Saturday, December 19, 2015

Pakistan - THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM OF SAVING RS 560 BILLION




Federal ministers of the government usually make tall claims about the achievements of their governments in order to give a better impression of their performance. Speaking at the 18th Sustainable Development Conference organised by Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad on 8th December 2015, Federal Minister for Planning and Development, Ahsan Iqbal, asserted that the government during the past two and half years had saved Rs 560 billion by ensuring transparency in the execution of public sector projects. Further, economic indicators and security situation in the country had improved due to effective policies of the government. Government had also given Vision 2025 for sustainable development and under this long-term development plan efforts were being made to put the country in the list of 25 top performing countries over the next 10 years. Besides, the government was working in close collaboration with the provincial governments in line with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A collective Vision for South Asia should also be launched to fight the common enemy in the form of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and terrorism. This can only be achieved through regional cooperation and integration. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a manifestation of regional cooperation, would bear fruits for all the partner neighbouring countries. Speaking on the same day at the inaugural session of a consultative workshop on mid-term performance and future planning, Ahsan Iqbal reiterated again that the government had saved Rs 567 billion through scrutiny and rationalisation of various ministries and divisions. However, he admitted failure to address structural challenges of the economy during the last two and half years as entire focus had remained on stabilisation. 

Although the competence of Federal Minister for Planning and Development is beyond doubt yet what he has said at both the above occasions is rather vague and difficult to digest. He has said that economic indicators have improved during the tenure of the PML (N) government but the reality is that the improvement is confined to only few indicators like the level of foreign exchange reserves, the deceleration in the inflation rate and some semblance of stabilisation of the economy. Structural problems and other weaknesses of the economy have still to be addressed. So far as Vision for South Asia is concerned, it may be a good idea but it is a collective effort and no country in the South Asian region is contemplating about it, at least as yet. How the government Vision 2025 is likely to unfold and bear fruit could only be judged after 10 years. The most controversial observation could be the saving of Rs 560 billion by ensuring transparency in the public projects. Ahsan Iqbal should know that this is a lot of money and there is no precise measure to properly estimate the saving through transparency in projects. In fact, most of the analysts accuse the present government of overspending on certain projects like the Nandipur power project and transport projects in urban areas. 

While Ahsan Iqbal may have been swayed by political considerations in his observations, Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, Nadeem Javed, seems to be more upright and objective in his presentation. In his speech at the workshop on the same day, he remarked that low growth, a decline in exports, low saving and investment as well as foreign direct investment and declining credit to the private sector were some of the major issues confronting the economy. There was a gap of 2 to 3 percent in revenue mobilisation in the first quarter of FY16. Country's exports had been falling due to multiple factors such as energy crisis, overvaluation of exchange rate of around 7 percent and low commodity prices. Handsome taxation and regulatory duty as well as liquidity crunch was reducing private sector credit growth. Current growth rate was inadequate to provide employment opportunities to the youth and the government faced a massive challenge of raising GDP growth rate to 7-7.5 percent to generate enough employment opportunities. There was also a challenge for the government on how to start economic activity in the manufacturing sector. Strangely enough, all these observations are against the usual tendency of the public servants and coming from a person who is part and parcel of the government machinery. We appreciate his outspokenness and wish other officials to follow his example. After all, recognition of weaknesses is the first step towards their resolution. 

Pakistan - Education crisis

MANY of Balochistan’s social indicators are not encouraging, and the situation in the education sector appears to be particularly troubling.
Speaking in Quetta recently, the adviser to the Balochistan chief minister made some frank and worrying admissions about the state of education in the province.
Sardar Raza Barrech said that 1.6 million children were out of school in the province; two-thirds of these unfortunate youngsters were girls.
The official also observed that there was a shortage of schools, while the ones that existed lacked facilities. Such figures are routinely quoted by education activists and NGOs. While the latest version of the Annual Status of Education Report shows a slight improvement in enrolment figures as well as learning outcomes in Balochistan’s rural districts as compared to last year, there is still much ground to cover in the province.
It is welcome that a government functionary can realise and admit to the scale of the problem. Yet simply stating the problem will not be enough; thorough action is needed to remedy the situation.
While such a vast number of children out of school is problematic, it is just as unfortunate that school-going children are apparently not learning very much.
For example, discussing learning levels, the 2015 Aser survey says that 60pc of class five students could not read class two-level sentences in English.
On the other hand, 55pc of the surveyed class five children could not read a class two-level Urdu story. This small window into the state of education in Balochistan shows that matters still need massive improvement. While public education in Pakistan overall is mostly below par, in Balochistan (as well as in Sindh) the situation is particularly bad.
Teacher absenteeism is a problem, as is the menace of ‘ghost’ schools. So whether it is out-of-school children or poor learning outcomes, unless there is a complete overhaul of the education system in Balochistan the outlook will remain bleak.
A generation of illiterate or poorly educated children will have adverse socioeconomic and sociopolitical consequences for the province, which already lags behind in most fields.
Both the provincial administration and the centre must realise that while Balochistan’s law and order and political problems are indeed major and require full attention, the state of education is no less alarming and requires equal focus.
The state has promised to fight illiteracy in response to the Army Public School tragedy. Balochistan must not be left behind in this endeavour.

Pakistan - Fighting terrorism



General Musharraf's famous u-turn proved to be a double u-turn as extremist militancy expanded and flourished under the cover of "enlightened moderation".

Pakistan - CH NISAR's - ''Ministry of Incompetence''



Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan has once again revealed the staggering incompetence of his ministry when it comes to pursuing the goals of the National Action Plan (NAP) and eliminating terrorist networks from within Pakistan. On Thursday, the Interior Minister presented the much awaited performance report of the Ministry of Interior (ever since he took charge in 2013) in front of the National Assembly (NA), and the expectation was that the report would have a meaningful breakdown of NAP, since Chaudhry Nisar has been the point man for the operation ever since its launch earlier this year. But what was presented to the NA largely dealt with the internal affairs of the ministry and the PTI/PAT sit-in of 2014, whereas NAP was relegated to a few lines. The report merely reiterated the ministry’s year-old aims to set up registration forms for seminaries, development of a national anti-extremist narrative and the setting up of a Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) without showing much in the way of progress. When pressed by other lawmakers about this lack of progress, Chaudhry Nisar protested that his ministry was not the only state institution responsible for NAP and even recalled his reluctance to take up the role as the focal point of NAP when the operation was being planned. He pleaded that the Ministry of Interior and NAP should not be conflated and suggested that he was also busy with ministry matters. In his defence, the Interior Minister pointed to the overall improvements in law and order, the Karachi operation, the reduction in suicide attacks and anti-corruption drives of his ministry. But none of these justifications cut much ice with the unimpressed colleagues of the Interior Minister in the NA and they bemusedly reflected on the absurdity of Chaudhry Nisar absolving himself of responsibility when no other state institution apart from the Ministry of Interior is better placed to take the lead on NAP.

While it is hard to deny the successes pointed out by Chaudhry Nisar, it will be premature to celebrate them too wholeheartedly because doubts remain whether these advances can be sustained. The reduction in terrorist activity may not turn out to be a definitive trend but merely suggest a regrouping of the militant outfits reeling from the momentarily energetic onslaught by the state. It should be clear to the Interior Minister that while personnel matters of his ministry may have some significance, the importance of a detailed inquiry about NAP’s progress dwarfs all other concerns. If the task is proving beyond the competence of the Ministry of Interior, perhaps the timely suggestion by PPP leader Bilawal Bhutto Zardari that a parliamentary security committee should oversee NAP is worth considering. Having a body with support from across the aisle would engender great cooperation and understanding between the opposition and government and will definitely make the progress of NAP a reality.

US for closure of 600 religious schools in Pakistan

An influential US lawmaker has sought closure of religious schools (madrassas) which are fanning terrorism and extremism in Pakistan as he asserted that the country had failed in eliminating the extremist mindset. He sought the closure of 600 Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan, describing them as an “infrastructure of hate” while other madrassas should be registered.
Congressman Ed Royce, Chairman of the powerful House Foreign Relations Committee’s comments came after the deadly shooting in California on December 2 by a radicalised Pakistani-origin couple that killed 14 people.
He alleged that the madrassas were spewing hate. He said that Pakistan should allocate a sizeable portion of its budget on education instead of giving major budgetary allocations to defence. He said that $30 billion (Rs3000 bn) had been given to Pakistan after 9/11 and those funds had not been accounted for. He also called for stopping the $2 billion annual aid to Pakistan. He said that armed forces of the country should act against militant groups like the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and others. He alleged that Pakistan’s security apparatus had links with terrorists which should be brought to an end and till these links were eliminated, the partnership between Pakistan and the US against terrorism could not be meaningful.
“Unless that infrastructure of hate is shut down, Pakistan will never win its struggle for internal peace,” Royce said during a Congressional hearing on Pakistan. “That’s the issue. We have the list of the 600 schools. I’ve made three trips, as I’ve indicated, to try to convince the government to shut those down. We’ve had little success in convincing families in the Gulf States not to send their money there or convincing those governments in the Gulf States not to fund this,” Royce said.
“It’s a phenomenon that frankly, it’s so frustrating, because what we see is the failure of the government, time and time again, to address issues that are in that government’s own best interests. And this to me, given the knowledge about what goes on in those 600 schools, is the most obvious and vexing problem that is right in front of us,” Royce said.
Responding to his concerns, Richard Olson, Special US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the growth of such madrassas was due to the lack of primary education system.
“The reason, in a way, that they exist and have become popular in Pakistan, if that’s the word, is because they do provide a free education,” he said. “We think that what has to be done is there has to be further reform of the public education system. The public education system is not delivering in Pakistan and it has to be a viable alternative for parents who otherwise have no choice but to send their children to schools that are free and indeed where not only are they free, but food is provided,” Olson said.
“So there’s a real draw factor in all of this. We also think that it’s important that the government of Pakistan, and we’re working in this area, in the countering violent extremism area, to try and reform the curriculum so that at least in the religiously-oriented schools, there are marketable skills, standardised curricula and there are attempts to address a more modern perspective,” Olson said.
Royce said Pakistan would be better served addressing this issue of shutting down these schools.
“And if they do it funding public education there for individuals, for families, as an alternative for their sons to go to those schools in this case, instead of the lads going to schools where you and I suspect the final outcome is going to be like a lot of others that were radicalised in those Deobandi schools,” he said.
Meanwhile, members of Congress expressed their concerns that the F-16 military jets and other weapons the US provides to Pakistan are being used “against their own people” in Balochistan during a hearing on Capitol Hill.
The hearing on the future of US-Pakistan relations was held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
After Richard Olson, the State Department’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated that “with all the challenges of the relationship, I think it’s most important for the US to be engaged still and to build a partnership with Pakistan,” Rep Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) responded:
“The fact is that Pakistan has, from its very beginning, been plagued with corruption and oppression by its own government. The brutality and corruption in Pakistan was so bad that early in 1971, the people of Bangladesh couldn’t take it anymore.
“And their uprising was, of course, answered not by trying to reform their government but instead by brutal suppression which led to the independence of Bangladesh,” said Rohrabacher, who chairs the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats.
“I see similar type of sentiments with the situation arising with the people of Balochistan. There are now these F-16s that the judge was talking about, those F-16s and the military equipment that we are providing Pakistan are being used against their own people, just like they did against the people over there in Bangladesh,” said Rohrabacher.
Rohrabacher has long been an advocate for the people of Balochistan, having introduced a resolution in 2012 supporting its independence.
“If we were thwarted in trying to bring to justice Osama bin Laden, it would have been because the Pakistanis were using American jets to shoot our people down. “We calculated on that. That was not out of the realm of possibility. And the fact that that is the reality of it and we end up giving them billions of dollars of military equipment, no wonder they don’t respect us,” Rohrabacher continued.
Earlier in the hearing, Poe said: “I want to be very specific in what I am concerned about, and that is, the sale of American fighter jets to Pakistan or the giving of American fighter jets to Pakistan through military aid. That military aid is then used in the United States to buy those jets.”

Pakistan’s Failed War On Ideology







Pakistan may be winning the war against radicals on the battlefield, but it’s losing the war for hearts and minds. Since the Dec. 16, 2014, school massacre in Peshawar, Pakistan, the government in Islamabad has taken robust steps to crack down on internal militancy. As Sameer Lalwani recently explained, these steps go well beyond merely targeting anti-state terror outfits such as the Pakistani Taliban. With terrorist violence down significantly in 2015, even Pakistan’s harshest critics must acknowledge the country’s very real counterterrorism successes over the last year.
 Unfortunately, there’s another side to the story. Pakistan may be killing terrorists on the battlefield, but it has not defeated the ideology that sustains them. The country continues to provide an enabling environment for extremism. For all the militants killed today, the resilience of radical ideologies within Pakistani society ensures that more will be mobilized tomorrow.
To be sure, Pakistan has made efforts to curb hate speech and other hardline sentiment. But it faces a long road. After police in Lahore recently tore downshopfront posters critical of the Ahmadis, a harshly persecuted religious minority, droves of marchers took to the streets to protest the move.
Meanwhile, schools, clerics, and some media outlets continue to churn outhardline narratives that Islam in Pakistan is under siege and that the United States and India are responsible for the ongoing terrorism challenge. Instead of combating these narratives, the Pakistani state — and particularly the security establishment — often parrots them. There are few state-driven counter-narratives, only conspiracy theories and crackdowns against vociferous critics of state-centered narratives. There is also, predictably, confusion. Consider the much-cited Pew finding that a staggering 62 percent of Pakistanis don’t have an opinion about the Islamic State (IS).
Even worse, some hardline ideologies are institutionalized by the state. Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment refers to Ahmadis as non-Muslims, while its blasphemy laws –meant to prevent public offenses to Islam — are easily exploited by the state and hardline Islamic groups to implicate religious minorities in anti-Islamic acts. Meanwhile, the state has not severed its ties with terror groups such as the Haqqani network, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba that target Afghanistan and India, as well as Americans and other foreigners in those countries.
And yet, it’s not just hardline Islamist ideologies that endure. Class divisions are another unwavering trigger for radicalization that won’t go away anytime soon.
Pakistan is a deeply divided nation. Much has been written about its sectarian, provincial, and ethnic cleavages. Less is heard about its stark class divisions and inequalities. A 2015 study by Oxfam and Lahore University of Management Sciences points to persistent and worsening inequality, with “significant variation” between and within provinces. Such inequality is entrenched: 40 percent of children in the lowest income quintile are expected to remain in that same quintile for their whole lives.
Pakistan’s class divides are discernible across society. Poor kids go to private religious and public government schools, while the wealthy attend elite English medium schools. Additionally, 57 percent of Pakistan’s poorest children are not in school; for the rich, the figure is 10 percent, while for the upper middle class it is 16 percent. In addition, Pakistan’s government spends about 2 percent of GDP on education — one of the lowest such rates in the world.
Meanwhile, land ownership is deeply skewed; a small minority holds a sizable portion of all privately owned land. In Punjab and Sindh provinces,only 0.05 percent of households hold more than two hectares of land. Not surprisingly, the landless are often poor (and account for 70 percent of Pakistan’s rural poor).
Pakistan’s class divides are also on sharp display in households, where anyone with means retains servants to carry out the most basic of tasks. This hired help is often treated poorly; it is not unusual for otherwise kind people to be belligerent and belittling toward their servants. Such treatment has consequences. Ominously, a former top Pakistani police official notedrecently that servants have begun attacking their bosses more frequently than in the past.
Those on the disadvantaged side of the socioeconomic divides cannot count on the support of politicians, who tend to overlook them. In an article forHerald magazine last month, Umair Javed, who teaches political science at Lahore University of Management Sciences, described how Pakistan’s main political parties no longer appeal directly to the poor. Instead, they pitch their messages to Pakistan’s middle class and other non-poor demographics such as the business community.
In recent decades, Javed writes, the grievances of labor unions and other workers’ groups have been taken up not by the state, but by conservative Islamist organizations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. They blame Pakistan’s inequalities on moral degradation, and call on the working classes to embrace religious solutions.
What does inequality have to do with terrorism? Economist Thomas Piketty recently (and controversially) asserted that inequality helped fuel the rise of IS. Economists have roundly criticized his thesis as flawed. However, in the Pakistani context, his theory has some merit. In Pakistan, fledgling militant outfits have used class divides to spur recruitment and justify their violent tactics.
The most well-known example is the Pakistani Taliban’s offensive in Swat in 2009. There, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which had been formally established only two years earlier, appealed to the poor and landless to take on the region’s wealthy landlords and established peasant armies to help drive them out. After the landlords fled, the TTP divided the spoils among the public.
Six years later, even as a degraded shell of its former self, the TTP positioned itself once again as a defender of the people – albeit, on a much more modest scale. During a deadly heatwave in Karachi, the TTP threatened “actions” against “greedy” K-Electric, the city electricity utility, unless it restored power to the “oppressed” people of Pakistan.
Pakistani sectarian terror groups have couched their appeals in class terms as well. In the mid-1980s, the newly established Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) channeled the discontent of Sunni peasants in Punjab, who felt exploited by Shia landlords, according to Owen Bennett-Jones in his book Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. This brought support to SSP from landless farmers, but also from urban lower middle classes who resented the local aristocracy.
Such tactics are unsurprising. Over the years, numerous Pakistani militant leaders have styled themselves as Robin Hood-like crusaders. Consider Mangal Bagh, leader of Lashkar-e-Islam, based in the Khyber tribal agency. According to a 2008 profile, “He is keen to highlight the plight of the ordinary tribesmen . . . and motivated to solve the problems confronting the common man.” This, in turn, “explains the reason for young men, mostly jobless, to flock to his banner and make up [the] bulk” of his organization. Some Pakistani militant leaders are themselves drawn from the working class. Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban’s first supreme leader, was agym instructor. Mangal Bagh cleaned buses. Current TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah operated chairlifts. Such bonafides can help cement their status as genuine champions of the working class.
Now, to be clear, Pakistan’s predominantly Islamist militant groups have no intention of launching Marxist revolutions. While they have seized on class divides and inequalities to spark recruitment, at the end of the day their broader appeals fall back on Islam. This makes good strategic sense: by invoking an issue like Islam that transcends socioeconomic differences, they can target a broader recruitment base. Ultimately, in pious Pakistan, both the rich and the poor are more galvanized by narratives centered on religion than those based on class.
Furthermore, in Pakistan, pitches that urge the downtrodden to take on the upper class will often fall flat. In a nation rife with patronage, where commoners depend on favors from influential figures to help them get by, such tactics amount to an extreme case of biting the hand that feeds you.
Still, many will remain vulnerable to class-focused recruitment pitches. A top recruitment target in this regard may be members of the working class. This includes the young, semi-educated, tech-savvy, and urban-based, those that constantly lose out to the upper class for jobs and other opportunities, and those aware of the better opportunities available to their working class counterparts in other countries. These people may not only resent the elite, but also depend less on them for patronage than the poor do, meaning they have less to lose by embracing an anti-elite cause. Several Pakistani terror groups have used class-focused recruitment pitches during their first few years in existence, shifting to a broader religion-focused strategy only after they had developed a core base of members.
Such strategies have troubling implications. In the years ahead, Pakistan’s enduring class divides and inequalities, if ignored, could be exploited once again to form and grow new terror organizations — or rejuvenate existing ones that have fallen on hard times.

Pakistan's 'war on terror' failing in fight against extremism: activists

Worshippers at the infamous Red Mosque in the Pakistani capital Islamabad still gather in their hundreds for Friday prayers, but the fiery sermons calling for Sharia law led by hardline cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz are now a thing of the past.
The preacher, who once led a week-long armed conflict against Pakistan's army and has repeatedly called for the overthrow of the government, has now been muzzled by authorities -- though technically he remains a free man and a revered figure among the Taliban.
It is this duality -- where hardened resolve against groups such as the Taliban is blunted by a willingness to tolerate and even fan the flames of extremism still bubbling beneath society's surface -- that activists say sums up the country's more than decade-long battle against a homegrown Islamist insurgency.
Official and public opinion was galvanised against the Pakistani Taliban in the wake of a massacre at a school in the northwestern city of Peshawar in December 2014 that left more than 150 dead -- mainly children.
It was at the dun-coloured mosque at the centre of Pakistan's leafy capital that Muhammad Jibran Nasir, a 28-year-old lawyer, organised a demonstration in the wake of Aziz's refusal to condemn the attack.
That protest, which called for the cleric's arrest for inciting hate speech, snowballed into a nationwide movement among marginalised urban liberals who rallied to "Reclaim Pakistan" from the clutches of Islamist violence.
One year on and an army-led crackdown has put the country on course to see the fewest casualties linked to extremist attacks since 2007 -- the year Aziz led his brief insurrection in the capital, which later became the catalyst for the formation of the umbrella Pakistani Taliban movement.
"The country was devoid of any road map for fighting these extremist forces, but now I think they have found their way," said security analyst Imtiaz Gul.
According to Nasir, however, a military operation against extremists and government crackdown in the wake of the massacre have simply diverted attention from what lies beneath.
"The main thing is extremism -- textbook reforms, madrassa reforms, mass awareness community reform cutting down the influence of the clergy in the society," he told AFP.
"What we're doing now is stifling the growth of the cancer but we're not addressing the reason why we keep on getting cancer."
- Thin line -
For authorities, the doublethink is strategic, with activists such as prominent feminist Marvi Sirmed accusing Islamabad of a kind of realpolitik over who it chooses to crack down on -- such as clerics who preach against the army.
Meanwhile Kabul blames Pakistan's historical support for the Afghan Taliban prolonging much of the conflict wracking their country, and tensions drag on with India over disputed Kashmir and Islamabad's support for proxy groups there.
But for the Pakistani public, a Supreme Court-led shift towards a seemingly more moderate stance on issues such as blasphemy merely masks simmering intolerance that can still boil over into mob violence.
Activists have noted some improvement, particularly after the Supreme Court observed in October that calling for reform to controversial blasphemy legislation is not equivalent to committing blasphemy.
But violence against those accused of blasphemy continues unabated, with hardliners inciting attacks that often target minorities. In November, hundreds of people torched a factory after one of its workers from the minority Ahmadi sect was accused of burning pages of the Koran.
Meanwhile new forms of extremism continue to emerge.
In April social activist Sabeen Mahmud was gunned down outside the cafe she operated in Karachi, which hosted discussions on topics from feminism to the role of minorities in society.
That killing was blamed by authorities on college-educated Saad Aziz, also said to be the mastermind of an attack on an Ismaili Shiite bus that left 44 dead, highlighting the fresh threat posed by self-radicalised "lone wolf" extremists who are motivated more by global jihadism than local causes.
The "Reclaim Pakistan" movement flared again after Mahmud's death, though it has largely shifted from the streets to the blogosphere.
Opposition Senator Sherry Rehman, who led the legislative charge for blasphemy reform under the last government and has lived under constant death threats since, says Pakistan has the will but needs to refine the way.
"We've come up to speed on the resolve, finally," she told AFP.
"But we have to really think of this over the next 10 years -- how we can dovetail this with the fight against extremism?
"This cannot just be a fight against terrorism."

The False Savior of Pakistan

BY SUALIHA NAZAR



    Pakistanis hope that the army’s new chief of staff, Raheel Sharif, will crack down on militants and boost security. But can one man change a corrupt legal system and prejudiced security infrastructure?
    Pakistan has finally found a hero in General Raheel Sharif, the army’s chief of staff since November 2013. In a short time, he has become one of the most powerful and beloved men in the country. From Peshewar to Karachi, billboards and banners thank him for curbing terrorism. This adoration stems, in part, from his warnings that regional rival India will suffer “unbearable costs” if it causes mischief.

    What truly catapulted General Sharif to stardom was Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an operation launched in June 2014 to eradicate militants from every corner of North Waziristan. The operation was to serve as an aggressive response to the deadly attack on Jinnah International Airport that occurred earlier that month, and gave new hope to a nation that had lost over 3,000 lives to terrorist attacks in 2013 alone.
    Zarb-e-Azb signaled a strategic shift for Pakistan’s internal terrorism policies. The international community had long charged Pakistan with providing safe haven to select militants — those fighting in Afghanistan and who do not pose a direct threat to, and perhaps even support, the interests of Pakistan’s government– and Zarb-e-Azb attempted to prove that Pakistan was, in fact, targeting all militants equally. There would be no more turning a blind eye to the terrorist activities of “good” militants.
    General Sharif does deserve a certain level of praise for increasing security. Not only have terrorist attacks in Pakistan dropped by 70 percent since 2012, but  Zarb-e-Azb made a significant impact on the terrorist groups Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi through military operations to weaken safe havens and confiscate weapons — progress all of the general’s predecessors failed to achieve.
    Yet, this success is tempered by accusations that the crackdown against these groups has ulterior motives. The most-targeted groups are ones known to oppose the Pakistani state. The international community has demanded a stricter crackdown on other groups, too, ones like the Haqqani network and the India-focused Lashkar-e-Taiba – neither of which Islamabad considers to be an anti-state actor in addition to a terrorist organization. Rather than tackling all of the militants in the area simultaneously, Pakistan is first eliminating anti-Pakistan groups before setting its sights on anti-U.S. or anti-India groups.
    These accusations of selective counter-terrorism enforcement gained momentum following claims made by Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain during his visit to Beijing in September. According to Hussain, Zarb-e-Azb managed to almost completely eliminate the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, an anti-China separatist group. But that celebratory announcement was marred by questions of whether the recent developments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor had anything to do with the government’s swift moves against the group. The agreement could boost Pakistan’s economy over time, but hinges on China’s $46 billion investment in various projects to improve the trade route from China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea.
    On December 16, 2014, militants stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar, brutally executing almost 150 students and staff. In response, the government lifted the moratorium on the death penalty, leading to the death by hanging of 180 alleged terrorists. These executions were ostensibly meant to deter other militants, much like the military’s Zarb-e-Azb Operation and National Action Plan, legislation developed under the guidance of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to curb terrorism.There is another aspect of Pakistan’s National Action Plan that should give pause: military tribunals meant to rubber stamp the government’s death warrants against suspected militants.
    Eliminating the threat of 180 terrorists would be a praiseworthy step, if only those hanged were actually guilty of terrorism. In reality, those behind bars came to be there through the country’s two most corrupt institutions: law enforcement and the judiciary. A lack of transparency in these institutions has led to rampant bribery and nepotism. Those with the means to escape punishment can easily do so without any accountability or fear for the consequences. In such a corrupt system, there is no way to guarantee the guilt of those who hang nor the innocence of those who walk free.
    The facts certainly don’t seem to support the Pakistani government’s narrative of increased security and accountability for militant activity. According to a Reuters analysis, fewer than one in six of those hanged were associated with militancy. From kidnapping to murder, those executed were charged with a wide range of crimes; several cases had severe legal shortcomings that should have marred the guilty verdict with reasonable doubt. While some may not have been innocent of violent crime, they were not guilty of terrorism or militancy like the government claimed.
    In most of the cases, the police relied heavily on witnesses who were prone to intimidation or bribery, rather than gathering hard evidence. Most of the accused were too poor to afford a good lawyer, which curtailed their chances of a fair trial.
    The most talked-about case is that of Shafqat Hussain, a man sentenced to death in 2004 for the kidnapping and murder of a seven year old boy. Hussain’s case was filled with ambiguities and loose ends, but despite questions about his guilt, his age, and his legal rights, he was executed on August 4th, 2015. Although the prosecution submitted a confession as evidence of his guilt, Hussain claimed he was forced to confess despite his innocence after nine days of severe torture in police custody. Additionally, his birth certificate indicated that he was a minor when the crime occured , a status that should have precluded him from receiving the death penalty.
    Hussain’s story rings with the injustice and corruption that prevails in Pakistan’s legal system. His is one of many. Yet, the government celebrates countless executions without challenging the methods that produced the guilty verdict.
    There is no doubt that under the tutelage of General Sharif, the security situation has improved considerably, creating a more stable Pakistan. The country’s credit ratings are up, and Foreign Direct Investment has increased 7.6 percent. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves crossed the $20 billion mark in October, 2015, a new record for the country.
    With these achievements in mind, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, leader of Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party, have praised the army chief on numerous occasions, a surprising development given their contentious relationships with the army in the past.
    While it seems contradictory, the praise syncs perfectly with the latest narrative in Pakistani media and among the people, which builds up General Sharif as a man of stronger resolve than his predecessors, a leader who puts national interest at the core of his ideology and mission. People are now calling for him to be promoted to field marshal, the highest military rank which has only been held by Ayub Khan, the second president of Pakistan.
    This celebration is premature. The progress made since Zarb-e-Azb launched appears shallow under the light of questions that remain unanswered. Are Pakistan’s efforts to flush out terrorist elements still divided into the category of state-friendly and anti-state? Has Pakistan truly given the executed and those on death row a fair chance? Are crackdowns against militants in individual cities, like that in Karachi,  just stop-gap measures? Pakistanis have waited for the blissful day when their country is finally militant-free. But after a year of relentless operations, that day does not appear to be any closer.

    Until these questions are answered, I refuse to acknowledge that true progress has been made. I refuse to acknowledge that the people and the government of Pakistan earnestly fight to keep their country from becoming a breeding ground for radicalization. With much sorrow, I refuse to accept General Sharif as my nation’s hero.