Pakistan does a North Korea, openly brandishes its nuclear weapons

By Seema Sirohi

At the recent Carnegie Conference on Nuclear Policy, Pakistan openly brandished its nuclear weapons, advertised its bellicose intentions and generally sounded more like North Korea than a maturing nuclear power.

The full-throated cry of frustration had a purpose—to put hurdles in the way of India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) because it would be yet another sign that the international community accepts India’s nuclear programme for special treatment but not Pakistan’s.

Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who has overseen Pakistan’s nuclear programme for more than 15 years and is still involved as an adviser, was in full flow, spinning scenarios and issuing warnings to India from what is arguably the most prestigious international platform on matters nuclear. You have the eyes and the ears of hundreds of western experts, government officials and budding scholars. In short, it is the best place, especially for countries with a highly questionable nuclear past, to muddy the waters and raise straw men. And he did both.

Kidwai faced no push back from the moderator as he built his case on what was essentially fiction. He said “Cold Start” was the reason for a Pakistan gone wild and for piling up an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Pakistan has also developed “full-spectrum deterrence” and is working towards a second-strike capability to counter India, he helpfully informed the audience.

Frankly, he should have been stopped in his tracks because “Cold Start” is not Indian policy. The political leadership never embraced it and the last one heard the Indian armed forces were firmly under the command of the elected government. Cold Start was an “idea” of a quick and limited conventional strike against Pakistan with the narrow aim to deny Islamabad the ability to raise things to a nuclear level. Indian generals, frustrated after the army’s mobilisation on the border in response to the ISI-supported Lashkar-e-Taiba’s attack on the Indian Parliament in 2002, had floated the idea but it was never adopted.

A principal recommendation of Cold Start was to move the Indian Army closer to the border. This never happened. The fact is whatever India does or doesn’t do, the Pakistani army will conjure up clouds of paranoia to justify its strategy. It is this imagination that is behind Pakistan’s rush to build TNWs. Tactical nukes are deemed highly destabilising because they are small and to be effective on the battlefield, they must be distributed to lower-level officers. The more diffused the command and control, the more likelihood of mistakes and escalation in the fog of war. The mechanics of deploying TNWs are tricky at best but Kidwai dismissed questions on command and control as “lesser issues.” Then he added Pakistan’s nuclear policy is one of “ambiguity.”

The nuclear gurus must ponder if “ambiguity” gives them confidence or bolsters “transparency” or marks an improvement from the days of AQ Khan when Pakistan was found proliferating nuclear technology from Libya to Iran.

Yet, Kidwai kept up the charade that Pakistan is the victim. In fact, he argued his TNWs had made “war less likely” because they would make India “think twice, ten times” before attacking Pakistan. If India still doesn’t get scared, “MAD (mutually assured destruction) will come into play.” He boastfully told India to keep in mind Pakistan’s “complete inventory.”

If it weren’t the Carnegie nuclear conference, one might be forgiven for thinking Kidwai was doing what today’s teenagers call “drama.” The climax of the drama: You gave India a nuclear deal but now don’t allow India to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group — the anticipated next step stemming from the 2008 Indo-US agreement— or Pakistan will go madder.

Blackmail? It sure sounded like it. Kidwai wants India’s entry into the NSG to be “criteria-based” because that would allow Pakistan to enter at some later date if it meets those criteria. It shouldn’t be a special favour for India. This demand is nothing but a giant ruse.

It is designed to tickle and press into service the same non-proliferation hardliners in the United States and Europe who initially opposed the India-US nuclear deal. They still have grievances against India and putting hurdles in India’s path to NSG membership has their attention.

But let’s go along and see how a “criteria-based” approach might develop. Here are some questions: Keeping in mind Pakistan’s record of proliferating nuclear technology to the likes to North Korea just a decade ago, what should be the period of punishment? Or should bad behaviour be incentivised?

Is outwards proliferation the same as inwards proliferation? Is bravado as displayed by Kidwai the same as transparency? Western observers tend to confuse braggadocio with facts without a shred of verification. Do statements like Kidwai’s help build strategic stability?

How about a criterion that no one with a jihadist mindset should ever get close to nuclear weapons? How can this ever be ascertained? Sorry, but Kidwai’s word is no good after insider attacks on Pakistan’s naval base and army headquarters. US experts are well aware of the penetration of Pakistan’s armed forces.

Another criterion could be determining the “motive” to enter the NSG. Is it prestige and parity as in Pakistan’s case or accessing technology as in India’s case? How about a criterion on the end-game: the country in question must give up revisionist tendencies.

And while the experts are at it, they can also examine the dangers of a country conducting terrorist attacks under a nuclear umbrella. That should certainly mean “No Admission” or shouldn’t it?