BY now, it has become apparent that neither is the PML-N government particularly good at explaining what it does, nor does it seem to be too concerned about its lack of necessary communication with the public it represents. But that does not mean that opaque decisions taken by the PML-N are not of great significance to the public and more should not be done to induce its leadership to explain controversial decisions. With little warning and absolutely no debate, at least in public, the PML-N has opted to invoke Article 245 of the Constitution to give the army the maximal legal space to operate in the federal capital. But what has triggered the need for army-led operations at this point in the capital? Neither the generic — unspecified security threats — nor the specific — blowback from Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan — that has been offered so far is nearly close to being adequate.
The questions are plentiful and serious. Why is only Islamabad specifically among all the cities and towns of Pakistan under the type of threat that requires such a dramatic escalation? Compared to the civilian law-enforcement and intelligence resources in many parts of the country, Islamabad surely has civilian resources that are reasonable. If the capital’s civilian resources are still inadequate, what has the PML-N done after 14 months of being in charge of Islamabad and nearly a year since a lone gunman humiliated the city’s law-enforcement apparatus by parading before TV cameras for hours near parliament? And what of the PML-N’s recent plan to draft in Rangers and special police squads from Punjab who can be seen patrolling the streets of Islamabad even now? Has the PML-N failed to protect Islamabad or has the threat escalated even further? There are few answers to be had at the moment, particularly since the once-again-active interior minister is loath to answer questions and the prime minister is on an extended summer break.
Yet, there is another dimension to the army-in-Islamabad question that simply cannot be avoided in the circumstances: the politics of the PTI’s rally in Islamabad on Aug 14. Like it or not — and it is difficult to see how politicians such as the PML-N can boast of in its upper ranks can ignore the obvious — the political narrative surrounding the invocation of Article 245 for Islamabad will entail speculation about whether the PML-N is trying to pull the army close and use it as a buffer between itself and the charging PTI. Whether the speculation is true or not, surely, at the very least, the PML-N ought to have been more forthcoming about the size, scope and duration of the army deployment and the specific responsibilities it would have. Else, there is just speculation of politics trumping security.
Sunday, July 27, 2014
Pakistan's Mini Martial Law: A controversial move
BY now, it has become apparent that neither is the PML-N government particularly good at explaining what it does, nor does it seem to be too concerned about its lack of necessary communication with the public it represents. But that does not mean that opaque decisions taken by the PML-N are not of great significance to the public and more should not be done to induce its leadership to explain controversial decisions. With little warning and absolutely no debate, at least in public, the PML-N has opted to invoke Article 245 of the Constitution to give the army the maximal legal space to operate in the federal capital. But what has triggered the need for army-led operations at this point in the capital? Neither the generic — unspecified security threats — nor the specific — blowback from Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan — that has been offered so far is nearly close to being adequate.
The questions are plentiful and serious. Why is only Islamabad specifically among all the cities and towns of Pakistan under the type of threat that requires such a dramatic escalation? Compared to the civilian law-enforcement and intelligence resources in many parts of the country, Islamabad surely has civilian resources that are reasonable. If the capital’s civilian resources are still inadequate, what has the PML-N done after 14 months of being in charge of Islamabad and nearly a year since a lone gunman humiliated the city’s law-enforcement apparatus by parading before TV cameras for hours near parliament? And what of the PML-N’s recent plan to draft in Rangers and special police squads from Punjab who can be seen patrolling the streets of Islamabad even now? Has the PML-N failed to protect Islamabad or has the threat escalated even further? There are few answers to be had at the moment, particularly since the once-again-active interior minister is loath to answer questions and the prime minister is on an extended summer break.
Yet, there is another dimension to the army-in-Islamabad question that simply cannot be avoided in the circumstances: the politics of the PTI’s rally in Islamabad on Aug 14. Like it or not — and it is difficult to see how politicians such as the PML-N can boast of in its upper ranks can ignore the obvious — the political narrative surrounding the invocation of Article 245 for Islamabad will entail speculation about whether the PML-N is trying to pull the army close and use it as a buffer between itself and the charging PTI. Whether the speculation is true or not, surely, at the very least, the PML-N ought to have been more forthcoming about the size, scope and duration of the army deployment and the specific responsibilities it would have. Else, there is just speculation of politics trumping security.
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