China Picks Pakistan as First Stop on $40 Billion Silk Road

by Ting ShiNatalie Obiko Pearson

China picked a dam project in northern Pakistan for its first investment by a $40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund as President Xi Jinping looks to expand the country’s influence across three continents.

The fund will become a shareholder of China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd., which will construct the Karot dam on the Jhelum river, according to a statement on the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website on Tuesday. The total investment will be $1.65 billion, according to the People’s Bank of China.

“We don’t subscribe to the view that a country expands hegemony when it becomes powerful,” Xi told Pakistani lawmakers on Tuesday. “Peaceful development is in China’s interest and also in the interest of Asia and the world.”

Xi’s visit is the first by a Chinese head of state in almost a decade to Pakistan, a nation that’s key to to his efforts to access the Indian Ocean over land and boost trade with Europe, Africa and the Middle East. China is Pakistan’s top trading partner, and they have a mutual distrust of India.

The two nations are planning $45 billion in projects along a 3,000-kilometer (1,850 miles) corridor stretching from Xinjiang in western China to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. The investments -- $28 billion of which were announced this week -- would boost Pakistan’s economic growth and provide another route for China to import oil from the Middle East.

‘Great Match’

The Karot dam will be located in Rawalpindi near the capital Islamabad. It’s a “great match” between the development strategies of the two nations and a priority project in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s central bank said in its statement.

The 720-megawatt run-of-river dam would take about six years to build, according to project disclosure documents filed by the World Bank’s International Finance Corp., which is investing $125 million in China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd. The project would generate 75 percent of its energy during the summer months when water flow in the Jhelum river is at its highest, the documents show.

China Three Gorges Corp., the Beijing-based developer of the world’s largest dam, expects to become Pakistan’s biggest clean-energy company with plans for $5.5 billion of hydropower, solar and wind projects totaling more than 2,000 megawatts in capacity, according to the IFC. Pakistan requires as much as $20 billion in investments over the next five years to overcome a 10,000-megawatt shortfall in power capacity, it said.

‘All-Weather’ Friend

On Monday, Xi and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed pacts to build roads, ports and power plants, nearly equal to the amount of foreign aid the U.S. has provided to Pakistan over the past decade to support its war in Afghanistan.

If realized, the investments will help Sharif revive Pakistan’s economy, which suffers from chronic power failures and an insurgency that has killed more than 50,000 people since 2001. Sharif has received a loan from the International Monetary Fund to help put the country’s finances back on track.

“It’s very significant,” said Mohammed Sohail, chief executive officer of Topline Securities Ltd. in Karachi. “It can bring a big change for all our economic fundamentals, in particular in energy.”

Pakistan’s benchmark stock index has been among Asia’s best performers over the past six months. It fell 0.9 percent at 11:29 a.m. local time, the most in three weeks.

The 51 agreements included an “All-Weather” strategic partnership that seeks to formalize longstanding defense ties between the nations. They also pledged to fight terrorism and help bring peace to Afghanistan. The two nations may conclude the sale of eight Chinesesubmarines, more than doubling Pakistan’s fleet.

‘Iron Brothers’

Xi met the chiefs of Pakistan’s armed forces and called the operation against militants near the Afghan border a game changer in bringing peace, army spokesman Major General Asim Bajwa said on Twitter. Xi also pledged to contribute in the effort, Bajwa wrote, without providing details.

China is viewed more favorably in Pakistan than in any other Asian country, Pew Research Center found in a poll conducted last year. Pakistanis gave a 78 percent favorable rating to China, compared with 14 percent for the U.S., the poll showed.

“We are truly iron brothers,” Sharif said. “All political parties have one united stance -- Pakistan should have a robust bond with China.”

What China’s and Pakistan’s special friendship means

By Ishaan Tharoor

The friendship between China and Pakistan, read billboards in Chinese and English dotting Islamabad this week, "is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel." This sort of romantic sloganeering routinely bubbles up ahead of key bilateral summits between the two countries, and so it did this week as Chinese President Xi Jinping made his maiden visit to the South Asian nation.

"This will be my first trip to Pakistan, but I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own brother," Xi wrote in an article published in Pakistani papers ahead of his arrival, adding another metaphor about how the relationship between the two countries "has flourished like a tree growing tall and strong."

It's easy to see such rhetoric as the cringe-worthy, cynical clap-trap that accompanies international diplomacy. After all, China and Pakistan may share a border, but cultural ties between the two nations and its people are thin, to put it mildly.

But the bond between Beijing and Islambad is indeed old and strong, stretching back to the 1970s and the Nixon administration's opening with China. Here's a primer of what you need to know.

What's happening now

Xi arrived in Islamabad on Monday bearing real gifts: an eye-popping $46 billion worth of planned energy and infrastructure investment to boost Pakistan's flagging economy. This would include adding some 10,400 megawatts to Pakistan's national grid through coal, nuclear and renewable energy projects.

Years of widespread power cuts have been a real drag on the country; energy shortages were one of the main popular grievances voiced ahead of the 2013 elections won by current Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

At the center of what's being announced this week is a new economic "corridor" — railways, roads and pipelines — that would connect an existing mountainous highway from the far western Chinese region of Xinjiang through to the Chinese-developed port at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.

It's an impressive proposal, on a scale that we've come to now associate with China's overseas footprint — more usually in corners of Africa. According to the BBC, the Chinese state and its banks would lend to Chinese companies to carry out the work, thereby making it a commercial venture with direct impact on China's slackening economy.

The project is also a key cog in China's own grand-historic vision of itself as a global power and the font of new sea and land "Silk Roads." The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would link up a major land route in Central Asia to what China imagines will be a key maritime hub at Gwadar.

Sure, there remain real reasons to be skeptical. Much of the new construction would be done in the vast, restive Pakistani province of Baluchistan, where the army is still grappling with an entrenched separatist insurgency. Moreover, as Pakistani journalist and columnist Cyril Almeidapoints out, the proposed Chinese numbers stretch credulity, especially when set against the meager sums currently being invested from the outside into Pakistan's economy. The proof, in this case, will be in the building.

An unequal relationship

The saccharine statements of love and friendship belie a harsher truth. In many ways, this is not a relationship of equals.

A Pew survey conducted last year found that an impressive majority of Pakistanis — 78 percent — viewed China favorably. Compare that to the 14 percent of Pakistanis who looked positively upon the U.S., a figure larger only than the 13 percent who have favorable views of India, Pakistan's archrival.

Yet, the same number of Chinese hold favorable views of India and Pakistan — that is, a minority of 30 percent. Surging Pakistani admiration for China, it seems, laps up on the shores of Chinese indifference.

China is one of Pakistan's top trade partners. But the volume of trade with Pakistan is a drop in the bucket for Beijing.

China views Pakistan also through the lens of counter-terrorism: a number of extremist outfits allegedly linked to ethnic Uighur separatists within Xinjiang have training camps in Pakistan's rugged borderlands with Afghanistan. Curiously, in a country where there are frequent displays of solidarity with Muslims suffering elsewhere in the world, the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority chafing under Chinese rule, rarely galvanize much Pakistani support.

The bigger chessboard

There are two elephants in the room whenever considering China-Pakistan ties: India and the United States.

Both China and Pakistan have fought wars with India in the past, and to this day squabble over disputed Himalayan territory. China helped Pakistan build its arsenal of nuclear weapons, and remains one of Islamabad's biggest arms suppliers — even as the U.S. continues to commit significant military aid to Pakistan.

After President Obama was India's guest of honor during its annual Republic Day commemoration last January, Pakistan extended a similar invitation to Xi to attend their National Day parade in February. The Chinese leader declined, perhaps wary of such unsubtle gestures.

As Andrew Small, an expert on China-Pakistan relations at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, writes, it would be an oversimplification to see China's expanding role in Pakistan as just a challenge to a U.S.-India consensus that's emerged in recent years. China, after all, likely values its bilateral relations with the U.S. and India as much — and likely more — than its ties with Pakistan.

While China has a more assertive stance in East Asia — its backyard — it's playing a different game to the west. China's recent offer to help mediate talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Small notes, marks a real departure from decades when Beijing's official policy has been that of non-interference in the politics of other countries.

Now, as the U.S. has technically withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Chinese have become stakeholders and not just bystanders. Guaranteeing stability in Afghanistan may involve China exerting its own leverage on Pakistan, which has a complicated relationship with the Afghan Taliban.

China, Small suggests, "is finally easing into its role as a great power." And, indeed, it's using Pakistan as a corridor.

War in Yemen Threatens Pakistan’s Ties to the Gulf

By Saagar Enjeti

Pakistan’s middle ground between Iran and Saudi Arabia now seems tenuous.

After spearheading a coalition of nine Arab states to bomb Yemen’s Houthi rebels for the past several weeks, Saudi Arabia is trying to attract new partners. It has a good case to recruit Pakistan to join the fight: the Saudis have spent lavishly to cultivate Islamabad as a military ally, recently sending over $1.5 billion in economic aid.

Riyadh attempted to cash in on that commitment in early April, formally requesting Pakistan’s assistance in its campaign in Yemen. But when Pakistan’s parliament took up the matter two weeks ago, not a single member of the national assembly or the senate supported intervention. That decision didn’t take place in a vacuum, either: prior to the vote, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Islamabad to counsel Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff Raheel Sharif against authorizing the use of military force in Yemen.

The war in Yemen has put Pakistan at the center of Riyadh and Tehran’s power struggle in the region. What does this mean for Pakistan’s role in the Persian Gulf?

The vote marks a major shift in the relationship between Islamabad and Riyadh. Pakistan has a long history of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, basing thousands of troops there during the 1991 Gulf war. Sharif himself found refuge in Saudi Arabia after he was exiled in a military coup 16 years ago.

But Riyadh’s sectarian jostling with Iran has deeply impacted Pakistan since then. While Islamabad maintains strong economic and military ties with Saudi Arabia, it recognizes the rising power of Iran. Complicating matters further, the two countries share a 565-mile border.

Pakistan, which has the world’s second-largest Shia population, fears that intervening in Yemen could deepen sectarian conflict within its own borders. Shireen Marazi, a prominent Pakistani politician, expressed fears thatsending troops into Yemen would worsen sectarian tensions within the country. The growing Shiite minority could erupt in protest, especially if the conflict in Yemen further ignites religious tensions.

Pakistan is also wary that intervention could kill a proposed natural gas pipeline project between Iran and Pakistan. This proposed pipeline would supply Pakistan with enough energy to bridge its current electricity shortfall. While Iran has completed its half of the pipeline, Pakistan has refrained from continuing construction, fearing U.S.-imposed trade sanctions for cooperating with Tehran. Under the current framework of the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 group of powers, among the first sanctions lifted by West would be those on Iranian energy exports.

The vote for neutrality and its affirmation by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif demonstrates Pakistan’s commitment to the pipeline plan and to better relations with Iran in the future. Intervening in Yemen against the Houthis, with the Iran nuclear deal in flux, could agitate a vital ally.

Pakistan’s decision to remain neutral in Yemen’s conflict shows that its approach in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula is a challenging balancing act. The struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia has manifested itself in war zones throughout the Middle East, including in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Those conflicts, and the friction they cause between Tehran and Riyadh, will make it tough for Pakistan to find a middle ground in its foreign policy.

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Pakistan - Terrorist Sufi Muhammad To Walk

When the moratorium on the death penalty was lifted and the military was invited to invade the judicial process and set up military courts, the nation and human rights groups were assured that only “jet-black” terrorists would be executed. Since then, it seems the term “jet-black” does not involve militants with the clout and influence to wipe out evidence against them. In other words, within the parallel society of hardcore terrorists, there is a militant elite that cannot be touched, and that we have seen consistently acquitted by anti-terrorism courts. Inside a process absolutely devoid of transparency, with first details of executions reported via two-part tweets, a process that silently and conveniently ignores men like Lakhvi and Mumtaz Qadri, Sufi Muhammad, chief of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and father-in-law to Mullah Fazlullah has had 16 terrorism charges against him dropped (all of which were registered under the Anti-terrorism Act), by a special anti-terrorism court in Peshawar. The sedition charges against him have been moved to a sessions court in Swat, which is by and large, as good as an acquittal.
TSNM was declared a terrorist outfit and banned in 2002. Sufi Muhammad has been under arrest since 2009. His son in law, Mullah Fazlullah, leader of the banned Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has headed the TSNM in the absence of Sufi. And yet, it would seem that despite these facts, Sufi Muhammad cannot be labeled a jet-black terrorist, whereas petty thieves and underage criminals can. Is it not common sense to assume that a man heading a banned terrorist organisation is by definition a terrorist? A “jet-black” one at that? Under the vast jurisdiction and obscure conditions of the Protection of Pakistan Act, Sufi Muhammad is absolutely a terrorist. Yet he will walk free in Swat, because the state could not produce a shred of evidence against him. How is this possible? It only proves that the Anti-terrorism court is not powerful enough to do the job it is tasked to do. It does not have the means, the empowerment, perhaps even the will, to do the real dirty work. It is one thing executing nameless, anonymous militants. It is entirely another thing taking a mastermind with the family clout of Sufi Muhammad to task. It is a travesty that every terrorism charge against him has been rubbished. In doing so, the anti-terrorism courts have rubbished themselves.

Ex-envoy opposes US arms for Pakistan to fight extremism

http://www.dawn.com/

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, has strongly opposed the use of American military aid to fight extremists in Pakistan and said instead it will fuel conflict in South Asia.

The Obama administration announced this month to sell almost $1 billion worth of attack helicopters, missiles and other equipment to Pakistan.

Read: US, Pakistan must ‘divorce’ as allies: Husain Haqqani

Mr Haqqani said that: “Pakistan’s failure to tackle its jihadist challenge is not the result of a lack of arms but reflects an absence of will.

He said: “With nuclear weapons, Pakistan no longer has any reason to feel insecure about being overrun by a larger Indian conventional force.

For the US to continue supplying a Pakistani military that is much larger than the country can afford, will only invigorate Pakistani militancy and militarism at the expense of its 200 million people, one-third of whom continue to live at less than a dollar a day per household.”

Also read: Husain Haqqani resigns, ready to face inquiry

The former ambassador said that unless Pakistan changes its worldview, American weapons will end up being used to fight or menace India and perceived domestic enemies instead of being deployed against jihadists.

“Competition with India remains the overriding consideration in Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies. By aiding Pakistan over the years—some $40 billion since 1950, according to the Congressional Research Service—the US has fed Pakistan’s delusion of being India’s regional military equal.

Seeking security against a much larger neighbour is a rational objective but seeking parity with it on a constant basis is not.

Instead of selling more military equipment to Pakistan, Mr Haqqani said, US officials should convince Pakistan that its ambitions of rivaling India are akin to Belgium trying to rival France or Germany.

Pakistan faces dilemma as Saudi bills come due

Islamabad caught in a quandry over demand for troops to join war in Yemen

Was it a yes, a no or a "perhaps later"? For the past two weeks, Pakistan was locked in an anguished debate over how to respond to an appeal from Saudi Arabia for troops to fight in the war now raging in Yemen.

When the Saudi appeal first came, it seemed that the dispatch of Pakistani soldiers to the Gulf was imminent: "Any threat to the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia will be met with a firm response," read a communique from Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

But soon thereafter, Pakistan's foreign ministry issued a denial that any of the country's military was engaged in Yemen, though the Pakistani flag continued to fly alongside that of Arab nations at the Saudi-based headquarters of Yemen operations.

This "now-you-see-it, now-you-don't" game ended only when Pakistan's Parliament voted against the dispatch of troops. Still, the episode shed light on the murky world of Pakistani-Saudi relations, a link which looks destined to shape the security map of the Middle East for years to come.

Bereft of friends and under a constant fear of being dwarfed by India, Pakistani politicians have a tendency to over-hype every alliance their country forges.

"Higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey" was how one senior Pakistani diplomat described relations with China.

However, while the Sino-Pakistani link remains overt and powerful as yesterday's arrival of president Xi Jinping in Islamabad indicates, the ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are still hidden from publicity.

Saudi-Pakistani relations took off in the 1970s due to a variety of reasons, which include natural affinity between big Islamic states, Pakistan's ability to export labourers to the Gulf and the US-led response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which transformed both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into the Cold War's front-line states.

From the start of this relationship, two things were clear: that Saudi Arabia viewed Pakistan as a unique military partner able to plug the desert kingdom's inherent security vulnerabilities and, second, that the Saudis were determined to cement this alliance through the funding of a vast network of personal, commercial and business partnerships which ultimately drew in most of Pakistan's ruling elite.

Saudi Arabia bankrolled large chunks of Pakistan's nuclear programme precisely because the Saudis saw it as their own route to eventual nuclear power status, should Iran acquire such a capability.

Saudi credits also allowed Pakistan to withstand the economic sanctions, which followed. The man who was central to Pakistan's nuclear decision-making at the time is the same Nawaz Sharif who rules the country's destiny today.

But Saudi Arabia's support for Sharif is also of a more personal nature. During his decade-long political exile, it was the desert kingdom that provided him with home and necessary financial resources.

The Saudi largesse goes much further: At key points during the military rule of Pervez Musharraf, all of Pakistan's exiled politicians were hosted by the Saudis.

The Saudis understood that an alliance with Pakistan works best when that country's national interests coincide with the private interests of its politicians. But, while until fairly recently the Saudis were content not to ask for much in return, now they are beginning to demand their payback.

In 2011, when Bahrain's royal family was critically endangered by local Shi'ite protesters who had Iran's encouragement, it was Saudi Arabia which put pressure on Pakistan to send thousands of Pakistani ex-policemen and soldiers to Bahrain to quell the revolt.

In the years that followed, Pakistan was also asked to provide training and equipment for a variety of Saudi-financed fighters in Syria and Iraq. But it was the recent demand to supply Pakistani troops for the war in Yemen that plunged Pakistan into its biggest dilemma.

It is easy to see why the Saudis turned to Pakistan for help. Saudi Arabia wants to portray the fight against the Shi'ite rebels in Yemen as a confrontation between the whole of the Muslim world and Iran, which supports the rebellion in that country, and the inclusion of Pakistan into such a coalition helps.

From the Saudi perspective, the important advantage of Pakistan's engagement in the Yemen conflict is strategic: It will act as a reminder that, while Iran attempts to corner Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia can also corner Iran from the east, with the help of Pakistan, which shares a 900km border with Iran.

The snag for Pakistan is that any overt involvement in Saudi Arabia's wars will come at a heavy cost.

After Iran itself, the largest concentration of Shi'ite Muslims is in Pakistan, where they account for around 26 million out of the country's 190 million inhabitants.

Pakistan is already suffering from unprecedented levels of sectarian violence, and that would clearly intensify if the country's rulers are seen as engaging directly in the Sunni-Shi'ite war which now tears the Middle East apart.

Iran can also retaliate against Pakistan at little cost to itself, by encouraging mayhem in Afghanistan, and cross-border incursions into Pakistan itself; these are the well-honed techniques by which the Iranians have expanded their influence throughout the Middle East.

That will bring closer the nightmare Pakistan's military planners fear most: Instability on all of the country's borders at the same time.

The Pakistanis are trying to sweeten the pill of their refusal: Sharif sent his close aide Sartaj Aziz and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab province, to meet Saudi leaders in order to reassure them that, despite the refusal, Pakistan remains Saudi Arabia's loyal ally.

According to Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Pakistan has also offered to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran; the effort could mirror the mediation efforts which Pakistan undertook with great success between the US and China at the height of the Cold War.

But neither the Saudis nor the Iranians are in any mood for negotiations, so mediation offers will get nowhere.

Meanwhile, the Pakistanis seem destined to come under heavier pressure from their Arab allies: A minister in the United Arab Emirates has already threatened that Pakistan would "pay a heavy price" for its continued neutrality.

Nor can it be excluded that, sooner rather than later, the Saudis will address to Pakistan the demand Pakistani leaders fear most: A request for the transfer of nuclear weapons know-how.

The Pakistanis have spent decades hoping to have their cake and eat it, assuming that they can get Saudi financial help with no strings attached. They are now discovering that, sadly, bills do

Pakistan: Cybercrime Bill Threatens Rights

Lawmakers Should Reject Bill to Ensure Free Expression.

 Pakistani lawmakers should reject a new cybercrime prevention bill which contains provisions which threaten rights of privacy and freedom of expression.

In a joint statement published on April 20 and distributed to Pakistani members of parliament, Human Rights Watch joined nongovernmental organizations Article 19, Bolo Bhi, Bytes for All, Digital Rights Foundation, Pakistan for All, and Privacy International in expressing deep concern about elements of the new Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2015 (PECA) bill which violate Pakistan's commitments to universal human rights standards.

“The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act bill neither protects the public from legitimate online security concerns nor respects fundamental human rights,” said Phelim Kine, Asia division deputy director at Human Rights Watch. “In its present form, Pakistan's cybercrime prevention bill will instead institutionalize unacceptable violations of basic rights with a thin veneer of legality.”

The bill's abusive elements include provisions that allow the government to censor online content and to criminalize Internet user activity under extremely broad criteria which could be susceptible to abusive interpretation. The bill also permits government authorities access to the data of Internet users without any form of judicial review process to justify that access.

The National Assembly Standing Committee on Information Technology and Telecommunication approved the bill on April 16 and it now awaits consideration by the National Assembly and the Senate. Minister of State for Information Technology Advocate Anusha Rehman Khan has defended the bill as a means to prevent cybercrime, defend national security, and boost and protect information technology, e-commerce, and e-payments systems.

However, provisions of the bill which pose a threat to human rights and the security of internet users include the following:

• Article 9 criminalizes anyone who “prepares or disseminates” any type of electronic communication with the intent to praise a person simply “accused of a crime,” or to “advance religious, ethnic or sectarian hatred,” as well as the more conventional intent to praise terrorism or proscribed organizations. The ambiguity of these categories of “glorification” invites abusive interpretation; for example, someone could be prosecuted for merely blogging about persons arrested, in violation of freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence.
   
• Article 10 defines “Cyber-terrorism” as including “glorification” of crime (article 9 above) or unauthorized access to, copying, or transmission of “critical” information with intent to create a sense of fear or insecurity in the government or the public or to advance religious, ethnic, or sectarian hatred. These vague definitions create a serious potential threat to whistleblowers who may seek to publicly reveal intelligence that shows abuses by government officials or agencies.
   
• Article 28 gives an “authorized officer” the unilateral and unchecked power to order the provision of data or the preservation of data whenever the officer believes it is “reasonably required for the purposes of a criminal investigation” and there is risk the data may be later inaccessible. While the authorized officer is required to notify a court of such requests, the provision does not require the court to examine the legitimacy of the request or impose any particular safeguards for rights. When combined with expansive data retention requirements under article 29, this article raises serious concerns about unrestrained government access to private communications and chilling of the freedom of expression and association.
   
• Article 34 enables broad government powers of censorship, including authorizing blocking or removing online content if it considers it “necessary in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court or commission of or incitement to an offence under this Act.” The bill does not require an approval from a court, and undermines any ability to safeguard against misuse of the provision. This article's sweeping scope violates freedom of expression and could be used to purge virtually anything the government doesn't like.

“Pakistan's Prevention of Electronic Crimes bill constitutes a clear and present danger to human rights on the pretext of addressing legitimate fears about cybercrime,” Kine said. “If Pakistan's government is serious about protecting its citizens from online threats to their rights and security, it should start by overhauling the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act bill to remove its potentially abusive provisions.”

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U.N. says Afghanistan's court system fails women

By ALI M. LATIFI

The United Nations says Afghanistan's court system is failing to provide adequate access to women who are victims of violence. In a report released Sunday, “Justice through the eyes of Afghan Women,” the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan said more women are turning to non-judicial methods, such as local mediation councils, rather than the traditional court system.

The 35-page report, produced in cooperation with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, is comprised of a series of interviews with 110 women across 18 of the nation’s provinces between August 2014 and February 2015. The vast majority of those interviewed chose to resolve their disputes through mediation rather than legal means.

Though the Elimination of Violence Against Women law, passed by presidential decree in 2009, criminalized 22 acts of violence, the U.N. found several factors that caused women to shun the court system.

Along with fears of corruption, including paying bribes to move the process along, women in Afghanistan, as in many other countries, felt they lacked a clear understanding of the legal process to know how the law would be applied to their cases.

Also, with increasing economic insecurity and unemployment in the country, women feared alienating or imprisoning the men who are most often the sole breadwinners of their households.

Nicholas Haysom, the secretary-general’s special representative for Afghanistan and the head of the assistance mission, said: “Mediation of violence against women cases require support and monitoring so they are guided by principles of consent, safety, impartiality and inclusivity.”

The report found at least six cases in which a woman complainant was not present during mediation. In 11 other cases, the call for mediation was “imposed on the woman” by other parties.

Of the 80 cases that were seen through to completion, only five resulted in convictions. Though the U.N. favors referring cases of violence against women to the courts, women’s rights activists said that until the judiciary is rid of corruption and reaches the entire nation, the value of mediation cannot be discounted.

Orzala Ashraf Nemat, a women’s rights activist who worked directly on cases of violence against women from 1999 to 2007 in Afghanistan and the refugee camps of Pakistan said that while there is an “assumption that mediation is anti-woman, often it is also a lasting, long-term solution to domestic violence.”

Speaking to The Times, Nemat said the majority of the mediations she has been part of saw family members from both sides join together to find mutually agreed upon solutions under the supervision of the legal department of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.

For many Afghans, Nemat said, mediation is as much influenced by geography as any other factors.

“Afghanistan is still 80% rural. Beyond the boundaries of district centers, people do not have proper access to formal court systems,” she said.

Nemat conceded that violations take place in the mediation process, but said that courts have also proven problematic.

“In the past, we have had judges telling victims of gang rapes to marry their rapists. Clearly, there has to be a certain level of corruption in the formal systems for people to prefer mediation.”

It was these shortcomings, said Nemat, that led her and a collective of other female leaders and rights advocates to help craft the violence against women law.

“It came from the shortcomings we were facing in dealing with the Afghan judiciary system … because our laws are vague,” she said.

Afghanistan braces for violence as Islamic State makes presence felt

By Sune Engel Rasmussen 

Suicide bombing in Jalalabad first major attack by militants aligned with Isis, while further violence is expected as winter ends.

Afghanistan is bracing for an upsurge in violence as spring begins with a new maverick force emerging: militants associating themselves with Islamic State.

Isis claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in the eastern city of Jalalabad on Saturday, which appears to be the first major attack in Afghanistan by insurgents aligning themselves with the group which has been wreaking havoc across Syria and Iraq.

Ahmad Zia Abdulzai, spokesman for the provincial governor, said a suicide bomber on a motorcycle detonated a vest rigged with explosives in front of the state-run New Kabul Bank, which has been the target of attacks in the past, killing at least 33 people and injuring more than 100.

In a statement, a group calling itself the Province of Khorasan – Islamic State’s name for the region it strives to conquer – named the suicide bomber as Abu Mohammad Khorasani. On social media, Isis supporters shared a photo of the purported suicide bomber, masked and flanked by a Kalashnikov rifle.

The Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, seemingly taking his cue from media reports, named Isis as the perpetrators. Ghani made his comments to local journalists on a trip to the northern province of Badakhshan, where he went to mourn victims of other recent violence.

The surfacing of an Isis-aligned splinter group has caused anxiety among Afghans, though officials disagree about the level of the threat.

During his recent trip to Washington DC, where he also lobbied the US for continued military and financial support, Ghani called Isis “a terrible threat”.

However, former spy chief Amrullah Saleh said in an interview with Radio Free Afghanistan that Isis, known as Daesh throughout the Arab world, would not be able to spread roots in Afghanistan, “because whatever Daesh has been doing in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban have been doing the same in Afghanistan for the past 20 years”.

Borhan Osman, an analyst with Afghanistan Analysts Network who has tracked the emergence of Isis inAfghanistan, said the group might benefit from frictions within the Taliban.

“[Isis] has not built a solid, actual political presence in Afghanistan so far,” Osman said, “but if the Taliban quasi-monopoly is broken, that will help [it] to build networks and their brand.”

With or without Isis, this year’s fighting season threatens to be the most deadly since the US-led invasion in 2001.

At least 23 Afghan soldiers were killed last week when Taliban militants overran their military posts in Jurm district. The Taliban answered Ghani’s promises to “defend our soil” with defiance.

“If they try to do an operation, we are ready to defend ourselves,” Zabiullah Mujahed, a spokesman for the group told the Guardian.

Even a supposedly safe haven like the northern city of Mazar-I Sharif has suffered a rare bout of violence. On 9 April, four gunmen stormed the provincial prosecutor’s office in the city, taking hostages and leaving at least 10 people dead.

Casualties have risen drastically since foreign troops began drawing down from a peak of nearly 150,000 troops in 2011.

With more than 10,000 civilian casualties, last year was the bloodiest on record for ordinary Afghans. In a new report, the UN documents an 8% increase in civilian casualties from ground engagements in the first three months of 2015, compared to the same period last year.

The research shows that, as foreign troops have largely receded from the battlefield and limited aerial support to the Afghan security forces, fighting has drawn closer to residential areas. As a result, the proportion of women and children among casualties is at an all-time high. 

“The continuing use of suicide attacks in densely populated areas, that are certain to kill and maim large numbers of Afghan civilians, may amount to a war crime,” Nicholas Haysom, the UN’s head of mission in Afghanistan, said in a statement on Saturday.

The Taliban traditionally launches an offensive in the spring, when snow recedes from the mountains. As they advance, the fighting uproots thousands of civilians.

“People are being displaced in much higher numbers than last year,” said Pia Jensen, programme manager for emergency response with People in Need, an NGO. “Militants come down and attempt to recruit people. They grab young guys and force families to feed them, or to give one of their sons to the fight.”

She said residents are being pressured by an influx of militants from Pakistan, where a long-standing military campaign in North Waziristan has pushed over 300,000 people across the border. More than 50,000 undocumented Afghans have also left Pakistan since December after harassment from authorities, according to the International Organisation for Migration. There are likely a substantial number of potential insurgents among the displaced, said Jensen.

Pakistan - The Chinese Solution

After several delays, interruptions and false starts, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, is set to begin his visit of Pakistan where he is scheduled to meet top civilian and military leadership and address the parliament. While the Chinese premier is here he is expected to sign several Memorandums of Agreement (MOU) and oversee the launch of $50 billion worth of infrastructural and energy projects; meaning that the work on the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (PCEC) can begin in earnest. The visit is also significant as it marks the beginning of a strategic tilt in Pakistan’s foreign alliances; away from transient alliances with the United states, and towards geo-strategic based ones with regional partners. The period ahead holds vast potential for Pakistan; and as such the government needs to ensure that it is handled with diligence, intelligence and sincerity.
The importance of the PCEC is self evident; during the next 7 years energy projects worth $35-37 billion are scheduled to be completed, many of them utilising renewable sources such as solar power and wind. These coupled with indigenously developed power projects hold the ability to end Pakistan’s crippling energy crisis – or at least bring it down to a less damaging level. The infrastructural projects, especially around the port of Gawadar, would open numerous trade opportunities. Easier movement of goods, access to new markets and an influx of new products are bound to impact the economy positively. The next decade could see Pakistan move towards an industry driven development phase, one that is sorely needed to push Pakistan out of its economic mediocrity. Yet the ‘Chinese Solution’ is not a magic fix, it requires momentous effort from the Pakistani authorities, to realize the potential.
The first concern is the transparency of the developmental process. The government, especially PML-N is infamous for awarding construction contract based on nepotism, and inevitably they run the risk of being substandard. The second is the diligence and speed with which these projects are completed, our “Iron Brother” is making an investment out of which they hope to receive a substantial return; any dithering on Pakistan’s part would prompt them to seek new clients. Thirdly, this development envisions a stable working environment, terrorism and militancy needs to be controlled across the board and indiscriminately; otherwise neither the construction, neither the prospective investment will materialize. This is a challenge that the state needs to contend with. The state –the government and the establishment – needs jettison obsolete and self-serving polices and display full transparency and accountability. Perhaps most significantly however, PCEC will remain nothing more than a pipe dream if policy continuation by successive governments is not enshrined in the Constitution. Economic priorities especially to the tune of $50 billion dollars of investment, must not change with every general election.

Pakistan - Human rights report card

For the most part, the HRCP’s State of Human Rights in 2014 does not make for very optimistic reading. The report highlights the fact that where human rights and fundamental freedoms in Pakistan are concerned, 2014 saw much of the same violence and exploitation that this country has known for far too long.

As the document notes, the last year began with “...faith-based assaults on religious minorities. ...” and came to a harrowing end with the APS Peshawar massacre.

And as the statistics show, vulnerable groups such as religious and sectarian minorities, women, children and the poor had to struggle to survive in a stifling atmosphere dominated by violence and intimidation, with the state largely failing to protect the citizens’ fundamental rights.

Read: HRCP presents dismal rights picture

Terrorism remained Pakistan’s foremost security concern in 2014, taking a bloody toll, with over 1,700 deaths in terrorist attacks. Violence against women also remained high, with hundreds of girls and women raped and subjected to ‘honour’ killings.

Far too many cases of custodial killings were reported, as were incidents of torture in custody, while sectarian and targeted killings continued to bedevil the country.

Yet in such an atmosphere of gloom there were a few bright spots. These included the fact that the provinces were active in the lawmaking sphere while the number of missing persons in Balochistan was down, but only slightly. Also welcome was the broad national consensus to tackle militancy that developed in the aftermath of the Peshawar tragedy.

But the shape this consensus took — the formation of military courts, the resumption of capital punishment — points to a preference for short-term, populist solutions rather than a desire to address the systemic, societal problems that feed militancy and terrorism.

Moreover, such solutions have given the state, especially the security establishment, sweeping powers that stray perilously close to trampling on basic rights.

Perhaps the root cause of Pakistan’s dismal human rights situation is the state’s lack of ability to implement existing laws, as well as the failure of the criminal justice system.

The report says that by the end of 2014, there were nearly two million cases pending in the country’s courts. This lack of accountability and justice delivery says much about the state’s desire to protect the people’s rights and bring the usurpers of those rights to justice.

The HRCP document rightly says that the “gap between laws and implementation” is a key reason behind the growth of crime, especially targeting minorities and vulnerable segments of society.

There seems to be complacency prevalent in all sections of the state and society. Yet the protection of fundamental rights is not the job of civil society or activists alone; it should be a matter of concern for every Pakistani.

Unless the state delivers on its responsibilities and the citizens actively remind the rulers of their duties, the weak and the vulnerable will continue to be exploited in Pakistan.

Co-Chairman PPP Asif Ali Zardari to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping tomorrow

Co-Chairman Pakistan Peoples Party President Asif Ali Zardari will call on the visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Islamabad tomorrow.

Vice President PPPP Sherry Rehman will accompany him during the meeting.

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Pakistan - PPP Human Rights Cell’s statement on Cyber Crime Bill

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The PPP Human Rights Cell Central Coordinator and Member National Assembly Dr Nafisa Shah has expressed concern on the passing of the Cyber Crimes Bill in the National Assembly Standing Committee without input and feedback of the stakeholders, the consumers, the software and IT industry in the country.

Nafisa Shah @ShahNafisa

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The concerns of the civil society on infringement of basicrights in #CyberCrimeBill r valid, govt must hold the Bill until they r addressed

10:25 AM - 19 Apr 2015

“The strong reaction of the civil society, the social media and the IT industry who have termed this Bill a ‘draconian law’ indicates that the government has proposed a law that might further curb rights and freedoms and may give arbitrary and sweeping powers to the government to block internet content at whim, and to victimize and muzzle criticism in the social media” said the PPP HR Cell Coordinator.
“The Peoples Party and other political parties in the opposition have also not been involved in the consultation on implications of this law on the freedom of expression. The party fears that this law will provide space for censorship” she added.
“This government is particularly famous for its secrecy, its antidemocratic, anti consultative approach to both law and governance. It has unfortunately an abysmal track record in law making and most of the laws, from POPA, to 21st constitutional amendment, has only restricted fundamental rights.
“We urge therefore that this law is brought into the public sphere for a wider consultation where the controversial parts of this law are amended, and the law is thoroughly reviewed and revised before it is tabled on the floor of the National Assembly.”

Challenge to India as Russia to invest $2 Billion to Build Energy Pipeline in Pakistan

by Rajeev Sharma

In the fast-changing geopolitics in its neighbourhood, India needs to watch Russia from the Pakistani prism and Pakistan from the Russian prism.

This should sum up the state of affairs in the newly emerging India-Pakistan-Russia triangle where the United States and China are the crucial X factors.

The latest example of Russia-Pakistan bonhomie is the news emanating from Islamabad that Russia has agreed to invest $2 billion in Pakistan to build an 1100-km-long energy pipeline from Karachi to Lahore to transport liquefied natural gas.

Pakistan Petroleum Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was quoted by Pakistani daily Express Tribune as saying thus on 18 April: "Pakistan and Russia have finalized an LNG pipeline deal in a recent meeting in Moscow and the two countries will sign a government-to-government basis deal next month."

More details are as follows. In return for the Russian investment, Russian companies will be awarded the contract to build the pipeline. Russia has offered to sell gas to Pakistan and will start its first LNG exports to Pakistan in 2016. The Russia-Pakistan contract will be awarded without any formal bidding process, which clearly means that it is a G2G or government-to-government understanding implying how closely Moscow and Islamabad are now working.

Pakistan is a potential lucrative market for gas exports for Russia which is the second largest natural gas exporter in the world.

Significantly, the move also means that Pakistan is willing to dare the United States-led Western community which has announced crippling sanctions on Russia for Moscow’s perceived sins of omission and commission over the Ukraine episode.

Naturally Pakistan cannot embark on this roadmap without the approval of China. This means that an interesting Russia-Pakistan-China synergy is emerging in the regional and global matrix. And all this is obviously at the expense of India.

Of late, a strategic shift is noticeable in Pakistan-Russia relations which this writer discussed in some detail here http://www.firstpost.com/world/will-the-pakistan-russia-military-exercise-make-new-delhi-moscow-ties-sour-2199754.html

The Pakistan-Russia bonhomie had started way back in the tenure of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani dictator who saw merit in courting Russia. During General Musharraf’s tenure, a Pakistan-Russia tango was considered a fool’s dream considering very strong and vibrant Russia-India ties.

But the geopolitical equations have changed drastically now. Pakistan-Russia proximity is not a diplomatic improbability anymore.

One major sign of Russia-Pakistan rapprochement came in 2012 when the then Pakistan Army chief General Kayani visited Russia. This was followed by a groundbreaking visit by Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu to Pakistan on 20 November, 2014, the first visit by a Russian defence minister to Pakistan in 45 years.

Afghanistan was the central theme of Shoigu’sdiscussions withhis Pakistani counterpart Khawaja Muhammad Asif . Russia and Pakistan signed an unprecedented defence agreement after talks between Shoigu and Asif.

Russia is in search of newer friends and markets in the wake of the Western sanctions. Anyone ready to stymie the West and embrace Russia at this point of time is welcome for Moscow. Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world to do this.

That’s why and how it is the best time for Pakistan and Russia to script a never-before story of bonhomie which could not materialize all these past decades.

From the Russian point of view, India is a changed girlfriend who is having dalliances with the US-led Western community. The multi-billion dollar Indian defence contracts have dried up for the Russian companies. To add insult to injury, the US has already displaced Russia as the single biggest defence exporter.

Simultaneously, the diplomatic-strategic graph of Pakistan for Russia has risen sharply. The American/NATO troops have started withdrawing from Afghanistan and only a small inconsequential number of these troops will remain in Afghanistan by 2016 end.

This would mean a concurrent increase in Pakistan’s profile in Afghanistan and Russia would like to tap this source for tackling an Afghanistan in Pakistani grip the way China has done for years. From this perspective, Pakistan is far more important for Russia though Russia and Pakistan do not share border.

Salvaging ties with a trusted and tested strategic partner like Russia should be a high priority for Prime MinisterNarendra Modi.

Modi will have an opportunity to do this when he visits Russia in July this year to participate in the BRICS summit. Needless to say, Pakistan will be an elephant in the room when PM Modi holds talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

It will perhaps be the first-ever Indo-Russian summit when the two old friends will be talking under the lengthening shadow of Pakistan.

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