(Pakistan's Interior Minister) - ''A dangerous approach''

By M AMIR RANA

PAKISTAN'S RULING PARTY SUPPORTS TALIBAN.

ARE we still too naive to determine our enemy?

Certainly not, but only if we have common sense and we keep our eyes wide open.

We must also keep in mind that the enemy is non-traditional, in the sense that it does not only want to encroach on our physical spaces, but also ideological, social, cultural and political ones, in order to disrupt the social fabric.

This enemy is more dangerous because it is internal; it lives within us and can hurt us from within.

It can poison our thinking slowly, without being noticed.

It wants to impose certain religious, ideological and social agendas against the collective will and order of the people.

It employs violence to achieve its goals.

Sometimes it only incites violence and creates an enabling environment for its violent ideological brothers.

The state has to take constitutional, legal and security measures to deal with its enemies.

But when our state functionaries appear to have lost the ability to recognise the enemy within us, it can be inferred that the enemy has accomplished its job.

Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan’s refusal to classify sectarian organisations as terrorist groups — apparently to justify his controversial meeting with the leader of a banned group — reflects deep-rooted sectarian and ideological ambiguities that persist in state institutions as well as in the minds of our leaders.

A flawed threat perception does not distinguish between a religious scholar and a sectarian leader. This newspaper has deconstructed his argument very well in its editorial and rightly pointed out that this is not a centuries-old dispute, as suggested by the minister, but that extremist violence in the subcontinent and especially in Pakistan is directly linked with the growth of the sectarian groups and institutions in the 1980s.

These groups have developed a sectarian hate discourse in Pakistan.

The militant landscape in Pakistan is very much sectarian in nature; sectarian tendencies flow like blood through the veins of religiously inspired extremism and militancy. All local and foreign terrorist organisations such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the militant Islamic State (IS) group follow sectarian agendas at varying levels.

The Afghan Taliban recognise sectarian differences and support sectarian outfits both in Afghanistan and Pakistan but avoid using the concept as a political tool because it could hurt their movement in Afghanistan.

While Al Qaeda has used sectarian groups as strategic allies in the region, IS has an even more aggressive sectarian agenda.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remained close to the Punjabi Taliban, Jundullah, and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi; all these groups take pride in their sectarian credentials.

The TTP’s splinter Jamaatul Ahrar also has strong sectarian credentials.

Overall, under the influence of Al Qaeda and IS, sectarian and jihadist groups underwent a radical transformation into global jihadist entities.

From where such groups draw their human resource is no secret.

Given this background, flawed threat perceptions on the part of the state are likely to adversely affect its approach to countering extremism and terrorism.

A flawed threat perception is our real enemy and it is based on certain stereotypes that many state functionaries also appear to believe.

These notions do not distinguish between a religious scholar and a sectarian leader.

This weak threat perception has failed to grasp the political dynamics of sectarian violence in Pakistan.

Many of the banned sectarian organisations wear political hats and have been taking part in electoral politics, whether under different names, through independent candidates or through alliances with mainstream political parties.

Using these tactics, these groups gained political legitimacy.

The six religious parties that comprised the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) — a political alliance that ruled two provinces after their 2002 electoral success — included the banned Tehreek-i-Jafaria Pakistan, whereas the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan was an ally of the Pervez Musharraf-led PML-Q government.

Both the TJP and SSP — now known as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat — have promoted sectarian hatred and intolerance.

Although the political dimension of sectarianism may have become deeply rooted in Pakistan’s political culture, the fact is that point 18 of the 20-point National Action Plan refers to countering sectarianism.

Meanwhile, points three, five, seven and 15 — that are about measures to deal with banned organisations, hate speech and counter extremism — also touch upon the issue of reining in sectarian groups.

Interestingly, in his Senate remarks, the interior minister also mentioned the 142 meetings on counterterrorism and security that he presided over during the past three-and-a-half years; in addition to these, 44 meetings were held at Prime Minister House.

What he did not mention, however, was the outcome of these meetings, especially the progress so far on curbing sectarianism in the country. Apart from political considerations, sheer lethargy is to blame for the lack of solutions to the problem of sectarianism. There are best practices that could have been followed to forge sectarian and religious harmony in the country. The frameworks for the reintegration of militants have also not been applied.

Most importantly, the government has not availed itself of the existing options for dismantling or reintegration of sectarian groups. Informed circles claim that a major sectarian group has offered to abandon all its sectarian activities and publicly announce and guarantee that no one will raise slogans against any other sects from their platform.

In return, the party has demanded from the government political rights to form a national political party.

It was learnt that a few other organisations from other sects also welcomed the idea and were ready to issue similar declarations. The government neither took this offer seriously nor tried to bring these groups under the complete rule of law.

The real crisis is that the government is not confident enough to use the options it has to deal with the menace of terrorism, sectarianism, and extremism.

It is afraid of the word ‘religion’ and confuses it with religious groups of different types.

The security establishment is taking strong action against those who have switched sides and declared war on the state.

On the other hand, the government has even surrendered its authority to regulate the institutions of religious education.