Optimism is in short supply on Afghanistan these days

Shaukat Qadir

A fresh round of peace talks on Afghanistan are to begin soon. Meanwhile, representatives from Pakistan, China and the US met the Afghan leadership a few weeks ago to settle on the way forward. The fact that no decisions made by the four principal countries involved has been made public might be good news – but only if it means that no stone will be left unturned to find the way forward.

Recently I’ve felt optimistic about a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, but I must admit that I am beginning to lose my optimism and despite not wanting to hold any single participant to blame, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to centre on America.

In the case of Pakistan it seemed, until early last year, that the US policy was ambivalent because of its desire to keep China encircled. Of late though, it appears that the US is again supportive of Pakistani efforts to improve its security situation.

However, there seems to be no reason for the US not to do everything possible to ensure peace and stability, and yet it has not.

A year ago some of us, while speculating on ISIL infiltrating this region, explained why it was unlikely to be successful in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. After learning of the death of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammed Omar, I dwelt on the necessity for urgency in dealing with this more insidious threat, but too late, due to splintering Taliban ranks.

Then ISIL captured Kunduz. Admittedly, it was retaken but while attempting to do so American planes bombed a hospital staffed by their own people, killing doctors and patients.

I explained that the logistic route to northern Afghanistan lies through territories where only the Haqqani Network could interdict them and, therefore, it was even more imperative that Haqqanis were included in peace talks.

On Pakistan’s insistence, Haqqani was represented during the meeting in Islamabad. Sensing the reluctance of the invitation to Islamabad, Haqqani sent fairly insignificant representatives. But that too could have been treated as a beginning; to open more doors to them. Apparently that did not suit Kabul and Washington.

Now the Taliban has taken Sangin. Once again Afghan troops are struggling to recapture it. This might be more difficult to recapture merely due to its location and terrain.

I repeat myself again. The Afghan Taliban were splintering but Mullah Omar’s death splintered them further. As a consequence, an ideal opportunity was created. If Afghan security forces could, like the Pakistani forces, conquer the Taliban speedily, then do so. If not, then begin negotiations immediately; while the Taliban are still in a position of weakness. But again nothing happened.

As many of us predicted, inactivity was bound to strengthen ISIL. Continued bad governance, a weakened economy, and widening cracks in Taliban ranks created opportunities which it has filled.

As in Syria, the moment ISIL capture sufficient space, they will create a mini-state. In the politico-economic state which exists in Afghanistan, it will be impossible then to prevent ISIL ranks from swelling further.

It is immaterial that ISIL might reveal its uglier side far sooner than the Taliban did in 1996.

Pakistan is considerably better off economically and in terms of the established capability of its security forces. But if ISIL becomes a force to reckon with in Afghanistan, Pakistan will be the most directly affected neighbour. If that happens, all that has been gained in the last two years could be lost in as many months.

And make no mistake, ISIL leaders are at least as wise as the Taliban, maybe even far wilier.

They timed their operations very well. Spring is upon us to open this year’s campaign season and it begins with Afghan troops attempting to retake Sangin. However insignificant Sangin might be in comparison to Kunduz, but over a hundred British soldiers died unsuccessfully defending it.

Ashraf Ghani has a very tenuous hold over his National Unity government. Far more tenuous than the wilier Hamid Karzai had when he began his first term – only because he was more shrewd. While Mr Karzai strengthened his hold, at least over Kabul and its surroundings, with every passing month, Mr Ghani has been weakened further.

Admittedly, Mr Ghani’s weakening has been partially due to events beyond his control and partially due to efforts of those deliberately undermining his authority. But his failure to demonstrate an attempt to end corruption and deliver good governance is also contributing to his weakening political hold.

By comparison, Pakistan is doing fairly well in its attempt to stage an economic recovery. Good governance might still be out of reach but the decision of security forces to take on corruption along with terrorism has helped improve the domestic scene.

But, only by comparison. We are far from being out of the quicksand we were getting sucked into.