De-radicalisation programme for North Waziristan IDPs

Dr Fawad Kaiser

While efforts to tackle polarisation are likely to have a positive long-term impact on radicalisation, their success will be inhibited if they are conducted through the lens of security

A total of 570 terrorists and 34 security forces personnel have been killed since Operation Zarb-e-Azb began. Around one million internally displaced persons (IDPs), belonging to 90,750 families, have been registered since the beginning of the operation. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif has said, “Now that their command and communication infrastructure has been disrupted, we will never allow them to return.” In my view, simply referring to the risk of violence and terrorism is not enough to justify the plight and the fear these IDPs will have when they are being rehabilitated. Intervening in this non-violent or pre-violent radicalisation phase with a robust de-radicalisation programme is necessary. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), in consultation with other institutions, can develop a national de-radicalisation screening programme to help counter terrorism and extremism in this cohort. A national de-radicalisation programme can then be implemented for people who are found to be vulnerable to extremism and need to be rehabilitated and reintegrated in society.

Such de-radicalisation programmes aim to discover whether rehabilitative forms of counter ideology can be used on Islamist extremists and terrorists in order to de-radicalise them and prevent them from committing acts of terrorism. In the 10 years following the 9/11 attacks of 2001, similar schemes were set up in almost every country where extremism became a problem, from the Far East to Europe. Some were lavishly funded, others poorly resourced. Based on classic criminal rehabilitation programmes, most involve a mix of vocational training and counselling, with a religious component designed to challenge the single narrative of Islamic extremism. They have been lauded by policymakers, counterterrorism experts and pundits as a critical part of the campaign to defend states and societies against militancy.

Notwithstanding the difficulties IDPs are going through, virtue ethics gives clear moral justification for programmes to prevent or stop radicalisation, provided that the programmes focus on developing participants’ capabilities to define and live their own good life. This justification for programmes that prevent radicalisation, or are aimed to stop a radicalisation process, poses constraints on the types of programmes that should be developed and the way participants are selected. Because the quest for a good life is a struggle for all human beings, it might not be stigmatising to point to a specific group that needs guidance or support. It needs to be carefully considered whether specific groups are targeted but, in principle, programmes should be open for every person in the camps.

De-radicalisation seeks to reverse the radicalisation process for those already or partly radicalised or help them to disengage with radical or extreme groups, whether or not they change their ideas. As a result, it tends to work. The unique approach of the de-radicalisation programme among IDPs can bring together social work with civic education in order to disentangle the individual’s sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world, and help in tackling both the factors driving their anger and also re-educating them in the ways of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing and answering their concerns. The programme can talk them through a ‘hierarchy of needs’: first is self-responsibility and leaving violence, and second is leaving the ideology. Both are important but if you attack the ideology first, you leave the individual with nothing and no sense of meaning or worth. In a very few, the programme cases have been in danger of failing because they were too quick to focus on ideology. This is the key issue. De-radicalisation does not take place in a vacuum.

One of the reasons for the disappointment of the on-going intelligence and police led de-radicalisation programme in Pakistan is that, when released, its subjects return directly to villages in areas where support for the Taliban insurgents is strong. Even if individuals are convinced by what they have heard during the programme, they have to be very brave men to go back to their community and start saying that everyone else is wrong. Critically, research analysis shows that de-radicalisation screening and rehabilitation programmes work best when an insurgency or an extremist movement is losing. However, most agree that projects need a mixture of those with direct experience alongside professionals with other skills, such as psychologists, social workers and mental health practitioners. This blended approach brings a more holistic response. For ethical reasons, it is also important that the programme obtains consent from the participants and continues to provide financial and rehabilitative support for families even if they decide not to take part in this programme, as exposure may have harmful effects on them by opening up old wounds.

While efforts to tackle polarisation are likely to have a positive long-term impact on radicalisation, their success will be inhibited if they are conducted through the lens of security. This immediately reinforces the uneven power dynamic between government and army, which can hamper efforts at partnership and risk leaving communities more marginalised and fragile rather than empowered and included. Governments must also be mindful of who engages IDPs on counter-polarisation work. Heavy involvement of the army and intelligence agencies in integration work, for example, is not only inappropriate but reinforces suspicions on the part of communities that they are under surveillance and undermines government messages about “partnership”. Broadly speaking, the essential question is whether the objective of these programmes should be disengagement i.e. a change in behaviour or de-radicalisation, meaning a change in beliefs.

Counter-radicalisation efforts seek to tackle divisions, grievances, narratives and means, and de-radicalisation projects should aim at influencing both cognitive and behavioural aspects. Current de-radicalisation programmes focus largely on the ideological factor seeking to de-radicalise programme participants through disputation of the content of terrorist groups’ doctrines and religious interpretations. The process through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is intent towards, or support for, violence requires being stopped. Programmes for IDPs can be directed against identified individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

Governments play an important role in this regard in setting the policy framework, providing funding and addressing structural issues but communities also need to play their part for the overall approach to be successful. The government can sometimes struggle to conduct community-level intervention work at the local level, so there needs to be a partnership approach. Civil society responses in this regard will often occur in the normal pattern of every day life and interactions, rather than specific projects or interventions but it requires communities to be equipped to play this role and have established intergenerational relationships. There is also a role for frontline workers such as teachers, doctors, social workers and mental health professionals to offer support and further help.