Can Turkey be ISIL’s next stage?

Aydoğan Vatandaş 

The twin bombing in Ankara, which left at least 97 Turkish citizens dead at a peace rally last week, triggered questions about the capacity of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and whether it could mobilize the masses for further and bigger purposes while Turkey is on the way to another national election due on Nov. 1. 

To answer this question, one should examine the ideology of ISIL as well as whether the “Salafi religious order” or “denomination” has any ground or impact on Turkish religious identity.

Another question that should be asked is whether the current Turkish government, which is controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his close circle, has any vulnerability in combatting ISIL ideology, religious interpretations and terrorism.

It is true that after Sept. 11, the word Salafism and its relation to violence have received a broad range of scholarly attention, particularly in Western academia, and there are numerous different definitions of Salafism. But in sum, Salafi ideology and its interpretation of Islam is actually based on the idea of purifying Islam by ignoring the entire tradition that came after the Umayyad Dynasty.

Therefore, it is safe to claim that in the early 19th century right after the Wahhabi riots on the Arabian Peninsula, Salafism recreated the conflict between Mu'awiyah and Ali, taking sides with Mu'awiyah and aimed to resurrect the Umayyad Dynasty by claiming it to be the only genuine Islamic state in history.

By relying on Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), who was a staunch opponent of any teachings other than core Islamic sources, they ignored the tradition of philosophy, Sufism and metaphysics and initiated a very strict and narrow interpretation of Islam by ignoring even traditional Sunnism. Any other applications and interpretations of Islam were left out, ignored and even accused of apostasy. Because of that, in the literature, Salafi ideology is also known as Takfirism or Takfiri ideology.

Now the question is whether Salafism has any roots in Turkey or not. Can Turkey be the next stage for ISIL?

By taking into account the influence of Wahhabi thinkers on the emergence of intellectual Salafism, which also triggered the emergence of Islamism as an ideology, it is safe to say that this linkage also found a way to reach political Islam in many Muslim countries including Turkey. An important indication of the vulnerability of the Turkish government in ideologically combatting Salafi ideology and ISIL is that Salafism has already found room in theology faculties.

In a 2013 Al Monitor article titled “A Salafi Assault on Turkish Theology?” author Mustafa Akyol wrote that the decision of Turkey's Higher Education Board (YÖK) to eliminate some secular courses such as philosophy in theology faculties might be an indication of a Salafi influence in the Justice and Development (AKP) government.

After writing his critical piece about the AKP's decision, Akyol has since written that he has received dozens of emails from concerned professors and other lecturers in Turkey's theology faculties. They were all disturbed, if not outraged, by YÖK's decision. One of them argued: “This decision will limit the theology graduates' ability to grasp secular society and open their way to be influenced by the Wahhabi/Salafi strain of thought. It also represents a return to the dogmatic madrassa system of the era of decline, which only saw tafseer [Quranic exegesis], fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] and hadith as necessary sciences. This change in the curriculum will make Islamic horizons more narrow and more shallow.”

Another professor of theology similarly argued that this new curriculum was tantamount “to disabling critical thinking … and opening the way to Salafi-style thinking.”

On the other hand, is it just a coincidence that thousands of police officers, of which many were experts in Salafi terrorism, were expelled from the police department in the last two years?

Turkish security establishment vulnerable to Salafi terrorism

Although we don't know whether it is a coincidence or not, it is obvious that the Turkish security establishment is more vulnerable to Salafi terrorism than ever.

Is it just a coincidence that while Erdoğan's government provides new room and opportunities for Salafi ideology in Turkey, he is trying to close the most successful schools in Turkey, which are considered the antidote of radicalism all over the world? President Erdoğan was also accused of sending arms to ISIL in January 2014. The prosecutors and military personnel who documented this illegal activity of the Turkish government were jailed.

Is it a coincidence that all social, political and religious groups which ideologically and intellectually oppose the Salafi ideology or ISIL are also demonized by the Turkish government?

Thus, it is safe to predict that the Turkish government has no power to ideologically or intellectually combat ISIL, while the Salafi interpretation of Islam has already found room in the Turkish state establishment.

Unfortunately, we don't have empirical data or surveys that could provide the Salafi population of Turkey. A 2013 survey conducted by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs provides some data about the denominational background of Turkish society. The data indicate that 77.5 percent of Turkish Muslims identify themselves as Hanafi Muslims. The Hanafi School is known as one of the four major “schools of law” in Islamic tradition, which is also known as considerably moderate and liberal. However, the survey provides very limited information about the preferences of the other 22.5 percent of the population.

I personally believe that the researchers had a chance to measure the Salafi influence in Turkish society if they had asked the right questions but they intentionally did not.

Turkey is on the edge of the biggest political and social turmoil in its history. During these turbulent times, ISIL is trying to gain power on the ground especially in some rural areas of middle Anatolia.

After 13 years of power, the AKP is not capable of representing the majority of Turkish people. The party lost its majority in the June general election and it's very likely that they will face a similar result in the next election on Nov. 1.

President Erdoğan's obsession not to accept that reality deepens the tension and polarization in Turkish society. Some even believe that the government is intentionally increasing the tension to give them a reason to postpone the elections. If the tension and polarization would cause societal unrest, ISIL would do its best to gain some power on the ground and mobilize some segments of society.

The obvious fact is that they have already started it.

If a new government emerges after the next election and the intelligence and security establishment could be reorganized, ISIL won't be able to achieve any of its goals in Turkey.