Monday, December 29, 2014

PAKISTAN’S ‘OTHER’ INSURGENTS FACE ISLAMIC STATE





By Karlos Zurutuza
The media tend to portray Balochistan as “troubled”, or “restive”, but it would be more accurate to say that there´s actually a war going on in this part of the world.
Balochistan is the land of the Baloch, who today see their land divided by the borders of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a vast swathe of land the size of France which boasts enormous deposits of gas, gold and copper, untapped sources of oil and uranium, as well as a thousand-kilometre coastline near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.
In August 1947, the Baloch from Pakistan declared independence, but nine months later the Pakistani army marched into Balochistan and annexed it, sparking an insurgency that has lasted, intermittently, to this day.
Now senior Baloch rebel commanders say that Islamabad is training Islamic State (IS) fighters in Pakistan´s southern province of Balochistan.
IPS met Baloch fighters at an undisclosed location in the Sarlat Mountains, a rocky massif, right on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and equidistant from two Taliban strongholds: Kandahar in south-eastern Afghanistan and Quetta in southwest Pakistan.
The fighters claimed to have marched for twelve hours from their camp to meet this IPS reporter.
They are four: Baloch Khan, commander of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and Mama, Hayder and Mohamed, his three escorts, who do not want to disclose their full names.
“This is an area of ​​high Taliban presence but they use their own routes and we stick to ours so we hardly ever come across them,” explains commander Khan, adding that he wants to make it clear from the beginning that the Baloch liberation movement is “at the antipodes of fundamentalism”.
“Today we speak of seven Baloch armed movements fighting for freedom but all share a common goal: independence for Balochistan,” says Khan. At 41, he has spent half of his life as a guerrilla fighter. “I joined as a student,” he recalls.
The senior commander refuses to disclose the number of fighters in the BLA’s ranks but he does say that they are deployed in 25 camps throughout “East Balochistan [under the control of Pakistan]”.
Khan admits parallelisms between his group and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), also a “secular group fighting for their national rights,” as he puts it
“We feel very close to the Kurds. One could say they are our cousins, and their land is also stolen by their neighbours,” says the commander, referring to the common origin of Baloch and Kurds, and the division of the latter into four states: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Historically a nomadic people, the Baloch have had a moderate vision of Islam. However, Khan accuses Islamabad of pushing the conflict into a sectarian one.
“Until 2000 not a single Shia was killed in Balochistan. Today Pakistan is funnelling all sorts of fundamentalist groups, many of them linked to the Taliban, into Balochistan, to quell the Baloch liberation movement,” claims the guerrilla fighter, adding that target killings and enforced disappearances are a common currency in his homeland.
The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, a group advocating peaceful protest founded by some of the families of the disappeared, puts the number of people from Balochistan since 2000 at more than 19,000, although exact figures are impossible to verify because no independent investigation has yet been conducted.
However, in August this year, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch called on Pakistan’s government “to stop the deplorable practice of state agencies abducting hundreds of people throughout the country without providing information about their fate or whereabouts.”
Baloch insurgent groups, however, have also been accused of murdering civilians. In August 2013, the BLA took responsibility for the killing of 13 people after the two buses they were travelling in were stopped by fighters in Mach area, about 50km (31 miles) south-east of the provincial capital, Quetta.
Pakistani officials said they were civilians returning home to Punjab to celebrate the end of Ramadan. Commander Khan shares another version:
“There were 40 people in two buses. We arrested and investigated 25 of them and we finally executed 13, all of whom belonged to the Pakistani Security Forces,” assures Khan, lamenting that a majority of the foreign media “relies solely on Pakistani government official sources.”
Could an independence referendum like the one held in Scotland possibly help to unlock the Baloch conflict? Khan looks sceptical:
“Before such a step, we´d need to settle down both the national and geographic borders as many parts of our land lie in Sindh and Punjab – the neighbouring provinces. Besides, there´s a growing number of settlers and the army is in full control of the country, election processes included,” the commander claims bluntly.
Instead of a consultation, the rebel fighter openly asks for a full intervention, “not just moral support but also a military and economic intervention.”
“The civilised world should support us, not Pakistan. Why help a country that is struggling to feed fundamentalist groups across the world?” asks the guerrilla commander before he and his men resume the long way back to their base.

Balochistan and beyond

The meeting with the BLA leader was only possible via Afghanistan, because Pakistan’s south-western province remains a “no go” area due to a veto enforced by Islamabad.
“The province has the worst record in Pakistan for journalists being killed so local journalists usually censor themselves to avoid being harassed, jailed or worse. Meanwhile, foreigner journalists are deported if they try to access the area,” Ahmed Rashid, a best-selling Pakistani writer and renowned Central Asia commentator, who was an activist on behalf of Balochistan in his youth, told IPS.
The visa ban over this reporter after working undercover in the region was no hurdle to get the viewpoint of Allah Nazar, commander in chief of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).
Through a satellite phone, this former medical doctor from Quetta corroborates commander Khan´s statements on a “common goal for the entire Baloch insurgency movement”. He also endorses the BLA commander´s analysis of Islamabad’s alleged backing of fundamentalist groups.
“Pakistan is breeding fundamentalists to counter the Baloch nationalist movement but it has entirely failed. Now they are trying to use the instrument of religion in order to distract attention from the Baloch freedom movement,” Nazar explains from an unspecified location in Makran – southern Balochistan province – where the BLF has its strongholds.
According to the movement´s leader, such threat could well transcend the boundaries of this inhospitable region. Commander Nazar gave the coordinates of “at least four training camps” where members of the Islamic State would reportedly be receiving instruction before being transferred to the Middle East:
“There´s one is in Makran, and another one in Wadh, 990 and 315 km south of Quetta respectively,” says the guerrilla fighter. “A third one is in the Mishk area of Zehri – 200 km south of Quetta – and there are more than 100 armed men there: Arabs, Pashtuns, Punjabis and others who are based there with the help of Sardar Sanaullah Zehri [a local tribal leader]. The fourth camp is near Chiltan, in Quetta.”
Nazar adds that Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) is “both activating and patronising the Islamic State.”
“The Islamic State is overwhelmingly present among us. They even throw pamphlets in our streets to advocate their view of Islam and get new recruits,” denounces Nazar.
In October 2014, six key Pakistani Taliban commanders, including the spokesman of Tehrik-e-Taliban – a Pakistan conglomerate of several Pakistani insurgent groups – announced their allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
“IS is simply an upgraded version of the Talibans and finds sympathy with the ruling establishment in Pakistan,” human rights activist Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur told IPS.
Talpur, who has been challenged and attacked repeatedly for writing about such uncomfortable issues for Islamabad, claims that creating the Taliban is “the core of state policy which has not yet given up on this megalomaniacal scheme of Islam ruling the world.”
Despite repeated calls and e-mails, Pakistani officials refused to talk to IPS. However, the issue is seemingly a well-known secret after the Minister of Interior himself, Nisar Ali Khan, recently told Parliament that even in the naval base in Karachi –Pakistan´s main port and commercial city – there is support for the activities of radical religious groups.

The Dangerous Drug-Funded Secret War Between Iran and Pakistan





By Umar Farooq
In the largely forgotten deserts of Baluchistan that straddle the Iran-Pakistan border, covert wars are underway that could have far reaching consequences.
Something fell out of the sky near Arif Saleem's home at 5:20 a.m. on November 25, 2013. He scrambled outside to find a 25-foot-wide crater just beyond the mud wall surrounding his family compound. The strike was one of three, in quick succession, that morning in the village of Kulahu, in Pakistani Baluchistan, 45 miles east of the Iran border. One of the blasts damaged the local mosque. Pages from the Qur’an fluttered in the air before landing gently on the rubble.  
The next day, Saleem made the 30-mile trip east to Turbat, the administrative center of his small district in southwestern Pakistan.  “They refused to register a case, saying the matter is out of their hands,” he told me.
With few legitimate industries or development assistance from the central government, Turbat is a derelict city prickling with militants.  Most of the area's inhabitants grind out a living as subsistence farmers or cross-border smugglers, shuttling everything from cement and diesel to Afghan opium between Pakistan and Iran. There are few paved roads, and at the airport, soldiers outnumber travelers. 
It is also the epicenter of a war being waged by the Shiite regime in Iran against a shadowy group of Sunni Baluch jihadists. 
Already involved in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and neighboring Iraq, Iran is now increasingly worried about the threat from Sunni militants on its eastern border with Pakistan, who get backing, it claims, from the United States and Saudi Arabia.  Although rarely mentioned in public, persuading Iran to budge on issues like its nuclear program may well depend on addressing what it now sees as a multi-faceted, global attack on it by Sunni jihadists.
On September 9, 2014, those jihadists detonated a massive car bomb at an Iranian military base near the border, clearing a path for 70 fighters to stream in.  According to a statement from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, reinforcements had to be helicoptered to the scene to end a three-and-a-half-hour gun battle, and the fighters fled across the border into Pakistan.  A few weeks later, the militants carried out a series of raids on border posts, killing five Iranian policemen.  The attacks were the latest in a long campaign of roadside explosions, suicide bombings at mosques, and gun attacks on security posts that have killed more than 600 Iranians, mostly civilians, since 2005. 
Across the entrance to the only functioning hotel in Turbat, the proprietor has strung a thick rope to slow down gunmen who may want to attack his patrons. The carpeting is worn, the furniture is falling apart, and the electricity is out for most of the day. Here, in a dilapidated room Saleem recounts the November blast. “Some buildings collapsed. Luckily, none of the kids were inside those.”
Clean-shaven and balding, Saleem is in his 40s and walks with a limp. He speaks in a whisper, flanked by the two locals who set up the meeting. They eye the door anxiously, convinced that at any moment, a Pakistani or Iranian intelligence officer will come barging in.
“The blast was so strong,” he said, “we thought the world was ending.” Saleem believes that the strike came from a nearby airbase across the Iranian border. Others, he recalls, heard the buzzing of Iranian drones.
He hesitates when I ask him about the target of the other missiles.  “I don’t even want to name him, he's not even from our area—but the missiles hit his homes.”
The man whose name Saleem is reluctant to utter is “Mullah Omar” (not to be confused with the Afghan Taliban leader of the same name).  A senior Iranian official in Pakistan later confirmed the strike took place, declining to elaborate.
An ethnic Baluch from Iran, this Mullah Omar helps lead a shadowy outfit called Jaish ul Adl, or the Army of Justice, whose fighters number fewer than 500.  He wasn’t on the premises when the strike hit, but it killed his 3-year-old grandniece, and injured other family members. Just a month earlier, Mullah Omar’s fighters had crossed into Iran and killed 16 Iranian soldiers.
The Kulahu strike was part of a widening covert war being waged by Iran inside Pakistan.  In the weeks following the September 9, 2014, car bombing at the Iranian base, Iran raided a village in the Pakistani district of Chagai.  According to Pakistani officials, Iranian soldiers, sometimes in helicopters and convoys, have chased militants deep into Pakistan on an almost weekly basis over the last year, sparking firefights and occasionally killing Pakistani soldiers.
Iran says the jihadists enjoy support not only from Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, but also from the Inter-Services Intelligence branch of the Pakistani military.
Pakistani officials say they are overwhelmed by internal security problems, and securing the border with Iran is not a top priority. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Sunni jihadists attacking Iran have deep ties with politically connected opium smugglers, men flush with billions of dollars who despise the Iranians for their own reasons.
Before it was split between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Baluchistan spread over an area slightly larger than California. The 650-mile Iran-Pakistan border drawn by the British in 1871 starts at the Arabian Sea, cutting through rugged mountains and dry riverbeds, into open desert at a point where the frontiers of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan touch.
The Baluch in Iran do not speak Farsi but Baluchi, just like the Baluch in Pakistan, and in Iran they are a Sunni minority.  Instead of the Western-style men’s apparel popular in Tehran, the Baluch in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province dress inshalwar kameez like their counterparts in Pakistan.  Many still have family on both sides of the border, and culture is not the only thing they have in common: the Baluch in Iran and Pakistan share a troubled, often violent, relationship with their rulers.
Iran says the jihadists enjoy support not only from Saudi Arabia and the CIA, but from Pakistan’s ISI.
Pakistan's province of Baluchistan, which accounts for nearly half of the country by area, is its poorest, least educated, and least developed region.  Sistan-Baluchistan, where most of Iran's Baluch live, lags behind the rest of Iran in almost every measure. Around half the Baluch in the province are unemployed, a result, say rights groups, of longstanding marginalization by Tehran. 
Under the Shah, Iranian Baluch children were banned from wearing shalwar kameez to school, and Baluchi language publications were blacklisted.  After the Iranian Revolution, discrimination took on a sectarian flavor. Riots broke out in 1994, after Iranian authorities replaced a Sunni mosque in Mashad with a development project.  Within a few years, Iran had jailed or driven from the country more than 60 Sunni clerics. Many of those clerics were welcomed into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where some now regularly appear on Arabic television networks, blasting the Shiite regime in Tehran. By the late 1990's, some Iranian Baluch had turned to militancy, couching their insurgency in a narrative of Sunnis fighting religious and ethnic discrimination at the hands of a Shiite theocracy.  
In the midst of this religious and political turmoil, drug trafficking thrives. More than 70 percent of the world's opium flows across the same border the jihadists do, and from the start, the traffickers and Baluch jihadists targeting Iran have cultivated a cozy relationship.
The Iranian strike in Kulahu in November, 2013, which is one of the best documented in this secretive war, was partly aimed at a compound in the village that has hosted jihadists since the 1990's, when an Iranian banker named Maula Bux Darakhshan formed Sipah-e-Rasul (or the Army of the Prophet).  Maula Bux (as he is called) mixed with the Afghan Taliban, and financed most of his work by trafficking poppy, according to a Salafi cleric who knew him personally.  Local journalists recall watching his fighters parade blindfolded Iranian soldiers through the streets of Kulahu in the back of Toyota Hilux pickup trucks. 
Mullah Omar, the Jaish ul Adl leader, got his start with Sipah-e-Rasul, where he and other fighters doubled as muscle for the trafficker, breaking associates out of Turbat's fortress-like prison. 
Maula Bux himself was killed in 2006, after being lured across the border by Iranian forces on the pretext of a drug deal.  But another, more powerful jihadi group already was emerging in Iran.
On December 14, 2005, gunmen ambushed the lead car in a motorcade carrying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on a tour of Sistan-Baluchistan, killing the driver and a bodyguard. Ahmadinejad escaped alive, but Tehran was rattled.
The attack was orchestrated by Abdelmalek Rigi, then age 22. Rigi's boyish, grinning face became the defining image of Baluch jihad in Iran. As a teenager, the Iranian-born Rigi had come across one of Iran's notorious public executions—eight young Baluch men strung up by cranes in public view—and he dated his militancy, in part, from that moment.  In 2007, he told Western media that his group aimed not to topple the Iranian regime, but to increase autonomy for Sistan-Baluchistan and shield minorities from Tehran’s “despotic religious rule, similar to Fascism or Nazism.” Within six months of the attempt on Ahmadinejad, Rigi’s group, Jundullah, pulled off several more brazen attacks on highways near the border, killing dozens of non-Baluch and taking Iranian Republican Guard officers hostage.
By the end of 2009, Jundullah suicide bombings had killed scores of Shiite worshippers at mosques in southeastern Iran and 42 people in Pishin, including the deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard ground forces. Fuming Iranian officials blamed the United States and United Kingdom for backing the militants, and Pakistan for inaction. A dozen Revolutionary Guards were caught deep inside Pakistan, tracking Rigi. In public, Pakistan denied Rigi was on its soil, but in private, authorities quickly moved to help the Iranians find him, focusing on the border near Turbat.
A 2008 Pakistani raid near Turbat turned up Abdolhamid Rigi, the brother of Abdelmalek Rigi. “Whatever used to happen in Iran, they would say it was because of Pakistan. But we did a lot, and the proof of that is that we handed over Abdolhamid Rigi,” said the then-Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik.  During two years in Iranian custody, Abdolhamid provided crucial details of how Jundullah operated.  On February 23, 2010, when Abdelmalek Rigi boarded a Kyrgyzstani passenger plane from Dubai to Bishkek, Iran had the flight diverted to Sharjah's airport, where the head of Jundullah was arrested.
Before executing Rigi in June 2010, Iranian television aired his “confession,” detailing how the West and Pakistan had supported Jundullah.  In his statement, Rigi named Naser Boledi as a main mediator between him and representatives of NATO.  Rigi said he met American handlers at bases in Afghanistan on trips arranged by Boledi and Yasin Ahwazi, an Iranian-Arab who lives in Europe. Both Boledi and Ahwazi have been prominent critics of Tehran for decades. Boledi, who lives in Sweden, laughs heartily when I call him to ask about his connections to Jundullah. He denies any link.
Outside of Iran, Rigi's “confession” seemed like another in the long tradition of statements extracted from prisoners there.  There was, however, some evidence the American intelligence community had sources inside Rigi's group, and some knew of Jundullah's intention to carry out attacks in Iran.
Part of a $400 million budget request for the CIA in 2007 included arecommendation to build ties with armed anti-Tehran groups like Jundullah.  Some in the intelligence community seem to have followed through on that plan.  According to an investigation by the New York Times, Thomas McHale, a detective with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, cultivated extensive contacts with Jundullah, starting in 2007.  McHale, who was assigned to the Newark, New Jersey, Joint Terrorism Task Force, which includes several state and Federal agencies and is supervised by the FBI. McHale passed his intelligence on to the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon, and his reports suggested he had known of Jundullah's intention to carry out attacks in Iran in advance, but it is unclear if he knew the details.  When the CIA began to suspect he was too close to Jundullah, it cut ties with McHale, but the FBI, and later the Pentagon, still sponsored half a dozen trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he met Jundullah members.  The relationship continued until late 2013, long after Jundullah was declared a terrorist organization by the State Department in 2010.
Shrubs and small trees dot a parched landscape along the road from Turbat to the border. Dust devils as tall as skyscrapers appear in the distance. Occasionally, green orchards of date palms emerge from the bleak horizon, a reminder of the region's once famous export.
Rugged, unmarked roads branch off, leading northwest through the Zamuran Hills to the Iranian frontier district of Sarawan, where Jaish ul Adl attacked the army base in September 2014.  Nestled in the hills are small market towns like Buleda, dominated by Baluch who make a living smuggling diesel and drugs.  Three years ago, Republican Guard soldiers came into the hills and killed a cleric accused of hosting Jundullah fighters.
“Iranian forces have long-term grievances with the people in the Pakistani border areas,” said Zahoor Buledi, a former provincial minister.  “They are always blaming us for abetting Jundullah, because Jundullah usually does its operations near these areas... Bombing and shelling are routine matters.”
Hundreds of families have left Zamuran because of the shelling, settling in places like Turbat, only to have the war follow them there too.
“Iran knows who lives in each and every house here,” one man in a Turbat mosque tells me. “They could come here, even to Turbat city, and take any of us and our government wouldn’t do anything.”
In a one-room home on the outskirts of town, a man named Abdullah speaks in a hushed voice as he recounts the disappearance of his 26-year-old son, Tanveer, in a Pakistani border town.  On January 11, 2013, four plainclothes soldiers in two Iranian trucks posed as diesel merchants and lured the young man into one of their vehicles. “When Tanveer realized what was happening, he jumped out of the truck, but the Iranians shot him,” Abdullah says.  “We got the body two weeks later.  They said they had the wrong Tanveer.”
At the Iranian Consulate in Quetta, ringed by multiple layers of giant sand bags to deter would-be suicide bombers, Syed Hasan Yehyavi offers tea, Turkish delight, and diplomatic words. “We have full confidence in the goodwill of Pakistan, our brothers and neighbors,” said the Consul General, “but we expect more help from Pakistani officials.”  He follows up with the now official line from Tehran, that Jaish ul Adl is being backed by the CIA, Saudi Arabia and “regional” powers – a nod to the ISI.
Mosques and madrassas run by Salafi Baluch, some of whom are financed and have studied in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, have sprung up in the region surrounding Turbat in the last decade, leading some to believe funding might be channeled through them to groups like Jaish ul Adl. 
Pakistani security officials offer a more nuanced explanation. Khan Wasey, the spokesman for the Frontier Corps, a Pakistani paramilitary force tasked with securing the border, claims there are no real Jaish ul Adl basesin Baluchistan.  He says his troops work to stop smugglers and jihadists, “but there are other forces at play.”
Indeed, more than 55,000 Pakistani troops are in Baluchistan waging a war of their own. For the last nine years, they have battled secular Baluch nationalists who would like to see an independent Baluchistan.  The Baluch militants blame a Punjabi-dominated military for profiting from the extensive natural gas, gold, and copper deposits that should have made the province the wealthiest in the country. The fighting goes on along the same dusty back roads used by Jaish ul Adl militants moving into Iran, but it’s apparent that they’re not the main enemy for those Pakistani government troops, and they exploit the disorder for their own ends. 
The Jaish ul Adl compound in Kulahu sits on a route where three Baluch separatist groups and at least one alleged government-backed death-squad have set up their own checkpoints; bribes ease the flow of diesel and opium here, even though Iran has constructed hundreds of kilometers of walls and trenches along the border.
Local police officials like Bashir Brohi, Turbat's soft-spoken, well-manicured police chief, think Jaish ul Adl is probably able to fund its activities through drug smuggling and conceded ”the government's writ basically ends at the city lines” of Turbat.
His latest target has been Hajji Hassan, a Baluch drug lord who fled Iran and settled in Turbat in 2000.  Hajji Hassan is legendary here.  Back in Iran, he once got word that the Iranians were going to raid a village where his men were stationed. “When the soldiers entered a valley, Hajji Hassan's men opened fire, killing more than 50 of them,” one of the kingpin’s neighbors tells me. “After that, he had to leave Iran.”
Hajji Hassan lives in Turbat's Overseas Colony, a hamlet for the city's elite whose imposing mansions covered in glazed tiles strike a jarring contrast with the traditional mud-walled homes in the city.  Many of the bosses living here, who dominate a multi-billion-dollar-a-year drug trafficking industry along the border, are Iranian Baluch in exile, and thought to finance groups like Jaish ul Adl. Locals close to Hajji Hassan say he has hosted Jundullah's leadership, including Abdelmalek Rigi, in the past, and may be hosting Mullah Omar's fighters as well. 
That sort of reputation seems to have tipped the Iranians to ask Police Chief Brohi and the Frontier Corps to search in the Overseas Colony for five soldiers Jaish ul Adl kidnapped in February, 2013, in the Overseas Colony. A series of raids earlier this year turned up dozens of Tanzanians, Nigerians, and Yemenis, and Iranians, too, kept as human collateral in global drug deals, but no soldiers.  Four of the five soldiers Jaish ul Adl kidnapped were eventually found in Iran, near the Zamuran hills, and released after the mediation of an Iranian Baluch cleric.
Pakistani officials point to that exchange as proof Jaish ul Adl has no presence in their country, but some are still convinced the ISI is grooming the militants indirectly, by supporting the drug kingpins who finance them.
For officials like Brohi, pursuing the drug traffickers in Turbat would mean crossing a political minefield. One of the drug world's most notorious traffickers also hails from Turbat, and enjoys the support of the ruling provincial party.  Imam Bheel, as locals call him, was added to a list of worldwide traffickers subject to US sanctions in 2009.  His son, Yaqoob Bizenjo, served as a member of the National Assembly until 2013. 
With all the internal security problems plaguing this corner of Baluchistan, it seems unlikely Pakistan will crack down on groups like Jaish ul Adl, or the drug kingpins funding them, any time soon.
Rigi used to couch Jundullah's aims in terms of an ethnic minority fighting for autonomy within a federalized Iranian state. Mullah Omar and his other successors, by contrast, have relied on the kind of polemical Shiite-Sunni rhetoric used by the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or ISIS, in Syria and Iraq.
When Jaish ul Adl took five Iranian border guards hostage in February 2013, its demand in exchange for their release included the freeing of 300 Sunni prisoners, some of whom it claimed were being held in Syria. An attack last year that killed 16 Iranian soldiers was publicized as a “response to crimes of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria.”
The group puts out most of its statements—on its Twitter feed, or its numerous websites—in Arabic, as opposed to Baluchi or Farsi.  The outlets giving these pronouncements the most airtime are Arabic news stations in the Gulf.  The group also has admirers in Pakistan.
“In Iran, Sunnis are not allowed to build mosques; their mosques are destroyed, their rights are taken away,” says Ramzan Mengal, provincial head of the Ahle Sunnah Wa Al Jamah party, which has been accused of targeting Shiites in Pakistan for decades.  Two policemen guard the door to his rundown madrassa on the outskirts of Quetta, protection provided to him, he says, because “Iranian agents” have gunned down eleven Sunni clerics in the city. Jundullah and Jaish ul Adl sprang up “in reaction to that kind of oppression,” he said.  “They started as small groups that are big thorns in Iran's side now.”
“The Syrian war is having its effects here as well,” said Yehyavi, the Iranian Consul General in Quetta.  “People want to paint this as a [global] sectarian war.”  Yehyavi and other Iranian officials worry Jaish ul Adl might become a globally-connected group, drawing support from the same forces backing the Islamic State in Syria.
Rights activists like Boledi, the Iranian Baluch dissident living in Sweden, harbor some of the same concerns.  As a well-known advocate for Baluch rights in Iran, young Iranians reach out to him for advice.  “I've had the same cell phone number for 15 years, so occasionally I do get calls from these militants,” he said.  “I tell them, we are Muslims, but we are not looking for some new Islamic government.  I tell them you are not what the Baluch want.” 

Pakistan - Where is the will to implement National Action Plan?






It is not the time to slow down

While the army is fighting the TTP related terrorists with commitment, the PML-N government seems to lack the will to implement its much publicised National Action Plan. Political parties had accepted some of the provisions in the document despite their principled opposition to them because the government seemed to be serious in putting an end to terrorism and extremism. In case it is seen to be wavering or neglecting some of the agreed measures, the national consensus may not sustain long.
The NAP specifically denounces “sectarianism, extremism and intolerance” and promises immediate steps against the spread of terrorism on the social media. It advocates leaving no space for terrorism in Punjab. It claims that decisive action is being taken against elements that spread sectarianism. Despite all the rhetoric on the part of the PM extremists continue to indulge in acts that violate the NAP.
A case was registered against the controversial Lal Masjid cleric for threatening civil society members of suicide bombers when they called for his arrest. Subsequently warrants for his arrest were issued by a court. The defiant cleric has however refused to seek bail or offer arrest which amounts to challenging the writ of the state. How will the government cleanse the 10 per cent of seminaries, which number thousands, when it is reluctant to force a single cleric to abide by law?
The media continues to be used to spread hatred leading to terrorist acts. Last Monday in a programme telecast by a private TV channel, Ahmadis were declared to be the enemies of Pakistan. It seems PEMRA has decided to continue to close its eyes to acts of the sort as before. Three days later an Ahmadi leader was killed in Gujranwala. During last year Punjab registered the highest number of killings of the Ahmadis as the extremist preachers were given a free hand in the province. If the government continues to ignore the incidents, the NAP would soon be dead as a dodo.

Dying concerns: Five newborn deaths recorded in Sargodha










Five more neo-natal deaths were reported at the District Headquarters (DHQ) Hospital in Sargodha due to a combination of factors including hospital negligence, as well as lack of intensive care unit facilities and life-saving equipment.
The infant fatality count has gone up to 75 during the last 40 days at the hospital whereas mortality of children was recorded 2,237 during the last two years.
However, Executive District Officer (EDO) Health Dr Muhammad Nazeer Nikokara told The Express Tribune “The five children’s deaths did not occur at once but they died during the last 48 hours after getting intensive care treatment.”
A number of enraged relatives of the children tried to attack the doctors and paramedical staff. Medical Superintendent the hospital Dr Iqbal Sami was suspended following the deaths.
Talking to The Express Tribune, an official at the hospital, acknowledged that there was an acute shortage of doctors, medical officers and other staff at DHQ Hospital.
Most of the medical specialists do not give enough time to the hospital, because some of them have their own clinics while others are working in private hospitals.
The nursery of the DHQ hospital has 25 beds and five incubators but they are always overcrowded and there is also shortage of incubators and oxygen gas cylinders for all the admitted infants.
When contacted, DHQ Hospital spokesman Dr Sikandar Warraich told The Express Tribuneon Sunday, “The additional block of the DHQ Hospital Sargodha, which is attached to the medical college, is confronted with the acute shortage of the medical officers, female medical officers, nursing staff and other paramedics.”

Pakistan - Year-end Tragedy

After the massacre in Peshawar on Dec. 16th, which left over a hundred schoolchildren dead, the country’s foremost analysts have painstakingly tried to pinpoint both historical and recent reasons that led to the carnage. It is a complicated, rather convoluted exercise with a great web of interconnected triggers. And though there is rarely a single reason for such tragedies, there are some that can be narrowed down. The fatal shooting of a young Ahmadi man Luqman Ahad Shehzad is one such incident.
In 1974, the Constitution was amended to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim. Going a step further, it became a crime for Ahmadis to pose as Muslim or “offend” a Muslim’s feelings. Since then, there have been scores of incidents of violence against Ahmadis, with attacks in Ahmadi mosques in May 2010 alone leading to 86 deaths. This year, 11 Ahmadis have been brutally killed for the crime of being Ahmadi alone, notably in July, by a mob that took the lives of two children and a woman. Perhaps what is even worse than the amendment to the ’74 Constitution are platforms that allow for its constant publicity. As though it wasn’t bad enough that countless Muslim clerics across the breadth of the country get to scream their violent opinions from their pulpits, now they get prime-time slots on popular television shows hosted by a particular brand of extremist showman.
In 2008, a show hosted by Aamir Liaqat featured Muslim scholars who declared Ahmadis to be Wajib-ul-Qatl, or deserving of murder. Within a day of the show being aired, two Ahmadis were murdered; one of them a physician and the other a community leader. Aamir Liaqat took no responsibility for the attack, and as the public is wont to do, the incident was soon forgotten; buried beneath a tirade of other controversies and a ridiculous brand of entertainment almost exclusive to Pakistan. Last Monday, this same man hosted a show featuring a notable Muslim cleric Syed Arif Shah Owaisi who strongly denounced Ahmadis and accused the Ahmadi community of blaspheming against the Prophet (pbuh) of Islam. Five days later, Luqman Shehzad, a leader of the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya (JA) was shot in the back of the head. It is impossible not to draw a correlation for the second time.
Why are these violence preaching clerics allowed on television at all? Why are show-hosts who stand so exposed one controversy after another, not held accountable for the tragedies that unfold in the name of their entertaining? Why are they granted dignity and treated with respect and position? Who edits these shows, and why has there been no apology for this editorial disaster? The year ends with yet another tragedy, because as we fight a war against terrorism on all physical fronts, we cannot recognise the place where it truly roosts.

Genocide Of Pakistani Ahmedi community: ''An open letter to Geo TV''

By Kashif N Chaudhry











You remember well that the last time your host Mr Amir Liaquat promoted anti-Ahmedi hate speech on your forum in September of 2008, two prominent Ahmedi leaders were gunned down within 48 hours.


Dear Geo TV, I did not think I would be writing this letter to you just days after picking up the heavy coffins of over 100 innocent children in Peshawar. But here I am writing this letter in pain and disappointment. I am pained by your callous disregard for the peace and life of fellow minority communities in Pakistan. And I am disappointed at your persistent refusal to own and apologise for your irresponsible — and that is putting it lightly — broadcasting.

You have done it again. Yet another murder (a third) after your forum was used by hate preachers to incite violence against Pakistan’s Ahmedi community. Let me put things in historical perspective for you.

You know well that the Ahmedis played a very prominent role in the creation of Pakistan alongside Jinnah, and its subsequent growth thereafter. I do not wish to detail these services here. You have probably heard of Mr Abdul Rahim Dard, the Ahmedi Imam who convinced Jinnah to return to India after he had moved to London. Sir Zafarullah Khan, Pakistan’s first foreign minister and author of the famous Pakistan Resolution was also an Ahmedi. Dr Abdus Salam, Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad, General Akhtar Malik, General Abdul Ali Malik and General Iftikhar Janjua are only a few of numerous Ahmedis who have given all they had for the betterment of Pakistan. Even after being severely ostracised today, Ahmedis continue to pray for Pakistan on all forums.

On the other hand, it is also well known that most hardline clerics, e.g. those belonging to the Ahrar party and the Jamaat-e-Islami vehemently opposed Jinnah and his struggle. When they failed to stop Jinnah’s dream from materialising, they turned to hurt the newly found state by continuing to fight Jinnah’s vision of a pluralistic, tolerant and inclusive state. They sowed the seeds of sectarian hatred and the religious divide. After much resilience, they were finally successful in hijacking the Quaid’s vision. Today’s Pakistan is, unfortunately, rife with discrimination, sectarian hatred, intolerance and violence. The Constitution itself encourages such discrimination by ascribing its Ahmedi citizens a lower class, unfit to even enjoy the basic right of freedom to self-identify.

Almost 70 years after the realisation of Pakistan, we are now starting to realise the bad choices we made along the way. Some of us have started admitting, for once, that sectarian hatred is at the core of our extremism problem. The prime minister’s recently formulated action plan to combat terrorism in the country addresses this concern. The plan encompasses taking measures to stop religious extremism and protect minorities, and promises prosecution of elements spreading sectarian violence in society.

Unfortunately, you, Geo TV, are part of the problem in this important dynamic. Recently, on Mr Amir Liaquat’s morning show, Subh-e-Pakistan, a panel of clerics accused Pakistan’s peaceful and patriotic Ahmedi community of backing terrorism in the country. Deflecting blame from the real terrorists, the Taliban apologists pinned the blame of the Peshawar attack squarely on the Ahmedis, the same Ahmedis who have endured multiple attacks from the Taliban themselves. Ahmedis were labelled “Jewish agents”, blasphemers of Islam and traitors of Pakistan by cleric Syed Arif Shah Owaisi. Demonising the already ostracised Ahmedis, the panel urged Muslims to unite against and fight this “enemy” of Pakistan and Islam.

Mr Amir Liaquat nodded in agreement and led the audience in a most cheerful applause to these remarks instead of realising that this hatemongering is exactly why Pakistan is in the mess it is in today. You remember well that the last time your host Mr Amir Liaquat promoted anti-Ahmedi hate speech on your forum in September of 2008, two prominent Ahmedi leaders were gunned down within 48 hours. You, Geo TV, never apologised back then. Nor did your anchor Mr Liaquat despite your clear roles in the incitement of this anti-Ahmedi violence.

Six years later, you have done it again in 2014. Yet another murder has taken place after your public instigation. Probably out of concern for the peace of Pakistan, someone took the advice on your forum seriously and decided to fight the state’s ‘enemy’ on their own. A 27-year-old Ahmedi man lost his life when he was gunned down in Gujranwala.

You had blood on your hands back in 2008. You have blood on your hands this time again. And it is now time that you clean it off, once and for all.

We are not waiting for more dead bodies to pile up — God forbid — in the wake of this inflammatory and provocative broadcasting. This time, we will not be silent witness to continued attacks on a patriotic and already ostracised Pakistani community through your forum. It is time that you should be held accountable for this instigation of hate and murder.

Responsible Pakistani citizens are protesting against your role in abetting sectarian violence. An online petition calling on the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority (PEMRA) to hold you accountable has already gathered over 5,000 signatures in just under 24 hours. The hashtags #AmirLiaquatSpreadsViolence and #ArrestAmirLiaquat have trended all over Pakistan on social media. We, the civil society of Pakistan, demand that you publicly apologise for your role in this madness and take steps to ensure that hatemongers are not allowed to further their bigotry through your forum ever again. We also demand that you fire Amir Liaquat Hussain immediately.

Unless this is done, we will continue to call on regulatory bodies such as PEMRA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), OfCom, etc. to take note of your continued provocation to attacks on religious minorities since 2008. We will also call on the state to hold you and Mr Hussain accountable under PPC 153(a) and Section eight of ATA 97 for fanning the flames of sectarian hatred at such a volatile time when the state is trying to make its choice between interfaith harmony and religious bigotry finally clear.

Geo, do the right thing. Listen to Pakistan’s civil society. Stop Mr Liaquat and yourself from hurting Jinnah’s vision. Clean your bloodied hands. Now.

Pakistan - Another Ahmedi dead








It is another sad day for Pakistan. After all the hullabaloo and loud noises that have recently been made in the aftermath of the Peshawar school attack about overcoming the spectre of extremism and hate, yet another Ahmedi has been gunned down in the kind of crime that has become all too common: killing someone because of their faith. On Saturday, 27-year-old Luqman Ahmad Shahzad, a leader of the minority Ahmedi community in Gujranwala was shot in the back of the head — a truly cowardly act — on the way to his farm. As usual in such circumstances, the perpetrators have gotten away and it seems unlikely they will be caught. This attack comes just five days after the bigoted Amir Liaquat once again allowed anti-Ahmedi vitriol to be spewed on the show he hosts on a private television channel. The Ahmedi community was labelled the “enemy” of Pakistan by three Islamic ‘scholars’ followed by much clapping and nodding by Mr Liaquat and the people in attendance. Now we have the dead body of an Ahmedi male in the aftermath of this provocation. This is not the first time Amir Liaquat has instigated Pakistanis against the Ahmedi community; he did it once before in 2008 and two Ahmedis were killed immediately after. While one cannot say with any real evidence that the killings were in response to the television personality’s warped sense of entertainment and religion — the killing of Ahmedis has become a regular travesty — there are too many coincidences. Why this hatemonger is still allowed airtime is a question that defies all logic.

Much is being said about the government’s National Action Plan in the wake of the massacre of scores of school children in Peshawar, a plan that promises, among other things, to curb the belligerent spread of hate speech. What transpires on Mr Liaquat’s show from time to time is the kind of hate speech that has had devastating effects. It is the kind of instigation that moves people to murder, endangers an already ostracised community and encourages the spread of extremism and terrorism. Something must be done about this and soon. We have just seen our precious children mercilessly gunned down by the Taliban in Peshawar and Amir Liaquat is back to his old tricks. The much touted action plan against terrorism must block the transmission of this man’s show to let the people know that it is serious about beating back the terror threat. We have had enough of people like Mr Liaquat, we have had enough of seeing our minorities being killed because of their faith. Enough.

Pakistan - Zamrud Khan pays tribute to Shaheed Mohterma Benazir Bhutto

http://mediacellppp.wordpress.com/

27dec14 Liaqat Bagh Highlites+Zamurd Khans speech by abbasnaqvi5













Activists and workers of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Rawalpindi chapter, on Saturday paid glowing tributes to the former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto for her services to the cause of democracy in the country.
Addressing the participants of the rally, PPP leader Zamarud Khan said that Benazir was alive in the hearts and the minds of the people.
“She was a leader of international stature who laid down her life for the supremacy of the constitution and democracy in Pakistan,” he said.
Khan said the day Bhutto was assassinated, was the darkest in the history of the country.
“If Bhutto was alive, Pakistan would have joined the league of developed countries,” he said.
Khan said they would pursue the mission of Benazir Bhutto till their last breath and would never succumb to the pressure of the anti-democratic forces that wanted to destroy the institutions of the country.
Zamrud Khan maintained that the party wanted to root out extremism from the country and raise a voice for the voiceless people.
“Ms Bhutto sacrificed her life for the country and democracy. The PPP will take revenge from terrorists for killing innocent children in Peshawar,” he said.

Asif Ali Zardari - Musharraf with other elements conspiring against Sindh govt

http://ppppunjab.wordpress.com/







Dunya news- Pervez Musharraf trying to weaken... by dunyanews






Co-Chairman PPP former President Asif Ali Zardari has asked democratic political parties to take notice of the attempts to de-stabilize the provincial government of Sindh by some elements. In a statement the PPP Co-Chairman said that the Party had reasons to believe that former dictator General (r ) Pervez Musharraf was hobnobbing with some elements to de-stabilize the provincial government. Spokesperson Senator Farhatullah Babar said that the PPP Co-Chairman also warned that the PPP will never permit any such attempt to succeed. Mr. Asif Ali Zardari also said that the PPP was a united political force and those seeking to topple the present provincial government through horse trading will not succeed in their designs.

On Saturday, the PPP co-chairman had blamed the former military ruler Pervez Musharraf for the upward spiral of militant violence in the country. “Had he [Musharraf] taken notice of the October 18, 2007 terror attack on PPP workers and launched an operation against terrorists, the Peshawar tragedy could have been averted,” he added.



“Although he [Musharraf] is on bail, he is engaged in politics with the army’s help,” Zardari said. “If the army wants to use him in politics, then we are ready to face him the way we faced military dictators since General Ziaul Haq’s era.”