Tuesday, March 16, 2021

Biden’s Options in Afghanistan - The United States and Pakistan must work together to secure the country’s future.

BY ANNE PATTERSON, ALI JEHANGIR SIDDIQUI, SYED MOHAMMAD ALI
In a deal signed with the Taliban in February 2020, the United States agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by May this year. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden is trying to stick to this peace deal, but it is faced with some difficult challenges as violence remains high and little progress has been made on intra-Afghan talks.
In order to make an American withdrawal more feasible and not entirely abandon the U.S.-Taliban agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has put forward a revised peace plan with an interim power sharing formula and a proposal to involve key countries in the region. Developments over these coming weeks will determine whether the Biden administration can stick to the withdrawal deadline. It is clear, however, after 20 years that no government in Afghanistan can succeed without Taliban participation and that no peace process in Afghanistan can succeed without Pakistan’s full support.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States were all instrumental in helping the Afghans repel the Soviets from Afghanistan and bring the Cold War to a close. However, Afghanistan was torn apart by bloody infighting after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The chaos allowed al Qaeda to flourish and its leader, Osama bin Laden, to carry out his global terrorist agenda. Heroin flowed out to neighboring countries, particularly Iran. When the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, the group managed to curb opium production, but their rule was ruthlessly repressive, particularly of women. While conflict lessened, India and Iran continued to engage in proxy wars against the Taliban. When the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused to hand over Bin Laden to the United States, it took only two months to overthrow the Taliban. They were far from defeated, however.
For the next two decades, the relationship of the United States and Pakistan has been dominated by the situation in Afghanistan and often plagued by animosity and accusations of duplicity. Americans were furious that Pakistanis would not crack down on Taliban hideouts within Pakistan, particularly the notorious Haqqani network, and Americans argued that safe havens in Pakistan prevented an U.S. military victory in Afghanistan. Americans wrongly believed that their billions of dollars in coalition support funds to the Pakistan military would buy them sufficient influence to secure the United States’ strategic goals.
But soon the Americans were accusing Pakistan of not doing enough to crack down on its own terrorist problem. In turn, Pakistan saw the ongoing debates in the United States about troop levels, the swings in violence, and factionalism in Kabul as evidence that U.S. policy was unpredictable and risked expanding the war theatre into Pakistan. If the Taliban were going to be there in the end anyway, Pakistan had a compulsion to continue engaging with them.
Pakistan’s leadership has consistently argued that its inability to go after the Afghan Taliban seeking refuge on its soil was not a matter of will, but of capacity. Pakistan’s military was simultaneously contending with an increasingly hostile India and a lingering insurgent threat in the province of Balochistan, which it suspected was fueled by India. Moreover, although Pakistan retains leverage over the Taliban, pushing the group harder could have driven it even closer to other countries which also built relations with it after the U.S. invasion.
From a Pakistani perspective, the United States made two fundamental mistakes: the first was not to differentiate between al Qaeda and the Taliban; and the second was the United States’ decision to bar the Taliban from the government formation process after the Bonn Agreement in 2001 which sought to reestablish government institutions after the U.S. invasion. In the past year, Pakistan has been the key player in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. With the U.S. withdrawal agreement at risk, Pakistan will now be expected to pressure the Taliban to comply with its commitments. But the truth is that every day that a political settlement is delayed, Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban is eroded.
The peace process is fragile, and the Afghan army and NATO forces are still fighting the Taliban. Although no U.S. forces have been targeted recently, a breakdown of the peace talks risks a spike in attacks against Americans, which will further complicate the U.S. withdrawal. Lingering destabilization within Afghanistan would lead to a deterioration of Pakistan’s internal security situation and spur another wave of Afghan refugees. Pakistan still has an estimated 2.5 million Afghan refugees within its borders; a stable Afghanistan would give them the option of finally returning home. Renewed instability in Afghanistan would bring violence to Pakistan’s border towns and eliminate any prospects of bilateral trade.
In recent years, Pakistan has made progress against its domestic terrorist threat and avoided unification of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. Importantly, Pakistan’s security establishment has also continued to upgrade its nuclear command and control processes and improved the country’s Nuclear Safety Index rankings.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/16/afghanistan-future-peace-talks-biden-united-states-pakistan/

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