Friday, June 28, 2019
Why Pakistan's economy is sinking
By Taha Siddiqui
Pakistan's new budget will not fix the country's economic woes. Here is why.
The Pakistani government unveiled its first annual budget for the fiscal year 2019-2020 on June 11 and was only able to pass it on June 28. The considerable delay was due to strong resistance from the opposition in parliament which threatened with protests over perceived economic mismanagement by the government.
The economic situation in Pakistan today is indeed worrying. This year's Pakistan Economic Survey, a government-issued report that precedes the annual budget presentation, has painted a dismal picture of the domestic economy.
Almost all financial indicators have seen a downward trend. The growth rate fell by almost 50 percent from 6.2 percent to 3.3 percent. It is expected to go down even further to 2.4 percent next year, which will be the country's lowest in the past 10 years. The Pakistani rupee has lost a fifth of its value against the dollar since the beginning of this fiscal year. Inflation is expected to hover around 13 percent over the next 12 months, reaching a 10-year-high as well.
Then there is the issue of the ever-increasing debt, which eats up some 30 percent of the budget every year. Pakistan continues to take out loans to be able to cover repayments of past borrowing. It recently signed yet another deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout package worth $6bn.
In a televised address after his budget presentation, Prime Minister Imran Khan announced the creation of a special commission to investigate why the country has so much debt.
But Khan does not need to look any further than the budget unveiled by his own government to see where the problem lies: The country has low sources of revenues and high non-development expenditures, which is a recipe for a financial disaster.
For decades, the Pakistani authorities have been unable to establish effective tax collection practices. Currently, only one percent of Pakistanis pay their taxes and the country has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world.
Successive governments have avoided imposing stricter controls because they have been staffed by members of the same elites that are actively evading taxes. They are able to do so not only because of government inaction but also because of widespread corruption. In fact, it is cheaper for them to bribe than to pay their dues.
Thus, the tax burden in Pakistan falls overwhelmingly on the poor who pay in various indirect ways and who already struggle to make ends meet. Currently, a third of the nation is living below the poverty line.
Khan promised to crack down on tax evasion and corruption before coming to power but little has been done so far. He has not introduced any measures to address corruption in the ranks of his own party, for example. Recently it emerged that a minister in Khan's cabinet had evaded paying taxes for years by transferring his luxury properties to one of his employees, but no action has been taken against him so far.
Given this selective justice, it is hardly surprising that a recent tax amnesty scheme implemented by the government in which tax debt is forgiven in exchange for a fee failedto kick off.
While Khan's government is failing to raise revenue flows it is also failing to cut non-developmental expenditures.
The biggest source of such spending after debt-servicing is the military which officially receives around 18 and 23 percent of the budget every year.
The funds the military receives from the state budget is in addition to the revenue it gets from its large business operations, which include over 50 commercial entities generating some $1.5bn annually. It just recently moved into the mining and oil and gas exploration sector, some of which was facilitated by Khan's government.
So despite being rich itself, the army continues to be a burden on the Pakistani economy and to get preferential treatment. At this point, there are no signs that this would change under the current government.
Earlier this month, Khan announced the formation of a new committee called the National Development Council to oversee Pakistan's economic growth strategy. Apart from a number of ministers with relevant portfolios and key government officials, the army chief is also a member of the council, which indicates that the military will continue to be part of any decision-making on the economy in the future.
A few days before the annual budget was submitted to parliament, Khan also announcedthat the military was going to take a voluntary budget cut, attributing it specifically to the economic turmoil. However, when the details of the budget were made public, it turned out that the allocation to the army saw an increase of 17.6 percent from last year. As a result, some have speculated that the earlier announcement was just a PR exercise, aimed to fool Pakistan's international creditors, like the IMF, who have urged the government to cut down its non-development expenditures.
Despite this persistent pressure from outside entities, defence spending continues to be prioritised. The official justification for this policy is always the perceived threat from neighbouring countries, which in some ways the military itself perpetuates.
Both Afghanistan and India are regularly identified as sources of threat to the national security in local mainstream media, yet the fact that militant groups targeting these two countries are allowed to organise on Pakistani territory is often overlooked.
Their presence maintains low-intensity conflicts with neighbouring countries, which conveniently justifies increased military spending to protect Pakistan from "foreign enemies".
Thus Pakistan appears to be stuck in a vicious cycle of accommodating the interests of the army and the powerful economic elites which cripple its economy and force it to continue borrowing from international creditors, sinking further into debt and inching closer to full economic collapse.
At this point, those in power and those who enjoy economic privileges must realise that this status quo is unsustainable. The only way out is to implement a just tax system along with a cut or at least a freeze on the ever-increasing military budget.
If Pakistan is to avoid the looming economic disaster, it must revise current spending and prioritise expenditures that will actually generate social and economic development and uplift the poor, not just the civilian and military elites.
Thursday, June 27, 2019
Bangladesh's mainstream pupils more radical than Islamic school graduates
- Author Zobaer Ahmed
A police study has revealed that more than half of the country's radicalized students complete their education in general schools. Experts say the government needs to shift focus while targeting potential militants.
The Anti-terrorism Unit of Bangladesh's police published the report, called Preventing Terrorism and Extremism through Community Engagement, last week. The study used data collected from 3,000 suspects who were arrested between 2015 and 2017.
"The common idea is that only Madrassas produce militants, which is absolutely wrong. It is evident that only the Madrassa or Islamic education system cannot be blamed for militancy," Additional Deputy Inspector General (Intelligence) Mohammed Moniruzzaman told DW.
Education to blame?
Schooling in Bangladesh is divided into three chief systems. The general, or mainstream education system treats all religions equally and the curriculum is controlled by the government. Madrassas focus on Islamic education for their students and English-medium schools offer all subjects in the English language. There are around 100,000 primary schools in Bangladesh that follow the general system.
Data from the police study revealed that 56% of Islamic radicals had been educated in the general system, while 22% each came from English-medium and Madrassa schools, although the English system has only 200 schools compared to 20,000 madrassas.
Speaking to DW, Shantanu Majumder, professor at the University of Dhaka said that the education system alone was not to blame for the influencing students negatively.
"One can be exposed to such [radical] ideas sitting in any type of school, whereas I still believe that the government should not take its hands off of monitoring the books or syllabus that are studied in some religion-based schools," he told DW.
More internet, more radicals?
The survey also revealed that 80% of those arrested were radicalized through the Internet while 20% were swayed by their peers. Police officer Moniruzzaman said that students of Bengali and English-medium schools used the internet more often compared to Madrassa students.
He said it was possible that frequent access resulted in more radicalization, but other surveys have proved the contrary. For example, a survey by Move Foundation, a nonprofit organization based in Bangladesh, revealed that 75% of Madrassa students had access to the internet through their mobile phones and tablets. Their survey included 36 Madrassas across 12 districts of Bangladesh.
"On an average, students of Madrassas spend one and half hours on the internet every day," Saiful Haq, the head of the NGO told DW, adding, "Girls spend more time than the boys." However, school administrators could not prevent students from using the internet when they were at home.
"Many of them use mobile phones and computers at home. They can use the internet there," Mawlana Mahfuzul Haq, principal of the Jamia Rahmania Arabia Madrassa in the capital of Dhaka told DW. He also said that his institution regularly held teachings to dissuade students from joining radical groups. "With references from the holy Quran and Hadith we tell them that there is no relation between religion and terrorism," he said.
Shift in Focus
In the last few years, several terror attacks in Bangladesh, including at the Holey artisan bakery in Dhaka, the murders of bloggers and liberal thinkers have led the government of Bangladesh to adopt a "zero-tolerance approach" towards Islamic radicalization. Among other initiatives to prevent the youth from joining extremists, the police are increasingly monitoring educational institutions other than Madrassas.
"Especially after the Holey Artisan attack where students from private universities were involved, the common attitude of blaming Madrassas for spreading radicalization has changed drastically among people," the University of Dhaka's Shantanu Majumder told DW.
He thinks that government agencies have successfully countered terror acts, but there is a complex process through which radicalization occurs, and this has increased. On the other hand, cultural activities like theater, which create open attitudes and promote free thinking, have reduced.
Majumder feels that focusing on cultural movements could fight radicalization. "For that, we need to promote more cultural activities in schools, hostels and other places."
#Pakistani Opposition Unites Against Military’s Political Role
Most opposition political parties in Pakistan appear to be uniting in opposing the growing role of the country’s powerful military in shaping the country’s politics, governance, and economy.
A major meeting of leaders of the country’s main liberal, conservative, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist political parties this week agreed on a charter of demands, an agitation date, and a way forward that extensively targets the military’s involvement in Pakistan’s politics and its role in shaping major policies.
Jamiat Ulma-e Islam (JUI), an Islamist political party, hosted the June 26 meeting that included the top leaders of the conservative Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), the liberal Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and nearly half a dozen other parties. Together they present a formidable opposition to the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI), whose coalition government holds a thin parliamentary majority.
“This meeting has emphasized parliamentary, constitutional, and civilian rule in the country,” JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman told journalists late on June 26. “We will oppose every move aimed at weakening the parliamentary democracy in our country.”
Rehman said the opposition will unite in moving a no-confidence motion against Sadiq Sanjrani, the current chairman of the Senate or upper house of the Pakistani Parliament. He vowed to mark July 25 as a “black day” to protest what the opposition claims were rigged elections on the same day last year.
Former lawmaker Afrasiab Khattak says the opposition meeting is significant because it shows their resolve to reverse what they see as “political engineering” by the military.
He told the RFE/RL Gandhara website that most opposition leaders are convinced the PTI’s rise since 2011 and its victory in last year’s parliamentary election was orchestrated by the military, which now holds a commanding influence over the administration. The PTI denies being supported by the military, and a spokesman for the military has repeatedly denied meddling in politics.
Khattak says the election of Sanjrani, a political novice, to lead the Senate in March 2018 was part of a larger scheme to dominate the current political system by orchestrating the PTI’s victory. “Removing the chairman of the senate will be a logical first step toward the subsequent removal of the puppet government,” he said of the opposition’s strategy.
Beyond the country’s treacherous power politics, some of the opposition’s most pressing demands also directly address the military.
“We demand that laws should be framed to deal with the issue of forced disappearances,” Rehman said. “People being held by the security forces must be presented before courts of law. We need to also legislate against torture.”
For more than a decade now, Pakistani political parties and human rights organization have accused the security forces of being involved in forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and other grave abuses in conflict regions such as southwestern Balochistan Province and parts of northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
While the Pakistani military denies any involvement, these issues have prompted large-scale protests under the banner of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), a civil rights movement that emerged in February 2018.
The Pakistani military has accused the movement of colluding with the intelligence services of neighboring India and Afghanistan. But PTM leaders reject such accusations and say they are demanding rights and security for Pakistan’s largest ethnic minority, an estimated 35 million Pashtuns, through peaceful protests.
Months of tensions between the military and the PTM boiled over last month. On May 26, the military killed 13 PTM protesters at a check post in North Waziristan tribal district, according the movement’s members and witnesses. The military, however, said it only responded after protesters led by lawmakers Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir first opened fire.
The two PTM lawmakers are still in prison. Asad Qaisar, a PTI leader and speaker of the National Assembly or lower house of the Pakistani Parliament, has refrained from allowing them to participate in the ongoing budget session. Opposition leaders demanded that the two lawmakers must be allowed to participate in the parliament’s deliberations and called for the formation of a parliamentary committee to probe the May incident in Waziristan.
Rehman said that all leaders are united in opposing the military’s role in first-ever provincial elections in Waziristan and five other districts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which were merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa last year. “We reject the election commission’s recommendation of deploying army soldiers inside the polling stations during the upcoming elections in the erstwhile FATA,” he told journalists.
The opposition rejected the PTI’s proposed budget and ruled out new government initiatives to investigate alleged past corruption and grant the military a formal role in economic decision-making. It called for the freedom of press, which international watchdogs say is reeling from censorship imposed by the military.
Senior leaders of the ruling PTI, however, are not deterred by the opposition’s posturing.
“It is the job of the opposition to criticize and target us, while ours is to stop them,” Firdous Ashiq Awan, a special assistant to Prime Minister Imran Khan, told reporters. “There is not a single word in the [opposition] parties’ declaration against corruption,” she said, alluding to her party’s longstanding campaign that most Pakistan’s current problems stem from corruption by leaders of the PPP, PML-N, and other parties.
But opposition politicians are banking on rising resentment among Pakistan’s 207 million people amid rapid economic decline. The rupee, the Pakistani currency, dropped to another record low against the U.S. dollar this week. Since December 2017, the rupee has lost more than half its value. Runaway inflation, new taxes, and increasing utility prices are stoking widespread anger.
“We aim to relieve the masses of the crippling inflation created by the incompetent government that assumed power after a rigged election,” Rehman said.
'selected prime minister' - In Imran Khan’s Pakistan it’s not the economy, stupid. It is a dreaded word keeping PM awake
NAILA INAYAT
What was more or less an inside joke about Imran Khan being a 'selected prime minister' has now become a joke beyond borders.
Of all the things that Pakistan has banned in the past – from YouTube to Facebook – the latest is the most bizarre. This time, a word has become public enemy. And the word is ‘selected’.
Actually, it all began last August when Imran Khan came to power with his Naya Pakistan slogan.
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in the opening session of parliament cheekily called Imran Khan “prime minister select” while congratulating him for Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI) win. Bhutto was hinting at the possibility of the establishment helping Imran Khan win. Ironically, Khan had even thumped the desk then.
On Monday, almost a year later, a rather emotional deputy speaker Qasim Khan Suri banned using the phrase ‘selected prime minister’ for Imran Khan during the budget session. He said it was an insult to the entire parliament.
One would think that cricketer-turned-politician Khan sahib would want to wear that word on his sleeve, but his colleagues can now no longer utter it. So much for sportsmanship and some harmless sledging.
Joke to disaster
Opposition parties questioned the legitimacy of the ruling and termed it undemocratic, frivolous and a step towards censoring parliament.
Bilawal Bhutto said that it was because of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s “ego” that the word was banned.
Pakistanis – both in parliament and outside – have already found ways to bypass the ban.
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N)information secretary Marriyum Aurangzeb chose the word “handpicked” instead for the prime minister.
What was more or less an inside joke about Imran Khan being a “selected prime minister” has now become a joke beyond borders. The ban has reopened the debate of how he came to power rather than preserve Imran Khan’s image.
Or, is this a classic case of a guilty conscience?
The general elections of 2018 were widely criticised by the PPP and the PML-N. They accused the military of intimidating their political workers and engineering the election in Khan’s favour. Censorship of mainstream media didn’t give parties a level playing field either.
The umpire’s finger
‘Selected’ is not the only word Khan should get banned. His naysayers have often described his relationship with the military by calling him a “ladla” (favourite child), “ghost employee” or “nikkay da abba” (father of the young child). Back in the day, Khan himself had referred to the establishment as “umpire” and pre-empted how the umpire’s finger would go up against Nawaz Sharif.
To refer to the political manoeuvring by the military without getting into trouble, a creative set of terms was invented: “Farishtay” (angels), “khalai makhlooq” (aliens), “Selectors” or “mehkma-e-zarat” (Department of Agriculture).
To refer to the powerful men in uniform, terms such as “boys”, “boots” or “namaloom afrad” (unidentified people or known unknowns) are often used.
The etymology of mekhma-e-zarat is one of the most hilarious.
Rana Iqbal Siraj, a PML-N candidate from Punjab assembly in 2018, in a viral video, had alleged that he was tortured by the personnel of a secret agency over his refusal to return his ticket. Subsequently, a raid was conducted on his fertiliser godown. He later backtracked, apologising that he actually was not threatened by agencies, it was the mehkma-e-zarat (department of agriculture) that raided his facility. Since then the department of agriculture has become synonymous with security personnel.
What is keeping Imran Khan up?
Historically, many political terminologies have been used for opponents in Pakistan’s parliament. “Mr 10 per cent” for Asif Ali Zardari, “Maulana Diesel” for Fazalur Rehman, “Sheeda Talli” for Sheikh Rashid’s over the top demeanour or “Lotta” to define turncoats. Those at the receiving end have always taken these terms with a pinch of salt and never asked for bans. After all, puns and metaphors are all that keeps ‘engineered’ assemblies alive.
Marred with economic crisis, incompetent governance, lack of vision and inability to deliver on the promises made to his constituents, the first year of the Imran Khan-led government has not gone well and the pressure seems to be getting the better of the PM.
Otherwise, why would Khan bother with who calls him what, knowing how he in his opposition days had called prime ministers and presidents dacoits, liars, cheaters and even cursed the same parliament that he is now the leader of.
Selected is elected
So, is Imran Khan a selected prime minister? Absolutely.
According to the dictionary, an election is “the act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of persons, things, courses, or rights.”
Lahore High Court’s 2003 ruling on the subject follows the same theory. A selected prime minister is one who has been elected by parliament. Clearly, neither the speaker, the ruling PTI, nor the PM knows that.
Selected is elected. And Mr Prime Minister we all know what you think we didn’t know!
Bilawal meets President Ghani, shows well wishes for Afghan peace process
The PPP chairman welcomed President Ghani over his arrival in Pakistan.
Bilawal, Ghani discussed matters of mutual interests during the meeting. Bilawal expressed his well wishes for ongoing Afghan peace process.
The meeting was also attended by PPP’s senior leader Farhatullah Babar and Sherry Rehman.
Wednesday, June 26, 2019
#SaudiArabia - The Real Largest State Sponsor Of Terrorism
Adam Weinstein
Saudi Arabia—not Iran—is the biggest state sponsor of terrorism in the world today and Wahhabism remains the source of most radical Islamic extremism. For years Iran has borne the unenviable title of “world’s biggest state sponsor of terrorism.” However, out of the 61 groups that are designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department, the overwhelming majority are Wahhabi-inspired and Saudi-funded groups, with a focus on the West and Iran as their primary enemy. Only two are Shi’a—Hezbollah and Kataib Hezbollah, and only four have ever claimed to receive support from Iran. Nearly all of the Sunni militant groups listed receive significant support from either the Saudi government or Saudi citizens.
The Great Compromise
Wahhabism is an ideology of compromise between the ambitions of the zealot and the needs of the ruler. Wahhabism can be thought of as a religio-political subcategory of the Salafi approach to Islam. Salafis get their name from the al-salaf al-salih or “pious companions” of Muhammad whose practices they claim to imitate. What distinguishes Wahhabism from Salafism is that the former is dependent on the House of Saud for its power whereas the latter is a phenomenon that exists globally.
The 18th century partnership of tribal leader Ibn Saud and cleric Abd al-Wahhab wedded two parallel sources of legitimacy in Arabia—religion and tribal kinship. The clerics known as ulema received their authority from God and then conferred it upon the Saud clan themselves. In exchange the ulema are protected from the risks that come with governance. Wahhabis must be distinguished from jihadi Salafis because Wahhabism is inextricably linked to the Saudi state and therefore not revolutionary in nature. The Royal family walks a tightrope between the liberalization necessary for economic development and strong political ties with the West, and the more conservative demands of the Wahhabi movement. One such demand is to turn a blind eye to the sponsorship and export of terrorism and jihad in South Asia, the Middle East, and even the West.
Exporting Jihad And Buying Friends
Some contend that Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia are being used as scapegoats when in fact the real causes of Islamist terrorism are far more complex. Mohammed Alyahya made just this argument in his New York Times article “Don’t Blame ‘Wahhabism’ for Terrorism.” The crux of the argument is that “most Islamist militants have nothing to do with Saudi Wahhabism.” For example, he asserts that the Taliban are Deobandis which is “a revivalist, anti-imperialist strain of Islam that emerged as a reaction to British colonialism in South Asia” and al Qaeda “follow a radical current that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood.” While a nuanced understanding of the causes of terrorism is important, it must not lead policymakers to ignore an obvious source.
It is certainly true that not all Sunni extremist movements find their roots in Wahhabism. Al Qaeda was inspired by the anti-state Islamist literature of Muslim Brothers like Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. But organizations and movements evolve. The al Qaeda we know today is very much a product of the more extreme elements of the Wahhabi movement that is tolerated and promoted by Riyadh. However, it is Pakistan rather than the Arab world, which is the true ground zero of Saudi Arabia’s export of extremism. An invasive strain of Saudi-sponsored Salafism, often referred to as the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, has spread throughout Pakistan, all the while the fundamentalist Deobandi movement is increasingly supported by Gulf donors. According to a U.S. government cable, “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from ‘missionary’ and ‘Islamic charitable’ organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” This fusion of Salafism and Deobandism occurs at the expense of indigenous South Asian interpretations of Islam like the Sufi-oriented Barelvis.
The close relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan began as early as the administration of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. According to a recently available CIA report, in 1975, Bhutto “obtained assurances of generous aid from Saudi Arabia” during a state visit. In exchange for such support Pakistan “furnished military technicians and advisers to the armed forces of Saudi Arabia.” Other CIA documents reveal that during Zia ul-Haq’s military dictatorship, Pakistan viewed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan beginning in 1979 as an existential threat. So Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency was more than enthusiastic to train Pashtun mujahideen to fight the Soviets with Saudi and U.S. assistance.
Saudi officials naturally garnered greater respect from Pakistani officers than their American counterparts due to the revered status of the Kingdom as caretaker of the two holiest sites in Islam. The U.S. also underestimated the extent to which Pakistani officers would develop sympathies for the militants they spent years training. The ISI became an intermediary between Saudi Arabia and militant Islamic groups across South Asia. During the 1990s, the ISI shifted its focus towards Kashmir and the Punjab in an effort to counter perceived Indian aggression. But the deep connections fostered between the ISI and various militants resurfaced after 9/11 when their focus pivoted back to Afghanistan.
Meanwhile the ISI fought some militant groups while allowing others like the Haqqani Network to remain powerful. When Osama bin Laden was discovered in Pakistan, the U.S. ramped up drone strikes against safe havens, and the ISI retaliated by releasing the name of the CIA’s Islamabad bureau chief which resulted in numerous death threats. Since 9/11, Gulf dollars have continued to bolster extremist groups inside Pakistan even as Pakistani civilians die by the thousands from suicide operations linked to Saudi-sponsored madrasas.
In exchange for tolerating Gulf-sponsored terrorism Pakistani leaders get security. While in power they have an unofficial army of militants they can call upon to deal with anything from Baluchi separatists to keeping India on its toes. Once they leave power they have an escape hatch to protect them and their family. When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was found guilty of corruption, kidnapping, and hijacking, in the summer of 2000, Saudi Arabia accepted him to live in exile. Benazir Bhutto’s notoriously corrupt widow and ex-president, Asif Zardari, went on a “self-imposed exile” to the U.A.E. throughout 2016. And the former president and general, Pervez Musharraf, is currently hiding out in Dubai to avoid prosecution for treason charges.
But the export of extremism from Saudi Arabia is not always by design. In his history of Pakistan, Ian Talbot argued that “the exposure of the lower-class Pakistanis to the Islamic heartland further encouraged a mindset favourable to Islamization, although Zia was to find that its impact on sectarianism was to prove unpredictable and potentially destabilizing.” Saudi Arabia fears the effects of its own radicalization and recently deported 40,000 Pakistani workers over concerns of terrorism. Today South Asia is rocked by sectarian violence from the mountainous peaks of Kabul to the tropical markets of Karachi and posh hotels of Mumbai. This February, suicide attacks killed hundreds across Pakistan. The province of Sindh begged the central government to shut down Gulf-funded seminaries. Islamabad declined.
Controlling The Message
The internet age rendered in-person missionary work by Saudi clerics less relevant. The radical messages of Saudi preachers and their protégés can be viewed on mobile phones across the world. Students filter into the seminaries in Mecca and Medina and return to teach at the hundreds of madrasas spread across the world. These representatives of the Kingdom do not always preach a militant message. Sometimes, and perhaps more dangerously, they preach an apologist one.
In 2008, popular Indian televangelist Zakir Naik called 9/11 an “inside job” done by the Bush administration to defame Islam. He also commented that “If he [Osama bin Laden] is terrorizing America the terrorist, the biggest terrorist, I am with him.” Despite these comments Naik went on to win the King Faisal International Prize for his “service to Islam.” The conspiracy theories he peddles are crucial to Saudi Arabia’s standing among the Muslim masses that are not necessarily prone to violence. However, conspiracy theories that brush aside the problem of extremism within the Kingdom are nothing new. Rumors about U.S. involvement in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca led to an attack on the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in 1979 resulting in the death of two U.S. citizens.
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia spends millions on public relations firms in Washington D.C. every year in order to ensure it is not viewed as a state sponsor—or even enabler—of terrorism. The Kingdom attempts to contain the effects of its own hate preachers by campaigning to distance itself from the most egregious acts of terrorism in the Muslim world while still embracing a Salafi message. All the while in D.C. the Kingdom scrambles to disassociate itself not only from terrorism but from extremism altogether.
A Complicated Relationship
Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull once asked President Obama “aren’t the Saudis your friends?” Obama famously replied “it’s complicated.” It is complicated. How can Saudi Arabia possibly serve as an effective partner against terror when its internal security is dependent on the continued export of terrorism? The answer is that for both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. the other has always been the perceived lesser of two evils.
In the early 1930s when U.S. companies first began to explore the Saudi oil market they were favored by the Royal family over the British who were viewed as imperialists disguised as businessmen. This enemy-of-my-enemy partnership grew closer during the Cold War and the goal to contain the Soviets was described as the “complementary foreign policy” of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in a 1983 CIA memorandum. The fact that Saudi Arabia promoted a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in order to counter the Soviet Union did not alarm the U.S. intelligence community. Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran cemented Saudi Arabia’s position as the lesser of two perceived evils.
When the Gulf War incited harsh criticism of the Royal family for hosting non-Muslim soldiers they responded by coopting the majority of Wahhabi scholars into official government positions. Those who were too extreme for government work were encouraged to go abroad. The “28 pages” report detailing connections between the Saudi government and 9/11 hijackers proved once and for all that it wasn’t only private Saudi citizens who provide financing and manpower to radical terrorist organizations but the government itself. But Saudi Arabia claims it too is in a fight against radical extremism. Yet the majority of terrorist attacks in the Kingdom remain directed at the Shi‘a minority in the Eastern Province and Western targets. In fact, the U.S. State Department website explicitly warns citizens in Saudi Arabia to avoid “places where members of the Shia-Muslim minority gather.”
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad recently wrote in Politico that the Saudis claim to have adopted a new “policy of honesty” and admitted to him that in the past they had funded extremists. However, partial confessions and lukewarm commitments to fight terrorism are a pillar of Saudi diplomacy. After 9/11, the Saudi government made some effort to share intelligence and set up rehabilitation facilities for low-risk terrorists. But this was largely a show of good will that produced few long-term gains in the war on terrorism. The infamous “Podesta emails” confirm that the U.S. intelligence community believes Saudi Arabia and Qatar are now “providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL.” The export of fanaticism and terrorism is a necessary release valve so that the fragile equilibrium of Saudi society does not implode.
One Terrorism Policy
When the late Taliban commander, Mullah Mansoor, was killed in May of last year, it was his recent trip to Iran that became the focal point of discussion. For years, however, Washington all but ignored that the vast majority of the ammonium nitrate used to construct IEDs that delimb American soldiers in Afghanistan comes from Pakistan. In 2007, at the height of the war in Iraq, the U.S. military estimated that 45% of all foreign terrorists targeting U.S. troops were Saudi. Now the debate in Washington is whether to designate Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has rarely engaged in terrorism and the IRGC’s main focus appears to be Iranian dissidents abroad and fighting ISIS in Syria. Meanwhile the metastasization of Gulf-sponsored terrorist networks continues unabated. Counterterrorism policy has been reduced to a popularity contest rather than an assessment of real threats.
The U.S. must stop treating implicit and explicit state sponsors of terrorism differently. Saudi Arabia’s compartmentalized efforts at containing rather than eradicating extremism should not be lauded as a genuine partnership. States that clandestinely sponsor terrorism, albeit sloppily, must be held to the same standards as those that openly provide support. Counterterrorism strategists must adopt a long-horizon approach and recognize that state sponsors of terrorist groups are responsible for the consequences even when those organizations inevitably go rogue and turn on their benefactor. And just as Pakistan paid a heavy price for tolerating Saudi support for Wahhabi terror, the U.S. and the West are starting to feel the brunt of their own negligence of Riyadh and Doha’s love affair with terrorists.
Indeed, the very phrase “biggest state sponsor of terrorism” is best removed from diplomatic vocabulary altogether because so long as it shines the spotlight on only one country, others will hide in its shadow.
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