July 17, 2019, by the Counter-Terrorism Police in Gujranwala, Punjab, under charges of terror financing. On August 7, 2019, the CTD of Punjab Police declared Saeed “guilty of terror financing” in the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) in the Gujranwala District of the Punjab Province. Presently, Saeed is being kept at Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat prison amid high security.  May 15, 2019, reports indicate that the Pakistani Government had also arrested JuD’s ‘second-in-command’ or ‘Naib Emir’, Abdul Rehman Makki, Saeed’s brother-in-law, on charges of making an extremist public speech and terror financing.
Nevertheless, given Pakistan’s past record, Saeed is likely to be freed soon.
According to various media reports, Saeed has, so far, been ‘arrested’ nine times (including the latest occasion) and released thereafter. He was last arrested on January 30, 2017. However, predictably, the Judicial Review Board of Pakistan’s Punjab province ordered his release on November 22, 2017, on the grounds that “the government was not able to present any evidence to justify [Saeed’s] continued detention.” There is little reason to believe that the Government will abruptly present any decisive evidence to the courts this time around.
Meanwhile, JuD was banned on March 7, 2019, along with seven of its affiliated groups. The organisations which were proscribed included Al-Anfaal Trust, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalaq, Al-Dawat ul Irshad, Mosques & Welfare Trust, Al-Medina Foundation, Muaz Bin Jabal Education Trust and Al-Hamad Trust. All these groups are Lahore-based. Apart from these, the Lahore-based Al-Fazal Foundation/Trust and Al-Easar Foundation were also banned for having links with the Falah-i-Insaliyat Foundation (FIF), another JuD front. The FIF, like JuD, had also been banned in March 2019 by the Pakistan Government.
The Government also ‘took control’ of JuD and FIF properties, including seminaries and mosques across the country. According to the Punjab Police, as reported on March 7, 2019, the Government seized control of 160 seminaries, 32 schools, two colleges, four hospitals, 178 ambulances and 153 dispensaries associated with JuD and FIF in Punjab. The Punjab Home Department later disclosed that the seized properties, spread across 36 Districts of the Province, were ‘taken over’ by the respective district administrations. The district administrators took control of the management and operational conduct of the properties. There was, however, no report of any change of staff in the establishments and they continued to be run by the same people who were running them previously, indicating that the takeover was a sham. Indeed, it was further clarified that the administrators’ role would only be that of a ‘supervisor’.
Significantly, Saeed was asked to keep a low profile at his Jauhar Town residence in Lahore and was barred from entering the JuD headquarters in the Markaz-e-Taiba complex in Muridke and Jamia Al Qadsia in Lahore.
The ban and the subsequent action, however, had no major impact on JuD’s functioning. Notably, soon after the ban, JuD joined hands with other groups to carry out terrorist activities on its behalf. According to an August 12, 2019, report, intelligence inputs suggested that JuD was using fringe groups for terror financing and money laundering. JuD has also been misleading the United States and global anti-terror watchdogs by using Jihadi ‘tanzeems’ (organisations) who are not on the banned list to carry out its terror-related operations.
This is not the first time that the JuD has collaborated with other groups. In the year 2011, more than 40 Islamist and right-wing parties and groups in Pakistan joined together to establish the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) or the Defense of Pakistan Council, led by the JuD, including the Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), the new name of the sectarian terror outfit Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The presence of JuD and the ASWJ in the DPC, where most of the other parties and groups were those who openly participated in national politics, was worrisome as it signified the radicalisation of Pakistani Civil Society. Indeed, the DPC openly held several anti-Shia, anti-Barelvi, anti-Ahmadi, anti-Christian public rallies in various cities of Pakistan, including, Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Multan, to promote Islamist extremism. In one such incident, as reported in February 2012, the DPC vehemently campaigned against a mosque in Rawalpindi run by the Ahmadiyya community.
Overtly, JuD acts as a socio-religious, cultural, spiritual and educational force, but underpins its armed wing, LeT. JuD’s funding sources include charities, state sponsorship, and businesses. Funds are transferred from various sources through banks, use of hawala (illegal money transactions) and by couriers. Funds are used for dawa (preaching), khidmat-e-khalq (provision of social services), and jihad, including recruitment, training, and procurement of equipment and weapons. JuD has also used social media to collect funds. According to officials, JuD’s network includes 300 seminaries and schools, hospitals, a publishing house and an ambulance service. JuD and FIF have about 50,000 volunteers and hundreds of paid workers.
Actions against externally directed terror formations in Pakistan, including the JuD led by Saeed, have long been a mere eye wash, intended to safeguard Pakistan from punitive action by international agencies and the West. In the immediate context, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), during its meeting on June 16-21, 2019, retained Pakistan, as expected, on its ‘grey list’, along with seven other countries. A FATF spokesman categorically stated, “The FATF has decided to continue to keep Pakistan on its compliance document (i.e. Grey List) for the ICRG [International Co-operation Review Group] monitoring…” Pakistan has been on the FATF grey list for the second time since June 2018. Pakistan was first put on the grey list in 2012 and remained there for three years.
More recently, on August 23, 2019, FATF’s Asia-Pacific Group (APG) placed Pakistan on its Blacklist for its failure in meeting required global standards and its failure to combat terrorism and money laundering. Pakistan was put in the Enhanced Blacklist because the country was non-compliant in 32 of the 40 compliance associated elements of the FATF and ranked low in 10 of the 11 Effectiveness Parameters. FATF’s 40 recommendations are related to money laundering, terrorist financing, targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing, financial intelligence units, etc.
Pakistan is now under pressure to avoid its entry into the FATF Blacklist in October 2019, when FATF will hold its Plenary meeting in Paris to decide on Pakistan’s status. This final FATF meeting is crucial, as it would be decided either to exclude Pakistan from the grey list, keep it there, or put the country into the blacklist.
If Pakistan lands on the list, which indicates that the country concerned is “non-cooperative” in the global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the FATF members could, as an ultimate recourse, even agree to restrict, target or prohibit financial transactions with Islamabad. This would not only negatively impact foreign investor sentiment but also lead to a downgrading of the country by multilateral lenders like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU). This would have grave consequences for Pakistan’s financial sector and its economy, which are already reeling under severe stress, with foreign investment dwindling, and funding avenues to keep the country afloat drying up. Pakistan is expected to grow at less than 3 per cent in both 2019 and 2020, according to the IMF. As of March 2019, the country’s outstanding debt was more than USD 85 billion. It has taken loans from a very large number of countries, the largest creditor being China.
In his recent visit to the US, in the month of July, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan admitted that about 30,000 to 40,000 “armed people”, who fought in Afghanistan or Kashmir, were in Pakistan. He also stated, “There were 40 different militant groups operating within Pakistan…” Reiterating Pakistan’s ‘commitment’ to fight terrorism, he said, “There was a watershed in Pakistani politics. In 2014, the Pakistani Taliban slaughtered 150 school children at Army Public School (in Peshawar). All the political parties signed the National Action Plan and we all decided after that, that we will not allow any militant groups to operate inside Pakistan.”
Khan’s formulation “we will not allow any militant groups to operate inside Pakistan”, is crucial. Islamabad has no doubt gone after domestic terror formations operating within the country, but has studiously protected groups operating from Pakistani soil and targeting other countries, particularly Afghanistan and India. Terrorist formations such as the JuD-LeT complex and its affiliates, Jaish-e-Muhammad, the various groupings operating under the United Jihad Council, and of course, the Taliban and Haqqani Network, continue to flourish in Pakistan, under state protection and patronage. Despite Pakistan mounting internal difficulties and looming economic catastrophe that would follow a FATF blacklisting, Islamabad remains a minimal satisfier, going through the formal motions of some elements of compliance, even as its favoured terrorist formations continue to operate with impunity.

Premier of Pakistan Imran Khan telling lies about situation of minorities in Pakistan. Part1; By Nazir S Bhatti



After revoking Article 370 by India of Kashmir, Pakistan is put on fire by Imran Khan and Pakistan Army with statements of violation of minority rights in India and praising what Pakistan provides to minorities in Pakistan. We need to analysis situation of minorities in Islamic Republic of Pakistan?

Firstly, Pakistani lawmakers targeted minorities by adopting 11th Amendment in constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1937, when Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadi and other religious communities in Pakistan we declared Non-Muslim; It was first step to scratch religious identities of Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis and others that there must be two categories of humans to be known as Muslims and Non-Muslims. This was sure to decrease share of resources of state amongst its citizens.

Secondly, This amendment in constitution bared representation of religious minorities in parliament and Muslim majority law makers were provided with a chance to nominate minority members in parliament of their choice after receiving big amount of bribes which were called party donations after revoking Separate Election System which enabled Christians to vote a Christian representative in Parliament, Hindu voters to Hindu candidates on reserved seats of parliament for minorities.

The Minority Community felt unsafe after 4th Amendment in Constitution when Ahmadi Muslims were declared Non-Muslims and other religious communities after decades met with same fate to face challenges of under title of Non-Muslims.

Lets, discuss what were issues of religious minorities after formation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1973, when constitution was declared Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan? Why the Muslim majority felt need to adopt a constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan?  

http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/editorial-details/140

Pakistan Sikh girl not yet reunited with her family

A video of the girl's family had gone viral on social media in which one of her family members had alleged that a group of men attacked their house and she was abducted and forcibly converted to Islam.

The alleged abduction and conversion of a Sikh girl and her marriage to a Muslim man in Pakistan has taken a new twist with a top official of the Sikh community organisation clarifying on Friday that she is yet to be reunited with her family.
The Secretary General of Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Parbhandhik Committee's (PSGPC) Ameer Singh told PTI that Jagjit Kaur is in Lahore's Darul Amaan (shelter home) and she has not been sent back to her parents' home as yet.
"We don't know who posted this tweet and who is running it," he said, referring to a post on the PSGPC 's official Twitter handle that Kaur has returned home .
"I am the Secretary General of the PSGPC and we have not issued any such statement on Twitter," Singh said.
Kaur was allegedly abducted by Mohammad Hasaan of her locality in Nankana Sahib, some 80kms from Lahore, last week and married her.
A video of the girl's family had gone viral on social media in which one of her family members had alleged that a group of men attacked their house and she was abducted and forcibly converted to Islam, triggering concerns in Pakistan as well as in India.
India said it has raised with Pakistan the issue of her abduction and forced conversion to Islam and sought for "immediate remedial action".
In response to a media query regarding the incident last week, the ministry has received a number of representations from various quarters of civil society in India, including Sikh religious bodies regarding the case.
"We have shared these concerns with the government of Pakistan and asked for immediate remedial action," Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said in New Delhi.
Meanwhile, there are reports that Hasaan has divorced Kaur, thus paving the way for her return to her home.
But a source in the Governor's House told PTI that as Hassan's family was under extreme pressure from police and the government officials he divorced Kaur so that she could be sent back to her parents.
"Police had taken 10 or so relatives and friends into custody to put pressure on Hassan to divorce her... and finally Hassan gave into pressure," the source said.
Nadeem Sarwar, a counsel for Hassan, told PTI that there has been "extreme pressure" on his client to divorce Kaur but he is still resisting.
"Kaur on the other hand has not yet filed an application in the court to express her wish to go back to her parents' house," Sarwar said.
Punjab Governor Chaudhry Sarwar who has engaged both families claimed that the matter has been resolved amicably. The government is facing strong reaction from the Sikh community that is not ready to accept this marriage.
"Ahead of opening of Kartarpur corridor in connection with 550 birth anniversary of Baba Guru Nanak, the Pakistani government cannot afford annoyance of local Sikhs over this issue that created tension among the Sikhs and Muslims in Nankana Sahib," the official said.
On Monday, police did not present Kaur before a special judicial magistrate citing security reasons. On this, the magistrate adjourned the proceedings and directed the police to produce her after September 10.
According to sources, there were intelligence reports that the girl might be hurt during the court appearance by her relatives.
The Lahore High Court on Monday granted protective bail to the suspect, Hassaan till September 7 with direction to approach the relevant court in district Nankana Sahib for the relief of pre-arrest bail.
Hassan's counsel told the Lahore High Court that the FIR against him and others was lodged by the girl's family under pressure as she contracted marriage with him (Hassan) with her own free will.
"Kaur embraced Islam without any coercion and was given Muslim name Ayesha before nikhah (marriage) of the couple was solemnized. She has already recorded her statement before a judicial magistrate concerned denying the charges of abduction and forced conversion to Islam," he said.
An FIR was filed with the Nankana Police Station on Thursday last against six people for abducting and forcibly converting Kaur, daughter of a Sikh (Granthi) priest to Islam. The police arrested Arsalan, a friend of Hassan.
Earlier, Governor Sarwar met with Kaur at the shelter home and tried to persuade her to return her parents’ home but she declined. She told the governor that she loved Hassan and married him with her own free will. She said she feared for her life if she returned to her parents’ home.