Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Pakistan - Minority protection




JAMAATUL AHRAR claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attacks targeting two churches in Lahore, which resulted in several deaths. In retaliation, an angry mob lynched two innocent citizens (in police custody) they thought were involved. The state stood by as a silent observer. Episodes of attacks against religious and ethnic minorities have sadly become routine. While the government condemns such acts, it is unable to prevent them. The state has not owned up to its responsibility to proactively protect the minorities’ right to life.
The state argues it is not the state, but terrorist/non-state actors who violate this right. Disregarding for a moment the state’s failure to adequately prosecute the perpetrators, or its role in sowing the roots of such aggression, the question is: what level of positive (in which the state takes action) obligation is required from a government to protect the civil, political and socio-economic rights of vulnerable communities?
The Westphalian state has provided negative (where the state is passive) rights and freedoms to its population. Western tradition has valued civil and political over social, economic and cultural rights and has continued to view only the transgression of the former by the state as a true rights violation. In other words, there is little legal obligation on the state to positively protect human rights when it is not directly causing the violation itself.
Further, while the judicial system is available for violations of individually vested legal rights, this has not been so for the dispensation of group rights including minority freedoms. This was not always the case in Europe. In the pre-Second World War period, several states through treaties assumed the responsibility of protecting minorities as a group. Minorities were to be given special consideration so they could be equal in fact as well as in the eyes of the law. Such forms of protection did not work in the run-up to the Holocaust. Thus their subsequent absence in international conventions could partly be a result of the view that by demarcating a group of people as a minority, the state effectively ‘others’ them and alienates them from the majority of the population.

The state must set aside a budget for the realisation of rights.


Seminal international rights treaties retain this approach. There is no operational convention that thematically focuses on the protection of religion or minorities, while there exists one on the rights of the child, the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights primarily focuses on negative rights and freedoms; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment requires the involvement of a public official for acts to be classified as such; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while focusing on positive obligations attributable to a state, views these rights as aspirational, not legally vested and subject to progressive realisation. Pakistan is a signatory to these UN conventions.
Naturally, a number of developing and non-Western states including the communist bloc and Islamic states challenged the present understanding of state responsibility and the hierarchy and conceptualisation of international human rights. While at international fora, Pakistan has been a protagonist in this resistance movement, at the national level it starts to present contradictory arguments to shirk responsibility and obstruct accountability.
Rights become compromised when the state fails to expend public funding to enable them. Apart from legal reform, such as stren­gthening hate speech laws, the state’s duty to protect minority rights means it must set aside a budget aimed at providing the infrastructure for the realisation of such rights. The government must be held accountable and actively protect and promote minority rights. It needs to allocate public funds for effecting awareness drives promoting tolerance. Among other measures, the state media should be employed and the curricula revised to promote diversity and harmony.
The state needs to have a long-term sustainable policy aimed at protecting minority rights and religious freedoms. It is true that positive state duties in the West do not require as much expenditure as the provision of positive rights would in Pakistan. However, such an allocation of finite funds becomes a legislative prerogative, and once allocated the state can be held directly accountable via the judiciary for its spending and performance. There is precedent for such an approach — positive obligations have been monitored and dispensed with successfully in states like South Africa through active judicial involvement.
Sadly, in Pakistan in response to every major attack on minorities, political parties at best offer condemnations and the government sometimes provides monetary compensation to the families of the victims. These gestures are hardly solutions to an endemic problem.
The writer is the author of International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-political Aspects.

Pakistan - The Mad-ressah problem

IT was always going to be a difficult task — reforming the madressah sector and purging elements within who promote extremism, militancy and terrorism. But as a report in this newspaper yesterday indicates, the government appears to have all but given up already.
Three months on from the articulation of the National Action Plan, the federal government does not appear to have even decided which ministry should take the lead in dealing with the various madressah networks in the country.
Take a look: The madressah factor
Should it be the Ministry of Interior, with its basic responsibilities for law and order and hence identifying extremist- and militancy-supporting madressahs? Or should it be the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which coordinates with the madressah networks and in theory ought to have responsibility for determining the curricula taught?
Or should it be the Ministry of Finance, a unit of which is meant to supervise financial transactions in the country, that must be aware of the money flowing to the madressah networks?
Yet, unless all three are done, unless curricula reform, capturing militants and monitoring financial flows are pursued by the relevant ministries, a certain sub-section of the national madressah network will continue to pose a threat to the country’s security.
The problem, as ever, appears to be less about the difficulties in drafting a meaningful plan and implementing it with purpose, and more about the state — both the political and military arms — not really considering it a priority.
Perhaps the PML-N finds it easier to do nothing: taking on the religious right with its street power and other means to put pressure on the state is hardly something any elected government would relish doing.
Perhaps the army-led military establishment is preoccupied with fighting militants and extremists, or maybe it does not consider dealing with extremism its responsibility.
Whatever the reasons for the state sinking back into inaction against the nurseries of hate, intolerance and extremism in the country, the effect is predictable: the gains in the short term, via military operations, against militancy and terrorism will likely be squandered in the long term.
For there is little possibility of the state winning the fight against militancy if it does not also seek to address the root causes. Why are so many Pakistanis taught distorted religious ideas in centres funded by foreigners?
It must also not be forgotten that the madressahs are only one part of a much bigger mosque-madressah-social welfare network that is collectively used to spread distorted beliefs and, sometimes, preach violence and hate.
Just yesterday, the Jamaatud Dawa, perhaps the most well known of the so-called welfare networks, held a public event in Karachi to commemorate March 23 — this just a month after intense speculation about whether the group is to be banned or not. How serious, then, is the state in its promise to end militancy and terrorism of every stripe?

Video - Sherry Rehman discusses Pak-Afghan relations on Between Frontiers


Between Frontiers - 23rd March 2015 by sm_raza1

Rewriting the Pakistani script


Ayaz Amir


A few words about the parade...why must the accompanying commentary be so hysterical? I put on the TV at about a few minutes to eleven but the commentary, male and female, was just too much, going on and on without a moment’s rest, much too loud and indeed deadlier than any of the weaponry marching past. If the military can’t be made to learn the uses of brevity what hope for the rest of the nation? Thanks to the commentary, two minutes of the parade was all I could stand. There was also the charismatic visage of the president. On this subject what more is there to say?

I have no problem with patriotism but I do have a problem with the myths and fantasies surrounding Muslim power in the Subcontinent. This power reached its zenith under Shah Jahan. Aurangzeb was also a great emperor but by his time the empire had begun to show signs of exhaustion. Too much was spent on the wars in the Deccan and against the Marathas and the aged emperor spent his last years trying to douse these fires. 

It is worth remembering that when European armies had developed new battlefield tactics Mughal emperors were still riding to battle on elephant back. The great Babur was in step with his times but by the time of Aurangzeb it was clear that the modern age had bypassed the Mughal Empire – as indeed it was bypassing most of the Muslim world.

Aurangzeb died in 1707 and within a space of 32 years the Timurid Empire, mighty in its time, could not withstand the invasion of the Persian king, Nadir Shah, who ransacked Delhi and carried off its treasures, including the Peacock Throne and the Kohinoor diamond. A daughter of the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah Rangila was taken by a son of Nadir Shah as his wife. Thousands of girls, both Muslim and Hindu, went as slave girls. Afghanistan and Punjab were detached from the Mughal Empire.

The Sikhs were a rising power in Punjab, there were rebellions elsewhere, and the British had established a foothold in Bengal. Muslim power in Hindustan was thus on the decline, the days of its glory over. Paradoxically, the arrival of the British and the establishment of their Raj helped to arrest the process of this decline. The Sikh kingdom of Lahore was not defeated by Muslims; it was crushed by the British. And it were the British who lent a ready ear to the very loyal and almost obsequious plea of the Muslim League, when a delegation of Muslim grandees waited on Lord Minto in Shimla in 1905, for consideration and special treatment.

The concern of the Muslim community, or its leading torch-bearers, in the years leading up to the Pakistan resolution in1940 was less freedom and liberation from foreign rule and more the fear of Hindu domination. It was not about kicking the British out of India. It was about the morning after, about what would happen once the British had gone. Not to put too fine a point on it, the Pakistan movement was thus born out of a sense of fear and foreboding. And that fear – despite our missiles, tanks and nuclear capability – seems not to have left Pakistan’s decision-making circles even after the passage of all these years.

Turkey under the great Ataturk made a clean break with its past. The Bolshevik revolution was a break with the Tsarist past. Mao and the Chinese communist party erased all the symbols of the past and created a new Chinese consciousness. If the leading lights of the Muslim community were at all interested in building a modern, progressive society then here too the effort should have been to leave the past behind, after reflecting on its weaknesses, and then laying the foundations of a new society.

The Chinese communists did away with such symbols of the old China as the pigtail and the clothes worn in the old days. Ataturk did away with the fez, that symbol of traditional Turkish society, and decreed that even the Turkish peasant tilling the land would wear western clothes. Look at any gathering of the 1947 Muslim League leadership. The paladins are the very pictures of caution and respectability, on their faces not a trace of boldness or anything out of the ordinary. 

We should have had a constitution within a year if not six months. Quaid-e-Azam should have realised the importance of the Bengali language and there should have been no language issue in the new state. Feudalism should have been abolished at once and land reforms undertaken – large estates broken up and land distributed among tenants and small farmers. In the new state there should have been no place for distinctions of caste and creed. Titles such as makhdooms, maliks, chaudrys, etc, should have been abolished at once. But the new leadership in West Pakistan was landlord-dominated. The concern of this leadership was to protect its privileges, not go about creating a progressive society.

The Kashmir war, once begun, should have been prosecuted with vigour. Srinagar was there for the taking, defenceless and open. But the tribesmen tarried and there weren’t enough officers with the requisite ability or audacity to grab that opportunity.

The distribution of evacuee property – admittedly not an easy task – could have been undertaken on different lines, each incoming migrant getting one small house or a portion of a house. But this became a scam, false claims being submitted and a race started for the grabbing and accumulation of property. Of all the legacies of independence and Partition this has proved to be the most enduring, the accumulation of property by fair means or foul the leading symbol of the new state.

And Pakistan entered into alliances with America and became a pawn, a stooge, in the emerging cold war. Pakistan’s leaders – the bureaucrats and feudalists sitting in its councils – did not have the imagination to steer an independent path for the new country. The achkan-wearing and poetry-spouting leaders of the Muslim community were afraid in undivided Hindustan. Fear and insecurity remained their defining hallmarks even when the new state was formed.

But all this is past and done. This is a country of 200 million souls. It deserves better. It deserves to step into the modern age. Granted that there is no Ataturk around and no Chinese communist party, and the political class just can’t free itself from its conservative and reactionary outlook. But are there no progressive elements left in this decrepit society? Is all hope lost? Is there no way forward? 

No, our prospects can’t be that bleak. Isn’t the army trying to follow new directions? It hasn’t discarded all its prejudices or pet theories but a beginning is being made. How long before the rest of the nation becomes serious about national renewal?

We can’t remain the inheritors of a dead civilisation. We can’t keep mouthing the old inanities. We can’t keep taking refuge behind Islam, raising its banner when stumped for answers.

On the political front we need greater vitality, greater imagination, and a better crop of leaders. Does our society have this capacity of throwing up something new? There are leaders claiming to be agents of change. On a bad morning one look at them is enough to make the heart sink. Still, there is no alternative. Pakistan renews itself or it keeps floundering.

New trends are slowly emerging and that is a positive sign. A year ago there was no possibility of serious action against extremism and terrorism. A month ago who could have imagined that the MQM would be bearded in its den? Small signs but they add up to something different.

But a greater shaking up is needed, something in the nature of upheavals that other nations have gone through. Question is whether that lucky moment will ever arrive or through some accident of fate or history we are condemned to those two greatest afflictions of human society, mediocrity and decline?

Pakistan’s Identity Problem




Pakistan's "establishment" has chosen to focus solely on the country's Muslim history, but that has done more harm than good in forging the nation's identity.
When you hear about Pakistan, what most often comes to mind? The place where schools, markets, and neighborhoods are routinely bombed? The terrorist haven where Osama bin Laden hid for almost a decade? The “Pak” in Af-Pak? The difficult ally America can’t drop because of its nuclear capabilities? The country where Malala Yousafzai was shot? All of this is true, but there is so much more to this country of 182 million people.
The common perception of Pakistan is more similar to its neighbor in the west (Afghanistan) than the one in the east (India), the country with which it shares its history. This is a direct result of how Pakistan’s “establishment” — its military and political elite — has defined its identity. This definition emphasizes Islam above all else, and pitches Pakistan as completely different from India.
In Pakistan’s history textbooks, Hindus and Muslims living on the Indian sub-continent during British colonial-era rule, and for centuries before, are described as two nations –distinct and separate. Yet the reality is that they intermingled and co-existed, sharing their customs and culture. In fact, until the British came and conducted a census in 1881, no one knew how many South Asians were Hindu and how many were Muslim.
The official version of Pakistan’s history only has room for Muslim heroes — no Sikhs, no Hindus — and only orthodox Muslims, at that. For instance, the Mughal Emperor Akbar, who ruled from 1556 until 1605, and espoused a tolerant version of Islam, giving Hindus prominent positions in his cabinet, is compared unfavorably to the orthodox but cruel Emperor Aurangzeb. (Aurangzeb ruled from 1658 to 1707, and had political opponents executed, including his own brother, Prince Dara Shikhoh.) Bhagat Singh, a Sikh revolutionary from now-Pakistani Punjab who fought for independence from the British, isn’t mentioned at all in Pakistani textbooks. He isn’t even remembered on the street: A move by activists to have a traffic circle in Lahore — where he was hanged to death in 1931 — named after him in 2012encountered intense opposition and was tabled.
Because Pakistan has disavowed large parts of its past and its identity, it is easier to define it in terms of its present struggle with terrorism. There is little else people know about it. Few people ask me about what Pakistan is really like, about life in my hometown, Lahore, the city of gardens.
No one knows about the city’s historic Sufi shrines, the grand Badshahi Mosque, or the Lahore Fort, which is next to a gorgeous Sikh gurdwara (a place of worship). Travel to the country is often discouraged, especially if one is not Pakistani, but even if the security situation were different, how many people would know about its rich heritage? And can one blame them, if Pakistan itself disowns large parts of it? Yet in erasing Pakistan’s past and creating an Islamic identity for the country, the establishment has, in fact, contributed to the worsening security situation.
Since the 1970s, Pakistan’s military and political elite have chosen religious fundamentalism over a democratic plurality. The establishment has emphasized a Sunni Muslim identity at the exclusion of all other ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities. Saudi-imported Wahhabism — an ultra-conservative version of Sunni Islam that lies at odds with South Asia’s tradition of Sufi-influenced Barelvi Islam — has been making in-roads in Pakistani society since the 1980s. The Ahmadi sect, which considers itself to be Muslim, was declared “non-Muslim” by Pakistan’s leaders in 1974. The colonial-era blasphemy laws were made particularly severe in the 1980s, and since 1987, 1,335 people have been accused of defaming Islam. Vigilantes have attacked many of those who have been accused, and militant groups are thriving in this shrinking space for diversity.
Yet this path wasn’t inevitable with the creation of a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. In his August 11, 1947, address to the Constituent Assembly, Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah was clear that he intended it to be a country for Muslims that welcomed all religions, not an Islamic country. Today, his vision has given way to a harsh, one-dimensional reality — to a country better known for harboring bin Laden than anything else.
But all is not lost. Pakistan’s creative, intellectual heart strives to be heard over the din of poor security. People are writing books, holding literature festivals, putting on plays, and creating wonderful music. In fact, they seem to be doing a better job than ever, given all of the odds stacked against them. Yet for the rest of the world, Pakistan’s image remains unchanged.
The West would do well to recognize Pakistan’s long history, its beautiful complexity, its many dimensions, and its South Asian-ness, but the final burden rests with Pakistan’s leaders. The country must preserve its glorious pre-Islamic heritage, such as the ancient city of Mohenjo Daro in Sindh province, which was built 4,500 years ago, but is threatened by the elements and mismanagement. It must embrace its full past, Islamic and non-Islamic. It must teach its complete history, which includes Hindu empires and Muslim rulers. It must celebrate all of the ethnicities living within its borders, and the richness of its South Asian culture. Imposing an identity that does away with this history and diversity has done Pakistan enough harm.

Sardar Ali Takkar - PERSIAN POETRY - LAAL SHAHBAZ QALANDAR

Monday, March 23, 2015

Video - U.S. to continue funding Afghan Security Forces

Afghan President Says He is Working With US to Repair Relations

In an exclusive interview with Voice of America on Sunday evening shortly after his arrival in Washington, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani spoke about his request for a change in U.S. troop levels, the threat from the Islamic State, and what he is doing to set a course to repair relations with the United States.
The interview with Afghan Service reporter Said Suleiman Ashna was held at Blair House in the Pashto language. What follows is an edited transcript.
Q: Why did you request a change in the troop levels?
Ghani: “We were in a dangerous situation. Our elections went through a complicated process, resulting in the waste of almost eight months. On top of that, (former Afghan) President (Hamid) Karzai’s decision not to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement [BSA] has led to a hasty withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and that in part contributed to the weakening of technical assets at our disposal in the country.
“The very issue of funding, equipping and training the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] came under question with the speedy withdrawal of foreign forces. In the past six months, we have managed to survive from a fundamental problem which the enemies had greatly counted on and it was apparently the God forbid, complete overthrow of the Afghan government or the loss of certain provinces to the enemy.
“We have successfully managed to foil that plot. The prevention of this great plot is a victory for the Afghan nation and the Afghan National Security Forces. Initially, we were in defensive mode, but with the grace of God, we have managed to transition to offensive mode.
“In addition to that, when Afghanistan was going through the transfer of security responsibility from NATO to Afghan National Security Forces, I had the honor to lead and facilitate the process. At that time, the situation differed from that of today. The decision to launch a military offensive against militants in North and South Waziristan was not even considered or thought of at the time nor was deliberations given to its impact on Afghanistan.
“Secondly, the threat of Dayesh (ISIS) was not even in the minds of the people. Moreover, from a qualitative perspective, terrorist networks have transformed and they have begun concentrating on us [Afghanistan] through various factors. Our historical name of “Khurassan” has a vital and symbolic significance for the ISIS and you are aware of the fact that many ISIS members have changed their surnames to “Khurasaani”.
“In their philosophy [ISIS’s philosophy], Dajal will emerge from Khurasaan and fight them [ISIS] in the apocalyptic war in Syria. Considering this environment and circumstances and bearing in mind our national interests and global threats, we have had a series of discussions and reached to this common conclusion.”
Q:What have you done to repair relations with the US?
Ghani: “First of all, we have taken the initiative to act. On the very first day of the National Unity Government, we have signed the Bilateral Security Agreement [BSA] with the United States and the multi-lateral security agreement with NATO. On the second day of the government, we concentrated on the issue of corruption and reopened the Kabul bank case. On the third day of the government, I have assumed the tasks the of commander-in-chief.
“We did not sit idle and rather sought to implement our program step by step. We have launched a series of discussions with them (the United States) premised on rational fundamental issues and free of emotions. In addition to that, we have taken the initiative on regional level as well and did not wait for anyone.
“China was geographically closer to us and we are the first country to have sought closer ties with both the United States and China. We have concentrated on the Arab and the Islamic world as well and have utilized all our five foreign political rings to proceed. We have realized that the United States is our strategic ally and debates amongst allies ought to be premised on principles, mutual interests and rationality.”
Q: What is the most important thing you're going to tell Obama?
Ghani: We have mutual interests and are faced with common threats. Given that, we have to create the type of coordination and cooperation that both ensures Afghanistan’s national interests and secures United States vital interests in the region.
Q: Will the political division of the U.S congress have an impact on the U.S-Afghan relations?
Ghani: “Absolutely not, because with the grace of God, all political leaders in the U.S have come to a common conclusion to agree on Afghanistan. I have spent a lot of time with members of the U.S Congress. Upon assuming the office of the president of Afghanistan, I have talked to them over the phone and have met with U.S Congress delegates in person upon their numerous visits to Afghanistan.
“I have talked to them (members of the U.S Congress) in Munich as well. You know that not every leader gets to talk to the Joint Session of the U.S Congress and I have the honor to address the American people and their respective representatives in the U.S Congress. It’s vital to send the message in my address to the U.S Congress that Afghanistan is collectively and unitedly moving forward and is faced with clear, real and visible threats. And Afghanistan will triumph over these threats. We will appreciate their assistance to Afghanistan.”
Q: Why have national peace talks not taken place?
Ghani: “Peace talks should be conducted directly or else it will create doubts in our society and doubts break our national unity which is essential for us. Enabling the environment for peace was my job and I have done so which created the necessary bedrock to proceed with peace talks.
“However, one has to be very cautious in these circumstances because wrong moves and wrong assumptions bring about dangerous consequences. Mr. Karzai’s administration has put a lot of efforts into the peace talks. President Karzai has travelled 26 times to Pakistan, but it could not enable the environment for peace.
“Now, conditions have changed. The policy that we have been pursuing right now with regards to peace talks, with God’s grace will yield achievements and progress. However, unless and until the environment is ready, I will not be in a position to assure my nation and so long as I am not confident about the environment, remarks about the peace process will be pre-judgment on my part about the peace talks.”
Q: Have you discussed Durand Line border with Pakistan?
Ghani: No. Durand is not an issue in our discussions with Pakistan. The issue of Durand is beyond my authority. That belongs to the Afghan Grand Council (Loya Jirga). Currently we (Afghanistan and Pakistan) are discussing common threats and opportunities that how two independent governments could bring about the type of coordination and cooperation that will yield peace, stability and prosperity for the entire region.”

Video - Afghan leadership duo visit US to secure troops, aid

Ashraf Ghani: U.S. Critical To Afghanistan's Future

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani tells NPR that most people in his country want a continued U.S. troop presence and that his government is determined to make sure that the self-declared Islamic State does not gain a foothold.
Ghani, on an official visit to the United States, spoke in a wide-ranging interview withMorning Edition host Renee Montagne to be broadcast on Monday.
He says the perception that Afghans are eager for U.S. troops to leave the country is simply untrue. "They see the United States as critical to their future," he says.
Ghani, who came to power in September succeeding longtime President Hamid Karzai, is expected to spend Monday at Camp David, Md., for discussions with Secretary of State John Kerry and to meet with President Obama at the White House on Tuesday. He is also scheduled for talks with Defense Secretary Ashton Carter to discuss security and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew to talk about the economic challenges faced by Afghanistan.
Asked about ISIS, Ghani expressed concern that "terrorism is morphing into a system. ... It's becoming sophisticated. And more than anything else, it's controlling immense resources."
In Afghanistan, the Islamic State, he says, is "posing a threat, but we are determined to make sure that they do not do the kind of atrocities that they've managed so well in Syria, Iraq, Libya or Yemen."
One of the biggest challenges faced by his six-month-old government is corruption.
"It's a bottomless pit," acknowledges Ghani, a former World Bank official who has lived in the U.S.
"The good news is that it can be overcome. The bad news is that it requires an enormous amount of effort, determination and focus. And there'll be a lot of resistance to it," he tells NPR. Salaries are a main area of concern, as officials skim a take before paying employees. Technology may solve the problem. Paying salaries by phone would "clear the middleman," he says.
He's already gone after the Kabul Bank, "which was notorious," he says.
"It was a case of a fraud. From Day 1, it was established as a Ponzi scheme," Ghani says. An Afghan Supreme Court ruling last week has cleared the way to begin going after corrupt politicians and politically connected people implicated in the scheme "to get the depositors' money and use it for their own," he says. "[All] the books were fake. And we've tackled it," Ghani says.
Despite his reputation as a reformer, however, Ghani has not managed to avoid criticism. Some suggested that he's acting more like a dictator than a president — micromanaging the approval of contracts issued by the government. "I'm not taking power. I'm catalyzing systemic change. First you need to gather it in order to give it away in a credible and effective way," Ghani says.
"I'm too busy thinking about the larger issues to micromanage. All of my colleagues who've worked with me in the ministry of finance or other, they know I delegate," he says.

Video - Camera Spray before Meetings with Afghanistan Leaders at Camp David

With Military Parade, Pakistan Sends Message to India, Taliban


Today, Pakistan held its first military parade after a seven-year suspension due to “security concerns” amidst an escalating conflict with the Pakistani Taliban. The last parade was held on March 23, 2008 and reviewed by then-President Pervez Musharraf.
March 23 holds special importance in Pakistan. On that date in 1940, the All-India Muslim league adopted a resolution for the creation of “independent states” for Muslims in northwestern and eastern British India. The resolution was later interpreted to have been a specific call for the creation of Pakistan.
The March 23 parade is meant to illustrate Islamabad’s resolve, sending messages to both its nuclear-armed neighbor India and to Taliban extremists. “Pakistan is resolved to redeem its pledge given to its founding fathers that it will protect the homeland,” Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif emphasized in a statement.
This year, personnel from all three service branches, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, participated in the parade — including the army’s strategic command force, which administers Islamabad’s land-based nuclear weapons arsenal.
The parade featured nuclear-capable and conventional missiles, including Nasr, Shaheen, Ghauri, Babur, and Ghaznavi weapons systems, indigenously manufactured tanks  (such as the Al-Zarar,  and  Al-Khalid models), and  a squadron of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, a multi-role combat aircraft jointly developed by China and Pakistan.
Next to the regular army, air force, and navy units defiling past Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, President Mamnoon Hussain, army chief Raheel Sharif and other dignitaries, paramilitary forces (including the Frontier Corps and Pakistan Rangers) and the police also marched on the new Parade Ground, specifically built for this occasion near the Shakarparian hills in Islamabad.
A particular highlight was the flyover of Pakistan’s first locally manufactured armed UAV – the Burraq droneequipped with the laser-guided Barq missile, which was successfully tested for the first time on March 13, 2015.
The drone “will enormously help in the campaign against militants,” a government official said. Almost a third of Pakistan’s military is engaged in fighting Taliban extremists in the Af-Pak border region.
“I believe the Chinese helped Pakistan manufacture these drones, which fits into the pattern of this relationship,” a Western defense official notes in recent a Financial Times article.
However, notably absent from the parade ground was China’s President Xi Jinping, who officially had been invited in January this year. Many observers perceived that invitation to be Pakistan’s direct response to Barack Obama’s presence as “chief guest” at India’s Republic Day parade in New Delhi at the beginning of 2015.
Islamabad cited security reasons for  China’s declining the invitation. But even though Xi did not put in an appearance, “there will be plenty of China to see,” as the Western defense official put it.
Between 2010 to 2014, Pakistan was China’s top customers in military hardware. According to the Financial Times, Chinese defense technology constitutes the “ the bulk of Pakistan’s military arsenal.”
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi posted a conciliatory response to the recent display of Pakistan’s military prowess on Twitter: “It is my firm conviction that all outstanding issues can be resolved through bilateral dialogue in an atmosphere free from terror and violence.”
In an interview with The DiplomatPakistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Jalil Abbas Jilani, emphasized the importance of “trust building through continued dialogue and engagement,” including in Pakistan-India relations. Jilani also warned of the dangers of a “growing military imbalance in a region beset with long standing territorial conflicts.”

Pakistan: Ahmadi Muslim youth leader gunned down in Karachi was target of hateful wall-chalking

30 years old Ahmadi man reported killed in Karachi today was a reputable youth leader who may have been the target of a death threats campaign incited through wall-chalking in Model Colony in Malir Town.

A man very popular among his peers for his big heart and bravery, Noman Najam was the local president of the Rafa Ama chapter of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Youth Association (Majlis Khuddam-ul Ahmadiyya) in Malir town, Karachi.

Calling Najam "the source of our hope and living," his friends say he was a true Quranic representation of a 'legend'.

Najam was shot by unknown assailants who pumped 5 bullets into his chest while he worked at his place of business on Saturday evening (March 21) around 8:00 PM. Najam had died on the spot, it was reported.

It surfaced in the social media after the murder that a banned Islamist extremist group had reportedly sought the murder of Noman Najam on account of his Ahmadi Muslim faith.

Anti-Ahmadi wall-chalking and pamphleteering for inciting Ahmadi's murders is very common in many parts of Pakistan. Majlis Tahafuz Kham-e Nubuwwat (MTKN), a sanctuary for Islamists who are otherwise underground members of the banned Islamist outfits, leads in publishing anti-Ahmadi hate materials including hit-lists for targeting Ahmadis.

MTKN, which some claim operates like a mafia enterprise, is patronized by many religious, political and pseudo-academic personalities and groups.

Most recently, former judges, lawyers, and religio-political leaders associated with MTKN mafia have been at the forefront of defending Mumtaz Qadri, convicted killer of Punjab's governor, Sulmaan Taseer.

At their last conference in Lahore, MTKN mafia issued a warning to Ahmadis to 'abandon their faith or face consequences,' it was reported in Pakistani media.

According to a report published by The Express Tribune last month, a provincial lawmaker (MPA) from the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz group, Muhammad Ilyas Chinioti, was joined by 'three retired judges of superior courts including former Lahore High Court chief justice Khawaja Muhammad Sharif, former LHC judge Nazir Ahmed Ghazi (both counsel for Mumtaz Qadri) and former judge of the Federal Shariat Court Khalid Mahmood,' when the 'convert, or else' warnings were issues to the Ahmadis.

It is important also to note that the Karachi Ahmadi victim of Saturday's attack, Noman Najam, comes from a family where several men have been killed for their faith. His grandfather and two uncles were murdered in Gujranwala, Punjab, during the 1974 anti-Ahmadi riots which culminated in outlawing of the Ahmadi Muslim community to appease the extremists.
http://ahmadiyyatimes.blogspot.com/2015/03/pakistan-popular-ahmadi-youth-leader.html

Pakistan - The Worst Form Of Terrorism






Following the Youhanabad blasts in Lahore and the lynching of two men by a group of angry street protestors in the immediate aftermath, Chaudhry Nisar peeped his head out of from a window of the interior ministry’s ivory tower to declare that lynching was the worst form of terrorism, and that the perpetrators would be caught and punished. 

A short walk down the news cycle takes one to the November 4th lynching of a Christian couple in Kot Radha Kishan, where a young man and woman were burned in a kiln by an entire enraged community in an act of premeditated murder involving clerics, mosque loundspeakers, false charges, the blasphemy law and general intrigue. In classic form, after the painstakingly slow reactions from the notoriously lethargic Punjab Police, the Supreme Court in a March 9th hearing, expressed shock at the lack of results and hinted at a judicial inquiry to probe police inaction. A fortnight later, and the Punjab Police has come back with a fresh Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to look into the matter, and investigate the incident. A police report says that the new head of the JIT has been asked to ensure “good quality investigations.”
However, here is the thing: how can a police institution, suspected to be in tandem with (or at least protective of) the perpetrators and one so historically fraught with corruption, be expected to investigate an incident that involves many of its own? Why is the Supreme Court only threatening to, but not actually forming a judicial inquiry into the investigations, which have so far yielded nothing in terms of real results. Perhaps the sordid art of this crime has been the involvement of the sheer number of people, with 101 currently under arrest. It becomes difficult to sort through the web of suspects to get to the actual instigators. There are layers of crime here, from the man who raised the first accusation to the policeman who didn’t fire his gun into the air to force the crowd to disperse. The Punjab police is simply not equipped to handle a case of such severity and deliver justice, especially not on its own.

Pakistan - Campaign against ‘radical’ seminaries going nowhere










KALBE ALI 

Three months after the unveiling of the National Action Plan (NAP) and more than two months after Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan’s disclosure that perhaps 10 per cent of all madressahs were involved in terrorism, it appears that no government agency is ready to own the drive to identify these seminaries.
While the relevant officials in National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) and the interior ministry declined to comment on the issue officially, a senior Nacta official told Dawn off the record that the Ministry of Religious Affairs was the lead coordination agency for this effort.
Similarly, an official from the interior ministry, who too was only willing to comment on condition of anonymity, said that the interior secretary had asked the religious affairs secretary to coordinate with seminaries over three matters.

Religious affairs ministry reluctant to take the lead; seminary boards resisting attempts at regulation


“These three matters are source of financing and especially foreign funding, madressah registration and monitoring,” he added.
Whether or not the government is willing to acknowledge this officially, it cannot be denied that on the face of it, the only government department which has been involved in negotiating with the seminaries publicly is the religious affairs department.
Just a religious matter?
Religious Affairs Minister Sardar Muhammad Yousuf said that his ministry was focused on reforming the religious sector, streamlining madressah registration and facilitating the seminaries.
Officially, there is no news of the interior ministry or any of its departments having met representatives from the madressahs.
This means that government efforts vis-à-vis the seminaries are no different from past measures.
“We have held the meeting of the Madressah Education Board after 11 years and there is a proposal to establish an Islamic Education Commission on the lines of the HEC,” the minister said, adding, “These steps will correct the flaws in madressahs.”
Though the minister refused to explain what exactly he meant by “flaws”, he was adamant that the Ministry of Religious Affairs had nothing to do with terrorism or checking foreign funding to seminaries.
In his media statement on December 21, 2014 the interior minister had said, “Some 90 per cent of madressahs have no connection to terrorism – based on intelligence reports.”
By saying so, he implied that at least 10 per cent did have such links, which is the reason madressah reform was a major objective in the 20-point NAP.
A month later, on January 18, 2015, he reiterated, “The religious institutions are requested to cooperate with the government to identify potential terrorists.”
He also said that if there is any indication of any terrorist activity at a madressah, stern action will be taken immediately.
His words had the seminarians bristling, who threatened to launch a mass movement in case of a crackdown.
Subsequently, the interior ministry invited the five prominent Wafaq and the Jamaat-i-Islami to discuss the issue on December 30, 2014. However, at the last minute, the gathered clergy was told that the meeting would be chaired by the minister for Religious Affairs instead of Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan.
Since then, dialogue between the two sides has been no different from what happened under former president Pervez Musharraf and the PPP – bridging the gap between mainstream education and the madressah system.
But even this discussion has lost urgency as the frequency of meetings has decreased and the seminarians’ rhetoric about the consequences of these efforts has also reduced. In fact, the boards have already boycotted two meetings.
Financial questions?
It seems that like the interior ministry, the State Bank too is not interested in the nitty-gritty of shady transactions to the seminaries.
“The registration of seminaries will streamline all these issues as all madressahs will be required to have bank accounts and then, funding sources would be easy to trace,” a bank official said.
“There are two modes of legal money transfer – banking and exchange companies,” the official said, adding that the Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) of the finance ministry is responsible for checking any abnormal transfers. Following the announcement of NAP, the FMU is said to be working closely with the interior ministry.
But chances are that seminary donations do not use traditional banking methods to receive money – it is said that their donations come via ‘hundi/hawala’ or in cash, even from abroad.
The hundi/hawala cases come under the domain of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is also supposed to check the possible presence of money in the baggage of travellers at the airport, along with the Customs department.
There is little information of any special attention being paid to seminaries by these departments. The only ‘action’ being taken is the negotiation between the religious affairs ministry and a resentful body of madaris.
“We have said it before and we have said it now to this government too – we are not responsible for any terrorist, criminal or anti-social act of any individual affiliated with madressahs that are attached to us,” said Maulana Abdul Qudus, spokesperson for the Wafaqul Madaris al Arbia, the umbrella organisation that oversees most seminaries of the Deobandi sect in Pakistan.
“But people have even been booked for installing three loudspeakers, this is wrong.”
Similarly, Maulana Abdul Mustafa Hazarvi, Central Nazim-i-Aala, Tanzeemul Madaris Ahle Sunnat Pakistan – a Barelvi alliance – said that more than 7,000 clerics or mosque committee members had been arrested in Punjab on charges of reciting ‘Durood’ and ‘Salam’ before and after Azaan.
“After all this, the Punjab government on March 9 allowed the recitation of ‘durood’ and ‘salam’ along with Azaan,” he said, adding, “But no one took action against the terrorists – even the renegade cleric who has occupied a government mosque in Islamabad and continues to enjoy more rights compared to us, who have never been involved in any anti-state activity.”
Similar views were expressed by the office-bearers of Wafaqul Madaris al Shia, and Jamaat-i-Islami, who have repeatedly asked the interior minister to specify the names of madressahs involved in terrorism.
But the government has maintained silence.
It is hard to believe that the government has no proof. For instance, a report prepared by the special branch of Islamabad and Rawalpindi police identified seminaries that had close links with the TTP and could be used as bases for attacks.
But no action has ever been taken on basis of this report, which said that “well-trained terrorists, their leaders and commanders can also slip out of their hideouts in Fata and take shelter in the hilly areas of Abbotabad, Kakul, Nathia Gali, Murree, Aliot and Phagwari (Murree)”.
“It seems that the threat perception of the government is different,” said Amir Rana, director of the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, adding that “there is no clarity over the issue”.
And unfortunately, the dialogue over curriculum and new registration forms for the seminaries is also going nowhere.
This is because the unified forum of five prominent boards representing seminaries affiliated with Shia, Barelvi, Deobandi and the Ahle Hadith sects and one board attached with madressahs run by the Jamaat-i-Islami have many reservations about the government’s suggestions, including the establishment of the Madrassah Education Board – a semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
“The Wafaq does not trust the government,” said Khalid Rehman, director of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), adding that “if anything serious is not done, nothing will change.”


Pakistan Blocks Wordpress













Wordpress.com has been temporarily blocked in Pakistan. The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)has reportedly asked the Internet Service Providers across the nation to disable access to the site.
The reason for blocking the site hasn't been confirmed. However, a report in TechCrunch noted that when a Wordpress site is accessed in Pakistan, an error message saying "the content is prohibited for viewership from within Pakistan" pops up.
The country is known for its strict censorship of online content and sites, including Facebook, Flickr, IMDb, Twitter, and Wikipedia. Pakistan's ban on YouTube still exists. The reason cited for temporarily blocking or banning these sites is that the content these sources carry are blasphemous and inflammatory in nature.

    Local news sources in Pakistan have stated that the temporary ban on Wordpress could be lifted in a few days.